New Zealand & Australia: Divergence in International Relations

With Reference to the Howard & Clark Governments

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A thesis submitted to
Victoria University of Wellington
in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in International Relations

5 October 2007
Abstract

This thesis is an in-depth study into the New Zealand-Australian relationship and the two nations’ divergence in International Relations, with particular reference to the disparate foreign and security policies implemented under the Howard and Clark Governments from 1996/1999 respectively until the present time in 2007. The purpose of this study is to provide an accurate and up-to-date overview of the New Zealand-Australian relationship as it stands today, and to define the main areas of difference between the two countries which are driving trans-Tasman divergence in the international sphere. In pursuit of this goal, the subject-area is explored in the following ways.

Chapter One provides a general overview of the trans-Tasman relationship, reflecting specifically on three abiding dynamics which together have contributed to the ‘strangeness’ of the trans-Tasman rapport from the mid-1800s until today. Chapter Two, defines in fuller detail the greatest areas of divergence between the two countries in their foreign and security policies, and then additionally outlines three important issues in the international sphere on which the Tasman pair have diverged most strikingly in recent years. Chapters Three to Five introduce and explore three areas of fundamental difference between the Tasman pair in their International Relations, considered here to be driving factors behind the trans-Tasman divide – namely, different beliefs and approaches towards multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States. Finally, Chapters Six and Seven explore three contemporary theories attempting to explain New Zealand and Australia’s divergence in International Relations today.

There are three main arguments throughout this thesis: first, that New Zealand and Australia are becoming increasingly divergent in their foreign affairs; second, that this divergence is primarily due to the fact that the two countries are fundamentally different in their views and approaches towards three crucial areas within international politics – multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States; and thirdly, that these differences in view and approach, and the divergent policies they produce, in turn arise chiefly from completely disparate senses of national identity in the two Tasman countries, which motivate differing – and sometimes conflicting – foreign policy behaviour.

These three arguments are explored and expounded in the following ways. With regard to the first argument, Chapter Two provides an in-depth overview of the most important areas of divergence between New Zealand and Australia since 1999. As to the second argument, Chapters Three to Five employ a case study based on discourse analysis into New Zealand and Australian governmental speeches on the 2002-2003 Iraq Crisis – an issue that inherently involved these three fundamental areas of difference – in order to specify precisely how New Zealand and Australia diverge in their view and approach to these three matters based on the two Governments’ own self-proffered statements and explanations. These disparate beliefs are then shown to translate into divergent actions and foreign policy behaviour on the
world stage, by substantiating such rhetorical statements with evidence taken from the Howard and Clark Governments’ foreign policy record, as documented in governmental documents as well as in political and academic literature. Finally, with regard to the third argument, Chapters Six and Seven involve a discussion and critique of two rather convincing orthodox explanations for trans-Tasman divergence – Hugh White’s ‘Strategic Perception’ and David McCraw’s ‘Divergent Political Ideologies’, as well as a summary and broad application of one new theoretical explanation, called ‘Identity Theory’, to New Zealand and Australia’s foreign policy record, in order to show that it is indeed identity-based explanations, when combined with other strategic and political factors, that in fact provide the most accurate, comprehensive and insightful explanation for New Zealand and Australia’s divergent behaviour in the international sphere from the time of Federation in 1901 until today in 2007.

This thesis makes the following conclusions: first, that it is fundamentally different beliefs in regard to multilateralism, the use of force and relations with the United States which are driving the ‘continental drift’ between New Zealand and Australia, through motivating disparate policies and conflicting behaviour by the Tasman pair in their international affairs, as shown during the 2003 Iraq Crisis; secondly, that these dissimilar beliefs regarding the three matters stem in turn from deeply-rooted foreign policy traditions within New Zealand and Australia’s own core national identity, namely traditions of independence, idealism and multilateralism in New Zealand, and independence, realism and alliances in Australia; and thirdly, that it is in fact national identity – encompassing national beliefs, traditions and ideas of what the nation stands for and is destined to become – that can best explain nation-state behaviour and actions on the world stage today.

It is hoped that the research undertaken in this thesis will not only contribute to the new wave of academic literature attempting to describe and explain the differences between New Zealand and Australia in our foreign affairs today in 2007, but also add to the growing consensus in the constructivist academic world that identity-based explanations are crucial for understanding foreign affairs.

In my own view, I believe that it is indeed identity theory, when combined with elements of disparate strategic perception and predominant governmental political ideology advocated by White and McCraw, which together present the best and most wide-ranging means of understanding the complex realities of International Relations today.
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Introduction

Nearly forty years ago, when New Zealand stood at the crossroads following Britain’s membership in the EEC, the then New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs gave a series of speeches that emphasized the point that “the time has come for New Zealand to recognize that our relationship with Australia is more important to us than our links with any other country in the world…It has to be the cornerstone of New Zealand’s external policies” (Talboys, cited in McMillan, 1980, p. 166). This same notion is still being voiced today, as a speech given by Winston Peters, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs recently illustrated. “New Zealand’s relationship with Australia is unique, and it is the cornerstone of our foreign policy”, he said. “In many ways the strength of our foreign policy depends on this bond” (Peters, 2006a). Nevertheless, despite this kind of rhetoric, the fact remains that New Zealand and Australia have been drifting apart politically for quite some time.

Back in 2001, for instance, Gerald Hensley, a high profile former diplomat and Secretary of Defence, concluded the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs (NZIIA) conference by remarking on a prevailing atmosphere of pessimism among the academics and politicians participating in the proceedings on the topic of ’New Zealand and Australia: Where are we going?’. “Politically the two nations are in fact on different courses and are drifting apart,” he stated (Hensley, 2001, p. 95). According to Max Bradford, moreover, a former NZ Minister of Defence and Member of Parliament, the Australia-New Zealand relationship is not only drifting apart, but doing so rapidly. As he states: “certainly there are more factors pushing us apart than are pulling us together at any time since I have been in politics, or in business before I entered Parliament” (Bradford, 2001, p. 27). Academic Bob Catley likewise argues the two nations are diverging, and attributes the blame to the rise to power of the Clark Labour governments since 1999, under whose leadership, he states, the process of steadily-increasing integration between the two countries in defence, migration and economic liberalisation has been most drastically reversed (Catley, 2001, p. 18).

The disparity between these two Antipodean nations is particularly prevalent in the realm of security. Bradford describes defence as New Zealand’s “most important single
difference with Australia”, and one that has become not only the biggest source of friction and dispute between the two countries and a real source of grievance to Australians, but that has also contributed substantially to the deterioration of Australia-New Zealand relations – even though “both countries know neither can do without the other” (Bradford, 2001, p. 27). As David Dickens, a former Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand has likewise concluded: “the ANZAC strategic relationship is drifting apart” (Dickens, 2001, p. 50).

Today in 2007 too, despite the Clark Government’s continual assertion that New Zealand’s closest relationship is with Australia in every sense, and that Australia remains New Zealand’s most important defence ally (Kennedy, 2002), the political and military gap between the Tasman nations has continued to widen and ‘reverse continental drift’ seems the order of the day. The divergence in foreign and security policy has become so obvious, in fact, that Helen Clark herself has been known to remark on several occasions that New Zealand and Australia are “embarked on fundamentally different directions and the cultures of our two countries are moving further apart. The way our nations view the world and our place in it is also diverging” (Clark, in Hawke, 2006).

More dire have been the statements made by Allan Hawke, the former Australian High Commissioner, who warned forebodingly that the relationship is “in crisis” (Hawke, 2004a). “The relationship we have taken so much for granted is at risk,” he states (Hawke, 2004a):

we now stand on the cusp – our future relationship is anything but certain…
the Anzac relationship is finely poised on the fulcrum. It can go one way or the other – in defence, in trade, in every way. That assessment will underpin my three year term here as High Commissioner (Hawke, 2006).

If ominous tidings such as these have not resulted in alarm on the southern side of the Tasman, it has at least generated a great deal of interest about New Zealand-Australian relations, especially as globalisation heightens awareness of the differences in both countries (Patman, 2001). This is especially the case in the academic community and among the policy-making ‘movers and shakers’ of New Zealand’s political world. Firstly, a number of attempts have been made to account for the way New Zealand and
Australia have diverged from each other in the past three and a half decades and to ascertain what exactly is driving these differences between us. In 2001, for instance, the 36th Otago Foreign Policy School discussed the subject of ‘New Zealand – Australia Relations: Moving Together or Drifting Apart?’ which was followed by two seminars on the same theme arranged by the Wellington NZIIA as well as the Stout Centre and Institute of Policy Studies (Keith, 2001).

Secondly, calls have been made for a greater push to ameliorate the trans-Tasman relationship arising from several quarters of New Zealand’s academic and diplomatic community. In 2002, for example, participants at a Australian Historical Association conference called for “Closer Intellectual Relations” (CIR) between the trans-Tasman literary community in order to enhance and deepen understanding of the trans-Tasman relationship through “the rehabilitation of that ‘repressed memory’ in our joint pasts – Australasia – air-brushed out of both historiographies” (Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). Similarly in 2005 both the New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and two contributors of the ‘Anzac Neighbours Project’ called for increased academic research to provide more knowledge about “the mosaic of connections” between New Zealand and Australia, in order that the level of trans-Tasman commentary might be raised and popular attitudes towards the relationship improved (Rigoli, 2003; Smith & Hempenstall, 2005).

Finally, even at the social level, cultural interest in the trans-Tasman relationship has reached new heights with plays like “The Underarm”, touring the nation throughout October-November 2006. This piece of theatre attempted to address the many issues connected with trans-Tasman relations through exploring “relationships between brothers and brother countries”, focusing on two estranged brothers – an Aussie and a Kiwi – and the controversial “unsporting incident” that took place at a 1981 cricket match that reportedly sparked the nadir in New Zealand-Australia relations (Ricketts, 2006; ‘Kiwi theatre revisits the underarm saga’, 2006).

It is in this vein of renewed interest in the New Zealand-Australian relationship that this thesis attempts to explore this record of divergence between New Zealand and Australia in their International Relations. It seems in the year 2007 the ties of ANZAC are still waning, and so much so in fact, as to become a matter of serious concern to both countries, though particularly New Zealand as the smaller, most reliant, and therefore,
more vulnerable partner. Indeed, in many ways it is New Zealand’s policies and behaviour in the international sphere that has contributed most to the growing divide, owing to the fact that it is New Zealand which is the Anzac nation most out of sync with its historical traditions and attitudes towards military Australasian collaboration as well as other matters of external policy. As the new year of 2008 approaches, it is clear that the two Tasman neighbours have become noticeably divergent on a wide array of foreign and defence policy issues.

This thesis is an examination of this trans-Tasman political divergence that has become so apparent in New Zealand and Australia’s International Relations since 2001 under the Howard and Clark Governments (1996-present and 1999-present respectively).

Chapter One will explore the "strange" trans-Tasman relationship, discussing three of the dynamics inherent in the relationship that together render the relationship so interesting, if rather odd.

Chapter Two will provide an overview of New Zealand and Australia’s divergence in the international sphere, focusing on the main areas of difference in the domains of foreign policy and security policy, as well as the rather oppositional stances taken by the trans-Tasman nations on three contemporary and important international issues (National Missile Defence, the Kyoto Protocol and Iraq).

Chapters Three to Five will examine in finer detail three areas of fundamental difference between the nations, which in my view have become the driving forces in the widening political and military gap between the neighbours – multilateralism, the use of force and respective relationships with the United States. The neighbours’ respective beliefs and positions on these three matters will be closely examined through undertaking a case study on New Zealand and Australian speeches on the Iraq Crisis between September 2002 – May 2003, during which time the two nations’ views were most clearly expressed on these points. This examination will be supplemented by information from the countries’ foreign policy record, as recorded in political and academic discourse, to show how these beliefs expressed in New Zealand and Australian rhetoric have translated into action on the world stage.
In Chapter Six two orthodox theories used by academics to explain this trans-Tasman divergence – ‘Strategic Perception’ and ‘Disparate Political Ideologies’ – will be discussed and critiqued, in order to show how they are both incomplete and fail to stand up under scrutiny, and therefore, can not provide the best explanations for this divergence between the nations.

Finally, Chapter Seven will introduce a new theoretical approach to explaining trans-Tasman divergence – Identity Theory – and attempt to apply this new means of explanation for foreign policy to New Zealand and Australia in their international affairs.

Through this course of research it is hoped this thesis will not only be able to pinpoint how exactly the Tasman neighbours are diverging in International Relations, and in which areas predominantly, but also provide a fuller and more convincing explanation for this modern-day phenomenon in trans-Tasman affairs.
Chapter One: Odd Couple
The Strange Trans-Tasman Relationship

The Odd Relationship

Mates, Anzac brothers, rivals – all words regularly employed to describe the unique relationship that New Zealand shares with Australia, all of them true, and yet in a sense they all fall short of describing the real nature and complicated dynamics of the trans-Tasman relationship. Much like a tight knot made of many strands, the New Zealand-Australian relationship is a complex and multi-faceted creation - a product of history, geography, politics, war, trade and social interaction - which defies definition at every turn. According to Brabazon, it is this factor that causes the relationship, whenever it is discussed, to become simplified and “enclosed in the sandwich of Anzac Cove and the imperatives of economic integration” (Brabazon, 2000, p. 31). Indeed, as Denis McLean points out in his insightful book The Prickly Pair: Making Nationalism in Australia and New Zealand, the fact that the two countries struggle even to find a mutually favourable collective term to describe themselves, as two similar and interrelated countries located in the same geographical area at the bottom of the globe, is evidence of the mysterious and elusive nature of the relationship (McLean, 2003, p.10).

In fact the relationship is a rather odd one, the dynamics of which can enthral, surprise, disconcert and repel. As Ian F. Grant so aptly puts it: “The Australia-New Zealand relationship is a strange, complex one... few countries bicker and grizzle about each other more without actually going to war” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 9). Three dimensions of the relationship in particular contribute to this oddity and strangeness, each reflecting a different yet integral dynamic of the relationship – closeness, rivalry and indifference.

1) Close Relationship
The first dimension relates to the often recited ‘close’ and ‘unique’ relationship that exists between New Zealand and Australia, along which corollary we are said to be friends, allies, and even members of the same family. This is the aspect of the relationship much espoused and revisited by government representatives on either side of the Tasman ‘Ditch’. Take for example the passage relating to trans-Tasman relations on the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) website which proclaims:
Australia and New Zealand are natural allies with a strong trans-Tasman sense of family. Migration, trade and defence ties, keen competition on the sporting field, and strong people-to-people links have helped shape a close and co-operative relationship (‘New Zealand Country Brief’, 2006).

Or New Zealand’s version from the website of the New Zealand equivalent, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), which likewise echoes this assertion:

The New Zealand-Australia relationship is a uniquely close one, underpinned by geography, and shared history, values, and institutions. Migration, trade, and other people-to-people linkages have helped shape a strong trans-Tasman sense of identity (‘Australia’, 2006).

As a former Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, said of the two countries following an official visit to New Zealand in 1987: “We are, enduringly, the closest of friends…we are one Australasian family, but two nations” (cited in Wilde, 1989, p. 25)

Indeed, no-one can deny the inter-connectedness of the trans-Tasman relationship, nor the extensive wide-ranging networks that now exist between these two neighbours. As political commentator Colin James states, “No two nations are as closely intertwined socially, institutionally and economically as we” (James, 2005b). The New Zealand-Australia inter-governmental relationship, for instance, is considered to be better developed and more extensive than any other of its kind in the world with formal meetings between the respective Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers conducted twice yearly, and meetings between the Finance, Trade and Defence Ministers of each country held annually (‘New Zealand Country Brief’, 2006; ‘Australia’, 2006). In addition, New Zealand ministers sit on not less than 27 Australian federal-state ministerial councils responsible for determining national policy on a wide range of issues, from agriculture to health, making political and official trans-Tasman ties “tight to the point of intimacy” (Ansley, 2001). Economically, the Australia-New Zealand CER (Closer Economic Relations) trade agreement of 1983, designed to create a free trade zone between the Tasman pair, continues to be one of the most open and comprehensive trade agreements of its kind in the world with further advancements made every year, and is in fact reputed to be the leading model of a successful Free Trade Agreement in
the world (Downer, 2001; Hawke, 2004a). Moreover on a social level, people-to-people contact between Australians and New Zealanders, in addition to large-scale migration in both directions since the early years of the nineteenth century, have combined to forge practically impermeable bonds between our two nations. Thousands of Australians and New Zealanders cross the Tasman each year on a casual basis, either to visit family members, conduct business or to take vacations, while thanks to the 1973 inter-governmental trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements (which allows citizens to visit, live and work in each others respective countries without restrictions) there are currently over 60,000 Australians residing in New Zealand and at least 430,000 New Zealanders living in Australia – not including those who have opted to relinquish their NZ passports to take up solely Australian citizenship (‘New Zealand Country Brief’, 2006; Hawke, 2004d). Last but not least, the emotional bonds of kinship, nostalgia and shared historical experiences - such as British colonisation in the ‘New World’ and the Anzac tradition of World War I and II - along with common values, beliefs and interests, innumerable personal bonds, and an unspoken yet firm commitment to come to each other’s defence should either country be at risk of attack, have combined to form “real and thoroughly pervasive cables” (Ansley, 2001) between the two countries (Downer, 2001; Hawke, 2003a). As Denis McLean states: “These two have more in common with one another than either has with any other country on the planet” (McLean, 2003, p. 14).

2) Rivalry
Nevertheless, in spite of this closeness and interconnectedness, this odd relationship also incorporates a second dimension that mystifyingly can both reinforce or defy the first – that of trans-Tasman rivalry. As a widely accepted and engaged in phenomenon of antipodean life, this Australia-New Zealand rivalry has in turn become something of an enigma in itself, in that it presents itself at different times in different forms and degrees of intensity.

On one end of the spectrum, for instance, one finds a friendly comedic type of good-natured banter, comparison and joke-telling, or as Mike Moore describes it “abuse as a sign of friendship” (Moore, 2005, B5), with members of each country trying to ‘out-do’ those in the other. Good examples of this include the frequent teasing back and forth
over the use or pronunciation of words\textsuperscript{1} and the never-ending competition over which country can legitimately lay claim to such things as the infamous antipodean invention the Pavlova and champion racehorse ‘Phar Lap’, or indeed to any and every successful musical band, actor or phenomenon of the Southern Hemisphere\textsuperscript{2}. This kind of friendly rivalry is particularly in evidence at sporting contests between the two nations, especially rugby matches, where the competitive atmosphere along with the exultant jubilation and glee of the winners regularly converge to make quite a spectacle of this dimension of the trans-Tasman relationship.\textsuperscript{3}

At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, inter-Australasian rivalry can take a decidedly darker form revealing a rather different dynamic of the relationship – a deep-seated hostility and outright antagonism of a surprisingly malicious nature. Indeed, the rapidity with which the one can change into the other, in any realm and on any subject catches many foreign on-lookers off guard (I. Grant, 2001, p.76). Of course, this has been most noticeable in the domain of International Relations, as the former Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand once admitted, “Relationships between trans-Tasman heads of government have been fraught more often than not” over the years (Hawke, 2006). Consider, for example, the strained and sometimes volatile relationships between Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon, or Hawke and Lange in the 1980s, or indeed Keating and Bolger in the early 1990s (Hawke, 2005; I. Grant, 2001, p. 42). Or in a more general way the widespread anger and incomprehension in Australia, especially among the political elites there, following the New Zealand government’s cancellation of the F-16 air jet deal with America in 2001 (Bradford, 2001, p. 27). Indeed, on the announcement of capability cuts to the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) The Australian newspaper produced the angry headline of “NZ turns back on tradition of Anzac” (Ansley, 2001). Or as another telling illustration may show, the very public remarks made to all and sundry at the 2001 Gallipoli commemoration held at Anzac

\textsuperscript{1} Is it ‘Esky’ or ‘chilly bin’? ‘Thong’ or ‘jandal’? Is the number ‘six’ pronounced as ‘sicks’ or ‘sex’? Or ‘Sydney’ as ‘Sidney’ or ‘Seydney’?

\textsuperscript{2} A recent illustration of this occurred on the 24th November 2006 when a radio announcer from ‘More FM’ Wellington lamented that: “The Aussies have stolen our pavlova, ‘Split Enz’, ‘Crowded House’, Russell Crowe and now our iceberg!” in reference to the large block of ice recently found floating off the South Island last year.

\textsuperscript{3} A contemporary illustration of such national jubilation over an Australian sporting defeat by a New Zealand sports team occurred in February this year with celebration up and down the length of New Zealand and across all media after the New Zealand Black Caps achieved a “black-wash” of the Australians in the Chappell-Hadlee cricket series.
Cove by the Australian chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Sandy MacDonald, who said:

To have your foreign minister get up – he’s a very nondescript little fellow – in his crass suit and purple tie and purple shirt and talk about his commitment to nuclear disarmament…showed a lack of understanding of what the real world is…I think he and Helen Clark must be floating in the same boat (cited in Ansley, 2001).

Similar emotions of anger, incomprehension or outrage have likewise been expressed on the other side of the Tasman too with Kiwi outcries against Australian government policy on issues such as Ansett and the Australian Qantas bid for Air New Zealand, or more recently, Australia’s refusal to give ‘special treatment’ to newly arrived New Zealand migrants and its subsequent imposition of limits on New Zealanders eligibility for migrant status and welfare payments once in Australia (Ansley, 2001). At these times it seems the respective peoples of the two nations, in Grant’s words, “work hard at enlarging and distorting the differences” between them (I. Grant, 2001, p. 76). Yet this explosive kind of rivalry has been an every-present intrinsic part of the relationship since the beginning. As journalist Greg Ansley concludes:

From the time New Zealand gained its own direct shipping links to Britain and broke with New South Wales until the joint advent of affordable trans tasman air travel and the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) in the 1960s, the only time we got together was in war (Ansley, 2001).

This very changeableness of attitude between Australians and New Zealanders, the potential for large-scale mood-swings symptomatic of a very real sense of underlying tension between the two nations over their differences, contributes largely to what could be called the ‘ugly underside’ of the rapport, or what Grant has termed “the edgy relationship” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 10). In fact Alexander Downer, the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs, attributes this Australian-New Zealand rivalry, both in politics and on the sports field, to be the reason one feels “a bit of trepidation” when talking about trans-
Tasman relations (Downer, 2001). Yet surprisingly this rivalry has also become an integral part of the trans-Tasman relationship. As Downer once expressed concerning this mysterious element of the relationship, it is a “great conundrum...how our great affinity and friendship manages to thrive side by side with what must be one of the truly great global rivalries,” and yet at the same time, “that almost visceral rivalry is still very much what makes an Aussie an Aussie, and a Kiwi a Kiwi” (Downer, 2001).

3) Indifference

Equally strange in nature as the former is the final dimension of the relationship - a cold, off-hand kind of mutual ambivalence and indifference, equally on display on both sides of the Tasman, to which one could perhaps attribute the larger share of blame for the oddity of this New Zealand-Australia relationship. Many New Zealanders grow up much as McLean describes of his own experience, “neither knowing nor caring about Australia” (McLean, 2003, p.9). Likewise across the Ditch these same age-old patterns of indifference and ignorance have become so firmly rooted in Australian culture that New Zealand is practically invisible to them (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). Indeed, Bob Catley asserts that in at least four Australian states – the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania – New Zealand “might as well not exist, except as a tourist destination” (Catley, 2001, p.17). Grant argues this “infuriating indifference” of Australians towards New Zealand and New Zealanders is part of the reason why Kiwis find it of such great importance to thrash Australia in sporting matches as often as possible – in as many sports as possible – and may explain why, though puzzling to the rest of the world, “a victory over the Aussies at rugby is an excuse for national celebration and a loss casts a palpable pall over the country” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 11). In truth, indifference seems to tarnish every aspect of the relationship so that even the shared Anzac legends, reputedly the “most potent historical force bridging the Tasman”, generally ignore each other (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). Indeed, the ‘NZ’ in ANZAC has largely been deleted from the Australian Gallipoli legend altogether (Salmond, 1987,

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4 Perhaps it is this centrality of rivalry in maintaining separate Australian and New Zealand identities that can also explain why in New Zealand trans-Tasman rivalry has become such a prominent feature of television advertising campaigns this year, with both ‘NZI Insurance’ and ‘Kiwi Bank’ using trans-Tasman rivalry (along with a few anti-Australian jibes) to promote the ‘Kiwi’ identity of their businesses.

5 A recent example of New Zealand jubilation at Australian defeat on the sports field took place on 13th February, 2007, when the evening One News anchor Simon Dallow happily announced “the best news”, in reference to the Australian cricket team’s two losses against England in the One-Day 2007 Commonwealth Bank Tri-series in Australia, stating that: “The Australians have been thrashed twice and now they’re coming here!”.
p. 306-307), as political commentator Colin James once remarked: “To Australians the ‘nz’ in Anzac is a consonantal hiccup in a name to which they claim proprietary rights” (James, 2001a).

Smith & Hempenstall, main contributors of the Anzac Neighbours Project paper written in preparation for the 2006 Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum, lately exclaimed over this lack of interest between the two neighbouring peoples. “It is curious how incurious Australians and New Zealanders are about each other,” they state. “We know much more about the links that New Zealand and Australia have with third countries outside the region, like Britain and the United States, than about the multiple, complex networks between Australia and New Zealand themselves” (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). In fact, Smith & Hempenstall consider indifference to be the one crucial factor that explains why Australian and New Zealand representatives often “talk past one another” (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). Brabazon provides a good example of this in describing the strange first meeting in 1997 between newly-elected Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and his New Zealand counterpart at the time, Jim Bolger, and his deputy Winston Peters. She describes the Australian-New Zealand behaviour on this occasion (the “deeply hostile” atmosphere with Howard assuming the role of the “cold warrior”, confronting New Zealanders for neglecting their defence responsibilities and refusing to grant special treatment to its citizens in Australia, and on the other side Bolger coolly promising to do likewise to Australian citizens in New Zealand) as being comparable to an uncomfortably dysfunctional, dissatisfied, ageing, old married couple who have nothing left to say.  

“Here they sit,” she writes, “staring past each other, making assumptions that are not confirmed through conversation. Academics and journalists only reinforce this tendency” (Brabazon, 2000, p. 33-34). In an ever-globalising world of modern technology and communications, these prevailing attitudes of indifference and ignorance in Australia and New Zealand towards citizens of the other have contributed, as Simon Upton once acknowledged, to a feeling of “serious awkwardness” between the two countries that has grown not lessened over the years (cited in Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). In point of fact, the problem has become of such concern that a 2002 report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

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6 An observation reminiscent of Kiwi writer Fairburn’s 1947 analogy that the Tasman pair resembled “two shipwrecked Englishmen who lived together for years on a desert island without speaking, because they hadn’t been introduced” (cited in I. Grant, 2001, p. 84).
Committee, based on an inquiry into New Zealand’s economic and trade relationship with Australia, argues that it would take a twenty-year investment to build a generation of New Zealanders “whose fluency with Australia extends beyond good-natured insults and cut-price weekends in Sydney” (cited in Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003).

Why is this so? Why are these neighbouring peoples, with a shared history and experience of isolation at the bottom of the world, so committed to being indifferent to each other’s existence? Why have they persisted for over a hundred years in existing as strangers, though living side-by-side? Some academics have avoided this question by downplaying the level of indifference between the pair and alluding to the idea that, just as ‘familiarity breeds contempt’, the sheer proximity and range of similarities between the two countries have led one to conclude, as McLean once did, that ‘knowledge of the one equated with knowledge of the other’ (Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003; McLean, 2003, p. 9). However greater forces are at work here than meets the eye. Indeed, there are two ready wide-ranging explanations for this situation.

**Tradition of Indifference**

The first relates to the way that indifference has become somewhat of a tradition in trans-Tasman relations, a tradition which has its roots right back in the early formative years of the two nations, when New Zealand refrained from joining the Australian federation in 1901. As McLean states: “In choosing to stand aside from the long march of Australia, New Zealand became unimportant in Australian sight” (McLean, 2003, p. 22). Yet in actual fact, according to Grant, even on this most significant national decision in its entire history, New Zealand’s decision to stand apart from Australia was more owing to disinterestedness and apathy among New Zealanders concerning the issue than to any conscious debate upon the merits or disadvantages of federation (I. Grant, 2001, McLean, 2003). As an observer at the time summed it up in 1902: “New Zealanders never seriously contemplated coming in; nor have the Australians supposed that they would, or expended much time or trouble in efforts to enlist them” (cited in I. Grant, 2001 p. 22). Indeed, the legacy of dismissive unconcern between the two Tasman neighbours can be traced even further back in our history to the late nineteenth century, when the New Zealand pioneers quite obviously displayed a notable contempt for their ‘convict’ counterparts, while on the other side of the Tasman the early Australians were likewise little enthused about their highly lauded and venerated
neighbour. One Australian commentator, for example, became so angry about the constant discussion, debate and admiration for New Zealand in Australia during the 1880s that he exclaimed: “The name of New Zealand is becoming nauseating; I am sick of its being quoted” (cited in I. Grant, 2001, p. 11). It seems little has changed since then. Like foreigners inhabiting two different worlds, Australians and New Zealanders continue to live more than a century later as though there were a wall between the two countries rather than simply a stretch of water (I. Grant, 2001, p.84).

**Lack of Information**

A second explanation for this indifference stems from the first and concerns an ignorance springing from a general widespread lack of information available in either country concerning the history, literature, political processes and current affairs of the other. This ignorance is thought to arise from two factors: firstly, poor media coverage of trans-Tasman connections, policies or issues, particularly in Australia, owing to the scarcity of Australasian television networks, the ‘parochial’ and ‘localized’ nature of newspapers and radio in either country, and to a lack of interest or effort in supplying their alternate newspapers cheaply in each other’s countries (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005); and secondly, and more importantly, from a near total neglect in the education sector of trans-Tasman studies from primary level right through to tertiary institutions in both countries. Brabazon asserts, for instance, that there is a marked absence of critical writing and commentary circulating in Australia about issues affecting New Zealand, likewise little systematic discussion of New Zealand in Australian schools, and not one Australian tertiary institution in the country that teaches New Zealand studies (Brabazon, 2000, p. 34). It would seem New Zealanders experience the same fate, though not to the same extent due to Australia’s relative size and greater importance to New Zealand. For though New Zealand children of the 1940s and 1950s once received a thorough grounding in Australian geography, culture and history, largely due to schooling and widespread broadcasting of Australian radio programmes in the pre-television years, this has long ceased to be the case (Salmond, 1987, p. 300). Another indication is that even the renowned Political Science and International Relations Programme of the prestigious Victoria University of Wellington - considered the “first of its kind” in New Zealand and the standard-setter for all other political studies programmes in the country – though teaching courses on East Asian, Chinese, European, American, African and
Pacific Island politics, does not teach one paper solely devoted to Australian politics\(^7\) (Programme History: 60 Years of Leading Political Studies in New Zealand!, 2007; Political Science and International Relations Courses, 2007). Perhaps this explains why political people crossing the Tasman are said to be “commonly struck by the degree of ignorance displayed on each side about the political conditions and processes on the other” (Catley, 2001, p. 13). Indeed, any cursory internet search will reveal the astounding fact that there are more Centers of Australian and New Zealand Studies in the United States of America than exist in either of these countries themselves.

In truth successive generations of academics, historians and intelligentsia in both countries are much to blame for this lack of information and lack of academic interaction. They have unfortunately participated in and become themselves progenitors of a kind of ‘selective amnesia’ concerning the New Zealand-Australian connection, especially in the fields of history and literature (Salmond, 1987, p. 302). As Hempinstall, Smith and Goldfinch state:

> Australia and New Zealand have a shared past, but not a shared history…
> For 100 years scholars on both sides of the Tasman have produced national histories that ignore a shared past and neglect the historical parallels…[Instead] polite, mutual ignorance is the norm” (Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003).

One illustration of this point is the fact that despite the political connectedness of Australia and New Zealand in their political histories, with both countries producing politicians that would cross the Tasman to become leaders and shapers in the political and social development of the other\(^8\), the exhaustive six-volume *Australian Encyclopaedia* does not mention New Zealand’s longest serving Australian Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, nor even New Zealand’s reputedly greatest leader, Australian-

\(^7\) In fact in the whole School of History, Philosophy, Political Science & International Relations of Victoria University there is not anything taught akin to Australian studies (only one solitary paper is offered there addressing Australian history) (History Courses, 2007).

\(^8\) For example, Australians P.C. Webb, Robert Semple, H.E. Holland, M. J. Savage and W.E. Parry who contributed either to the socialist movement in New Zealand, were involved in the development of the Labour party, or held the position of New Zealand Prime Minister (Salmond, 1987, p. 304-306). Conversely New Zealander John Watson became the Prime Minister of Australia in 1904 (Woolcott, 1993, p. 163). Interestingly it was also a Kiwi, Fred Hollows, who became the Australian of the Year in 1991(Woolcott, 1993, p. 163).
born Michael Savage (Blainey, 1987, p. 316; Woolcott, 1993, p. 163). Likewise, few literary pieces survive the trip across the Tasman to wash up on the other's shores, and even when they do, they are generally regarded with a mixture of surprise and condescension, as New Zealand historians recently observed at an Australian Historical Association conference held in Brisbane in 2002 (Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003). Moreover, not one single modern literary work has been written in either country from a combined trans-Tasman perspective which “takes the antipodes as an integral experience across the twentieth century, in broad terms of culture and political economy or the patterns of antipodean modernism” (Peter Beilharz, cited in Smith & Hempenstall, 2005). In fact, according to Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, few scholars since 1902:

have been bold enough to discuss both countries together as a continuing community of interests. Thus, a century later, there remains a significant gap in vital knowledge of the sustained nature of shared experiments in the twentieth century, the extent of continuing trans-Tasman ties and interactions, and their impact on the respective identities of both nations (Hempinstall, Smith & Goldfinch, 2003).

In the Shadow of Australia

The baffling reality of this puzzle of trans-Tasman relations is accentuated when one considers that not only do these three dimensions of closeness, rivalry and indifference exist, in parallel, but they continue to be bedrock forces in the Australia-New Zealand relationship to this day and show no sign of disappearing - even in an age when global communications and information are readily available, literally at one's fingertips. McPhee considers this unpredictable vacillating nature of the relationship – its ability to blow hot and cold, oscillating between heated spats and cold indifference – to be reflective of the typical 'love/hate' relationship so often prevalent between countries where one nation considers itself to be in “the economic, cultural, and sporting shadow of a similar but larger and more powerful cousin” (McPhee, 1987, p. 292). Certainly this could easily be said to be true of New Zealand in regard to Australia. Just as Canada pales in comparison to its larger and more powerful neighbour the United States, New Zealanders live in Australia’s shadow and are vaguely conscious of the fact that as the
smaller, less varied, less visible, less self-reliant partner, we need them more than they need us. Indeed, this obvious imbalance – sometimes called ‘tyranny’ – of geography, size, population, ethnic diversity, and trade and industry between the Tasman pair, has corresponded in an imbalance of knowledge between their respective citizens with New Zealanders, often unwillingly, knowing a great deal more about Australia and Australians than vice versa (McPhee, 1987). Moreover, New Zealanders have been abandoning their homeland and escaping the burden of welfarism, an obsessive rugby culture\(^9\) and the so-called “Iwi-fatigue” (Catley, 2001, p. 17) for better jobs, higher pay and greater opportunities in Australia at an alarming and steadily climbing rate (Allen, 2006), thereby exacerbating New Zealand’s ‘brain drain’. Indeed, an exodus of 30,000 Kiwis migrated from New Zealand in 2001, another 22,500 did likewise in 2004, and today 600 New Zealanders a week say, in National Party leader John Key’s words, “au revoir to Helengrad and hello to the Lucky Country” (Key, cited in Bryant, 2005, p. 16). Of this number, 90,000 immigrants are of Maori descent, meaning that currently 14.6% of the total New Zealand Maori population is now living in Australia\(^{10}\) (Allen, 2006; Collins, 2006a; Collins, 2006b). This implies of course that whenever Australians and New Zealanders come into contact, the latter are liable to feel a little resentful or hostile (McPhee, 1987, p. 290). In the words of a one-time senior Australian politician, “Australians don’t care a – about New Zealanders, and they resent us for it” (McPhee, 1987, p. 291).

One of the ways New Zealanders have compensated for this imbalance is to perpetuate the element of indifference towards Australia by appealing to the age-old deeply ingrained part of the New Zealand psyche that wishes to remain unknowledgeable of all things Australian – what one could call a ‘willing ignorance’. As McLean states: “New Zealanders are unable to ignore Australia, but fall over themselves to be dismissive...Australia can never be irrelevant to New Zealand, but a surprising amount of energy goes into pretending otherwise” (McLean, 2003, p. 21-22). One of the best means of doing this has been the widespread use of grossly exaggerated stereotypes and crass generalizations to paint a very negative picture of the larger neighbour, a move which is generally exceedingly well-received, indulged in and propagated by the

\(^9\) Australia is thought to be more varied and diverse in the kinds of sport it embraces, with large support for not only rugby but also cricket, Australian Rules football, swimming and netball to name a few (Salmond, 1987; McLean, 2003).

\(^{10}\) In fact this figure is expected to rise so dramatically in future years that more than a third of Maori may be living in Australia by the end of this century (Collins, 2006b).
New Zealand mainstream media. Indeed, since 1900 when the *New Zealand Graphic* newspaper published the demeaning depiction of the Australian criminal ‘ogre’ attempting to seduce and beguile the ‘virtuous New Zealand maiden’ and her ‘noble Maori companion’ under the words, “How we see it” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 27), to the editorial of *The Dominion Post* on 18 May 2004, which warned New Zealand businesses following the Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum of that year to beware and “read the fine print, or the Australians will shaft you” (cited in Hawke, 2004d), there has always been a tacit undertone in the media on the subject of Australia and Australians that leads one to conclude, like Rod Oram of the *Sunday Star Times* that, “It would be a serious mistake to believe that Australia is the answer to most of our problems…by focusing too intently on Australia we [New Zealanders] would miss other, bigger opportunities” (cited in Hawke, 2004d). Australians, on the receiving end of much of this hostility, seem to react to such treatment by responding in like kind.

Evidence of this can be found in the sheer number of wide-ranging stereotypes and generalizations, constructed on either side of the Tasman concerning the other, that have come to occupy such a large area of the trans-Tasman lexicon and are regularly exchanged whenever New Zealanders and Australians come into contact with each other. In a way that can only serve to heighten inter-antipodean rivalry, New Zealanders regularly brand their neighbours as brash, dodgy, uncultured idiots and criminals (I. Grant, 2002). Australians, when they think of us at all, view New Zealanders as reserved, somewhat humourless and boring, quaintly hick, odd- accented, old-fashioned - even sometimes mean-spirited - country folk, with an unpredictable passive-aggressive violent streak (McPhee, 1987, p. 287-288; I. Grant, 2002, p. 148), “living in a 25-year-old world of eternally rusting Morris Minors and faded weatherboard bungalows” (Ansley, 2001). Or as Catley puts it, “as under-performing, sheep-loving losers, two hours in front and twenty years behind” (cited in I. Grant, 2002, p. 148). Of course such stereotypes as these are at the far end of the spectrum, far beyond the ‘much-liked mate’ (NZ) or ‘tough, hard-nosed, must-win country’ (Australia) metaphors that characterise other aspects of the relationship (James, 2005d), yet nevertheless they serve as a useful mask for certain long-held genuine insecurities on both sides of the Tasman. Openly aired for the first time at the inaugural Australia-New Zealand Leadership Forum of 2004, Kiwis tend to feel that Australians take them for granted, ignore or patronise them, or are totally dismissive - a good example of which is the oft cited illustration of former
Australian PM Paul Keating’s tendency, wherever he went in Australia, to tell the business community that every time Japan’s GDP grew by one percent, that equated to the whole of New Zealand’s GDP altogether (cited in Hawke, 2004d). Aussies, meanwhile, think New Zealanders are much too sensitive toward Australia, even somewhat obsessed and paranoid, while acknowledging themselves to be constantly plagued by a vague suspicion, much like PM Keating once was, that the New Zealanders are in some way getting ahead and outsmarting them by using their own lack of attention to New Zealand affairs as a weapon against them (Hawke, 2004b; Hawke, 2004d). Of course what is not so apparent about these sentiments is that they spring from deeper underlying issues in the two countries, namely: first, that Australian condescension springs from the sincere belief that New Zealand made a grave error in refusing to join the Australian Commonwealth in 1901, and has suffered the consequences – isolation, irrelevance, parochialism – ever since; and second, the centrality to New Zealand nationalism of not being an Australian (Catley, 2001, p.18).

Indeed, much of the rivalry between Australia and New Zealand can be contributed to a wish to maintain or defend separate identities. For though Australian and New Zealand identities were formed through interaction with each other, nevertheless, as McLean states: “Each side has clearly marked off its identity from the other. New Zealanders have gone to great lengths to show that they are not Australians” (McLean, 2003, p. 22). McLean asserts that even a decade before Federation in 1890, hints of such a New Zealand identity and destiny, separate from that of Australia, were already in evidence. As Wellington’s Evening Post proclaimed in 1890, in voicing its opposition to union with Australia, “The Australian people rather look down on New Zealand and New Zealand absolutely refuses to look up to Australia or accept a subordinate position” (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 22). According to McLean, this sentiment is still the crux of the issue concerning New Zealand’s relationship with Australia (McLean, 2003, p.22). McPhee has argued even further that New Zealand’s “national obsession” with anti-Australian jibes is revealing of an uncertainty about this very identity, and one which has grown not

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11 A sentiment echoed in 2006 when speaking of renewed Australian hopes for political union with New Zealand, Australian journalist Tim Dick of the Sydney Morning Herald referred to New Zealand as “the errant one that chose to go it alone” instead of joining the other six Australasian colonies in 1901 (Dick, 2006).

12 As McLean states: “By 1901, federation had be resisted because New Zealand identity was already defined as not-Australian” (McLean, 2003, p. 22).
diminished with the passage of time (McPhee, 1987, p. 293). As fellow Kiwi Grant states:

As a people most of the world cannot tell New Zealanders and Australians apart. From a distance our accents, interests and mannerisms are virtually indistinguishable. Perhaps perversely, that explains our antagonism. Our identity can all too easily disappear when Australia is prominent (I. Grant, 2001, p. 76).

Certainly, according to one-time Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating: “There are many parts of the New Zealand psyche that find it difficult to deal with Australia” (cited in I. Grant, 2001, p. 11-12). If this be the case, one would have to acknowledge that it is indeed New Zealand’s insecurity complex which forms the Achilles’ heel and most sensitive point of such a psyche in dealing with Australia. In point of fact, insecurity has often been cited as the motivating force behind the way that trivial though offensive Australian stereotypes are endlessly circulating in the New Zealand media (which in itself is often described as parochial and mundane compared to that in Australia) (McPhee, 1987; I. Grant, 2002). Take, for example, the Kiwi obsession to hear outsiders – especially from powerful countries – praise the landscape, New Zealanders and the Kiwi lifestyle (generally in that order) (McPhee, 1987; I. Grant, 2001). Or consider Grant’s claim that in New Zealand, “pulling Aussies down a peg or two ranks highly as a national pastime” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 9), as well as the extent to which New Zealanders take fiendish delight when winning against Australia in any sport, especially rugby (McLean, 2003). It seems that many New Zealanders feel, as Colin James does, that “we count in Canberra and the state capitals not as an opportunity but as, at best, a requisite afterthought and, more often, a niggling nuisance” (James, 2001a).

What makes New Zealand’s insecurity complex peculiar, however, is the way in which it masquerades in a guise of cultural, moral and intellectual superiority, dating back to the time of Federation, that emphasizes the convict origins of Australia as compared to New Zealand’s ‘more genteel’ British roots (McPhee, 1987; I. Grant, 2001). Indeed, according to Grant, “when New Zealanders are feeling really put upon by Australians there are two lines of attack guaranteed to brighten them up: Australia’s penal settlement beginnings and the treatment of Aboriginals” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 85). By contrast,
Australia seems entirely free from such narcissism arising from internal agonies of self-reflection and depreciation. Confident in the knowledge that they live in a rich\(^{13}\) and vast land the size of the United States, and with a diverse population five times the size of New Zealand’s, Australians are optimistic in outlook, calling itself “the Lucky Country” and singing a bold national anthem of ‘Advance Australia Fair’. Rather characteristically and reflective of its internal psyche, New Zealanders sing along instead to ‘God Defend New Zealand’, while at the same time attempting to trump Australia, as always, with the self-appointed ‘superior’ title of ‘God’s Own’ (I. Grant, 2001, p. 10, 76). Urged on by such strange patterns of behaviour as these, it seems the incomprehensible, unfathomable love-hate relationship between Australia and New Zealand is set to continue for many years to come.

\(^{13}\) Though New Zealand is rich in black coal, gold and an abundance of well-watered grasslands, fisheries and forests, Australia’s wealth in natural resources far outweigh those of New Zealand, being rich in tin, lead, copper, coal, gold, silver, an assortment of base metals and minerals, diamonds, natural gas and oil (McLean, 2001b, p. 21; McLean, 2003, p. 31, 35; Blainey, 1987, p. 318-319).
Chapter Two:
Trans-Tasman Divergence in International Relations

It could well be that the peculiarity of the New Zealand-Australia relationship owes much to the natural tension that occurs when two countries have so much in common, and yet at the same time have so much to set them apart. The fact is that despite the way that the two countries are so often and easily paired together in the minds of the world at large, even to the point of being considered anomalous, New Zealand and Australia are in truth quite different countries (Sutton, 2001, p. 9; Teare, 2001, p. 92). Though sharing much in common, the two neighbours have developed important political, historical and social differences and formed different characters and perspectives as nations in the wider world, with “distinctive domestic and international agendas” (Calvert, 2000). Ideas of separateness, once more the product of imagination than grounded in reality, have over a century worked to develop two different nations, each shaping and moulding their histories and destinies in different ways. As Mclean states: “The Australia-New Zealand story is about two adjacent peoples – of the same kind, and mostly from the same place on the other side of the world – who have grown apart rather than together” (McLean, 2003, p.13).

Divergence in International Relations

The reality of this divergence between the two Tasman neighbours is especially observable in the political sphere. Whether canvassing New Zealand and Australia’s separate historical development, their divergent political organization (one as a federation of six states and two territories and the other a unitary state with a centralized system of government), or their differences in dependence and allegiance with first Great Britain and then the United States in the twentieth century, differences between New Zealand and the Tasman pair can be found across a range of political literature. It is perhaps no surprise then, that just as these countries of the Antipodes have developed in distinctively different ways throughout their political histories, the same pattern of difference and divergence should also be apparent in the international sphere.

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14 As New Zealand historian F. L. W. Wood has written: “When in 1900 businessmen and politicians talked of the differences in character between the two countries this was nine-tenths of it nonsense. Within ten or twenty years it had grown up into a significant reality” (cited in I. Grant, 2001, p. 29).
Indeed, despite retaining many aspects in common in their international relations, today New Zealand and Australia have developed quite disparate track records in their foreign and security policies, especially since the mid-1980s, repeatedly taking rather oppositional stances on important issues in the international arena. The result of this actuality are, as Ashton Calvert and Winston Peters demonstrate in their statements, paradoxical and yet equally true facts to the effect that while “New Zealand and Australia share common purpose and effort on much of the foreign policy, trade and security agenda” (Calvert, 2000), “Australia and New Zealand are still two different countries, each with its own distinctive domestic and international agendas” (Calvert, 2000). As the current New Zealand Foreign Minister has stated: “We can, and we do, naturally differ at times in our perspectives and policies” (Peters, 2007a, April 23).

This disparity in New Zealand and Australia’s foreign and security policies is clearly evident even in an examination of the trans-Tasman relationship itself. For though unarguably New Zealand and Australia are very important to each other and both have a strong desire to keep up and strengthen the trans-Tasman relationship, nevertheless the relative importance of each country to the other actually varies in reality, with Australia being much more important to New Zealand than vice versa. In terms of trade, for instance, which is the area of greatest symmetry between the two neighbours, New Zealand’s number one trade partner is Australia, while New Zealand reciprocally ranks only fifth for Australia after Japan, the United States, the Republic of Korea and China (Hawke, 2006) - a pattern which has remained static for over a decade (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 143). Furthermore in terms of security alliances, despite both nations being “the two largest military powers in the South Pacific” (Gyngell & Wesley, 2003, p. 3), while New Zealand looks to Australia and relies heavily on Australian security, Australia looks to the US, Japan, South Korea and Singapore as reliable defence partners with whom to build strong security relationships in the Asia-Pacific region, with New Zealand now featuring of minimal importance in the overall strategic defence outlook and plan. As Emmet McElhatton sums up this difference: “New Zealand sees Australia as the defence partner. Australia sees New Zealand as a defence partner” (Emphasis added) (McElhatton, 2006). In fact the inequality in importance between the Tasman nations can even be seen in each country’s respective MFAT/DFAT publications. Whereas New Zealand has assigned a whole category to its relationship with Australia, Australia’s relations with New Zealand are conversely given
limited attention in DFAT publications with New Zealand being grouped in with other South Pacific nations such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

Indeed, though often subtly expressed in official discourse of the Governments on either side of the Tasman, important differences between New Zealand and Australia can be seen in a variety of areas relating to these nations’ international affairs. The widening gap in terms of foreign and security policies between these old ‘antipodean mates’ has even been noticed at the highest levels. For instance, New Zealand Prime Minister, Helen Clark, has herself been known to remark on several occasions that New Zealand and Australia are: “embarked on fundamentally different directions and the cultures of our two countries are moving further apart. The way our nations view the world and our place in it is also diverging” (Clark, cited in Hawke, 2006). This chapter will examine several key areas of difference in New Zealand and Australia’s international relations, namely those relating to the realms of foreign policy, security policies and approaches to important international issues on the international agenda today.

**Foreign Policy**

First of all in regard to foreign policy, though sharing a great interest and concern in the affairs and security of the Asia-Pacific region, New Zealand and Australia have diverged in their geographical area of prime focus and have developed different priorities. Australia, on the one hand, has focused the bulk of its attention within the region on Asia, particularly on strengthening and improving its ties with the nations of North and Southeast Asia. This is because close engagement with Asia is considered to be not only an abiding priority but also an imperative in Australian foreign policy, largely owing to “the fundamental strategic, political and economic interests we have at stake in the region” and because of “important relationships we have developed with Asian partners” - seven of which continue to be among Australia’s top ten export destinations (Calvert, 2000). Indeed, up until the early 2000s with the emergence of Pacific unrest and instability in the Solomon’s, Tonga and Fiji, Australia gave hardly a sideways glance at its Pacific island neighbours, a fact shown in the way that up until 2003 at least Australian foreign policy publications were marked by “the absence of any discussion of Australia’s relations with its Pacific island neighbours, not even any mention...of the largest and most populous of them, Papua New Guinea” (Templeton, 2004). New Zealand, on the other hand, has in contrast tended to concentrate its attention primarily
on the South Pacific, and made comparatively slower and more hesitant moves to engage with Asia, largely owing to the belief that the South Pacific is the area to which it can gain easiest access and in which New Zealand is able to more freely display its own qualities of leadership (Winston Peters, cited in ‘Australia offers to evacuate Kiwis, 2006). As Peters states, “our relationships in the Pacific are a special priority for the government” (Peters, 2006f), “the Pacific is of critical importance to New Zealand’s foreign policy because it is our neighbourhood, and our primary sphere of influence” (Peters, 2006h). Furthermore, even in the strategic area closest to ‘home’ for both countries – a zone extending from today’s ‘arc of instability’ North and Northeast of Australia through to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands - Australia has tended to focus its efforts on Melanesia, while New Zealand has concentrated on Polynesia where New Zealand interests mostly lie (McLean, 2001b, p. 23).

Moreover, comments have even been made in the international sphere regarding the two different styles of approach the Australasian nations have adopted in their foreign policies, in reference to their preferred style of diplomacy towards nations of the Asia-Pacific. Australia has been said to be much more assertive - even aggressive - in its diplomacy with nations within the region, more focus on obtaining concrete outcomes, and seemingly more prone to an approach of ‘influence through coercion’ (Hawke, 2004d). Indeed, at times Australia has been criticized for being less respectful of cultural differences and more driven for concrete outcomes and was recently even accused of being an “arrogant bully” adopting provocative tactics and attempting to manipulate island politics, as Prime Minister Sogavare of the Solomon’s alleged this year with regard to Australia’s influence within RAMSI (Berry, 2006a; ‘Howard calls Pacific bully label ‘laughable”, 2006; ‘Pacific tension dominates Tasman talks’, 2007). New Zealand, in comparison, is reputed to be more respectful, relaxed, and less demanding or intrusive than its larger neighbour, approaching sensitive issues with discretion, allowing room for the ‘Pacific’ or ‘Asian Way’ of conducting international negotiations, and generally preferring to influence through persuasion by way of compelling arguments (Jame, 2006d). As Winston Peters has expressed on the New Zealand approach, the Government’s over-arching foreign policy goal is to be able “to influence the international environment” through the promotion of the nation’s interests and values, in the knowledge that “our influence comes not from our ability to impose our will on other countries, but from working with others and persuading them of the merits of our
arguments” (Peters, 2006b). Or as stated elsewhere by John Wood, the NZ Ambassador to the USA, New Zealand is “conscious of the diversity that exists within our region and the different historical background of our peoples” in its approach to the Pacific region, and acknowledges that “approaches to problems in different parts of the Pacific need to be tailored to the cultural and national expectations of our diverse peoples and their abilities and needs” (Wood, 2004, p. 9).

**Security Policy**

However it is in the area of defence and security especially that New Zealand and Australia have diverged most noticeably from each other in recent decades. Indeed, according to Max Bradford divergence on security issues have become the biggest source of friction and dispute between the two countries, contributing greatly to the deterioration of Australia-New Zealand relations “even though both countries know neither can do without the other” (Bradford, 2001, p. 27). Or as Derek Quigley more emphatically argues, divergence in security policy between the Tasman pair is one of the major internal divisions in the trans-Tasman relationship and New Zealand’s most important single difference with Australia (Quigley, 2001). New Zealand and Australia’s differing attitudes and actions with regard to two security matters in particular have been instrumental to this security gap between the pair. These concern namely: their differing approaches to the nuclear issue; and secondly, their oppositional strategic assessments of the surrounding security environment that have resulted in completely disparate policies with regard to the purpose and structure of their own defence forces, as well as over-all divergence in their approaches to security.

**The Nuclear Issue**

New Zealand and Australia’s divergence on the nuclear issue is one that is well-known and documented on both sides of the Tasman. It is an issue that extends back to the time of the Cold War and the year 1985 when the New Zealand Labour Government, under Prime Minister David Lange, imposed a ban refusing entry to all nuclear-powered ships to New Zealand waters, an action that was part of the Government’s wider political agenda at that time of promoting a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) in the South Pacific. The move inevitably led to conflict with the United States in that it led New Zealand to, firstly, directly challenge the superpower’s fixed “neither confirm nor deny” policy for US ship visits, and secondly, to question the United States overall strategy of nuclear deterrence
in the Cold War\(^{15}\) - both American policies which were accepted and supported by Australia and its other major allies. At a time when the United States was keenly sensitive to dissension from traditional allies, the United States reacted by suspending all its obligations towards the country either in terms of New Zealand’s defence or its military development, which in effect equated to New Zealand’s expulsion from the 1951 ANZUS security alliance, and by demoting the small country’s status from ‘ally’ to ‘friend’. This in turn lead to a colossal split in NZ-US relations - fuelled in New Zealand by an explosive merger of general anti-American sentiment with the much larger anti-nuclear lobby (Swindells, 2004) - the echoes of which are still reverberating twenty years later (Dobell, 2004). However New Zealand’s introduction of anti-nuclear policies did not only affect the country’s relations with the US, but also caused a rift in New Zealand’s relationship with its nearest neighbour and primary security ally Australia. Indeed, New Zealand’s radical introduction of anti-nuclear policies was regarded by Australia as a violation of commitments New Zealand made in the tripartite ANZUS security treaty, especially its pledge to promote military inter-action between the other signatory nations Australia and the United States (McLean, 2001a). Up until this time New Zealand and Australia had approached security issues in more or less the same way, sharing as they did a common strategic outlook (McLean, 2001a). New Zealand’s actions in this matter marked the beginning of a parting of the ways between the Tasman pair, however, both in terms of their perspective on nuclear issues and their status with regard to the ANZUS security alliance with the US. Indeed, essential differences on these matters, reflected in the New Zealand and Australia’s divergent security policies since the mid-1980s, have remained on-going features of trans-Tasman relations to this day.

Indeed, New Zealand’s stance as a self-declared nuclear-free nation, with its anti-nuclear legislation and strong opposition to nuclear weapons, the ‘flawed logic’ of nuclear deterrence, and nuclear energy more generally, is in marked contrast to Australia’s nuclear policies. New Zealand, on the one hand, has sustained its own Nuclear Free Zone, “against enormous pressure to change from close allies” (Goff, 2001a, p. 12) and its anti-nuclear legislation has remained firmly in place since its imposition two decades ago. Indeed, since its official adoption by the National Bolger

\(^{15}\) In his Oxford Union speech of 1985, Prime Minister David Lange made the case that a deterrence strategy based on arsenals of nuclear weapons was “morally indefensible” (Lange, 1985).
Government in 1992 (James, 2006a) New Zealand’s anti-nuclear security policies have enjoyed bi-partisan support in parliament, a trend that is set to continue with John Key’s recent pledge to retain the legislation and keep New Zealand nuclear-free under any future National government (Houlahan, 2006c). In the international sphere, moreover, New Zealand has become a fearless spokesman on nuclear issues in the international arena and a fierce opponent of nuclear testing, the development or improvement of nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Indeed, the country has been greatly active in the anti-nuclear cause, working to put in place the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty banning nuclear testing in the Pacific, with the aim of making the Southern Hemisphere totally nuclear-weapon free (Goff, 2001a; Robson 2001a), and installing at least six monitoring stations in the Pacific as part of the International Monitoring system established to detect nuclear explosive testing anywhere in the world (Goff, 2001a). New Zealand has also gained membership to a wide array of anti-nuclear groups including the New Agenda group, which was created to push nuclear states into disarming more speedily and is presently engaged in compelling the five nuclear weapons states to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons (Goff, 2006b). In taking these actions New Zealand is working not only to make the world nuclear-free and to eliminate all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) for good (Robson, 2001a), but also – it has been said – towards the aim of becoming the “champion of the world anti-nuclear movement” (Locke, 2003). As Matt Robson, the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, has stated: “Ridding the world of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has long been important to New Zealand…New Zealand is actively promoting the cause of nuclear disarmament…Total elimination of these weapons is the real solution” (Robson, 2001b).

Like New Zealand, Australia is also seriously concerned about the spread of WMDs and is a strong supporter of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regimes as well as of moves to strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Calvert, 2000). In fact Australia and New Zealand have worked closely together on international anti-nuclear legislation in past years, such as on the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and on negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (Calvert, 2000). Both nations have also strongly condemned North Korea’s latest nuclear test in October 2006.
and continue to show concern regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions (Peters, 2006d; ‘Government condemns N Korea test’, 2006). Nevertheless, though Australia continues to support anti-nuclear initiatives in the wider world and actively promotes the importance of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (Calvert, 2000) it is not a member of the New Agenda group as New Zealand is, nor has it opposed the transport of radioactive materials through the Pacific as does New Zealand (Calvert, 2000). In fact the reality is that the country has never adopted any anti-nuclear legislation of its own for Australia, nor has there been in the past or at the present time a desire to do so among successive Australian Governments. Indeed, in addition to continuing to receive US ships in Australian waters as an on-going member of the ANZUS alliance, Australia retains nuclear installations at numerous US-Australian bases across the continent and has remained open to nuclear options, both in the realms of global security and that of energy production. For instance, Australia continues to mine uranium for export worldwide, even recently indicating an intention to export uranium to both China and India in future years (though under strict provisos in their case that Australian uranium is not to be used for military purposes) (Kelton, 2006), and is currently contemplating a nuclear solution to the twin problems of global climate change and Australia’s looming energy crisis, with plans to construct 25 nuclear reactors across Australia with corresponding nuclear waste disposal sites from 2020 (Kelly, 2006b). In fact, as of September this year, the Howard Government has approved uranium sales to Russia and made plans to join an American programme designed to develop new nuclear technology (Ansley, 2007). Moreover as far as the logic of nuclear deterrence is concerned, both throughout the Cold War and also today in the current War on Terror post-9/11, as well as in view of North Korea and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Australian Government remains committed with the United States and the United Kingdom to the principle of nuclear deterrence in the belief that, as former British PM Tony Blair phrased it, it would be “unwise and dangerous for...any of the nuclear powers, to give up its independent nuclear deterrent” as an “independent nuclear deterrent is the ultimate insurance” (cited in Knight, 2006).

**Strategic Outlook**

The second area of divergence between New Zealand and Australia in their security policy concerns the recent and unprecedented emergence of two disparate strategic outlooks between the neighbours. Since the early years of the Cold War Australia and
New Zealand had considered themselves to be so alike in their defence posture\textsuperscript{16} as to form a “Single Strategic Entity” (McLean, 1980; Hawke, 2003a). As the New Zealand 1978 White Paper Review stated: “In a strategic sense the two countries are one” (cited in Henderson, 1980b, p. 43). According to McLean this concept was “a reciprocal recognition on the part of both countries that in the great stream of history, Australians and New Zealanders have fetched up in a very anomalous position”, finding themselves in a shared strategic predicament as “two outliers of the West perched under the very diverse, dynamic but unstructured realm of Eastern Asia” (McLean, 2001a). In 2000-2001, however, this concept was put to an end under the newly-elected Labour-Alliance Coalition Government, with PM Clark starting that the concept of a ‘single strategic entity’ between New Zealand and Australia implied “the decisions would not be ours alone and, deeply as we love [the Australians] we are not prepared to take that step” (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 280-281). Henceforth, it was announced, the nation would make its own decisions and no longer be automatically involved with Australia militarily “come what may” (Quigley, 2001, p. 53) – what Mclean calls separatism at the expense of what could best be achieved together in a shared strategic environment (McLean, 2003, p. 281). As the notion of New Zealand and Australia constituting a single strategic entity had been a key element in the trans-Tasman relationship over many decades (Bradford, 2001, p. 27), New Zealand’s complete departure from the status quo sparked a major rift between the two nations and signalled an unmistakable parting of the ways in years to come.

New Zealand’s decision to bury the concept of ‘single strategic entity’, in what was a radical departure from history, and the divergence in security policies between New Zealand and Australia that have ensued in the years afterwards, have in actuality been primarily driven by the development of disparate strategic outlooks between the Tasman pair. Historically Australia has always maintained a rather pessimistic view of its surrounding strategic environment (Dunn, 1984) and this is a pattern that has continued to the present day under the Howard Governments (Ayson, 2004). As a key maritime state in the Asia-Pacific located at a close proximity to Southeast Asia and flanked by Indonesia, with the so-called ‘arc of instability’ “above its head inflamed with violence

\textsuperscript{16} The term ‘defence posture’ is used to encompass a state’s military capability, as well as its orientation and perceptions as regards other states, which may include both physical and political considerations (The Australian Approach to Warfare, 2002, p. 19).
and insurrection” (Ansley, 2001), and interests to protect on the Asian mainland as well as in the Indian Ocean, Australians continue to feel today as in the past that while armed conflict with its neighbours is not considered likely, such an event is not at all unthinkable either (Bradford, 2001, p. 27; White, 2003). Indeed, in viewing the region as one prone to conflict, threatened by state failure, and bursting with potential for collaboration with terrorists or engaging in transnational crime, the Australian Government considers Australia to inhabit a strategic environment that is “fluid and uncertain” and endued with great potential for change (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 16; White, 2002a).

In stark contrast, following the 1999 election of the Labour-Alliance Government led by Helen Clark, New Zealand adopted a new strategic outlook – and one completely at odds with that of Australia - which emphasizes the absence of traditional military threats to New Zealand and the idea that the country enjoys an ‘exceptionally’ benign strategic environment as “a small nation without enemies” (Clark, 2001b) located in the vast South Pacific ocean. As Clark stated in 2001, “We count ourselves very lucky to live in one of the most strategically secure environments in the world” (Clark, 2001a), or as she asserted more infamously in a Face the Nation television interview on 5th April 2001, “New Zealanders do not need to be concerned. We live in an incredibly benign strategic environment…the region poses no security risks”. While in defence of these statements, it has been suggested that the PM’s comments have been misinterpreted or taken out of context (Ayson, 2004), the fact remains that the Government has continued to advocate this message (though the wording has been adjusted), even in the aftermath of the horrific 9/11 terrorist attacks, the ensuing War on Terror, and the Bali Bombings of 2002 in which fifteen New Zealanders and scores of Australians were injured or killed. Consider, for instance, the following statements by Helen Clark and her consecutive Foreign Ministers, Phil Goff and Winston Peters, that continue to express the Government’s view that “in terms of state-on state conflict, of course it is a benign environment” (Clark, cited in Watkins, 2003) and that New Zealand “does not face a conventional military threat” (Goff, 2006a; Goff, 2007a; Peters, 2006b). As Goff remarked this year:

“New Zealand does not face presently, a conventional military threat. We are an island country of only four million people…Our closest neighbours are
Australia to our west, the South Pacific Islands to our North, and Antarctica to our south. We are surrounded by the Pacific Ocean" (Goff, 2007a)

What this means is that Australia is preparing for a more risky future in what it considers a "strategically dynamic and uncertain region" of the world (White, 2002a), at the same time as New Zealand continues to ‘assume’ the continuance of the present ‘stable’ environment (Hensley, 2001, p. 97) and to ascribe to the prevailing belief that New Zealand is a country of the mostly “quiet South Pacific” (McLean, 2003, p. 256). This contradiction in terms between Australia and New Zealand in their strategic outlooks can be seen even in regard to specific security concerns. In regard to the prospect of major power confrontation in the region, for instance, both nations observe that relations between the great powers - China, Japan, India, Russia and the United States - are relatively stable, and significantly more so today than in past years (Goff, 2006a; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 16). Nevertheless, while New Zealand optimistically views this fact as a sign that regional tensions on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Straits and in South Asia “can be managed without military conflict” in the future (Goff, 2006a), Australia conversely considers the risk of a great power conflagration escalating into a military conflict to be “not low”, meaning that Australia could well be drawn into a conventional war, whether as part of a US-led coalition or alone in defence of its own interests, forces or assets in the region, or in order to protect its own territory should the conflict be not far from Australia’s borders (White, 2002a). As Colin James states in regard to New Zealand: “A small, isolated and sea-girt country finds it difficult to accept that the quiet south is co-extensive with the dynamic, fast-changing world of emergent Asian nationalisms and of serious great power confrontation in the North East Pacific” (James, 2006d).

The rising spectre of international terrorism, now manifesting itself as a tough and adaptable menace to the world set to endure for years to come17, is another more vivid

17 As the head of the British Army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, recently expressed in a secret meeting with his senior staff later leaked to the British press, the world needs to prepare itself for “a generation of conflict” involving decades of fighting against ‘strident’ Islamic terrorism. According to General Dannatt, the British general public have not yet grasped the fact that Britain’s armed forces are engaged “in a wider conflict that may last for a generation” in which Islamic extremism would continue to menace the West not only in threats of conflict in the Middle East, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also within British society itself as “The threats and challenges to our society are global and have sympathizers in many societies and countries, including at
illustration of an issue on which divergent security outlooks have become apparent between the Tasman pair in recent years. In Australia the sense of threat among Australian policy-makers in the post-9/11 world has been greatly heightened with Government documents confirming that “Australia has been identified as a target” (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 11), that “militant extremists in Southeast Asia are prepared to take up the Al Qaida cause” (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 11) and that overall there is an increased risk of terrorist attack on Australians and Australian interests domestically and internationally (‘Defence and Security’, 2006). Indeed, Australia’s vulnerability to terrorist attack is something which weighs heavily in the minds of Australians with a 2005 poll revealing that 70 per cent of Australians believe their nation will experience a terrorist attack in the future (Moore, 2005, p. B5). In contrast even the shocking September 11 terrorist attacks that devastated forever America’s notions of invulnerability have failed to affect New Zealand’s view that it will never be directly attacked by anyone (McLean, 2003, p. 257). Indeed, despite its unalterable Western-nation stripe and the fact that it also displays the same democratic liberal qualities so despised by Islamic extremists, New Zealand not only continues to consider itself ‘safe’ from terrorist attack, but actually goes further in lauding itself as a safe haven from terrorism. In fact, according to political commentator Colin James, the country has even taken to “preachiness and moralizing” about the strategic perceptions and concerns of other nations (James, 2006d). As Colin James wryly comments: “Where the troublespots are far away, it is easy to gloss over the security concerns of others” (James, 2006d). It is this prevailing attitude of complacency in New Zealand which White considers may explain why New Zealanders finds it so hard to accept the...
legitimacy of Australia’s strategic perception, thought to underpin Australia’s entire defence posture, and why they are so apt to suspiciously question Australian motives and purposes (White, 2003).

The result of such different strategic outlooks of course are two neighbours that are not only anticipating disparate futures in the region, but that are each making oppositional capability decisions in order to meet these divergent expectations. As a consequence, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) have become widely dissimilar in recent years in their purpose or *raison d’être*, their structure, and the level of Government funding invested in their development.

**The Australian Defence Force (ADF)**

In continuing to view nation-states as well as the alignments and conflicts between them as the key components to Australia’s strategic environment (*Advancing the National Interest*, 2003, p. 16), Australia remains firmly anchored in a traditional defence posture with the main purpose and highest priority of the ADF being “the defence of our country and our community from armed attack” (*Defence 2000*, 2000, p. VII). For while a major attack on Australia is considered unlikely at the present time, the Australian Government considers that the consequences of even a minor attack would be sufficiently serious to Australia as to compel it to address and prepare for such an attack (*Defence 2000*, 2000, p. 30). Indeed, in accordance with its more wary strategic outlook, Australian strategic decision-making is formed with two very real possibilities kept in mind: first, that one can not assume the continuity of present circumstances; and second, that force-structure decisions must be made on the basis of long time frames of about 40-50 years, in recognition of the fact that “over long time-frames there may be significant potential for changes to our strategic environment which could make major conflict much less unlikely than it is today” (White, 2002a). After all, as Hugh White points out, Australia came very close to conflict with Indonesia after its INTERFET deployment in East Timor in 1999 (White, 2002a). Linked to this priority is an Australian security doctrine of ‘independent self-defence’—said to be at the heart of Australia’s defence posture - by which the ADF

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20 This security posture of ‘independent self-defence’ was actually adopted in the final years of the Cold War. Up until this time Australia had sought to assure its own self-defence though maintaining strong defence alliances with its key allies New Zealand, the United States and the United Kingdom, and through entering into collective security arrangements as in ANZUS or SEATO. However with great power alliances seeming of diminished value as the global political environment changed in the late 1980s, Australia decided it was
must not only have a capacity to defend the Australian homeland and its people from all threats, but also be able to perform such an act alone and in a comprehensive fashion should the worst case scenario occur as “Australia believes alliances and allies cannot be completely relied upon if the crunch comes” (McElhatton, 2006).

With such an objective as this in mind, Australia has developed the ADF in a manner that completely mirrors its ‘independent self-defence’ security doctrine, with a great deal of importance being continually placed on the ADF’s maintenance of a high level of combat capabilities across all air, sea and land forces in order that it might be able to fight major conventional wars, either in defence of its own territory or within the region at large (Kennedy, 2002; Winning in Peace, Winning in War, 2004). As the 2002 Australian White Paper indicates, the goal of the ADF is to maintain and further develop an “integrated and balanced joint force”, comprised of a credible combat-capable navy, army and air force, able to operate jointly to defend Australia by controlling the air and sea approaches and responding effectively to any armed incursion by hostile forces onto Australian soil” (Defence 2000, 2000, p. XII). In maintaining highly trained and equipped war-fighting forces across all three branches of the ADF, moreover, Australia considers itself to have created forces that are adaptable and flexible enough to be drawn upon to meet its second and third priorities in the realm of defence - contributing to the security of Australia’s immediate Asia-Pacific neighbourhood (either through combat operations in response to emerging threats or low-level operations addressing non-military threats like coastal surveillance, counter-terrorist response, emergency management, search and rescue, or disaster relief) and contributing to international operations towards global security in alignment with Australia’s national interests (either in UN or NATO sanctioned humanitarian operations or in coalitions of the willing in concert with Australia’s allies and friends – particularly the United States) (Dickens, 2001, p. 40; The Australian Approach to Warfare, 2002, p. 20; Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 26; Defence 2000, 2000, p. XIII). As a publication of the Australia Department of Defence makes clear:

The Australian Defence Force aims to develop and maintain high levels of professional war fighting mastery. In pursuing such mastery, our defence force deliberately focuses its training upon the most demanding and

necessary to have an independent security strategy, thereby taking on the new posture of independent self-reliance, while also continuing to place great emphasis on its key alliances.

Consequently, due to this commitment to maintain a defence force of the highest level of combat capability feasibly possible, since “a strong and capable defence force is fundamental to Australia’s security” (*Australia in Brief*, 2003, p. 26), Australia invests hefty sums into the ADF in order to maintain such a structure, much of which goes towards the reinvigoration or upgrade of its air combat, maritime, strike and information capabilities (Kennedy, 2002; I. Grant, 2001). In fact this is a trend that extends back to the end of the Cold War and the birth of Australia’s self-reliance doctrine which has continued under successive Australian governments to the present day. Indeed, total defence funding reached $16.35 billion between 2004-2005, and $20 billion has been pledged for the years 2006-2007 - a figure which is expected to rise by about 3% per annum over the next decade\(^1\) (*Australia in Brief*, 2003, p. 26; ‘Defence and Security’, 2005; Dodd, 2006; *Defence 2000*, 2000, p. VI, XVII).

**The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)**

Upon coming into office in 1999, the Labour-led New Zealand Government was quick to turn its attention to reorganizing the NZDF, which it then regarded as “representing a confused view of the roles our armed forces are likely to be called upon to perform” (Burton, 2001). Traditionally the priority task of the NZDF, as in Australia and elsewhere, had been the defence of New Zealand and its interests through the application of deadly force, with humanitarian tasks relegated to a secondary role (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). In the Government’s view, however, traditional defence postures were outdated and ill-suited to the security environment of the modern world -

\(^1\) This is the most specific long-term defence funding commitment given by any Australian Government in over 25 years. Another example of Australian divergence in its defence and security policies and outlook from that of its small neighbour, is the fact that while New Zealand has banished its air combat capability, Australia recently committed itself to a $16 billion purchase of up to 100 Joint Strike Fighters by 2013, and has pledged a total of $20 billion for defence spending during the years 2006-2007, a proportion of which is being funneled into recruiting over 2,600 Australians into the army so as to make two extra battalions, thereby boosting total army numbers to 30,000 (*Australia in Brief*, 2003, p. 26; ‘Defence and Security’, 2005; Dodd, 2006; Stewart, 2006; *Advancing the National Interest*, 2003, p. VI). Indeed, while the size of the Australian Army is set to increase by 20% from 25,000 to 30,000 over the next decade, New Zealand’s Army remains under strength with its regular and territorial forces at critically low levels – a fact said to have played a major role in its inability to make a meaningful peacekeeping contribution to Lebanon – with every increase of 5,000 Australian soldiers representing almost the entire full-time New Zealand Army (Roy, 2006).
after all New Zealand’s first battalion level deployment since World War II had been that of peacekeepers to East Timor (Burton, 2004a). Consequently, motivated by its new “realistic strategic assessment” (Burton, 2001), the Government set about to revolutionise (or in the Government’s words “re-energise”) both the NZDF and general thinking about the basic premises of defence and security in New Zealand (Burton, 2001). In June 2000 the Government released its Defence Policy Framework that declared that since New Zealand is not likely to be involved in widespread armed conflict, it can best contribute to regional stability and world peace by promoting comprehensive security through a range of initiatives including diplomacy, trade and cultural links, foreign aid, and arms control (Defence Policy Framework, 2000, p. 2). The new prime purpose of the NZDF, asserted the Government, was to produce sizeable well-equipped combat trained land forces ready and able to act as effective UN peacekeepers overseas, to perform non-traditional military tasks such as South Pacific resource protection, disaster relief and New Zealand civil defence, and act against what are widely deemed non-military threats like transnational crime, natural disasters, state fragility and failure in the Pacific, and the proliferation of WMDs (Defence Policy Framework, 2000; White, 2002a; Goff, 2006a; McCraw, 2006a, p. 24). In this way defence policy in New Zealand became - almost overnight - an adjunct of New Zealand’s foreign policy, concerned with the defence of New Zealand’s wider external interests rather than traditional self-defence against foreign aggression (McLean, 2001a; Burton, 2004a; O’Brien, 2005).

In what Colin James calls an agenda to “convert militarism to humanitarianism” (James, 2001b), the Government subsequently reorganized the NZDF to reflect this new role and to develop “an appropriate force structure to match New Zealand’s defence objectives” in pursuit of “a modern, professional, well-equipped Defence Force that is sustainable, affordable, and appropriate to New Zealand’s Defence requirements” (Burton, 2004a). Instead of maintaining a traditional defence structure oriented around self-defence capabilities and a ‘balanced military force’, which in the Government’s view had only produced an NZDF of “shallow breadth” (Burton, 2004a), the Government opted to develop “depth over breadth” (Burton, 2004a) and focus on equipping the NZDF only to perform the well-defined humanitarian tasks and roles delegated in the Framework, which the Government considered New Zealand could perform best (Burton, 2001). Thus severe downgrades were undertaken to New Zealand’s naval combat and maritime
surveillance capabilities and the air combat capabilities of the Air Force were abandoned – including infamously and controversially the cancellation of a planned F-16 purchase from the US and the scrapping of the NZRAF’s Skyhawk combat wing - since the Navy and Air Force were now relegated to playing supporting roles (Burton, 2001; Kennedy, 2002). In carrying out such a drastic action, the Government ensured that any future New Zealand deployment overseas would be undertaken in collaboration with a larger international force, an approach called ‘jointness’, which is considered “particularly relevant for small countries such as New Zealand” since it offers “a valuable alternative” to the increased costs and complexities of maintaining the all-round capabilities required by more traditional defence structures (Burton, 2001). Indeed, in acting this way the Government considered itself to be implementing a security strategy that would improve the NZDF’s ability to contribute effectively to international deployments, and thereby enhance New Zealand’s status on the world stage, while also sparing the country the expense of maintaining a broad range of capabilities which the Government contended could be provided by other countries anyway (Kennedy, 2002). As the former Minister of Defence stated a few years ago: “We had to maximize our strengths, directing our resources to those areas in which we excel, and where we can make a real contribution to international deployments. We are a nation of four million people, and we cannot be all things to all people” (Burton, 2004a). Or later on, “We had to refocus defence policy, in light of what New Zealand’s security needs were, and what part we wanted, and were able to play, in regional and global security” (Burton, 2005b).

Unsurprisingly the Government’s investment in the NZDF since 2000 likewise reflects this strategy, with funds being channelled primarily into equipping and outfitting the army, such as with light, highly-deployable craft like the LAV3 armoured personnel carriers necessary for effective peacekeeping, and in transforming the Navy and Air Force to better perform their ‘softer’ military roles, i.e. the acquisition of New Zealand’s first Multi-Role Vessel (MRV) the HANZS Canterbury to support New Zealand’s regional deployments. Through the Government’s 2002 ‘Defence Long Term Development Plan’ (LTDP) and 2005 ‘Defence Sustainability Initiative’ (DSI), the Government has pledged a $3.5 billion investment into new equipment over the next ten years and a further $4.6 billion into military personnel as part of its initiative to remould the NZDF, through “transforming the Navy, modernising the Army, and implementing capability improvements in the Air Force” (Burton, 2005b; ‘Annual Report 2006’, 2006; ‘Defence
Long-Term Development Plan’, 2006). This is in order to meet Government objectives of creating a ‘fiscally and resource sustainable, ready, deployable, up-to-date NZDF that is equipped and trained for combat and peacekeeping and able to operate alongside other forces’ (‘Statement of Intent of the NZDF’, 2006). However, when seen in light of its downgrades and combat capability cuts, this injection of funds is merely a ‘life-extension’ that covers only the basics of restoring the NZDF to a twenty-first century equipment level, boosting low personnel numbers so that it might perform its peacekeeping and peace support abilities, and generally retaining abilities that are necessary for the NZDF to carry out peacekeeping missions like those undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor, not to mention basic non-military functions (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24-25; ‘Statement of Intent of the NZDF’, 2006). Indeed, though the Clark Governments investment in the NZDF forms the first major boost in defence funding in five decades (Moore, 2005), according to McCraw as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product it is still one of the lowest in the world standing today at 0.85 per cent22 in spite of the ‘Defence Sustainability Initiative’ (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24).

This dramatic transformation of the NZDF undertaken by the Clark governments since 1999, and the country’s resulting shift away from its traditional defence posture and that maintained by Australia, has been alternately condemned as well as applauded by antipodean academics on both sides of the Tasman. As Ayson points out, at one end of the spectrum there has been a substantial number of voices raised both in New Zealand and in Australia portraying concern and alarm at what is viewed as an “apparent fraying of traditional linkages” on the New Zealand side of the Ditch (Ayson, 2004, p. 2). Indeed, New Zealand’s downgrade of its combat capabilities and shift towards humanitarianism in its security policies is reputed to have not only angered Australia but bewildered and distressed New Zealand’s other key security allies the United Kingdom, the United States and Singapore, all of whom have become increasingly suspicious that there is a hidden agenda in the Clark Government to turn New Zealand towards isolationism and a form of non-alignment in world affairs (Bradford, 2001, p. 27-28). Within New Zealand’s political community the change in direction has raised talk of New

22 In comparison Australia spent 1.8 per cent on defence as a percentage of GDP in 2004 (Hide, 2004) – a figure which is expected to rise. Interestingly, though under—investment in the NZDF and defence infrastructure was rife in the 1980s with New Zealand’s armed forces undergoing multiple downgrades and steady cuts in the defence budget throughout the decade (Henderson, 1991a), the average percentage of the GDP spent on defence before 1990 was a much higher 1.9 per cent with New Zealand having “no trouble funding a combat-ready army, navy and air force” (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24).
Zealand “drifting into irrelevancy” (Bradford, 2001, p. 28) and questions regarding whether the country is developing a welfare mentality about security (Hensley, 2001, p. 97), with fierce criticisms being made that the Clark Government “has emasculated the New Zealand armed forces at the very time when our main security partner, Australia, is making defence preparedness a top priority” (Prebble, 2002) and that as a result of Government decisions “our Air Force cannot fight to defend us, our Navy has only a part-time blue water combat capability, our Army is incapable of fighting as part of an allied formation... we cannot supply essential Defence” (Hide, 2004). As McCraw has stated: “No country maintains military forces just to cope with disasters or to keep the peace in other countries” (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24).

In Australia, moreover, there has been strong criticism that New Zealand has become “a strategic liability” (Paul Dibb, cited in ‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005) and a free-rider on its defence systems, being both unwilling and now unable to pull its weight in defence and carry its share of the military and fiscal burden of maintaining peace and security in the Asia-Pacific – a situation seen to be reflective of the Kiwi ‘bludging’ or ‘something-for-nothing’ mentality (Bradford, 2001; McElhatton, 2006; James, 2005). In fact since New Zealand is viewed as having made itself entirely dependent on Australia for its own self-defence in a worst case scenario, while unable to contribute anything of significance to the defence of Australia should it likewise require assistance, some Australians have become very upset and resentful that New Zealand seems to be ‘pulling out’ and “turning its back on the cooperation and comradeship of the ANZAC tradition” (Bradford, 2001, p. 27), causing some to conclude, like Pallet, that New Zealand is making “a mockery of eulogies so easily given on Anzac Day” (Pallot, 2006). Certainly New Zealand’s decisions on defence have led to a growing divergence between the Tasman pair as the tech gap widens and differences in force structure, strike capability and position with regard to the US alliance becoming increasingly apparent (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005). In fact New Zealand has so limited itself and its abilities, in terms of contributing to medium to high-level conflicts within the Asia-Pacific and their abilities to protect themselves while operating effectively, that should the security environment in the region become more threatening and conflict between regional powers more imminent, further strains in the Australia-New Zealand security relationship are expected to result (Ayson, 2004, p. 9-10).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, however, the changes made to the NZDF are considered to be realistic modern measures reflective of the security landscape of the twenty-first century in which traditional perceptions about security are being re-aligned away from responding to military threats from states to reacting to threats emanating from non-state sources and performing an increasing array of non-military security tasks (Fortune, 2005). From this perspective, Australia’s defence posture emphasizing preparedness for conventional warfare within its own region and in defence of its own territory is becoming old-fashioned and increasingly obsolete in the globalizing world of today. As the head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Hugh White, has predicted:

Industrialised countries around the world will slowly follow New Zealand’s lead by moving out of expensive capabilities needed in old-fashioned wars, and will move further down the road towards forces dominated by light, highly-deployable land forces suited to the new tasks which have become so common in the decade since the Berlin wall came down (White, cited in Kennedy, 2002).

Indeed, a broader definition of security which places a greater emphasis on non-conventional aspects of security has been increasingly accepted within both academic and policy-making circles in recent times (Kennaway, 2001). In this sense New Zealand sees itself as having taken a modern and holistic view of security reflective of a world in which threat-based assumptions about security are being altered to interest-based calculations and large armed forces and sophisticated high tech weapons systems are no longer necessary (Fortune, 2005). Instead, it is attempting to meet the new requirements of this new security paradigm which involves increased cooperation, interdependence and common security initiatives at the international level, and flexible, self-reliant armed forces with multi-role capabilities at the national level, with emphasis on interoperability with all likely partners (Fortune, 2005). Moreover, New Zealand feels perfectly justified in taking this decision since, as Kennaway indicates, the major threats to the well being of New Zealanders since the end of the Second World War have been threats to economic well being rather than the threat or use of armed force (Kennaway, 2001). In Australia too an independent assessment of New Zealand’s defence strategy undertaken this year by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute gave the NZDF as it is
today in 2007 an “A pass” describing it as “becoming modern, fully capable operational forces”, something which Phil Goff has expounded as constituting “overall a ringing endorsement of progress that has been made in the NZDF and how it is currently placed” (Goff, 2007b). Indeed, enthusiasts of New Zealand’s current security stance frequently point to the way New Zealand won Australian approval in its rapid and professional commitment to East Timor’s INTERFET operation in 1999, reputed to have made “a massive impression” in Canberra (Patman, 2005, p. 55), as well as to the fact that Australians continue to regard the NZDF as “a highly professional force” and the high quality of its personnel to be “beyond question” (Australia’s Defence 2000 White Paper, cited in McElhatton, 2006).

It has even been suggested that though distasteful to traditional realists, New Zealand’s security stance today is actually “a natural equilibrium or resting place” in the evolution of New Zealand’s defence and security policy philosophy which is likely to become a long-term position in future years even with changes in government (Ayson, 2004, p. 5). This is because, as Colin James has asserted, “this strategic outlook has become so predominant among New Zealanders that it would be highly unlikely that any government could win an election should it advance a policy to spend commensurately with Australia on defence” and “New Zealanders are too few anyway to counter it” (James, 2006d). Consequently, though many continue to believe that a less stable, less predictable security order has emerged in the world post 9/11 in which events and conflicts may occur without precedent in world history making it impossible to predict the future shape of the global security environment (Ferguson, 2002), it is expected that New Zealand will continue to emphasise a humanitarian approach and look towards multilateral options in the years ahead, which equates to “being a good international citizen, playing by the rules of international law and preferring multilateral mandates” (James, 2006d).

**International Issues**

In addition to this divergence in foreign and security policy as related in regard to these particular issues, New Zealand and Australia have found themselves at odds on a number of international issues in the global arena, foremost among which have been America’s plans for a system of National Missile Defence (otherwise known as the ‘Star
Wars’ project), the Kyoto Protocol, and lastly and more controversially, the matter of Iraq’s disarmament in 2002-2003.

1) National Missile Defence
The first issue of major disparity between the Tasman neighbours in their International Relations concerns the Bush Administration’s plans to develop a National Missile Defence (NMD) system to protect itself and its allies from ballistic missile attacks, especially those potentially launched by rogue states like North Korea, Iran and pre-2003 Iraq (Patman, 2005, p. 59). In ‘understanding’ the American desire for such a system, the Australian Government has supported the project even expressing a readiness to be involved in its implementation (Patman, 2001; Patman, 2005). In contrast, the New Zealand Government has loudly opposed and condemned the project, stating that the missile shield would not at all ensure the protection of the US and its allies from attacks by terrorists or rogue states, and risked causing tension with China and Russia while more generally undermining the existing international network of arms control and disarmament treaties (Patman, 2001).

2) The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol is an international convention formulated in response to growing worldwide concern about global climate change and the destructive phenomenon of global warming now so strongly manifesting itself at the dawn of the twenty-first century. First negotiated in 1997, the Protocol is a treaty ratified by 141 countries that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 per cent of 1990 levels by the year 2012, primarily through imposing binding national limits on the amount of carbon dioxide permitted to be released into the atmosphere (Devine, 2005). In its early stages both New Zealand and Australia had expressed an intention of entering into the international agreement. However following the US withdrawal from the Protocol under the Bush Administration citing fears for the harm such limits would inflict on the US economy, the Australian Government followed in America’s footsteps and likewise withdrew, stating that without the United States agreement and participation the Protocol was ‘dead’ (Patman, 2001). According to Prime Minister Howard, Australia’s decision not to ratify the treaty was also based on genuine concerns that the treaty did not address important associated issues and that if Australia signed the Protocol it would be disadvantaged when competing to provide liquefied natural gas in Asia where there is a growing energy
demand (Devine, 2005). Indeed, from the Australian’s Government’s point of view, signing on to the treaty would prove futile if countries like Indonesia that have gas resources containing high levels of carbon dioxide are free to provide energy unfettered by Kyoto constraints and thereby make the global environment worse while Australia “will have lost out” (Devine, 2005). Instead, Howard explained, Australia would meet self-imposed limits of its own, for example by aiming to keep greenhouse emissions to 108 per cent of 1990 levels (Devine, 2005).

New Zealand strongly objected to this point of view and in stark contrast has remained firmly engaged in the agreement having signed on to the Protocol prior to its entry into force in February 2005 (Devine, 2005; ‘Keeping up appearances’, 2007). In fact the two years since New Zealand has demonstrated its firm commitment to emission reductions in having already imposed some of the limits set by the Protocol on New Zealand business and infrastructure and engaging in the newly created system of ‘carbon trading’ of “carbon credits”, developed by the European Union, chiefly through government investment in “clean energy” projects such as the creation of an immense wind-farm on the hills surrounding Palmerston North, and the expansion of hydroelectric dams in the South Island (Patman, 2005; Devine, 2005). In administering undertakings such as these, however, the Government has also been criticized by New Zealanders. This is particular the case on the part of rural South Islanders who have accused the Government of destroying South Island waterways in their headlong pursuit to enhance New Zealand’s “clean, green image” and play the “virtuous international citizen” (Devine, 2005). As they have argued, the country’s power needs would be better met through building a nuclear power station in Auckland rather than “squeezing the last drop of hydro capacity out of South Island creeks” (Devine, 2005) - a suggestion which is destined to fall on deaf ears in nuclear-free New Zealand. Indeed, as one of the few APEC countries committed to the emission reduction targets set out under the Protocol the Government continues to expound its strong commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and to promote the cause, as it has at the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney, even indicating that it is “highly likely” that New Zealand’s commitment to the Protocol will extend beyond 2012 regardless of the actions of Australia and the United States (Watkins, 2007b).
3) Iraq

Finally, the issue of Iraq’s disarmament culminating in the Iraq war of 2003 was another international matter which revealed a flagrant difference of view between these two Antipodean neighbours. The global crisis over Iraq arose out of a need for the world community to deal once and for all with Iraq and achieve its full and final disarmament in light of that country’s twelve-year history of disdain, non-cooperation and non-compliance with multiple UNSC resolutions regarding it under the leadership of the renowned dictator Saddam Hussein. Exactly one year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks that shocked the world and gave rise to the global war against terrorism, the United States placed the matter of Iraq in the international spotlight and onto the UN agenda through an address to the UN General Assembly delivered on 12 September 2002. In this memorable speech President Bush named Saddam’s regime a “grave and gathering danger” to international peace and security (‘President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly’, 2002) and called for decisive measures by the international community, and the UN specifically, to immediately and finally address what America considered to be a dangerous scenario in such an uncertain and turbulent time in modern history - a call that would ultimately lead to a full-scale war the following year.

Prior to the war that was eventually conducted by a concert of nations outside the sanction of the UN in March 2003, all nations - with the exception of Iraq itself - believed the country to be in possession of undeclared WMD stockpiles. The central question, therefore, was not whether Iraq was in breach of the resolutions concerning it, some of which formed part of the cease-fire agreement ending hostilities at the close of the 1991 Gulf War, but rather when, by what method and by whose authority the international community should bring Iraq to account and achieve its complete compliance. It was upon the discovery that there existed sharp disagreement and division on these three questions within the international community that the matter of Iraq’s disarmament quickly unravelled into a full-scale international crisis, with clear divisions visible not only within the UN Security Council (UNSC) itself – the heart of the UN organisation - but also within the entire international community at large. The heated debate would rage for seven months, reaching its zenith just prior to war being commenced against Iraq by the US-led Coalition of nations.

Throughout the crisis Australia was unequivocal in its support for the US Administration led by President Bush and shared the American point of view on the serious threat Iraq
posed to the world, especially in the context of the global War on Terror post-9/11. In the months of intense international debate over the matter, the Australian Government worked tirelessly with the US and the UK to explain the compelling case for Iraq’s disarmament, and then ultimately for war against Saddam’s regime, motivated by the hope that in doing so it would not only gain international understanding of the Australian and American positions and their reasons for taking it, but also win international support and participation should any future action against Iraq become necessary. Finally on 20 March 2003 Australia joined with the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain in a “Coalition of the Willing” to wage war against Saddam Hussein’s regime and finally disarm Iraq of all its illegal weapons with the support of an assortment of 44 nations of the world, yet without explicit UN sanction. Not only were relations between Australia and the United States greatly strengthened and enhanced as a result, but in 2004 the country was also seemingly ‘rewarded’ with a valuable Australian-US Free Trade Agreement. To date Australia continues to maintain a presence in Iraq with a warship stationed in the Gulf along with a number of Air Force craft on site, and approximately 1,400 personnel on site including a task force of 550 in the south of the nation and a small security detachment based in Baghdad (Ansley, 2007).

By contrast, though New Zealand supported the ultimate objective of disarming Iraq, it stood with the opponents of an Iraq war in emphasizing a diplomatic solution to the crisis and in refusing to participate in any military action against Iraq undertaken without unanimous UN Security Council authorization. Indeed, in remaining firmly committed to the multilateral process and the United Nations system, the New Zealand Government did not join the Coalition of the Willing and engage in hostilities against Iraq, instead expressing the view that any unsanctioned military attack against Iraq would undermine international law and “play into the hands of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda” (Patman, 2005, p. 60). Though New Zealand was subsequently excluded from a free trade agreement with the United States in the years afterwards, raising concerns within New Zealand that the Clark Government is paying “an economic price for failing to fully recognise the link between defence and trade” (Patman, 2005, p. 62), the Government has advocated that its ability to take an independent and strongly multilateralist position on key international issues like the Iraq invasion “should not be traded for hypothetical economic or political benefits” (Patman, 2005, p. 58, 62). Iraq has remained an issue of contention within New Zealand’s own political circles in the years since the war too. Not
only has it been the cause of heated arguments between the Government and the Opposition in parliament, but it has also exposed acute differences of view between the Foreign Minister Winston Peters and the Minister of Defence Phil Goff of the Labour-NZ First Coalition Government, not to mention fissures between Peters and the Prime Minister herself (‘Pullout from Iraq would create chaos – Peters’, 2007).

These overt differences in perspective over Iraq have remained a constant dividing factor in trans-Tasman relations in the years since. In a context of continuing difficulties within Iraq in the creation of its first democratic system of government as well as ongoing sectarian violence, while PM Clark has contended that “the invasion of Iraq has made the world less safe from terrorism” (Houlahan, 2006b), Howard continues to express the view that “Iraq is an active battleground in the ‘war on terrorism’” (cited in ‘Australian role deepens despite shooting fiasco’, 2006). Indeed the Australian Government firmly believes that the disturbing media images so frequently haunting news television programmes “offer a distorted picture of the historic change occurring in Iraq” during Iraq’s first chance at democracy in not accurately reflecting the real progress being made there, and moreover, continues to advocate its deeply-held belief that Iraq’s transition from dictatorship to democracy “will be one of the most significant global strategic developments this decade” (‘Iraq – the path ahead’, 2006). Furthermore, Howard has praised the 1500 ADF personnel currently working in Iraq, calling them Australia’s “finest internationalists” (Walters, 2007; ‘Nelson backs Howard’s letter to Iraq’, 2007), and has indicated that Australia, like its ally the United States, “will not be hostage to a particular timetable” but will withdraw its troops from Iraq only “when the job has been finished” (‘Australian role deepens despite shooting fiasco’, 2006). In fact even in light of Britain’s significant withdrawal from Basra in recent weeks, the Government has announced that it remains committed to Iraq, that the Australian Government would continue to judge its deployment in Iraq on a “day-by-day, month-by-month, year-by-year” basis, and that as long as its forces are required the ADF would continue to play a role in Iraq as Australia will not desert the Americans in their time of need (Ansley, 2007). By contrast New Zealand has maintained a policy of ‘non-involvement’ since its initial contributions to post-conflict rehabilitation in 2003.
Three Fundamental Differences
Multilateralism, the Use of Force & the US Alliance

In Chapter Two it was shown how New Zealand and Australia have become increasingly divergent in their foreign and security policies, with significant differences in outlook and approach evident on a wide range of issues in the international sphere. Indeed, for all the two countries’ commonalities in history, heritage, culture, language and political development, there are nevertheless, as McElhatton states, “surprising differences between us” (McElhatton, 2006). As Mike Moore asserts: “New Zealand and Australia, for so long on similar political paths, seem to be going their separate ways. Australia is becoming more like the United States and New Zealand more like Canada and a bit Nordic” (Moore, 2005). Indeed, journalist Greg Ansley sums up the growing trans-Tasman divide in these words:

Australia’s growing sense of identity with Asia and the pursuit of much larger trade and diplomatic partners have lowered New Zealand on the nation’s horizon. Since the mid-1980s, New Zealand’s path has been very different, pursuing small-power diplomacy, and developing a new internationalism that eschews military alliances and questions Australian perceptions, while developing Australia as our major partner (Ansley, 2001).

Or as the Editor of the Sunday Star Times, Rod Oram, has concluded on the key differences between the Tasman pair:

Our foreign policy is independent and multilateral through the likes of the UN, WTO and APEC. Theirs is bilateral and closely tied to the US. We seek relationships with Asia-Pacific countries. They try to impose leadership on the region (cited in Hawke, 2004d).

Indeed, over the past few years a number of crucial differences between the Tasman neighbours have been highlighted by various academics and political commentators within New Zealand. While Colin James has noted that our demographics and strategic and trade priorities are diverging (James, 2005a; James, 2005b), Emmet McElhatton and David McCraw have emphasized the two countries different ways of looking at the
world (McElhatton, 2006; McCraw, 2006a). Moreover, speaking in reference to the fact that “New Zealand and Australia have been on different security tracks for some time” as PM Clark has remarked (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 281), Greg Ayson has pointed to “significant elements of difference in the perspectives and approaches adopted by the two countries” on matters of security (Ayson, 2004, p. 4).

However, there is one major overarching divide in particular, between New Zealand and Australia’s general approach to security and foreign affairs, that seems to be especially predominant on the radar of political analysts. This relates to the difference in emphasis between the Antipodean lands on alliances or internationalism as the way forward in the twenty-first century world. For example, in addition to being “profoundly divergent” in its approach to alliance with the United States and by extension to the entire security context in Asia and the Pacific (McLean, 2001a), Australia continues to emphasise the intrinsic value of alliances in its foreign and security affairs. Through developing strong defence relationships with Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, improving dialogue with Russia, India and South Korea, and building good relations with its largest and nearest neighbour Indonesia, Australia has shown its commitment to the logic of alliances and remains “determined to engage with whoever it needs to in order to look after Australian interests” (McElhatton, 2006). New Zealand, meanwhile, has taken a significant step away from a strategy of alliances - and the United States - and instead looks to diplomacy and collective security organizations such as the United Nations, thereby becoming the Pacific’s first major ‘internationalist’. In fact McCraw has gone one step further arguing that while Australia endorses a ‘collective security’ approach to its international affairs, along which paradigm like-minded countries work together to defend themselves against as aggressor or potential aggressors, New Zealand has since 1999 moved away from such traditional means of ensuring security, adopting instead a ‘common security’ approach in its international relations. This approach emphasises extensive multilateral engagement within the international community, including with potential adversaries, by promoting dialogue and confidence-building measures to foster cooperation and thereby work towards the security of all (McCraw, 2006a, p. 24).

In sum, it seems that just as McLean concluded, though similar in many ways New Zealand and Australia are in actuality two separate and different South Pacific countries (McLean, 2001a).
Exploring the Differences

In investigating this reoccurring pattern of difference between the Tasman neighbours in recent times, there seems to be three fundamental areas of difference in particular between the two countries which, as key underlying factors, could well be said to be the driving forces in the growing divide between New Zealand and Australia in their foreign affairs. These essential areas of difference concern the Tasman pair’s disparate views of, and approaches towards, multilateralism, the use of force and their respective relationship with the United States. Indeed, it seems that much like the Pacific plates beneath the two lands, that over time have thrust up and compelled a different shape and form to the two Antipodean landscapes, these fundamental differences have likewise over the years played an instrumental role in the formation of divergent foreign and security policies on either side of the Tasman.

In the interest of investigating further these major areas of difference in the Trans-Tasman relationship, these three areas of fundamental difference between New Zealand and Australia – multilateralism, the use of force and relations with Washington - will be explored in more detail in the following chapters. This will be done in two ways: firstly, through a case study examining New Zealand and Australia’s stance on a great international issue of the day, each nation’s position on these three areas, will be explored as they have been articulated by the Clark and Howard Governments respectively in the course of their speeches; and secondly, by demonstrating the motivating force of the two nations’ expressed beliefs on these three areas by providing evidence from a wider array of material available on the two nations’ International Relations, through which it will be shown how these beliefs have translated into tangible foreign and security policy in the international sphere.

It is the issue of Iraq’s complete disarmament – often referred to as the “Iraq Crisis” – which provoked an international upheaval in 2002-2003 that will be employed as the case study issue through which New Zealand and Australia’s differences in multilateralism, the use of force, and their relations with the United States are to be explored. This will be done through a close examination of the rhetoric employed by both the New Zealand and Australian Governments on these subjects, as they appear in the manifold Iraq speeches delivered at the time of the international crisis.
Case Study: New Zealand, Australia & Iraq

The issue of Iraq’s disarmament was both extremely divisive and illuminating of the international community, revealing in startling contrast the many subtle, long-held differences of perspective, approach and attitude between nations of the international community concerning certain aspects of international affairs. As such the Iraq Crisis is particularly relevant to this study into Australia and New Zealand’s relationship and their key differences, that likewise have been so often overlooked or overshadowed in the hustle and bustle of world affairs. Indeed, Iraq has become the most flammable issue of contention between the Tasman neighbours in the past two decades, a fact clearly demonstrated in the way that 600 New Zealanders protested Australia’s pledge of commitment to the war outside parliament during one of Howard’s visit to New Zealand in early 2003 (Watkins, 2007a). Not since New Zealand’s imposition of the nuclear ship-ban in 1984-85 has there been such stark division between New Zealand and Australia in their foreign and security policy as came to light in the two countries’ respective stance on the 2003 Iraq War. In fact, the momentous import and impact of this crucial difference of outlook and action between Australia and New Zealand on an international issue is comparable in significance to the historical import of New Zealand’s decision during the Second World War to acquiesce to the British request to keep its troops stationed on the British front line in Europe, while Australia instead recalled its soldiers to the Pacific theatre of war in order to face the Japanese threat in concert with the United States. Both signify large and real differences in loyalties and outlook within the two policy-making circles of either nation, and both mark a turning point in each nation’s choice of direction in the complex world of international relations, with both countries signalling their willingness to travel down two quite disparate paths in world affairs.

In fact, the issue of Iraq is one that is especially enlightening with respect to the key areas of differentiation between New Zealand and Australia, argued here to be crucial factors in the widening divide between New Zealand and Australia in their foreign affairs. This is because each nation’s attitude or stance towards multilateralism, use of force, and the United States necessarily came together to become factors in each nation’s assessment and positioning on the matter of Iraq’s disarmament. Consequently New Zealand and Australia’s views on these three subject areas are expressed in a clear, compelling and revealing way in the Iraq speeches. Indeed, perhaps it is the
combination of all three of these matters, already areas of strong disparity between the Tasman neighbours, when combined with the complexities of the Iraq issue itself, that has fuelled the fire of discord between New Zealand and Australia over the issue in recent times, causing the Iraq War to become a heated bone of contention between the Antipodean nations and causing relations between the two to sour more in 2003 than in any other year in the last two decades. It is of particular importance to mention here, however, that in discussing New Zealand and Australia’s disparate positions on the matter of Iraq’s disarmament, this case study’s intent is to employ the two Tasman Government's speeches as vehicles to better understand the two countries’ differences in these areas, rather than make the case either for or against the Iraq War.

Case Study Aim

In undertaking this research, the aim of this case study was twofold: first, to investigate and reveal in finer detail how specifically New Zealand and Australia are different in their viewpoints and approach to the issues of multilateralism, the use of force, and their relations with the US; secondly, to illustrate how these subtle though marked differences were instrumental in contributing to the two nations’ opposing positions on the Iraq War. It is hoped that by combining this kind of information with evidence from other sources of political and academic material on New Zealand and Australia’s behaviour in foreign affairs, it will be demonstrated that, just as these three differences have been fundamental in contributing to the widely disparate positions taken by New Zealand and Australia on this most important issue of our day, it is indeed also these three subject areas – multilateralism, use of force and US relations – that are of crucial import in the Tasman ‘drift’ and the widening divergence between the Tasman neighbours in their international affairs in the last several years.

Methodology

The methodology of this case study is as follows:

Resources
The resources examined were written texts in the form of speech transcripts, ministerial statements, and records of press conferences that were specifically related to the Iraq Crisis of 2002-2003. Only the speeches delivered by the Prime Ministers and Foreign
Ministers of either country were examined, namely those by PM John Howard and Alexander Downer in Australia and PM Helen Clark and Phil Goff in New Zealand.

Method of Selection
The resources were selected by going to the official websites of the said four politicians, www.pm.gov.au and www.foreignminister.gov.au for Howard and Downer respectively, and www.beehive.govt.nz for both New Zealand politicians, and obtaining all materials that appeared on the basis of a website search under the keyword “Iraq”.

Time Span
The case study speeches were then selected on the basis of whether or not they were given within a specific time period of September 2002 – May 2003. This time period was selected because it was over these months most especially that the debate over Iraq’s disarmament were most intense and evoked the most material from national governments, the crisis beginning as it did in September and continuing right through to May 2003 when the war was considered to have ended and the cessation of hostilities in Iraq was declared. Additionally, the speeches delivered during this time period focus predominantly on the logic and justifications for the two nations’ decisions either to support or oppose the war, thereby providing the greatest clarity and insight into what exactly the beliefs of each national Government are on the matter, whereas post-June 2003 the subject of discussion changes noticeably to matters of post-conflict reconstruction, the implementation of an Iraqi democratic government and of course the rise of sectarian violence.

Method of Examination
The method of research was to apply discourse analysis to the text of the speeches, taking especial note of all passages, taken from anywhere within the body of the speech, where the subjects of multilateralism, the use of force or each nation’s relationship or attitude towards the United States were mentioned, discussed, described, or referred to. In this way, it was hoped that by examination of a series of New Zealand and Australia’s Iraq speeches, a fuller picture of each nation’s true perspectives on these issues might be painted and the beliefs they hold on these subject-areas more deeply explored.
Findings: Note to Reader

It is of some importance to note here that during the course of the case study it was found that the Australian speeches on Iraq far exceeded in both length and range of content those given by New Zealand officials on the same issue during the same period of time. For instance, though New Zealand was found to have given 15 speeches on Iraq between the period of September 2002 – May 2003, compared with 12 speeches given by Australia within the same time period, the average length of a New Zealand speech on Iraq was a mere 2 pages, while Australia’s Iraq speeches had an average of 7 pages. Indeed, whereas the whole selection of New Zealand’s speeches during the given time period ranged from 1-5 pages, in comparison the whole selection of Australia’s speeches over the same time period had page lengths that ranged from 2-11 pages. In fact both PM Howard and Alexander Downer were found to have delivered two speeches each of 10-11 pages in length during this time. Moreover, owing to the difference in length of the speeches, stemming from either different stances on the Iraq issue or perhaps the different purpose of each Government’s discourse, the Australian speeches had a tendency also to be broader in scope canvassing a much wider array of subjects related to the Iraq issue than did the New Zealand speeches. As a result, speeches made by the New Zealand Government tended to appear rather scanty and narrowly-focused by contrast.

This has meant that in the writing process and compilation of the information found in the speeches on New Zealand and Australia’s three fundamental differences in International Relations, there is a greater length and breadth to explore in the Australian discourse, and therefore more to discover about Australia’s stance and perspectives on the three matters, than is possible in reference to New Zealand. Consequently, though a semblance of equality in explanations and descriptions of the two nations’ positions has been attempted, on some subjects the Australian point of view can be described in a much fuller and detailed way. Thus to a significant degree, the brevity of New Zealand’s speeches, when contrasted with the sheer abundance of material provided by Australia in their speeches on the matter, has itself become a hindrance to a comprehensive understanding of the psyche and perspectives of the New Zealand Government on Iraq, and by extension, on these three areas of major difference with Australia – multilateralism, the use of force, and relations with the United States of America.
Chapter Three:
Case Study: Multilateralism

Since the end of the Cold War multilateralism in international affairs has increasingly become the preferred and predominant form of diplomacy in the international arena. Indeed, as a multi-party, multi-issue, multi-role and multi-value form of diplomacy, flexible and adaptable to the challenges of a complex and globalizing world in a way traditional state-to-state bilateralism can never be, multilateralism is now widely considered to be the best and most appropriate means of managing interactions between states, forming coalitions, resolving conflicts and reaching international consensus in the world of today (Aviel, 1999, p. 11-12). As an internationalist approach to international affairs, multilateralism is predominantly employed in the international arena whether within international organizations, of both governmental and non-governmental stripe, or at international conferences or summit meetings (Sullivan, 1999, p. 202).

The New Zealand Perspective

On examination of the New Zealand speeches delivered by either Prime Minister Helen Clark or Foreign Minister Phil Goff during the months preceding and immediately following the Iraq war, there are five particular themes regarding multilateralism and the country’s position concerning it that are repeatedly and strongly articulated by the New Zealand government.

1. First, between 19 February – 26 March when the international debate over the Iraq issue was at its most intense stage of discussion and argument, New Zealand made clear on no less than five separate occasions its firm belief in multilateralism and its total commitment to the process in its own foreign policies. This is shown, for instance, by Goff’s statements that "our position is based on our strong support for multilateralism" (Goff, 2003 [2]), that “New Zealand remains committed to finding multilateral solutions to problems" (Goff, 2003 [4]), and finally that "New Zealand remains a firm believer in the multilateral system" (Goff, 2003 [5]). Likewise, the Prime Minister reiterates the same view in her speeches during the same period, stating that "New Zealand has rather clear views about multilateralism…and using those processes to the utmost that it can" (Clark,
2003 [1]) and that “New Zealand’s position on this crisis has at all times been based on its strong support for multilateralism and the rule of law” (Clark, 2003 [2]).

This belief can easily be seen in the New Zealand Government’s approach and conduct of its foreign policy too. Indeed, since the rise to power of the Labour-led governments from 1999 onwards, the belief and emphasis on multilateralism has been a central pillar in New Zealand’s foreign and security policies along with an equal commitment to the rule of law and respect for the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Goff, 2002; Goff, 2005). Accordingly, New Zealand has invested much time and energy into developing multilateral cooperation in the international sphere, motivated by the belief that multilateralism is not only the best and most pragmatic means by which countries can collectively determine their futures and formulate regional/global responses to regional/global problems, but also a most important vehicle for ensuring the rules-based system New Zealand believes should govern conduct between nations (Goff, 2005; Goff, 2006b). As Goff has stated: “Through our multilateral diplomacy we seek security, prosperity and the preservation of freedom, for ourselves and others” (Goff, 2005). Indeed, New Zealand considers itself to be “one of the most committed supporters of the multilateral system” in the world today (Clark, 2004), a fact evidenced in the way that New Zealand has become one of the most outspoken advocates of multilateral initiatives in the international community, for instance on the Kyoto Protocol and the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) (Patman, 2005). Additionally, the way that this emphasis on multilateralism has translated in New Zealand’s behaviour in the international sphere can be seen in its staunch support of a wide array of multilateral institutions, ranging from the UN – the multilateral organisation which features most prominently in this regard - APEC or ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and World Trade Organisation (WTO), to international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Goff, 2006b).

2. Second, the Iraq speeches provide an explanation for New Zealand’s strong commitment to multilateralism – namely, that from the Government’s perspective it is multilateralism alone that is the most legitimate and successful means of addressing problems in the international sphere as well as resolving international disputes. In short, it is multilateralism that is the best force for good in the world. This belief stems from the view that multilateral processes allow international problems, many of which have the
power to affect many nations in an ever-globalising world, to similarly be dealt with by many nations together in a collective fashion. Goff makes these two points apparent on several occasions in speeches given between 15 September 2002 and 12 May 2003, stating that "it is essential that we renew our commitment to multilateralism as the best way to address global problems" (Goff, 2002 [1]), that New Zealand’s position on Iraq was “a principled position founded in the conviction that world order is best secured through peaceful, multilateral action” (Goff, 2003 [10]), and that progress on the level of international participation in the multilateral process “will contribute to the goal of a more secure, just and harmonious world” (Goff, 2003 [10]). Indeed, according to Goff the United Nations itself has proven that “collective action can save lives and help rebuild nations” (Goff, 2002 [1]). Since the Government believes that “in today’s globalising world, no member state, no matter how powerful it is, can disengage from multilateralism entirely” (Goff, 2003 [5]), moreover, from New Zealand’s point of view it is the duty of every nation in the international sphere to engage with each other in a collective way to guarantee world peace and security. Indeed, from the Government’s perspective the Iraq war demonstrates the failure of nations to come together collectively in pursuit of an agreed goal of Iraqi disarmament and thus “represents a failure to resolve an international problem through multilateral channels” (Goff, 2003 [5]).

As Emmet McElhatton has shown, these beliefs have translated into action too in the international sphere. New Zealand’s approach to “striving for the global human good” is to not only advocate multilateral channels as “the only legitimate means by which to achieve long-standing solutions to global problems” (Goff, 2006; Peters, 2006f), but also to engage heavily with the United Nations organization. Indeed, the New Zealand Government has gone so far as to name the UN “our hope for the future” (Goff, 2003b) as “vital” for peace, security and progress in the world (Goff, 2005; Oliver, 2006), and “the greatest force for good in the modern world” (McElhatton, 2006). As a consequence of endorsing and embracing the UN in such a way, however, New Zealand has tended to have a rather optimistic, even idealistic, view of the UN organization and its role in world affairs, even displaying a tendency to blame UN failures on great power politics rather than on flaws within the organisation itself (McElhatton, 2006). This can be seen most noticeably in New Zealand’s behaviour and apprehensive pronouncements on the matter of UN reform, where in considering the matter to have been pushed onto the UN agenda solely by the Western great powers, New Zealand was initially very guarded and slow to
overcome its reservations on the matter, and even today repeatedly places the responsibility on the great powers for the results of such changes, calling on them to ensure that the improvements work (Peters, 2006e; Peters, 2006f).

3. The third theme in the New Zealand discourse on Iraq concerning the subject of multilateralism relates to the notion that actions taken by states in the international sphere are only legitimate when they are taken on a multilateral basis and sanctioned by the UN. As to the former, emphasis on multilateralism as the basis for authority with great attention and adherence given in parallel to international law, can be seen in PM Clark’s statements in March that any participation by New Zealand in the realms of reconstruction or humanitarian assistance following military conflict in Iraq would only occur “within the umbrella of the multilateral system” (Clark, 2003 [3]), in accordance with its “strong support for multilateralism and the rule of law” (Clark, 2003 [2]). As to the latter, moreover, New Zealand’s strong insistence on the centrality of the UN in authorizing all international behaviour corresponds with its considered view that a UN resolution embodies “the collective instruction which should have the unanimous endorsement of all member countries” (Goff, 2002 [1]) - even where states disagree with the UN’s judgement - and the Government’s equally strong desire for “upholding the authority of the Security Council” (Clark, 2003 [2]). Indeed, New Zealand’s speeches on the Iraq crisis reveal the country’s absolute refusal to participate in any international action which does not originate from a multilateral source or abide within the boundaries of international law, and most especially, which is not undertaken in accordance with a specific mandate authorized by a collective security organization, the UN and clear sanction of the UNSC being uppermost in this respect. In fact even with regard to the question of New Zealand involvement in post-conflict reconstruction in a post-war Iraq, the Government refuses to contribute to such an operation outside of a ‘multilateral umbrella’ with a UN resolution at is centre authorizing “the international community as a whole to assist in the rebuilding process” (Goff, 2003 [9]; Goff, 2003 [10]), so as “to clear the way for New Zealand and a wide range of other countries to make further contributions across areas such as humanitarian assistance and reconstruction” (Goff, 2003 [9]; Goff, 2003 [10]).

Indeed, as a consequence of this commitment to the principle of multilateralism-plus-authorization, the New Zealand Government refuses to participate in any unilateral
action itself, and condemns those other states that do, no-matter the reason or provocation. This is because from the Government’s point of view any action undertaken by either an individual country or a group of like-minded nations on any matter within the international sphere without authorization by the UN above all, or at least by another collective security body such as NATO, constitutes a direct challenge to international law and international security. Indeed, such is the extent of New Zealand’s belief in the multilateral process and its conviction that multilateralism works best in international relations, that unilateralism has become very much a dirty word in New Zealand’s political circles, and a dangerous one at that. As Goff twice pointed out on behalf of the Government in the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, “the process for enforcing resolution 1441 however must be multilateral, involving a clear UN mandate. We are opposed to unilateral action” (Goff, 2003 [1]; Goff, 2003 [4]). This means that while the New Zealand Government fully understood “the frustration, impatience, and outrage felt by the United States, Britain, and Australia at Iraq’s slowness to comply and resistance to complying with UN resolutions” (Clark, 2003 [2]) and similarly shared the same objective of disarming Iraq (Clark, 2003 [2]), New Zealand refused to sanction any action taken by one or more of these states on a unilateral basis, or in other words, without explicit UNSC sanction. As Clark expressed on the matter, New Zealand was divided from its traditional allies over opposing “views on how to proceed” (Clark, 2003 [2]), namely, the Coalition’s decision to by-pass the UN and act on their own sovereign authority. In fact the Government considered this action not only abhorrent - in that it appeared to be a clear case of unilateralism - but also “illegal” in having been undertaken without a specific sanction for military action from the UNSC. So severe is the New Zealand Government’s conception of the evils of unilateralism that Clark called the Coalition’s military invasion of Saddam’s Iraq “a matter of profound regret to us” (Clark, 2003 [2]), since from the Government’s viewpoint, the Iraq war could have been avoided had the US and the UK stayed within the multilateral framework (Goff, 2003 [1]).

4. The fourth revelation from New Zealand’s Iraq speeches on the nation’s approach to world affairs generally, and multilateralism specifically, concerns the notion of global order and how best to maintain it. For New Zealand the easy and obvious answer to such a question is to support the centrality of the UN in world affairs. As Goff stated in reference to 1945 and the founding of the UN, for instance, when nations of the world came together “in the belief that collective action was necessary to guarantee
global peace” and to “protect humanity against such threats” (Goff, 2002 [1]), such as those that had sparked the Second World War conflagration in international politics:

Today in the second year of the new millennium the need to act multilaterally is greater than ever before. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, people smuggling, drug-trafficking, diseases such as HIV/Aids and the unsustainable depletion of our natural resources, are all global problems which require a collective response (Goff, 2002 [1]).

In point of fact, as one of the foremost multilateral organizations in the world today, New Zealand has been a strong supporter of the UN since its creation and remains today a nation “heavily committed” both to the idea of the United Nations and to the sentiments of the UN’s founding documents of “saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (McElhatton, 2006). Indeed, as the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, recently declared, the Government “remains unwavering in its support for the United Nations” in the belief that “the world would be substantially worse off without the United Nations” (Peters, 2006f). Additionally, it considers itself to be “a country that engages with the United Nations with no hidden agenda” (Peters, 2006a). Expressions of commitment to the UN such as these have not surprisingly been mirrored in the country’s foreign policy record, with New Zealand being a signatory party to all the major UN treaties, ratifying nearly every key convention passed by the UN, as well as an active and influential lobbyist for issues relating to human rights, self-determination, disarmament issues and environmental concerns, and a significant contributor to multiple UN peacekeeping operations and aid programmes - even being one of the few members to faithfully pay its membership fees on time (Patman, 2005, p. 58). In fact, New Zealand’s commitment to the UN has been so great and extensive in past years that the nation was recently praised by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, as “a model member of the United Nations” (Goff, 2002).

According to Robert Patman, this dedication to the UN, so prominently displayed by New Zealand in its International Relations, can be attributed to the nation’s view of the kind of global order evolving today. New Zealand seems to believe that globalization is
reinforcing the multilateral system, and above all the role of the UN in the international order as “the embodiment of the multilateral process” (Patman, 2005, p. 58). It consequently rejects the realist contention about influence-through-power and instead, considering the need for multilateral institutions to be “as great as ever” (Peters, 2006f), regards greater participation in global forums to be the best way of managing the forces of globalization and curb its negative aspects while also accessing its benefits (Patman, 2005, p. 58; Goff, 2005). As Goff has stated on the matter: “Countries need to realise that to secure their national interests they must act multilaterally” (Goff, 2003b).

5. Fifth and finally, it seems that multilateralism’s preponderance in New Zealand diplomacy is inherently related to the nation’s comparative size and status on the international stage. This is because as a small – some would say tiny – nation on the world stage, historically prone to being either overlooked or recruited into Great Power political struggles, New Zealand finds both political and psychological security in numbers and consensus. As Goff stressed repeatedly in the run-up to the war, "New Zealand is a small country" (Goff, 2003 [1]; Goff, 2003 [4]). For this main reason, and since “it remains true that New Zealand and any state can achieve far less in isolation than it can working collectively with other states under UN auspices” (Goff, 2003 [5]), New Zealand “recognises the need for the rule of law internationally” (Goff, 2003 [1]; Goff, 2003 [4]) and “remains a firm believer in the multilateral system” (Goff, 2003 [5]).

As a consequence of this belief New Zealand pursues multilateral engagement and relies on the global rule of law in preference to the logic of alliances in its international affairs (Patman, 2005; O'Brien, 2005). Indeed, as a small state without hard power, New Zealand considers itself to gain advantages through engaging multilaterally, as well as a sense of psychological security, that would not otherwise be available elsewhere. As Goff has said: “We have a strong belief in multilateralism, which allows small countries like New Zealand to have a say in regional and world affairs” (Goff, 2002):

Effective multilateralism matters for hard-edged reasons of self-interest. As a smaller player on the international stage, our economic and physical security depends on a properly functioning system of collective security, the international rule of law and dispute settlement (Goff, 2005).
Additionally, however, this connection made between New Zealand’s small size and multilateral diplomacy can be attributed to the nation’s view of globalization and the idea that globalization is creating a more level playing field for small states like New Zealand (Patman, 2005). Consequently, in viewing globalization as a force enabling small states to “punch above their weight” in international affairs, and tending towards the perspective that a ‘balance of interest’ rather than a ‘balance of power’ approach is increasingly the way of the future in global politics (Patman, 2005), New Zealand has opted to engage extensively in multilateral forums and initiatives. However, New Zealand’s heavy reliance and devotion to the multilateral process could additionally be attributed to the fact that as a geographically-isolated nation located at a distance from the wider world, multilateralism guarantees New Zealand’s access and involvement in international affairs in a way that traditional politics never could.

**The Australian Perspective**

The Australian speeches on Iraq during the same time period reveal quite different ideas about multilateralism in international affairs. On the one hand, the Australian Government expresses the same desire as New Zealand, that the multilateral process be employed in addressing the Iraq crisis, and likewise reiterates the hopeful wish that such an endeavour through the UN will succeed in achieving Iraq’s compliance to UN resolutions and that country’s complete and final disarmament of WMDs. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the speeches reveal a marked if subtle variance in Australia’s viewpoint and approach to multilateralism, both generally and in regard to collective security organizations in particular. As in the New Zealand speeches, there are five main themes in the Australian speeches on this subject.

1. Firstly, in contrast to the many statements made in New Zealand’s speeches regarding its strong belief and unshakeable commitment to multilateralism, the Australian speeches are conspicuous in the total absence of such emphatic declarations. Nowhere in the speeches given between 28 January 2002 – 14 May 2003, delivered by either Australian Prime Minister John Howard or his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, is such a general belief in multilateralism itself asserted. Rather, an alternate theme regarding the Australian view of multilateralism is frequently alluded to in the Iraq speeches, namely, that the Australian Government is strongly supportive of the multilateral process when related to specific issues or areas of pressing importance to
international security, and subsequently to Australia’s own national security since the nation considers the two to be intrinsically linked. Among the speeches, these issues of primarily concern in which multilateral action is emphasized include the War on Terrorism, the non-proliferation campaign against the spread of WMDs, and arms control regimes. Just as in New Zealand, this belief concerning multilateralism has translated into tangible Australian behaviour on the international stage and the fostering of an alternative form of diplomacy as the primary means of interrelating with other countries in the international sphere.

In terms of the idea of multilateralism only on important issues, for instance, though the nation also interacts multilaterally in the international sphere on issues concerning the promotion of human rights and protection of the environment, or wherever maximize leverage can be obtained when acting in concert with other nations in areas of shared interests and agendas (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. x), Australia engages most readily in multilateralism wherever it faces matters of key concern – i.e. in the areas of security and trade which are central to Australia’s ultimate foreign, trade and security policy aim of ‘advancing the security and prosperity of the Australian nation’ (‘Foreign and Trade Policy’, 2006). In the realm of security, for example, Australia has been a strong supporter of multilateral engagement on key issues such as non-proliferation, addressing transnational threats, the campaign to enforce a global ban on anti-personnel landmines (in which Australia has played a leading role), and most predominantly and importantly today, in combating terrorism, such as in working multilaterally with other concerned nations to freeze the finances and restrict the movement of terrorist groups (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. xi). Likewise, in terms of trade, Australia regularly employs multilateral diplomacy in order to assist the trade liberalization process and secure improved access to Australian goods and services overseas, motivated it seems by the belief that the multilateral trade system is the best way to ensure a level playing field so that Australia may trade on an equal footing in the global sphere (‘Foreign and Trade Policy’, 2006; Calvert, 2000). As Ashton Calvert, the Secretary of the Australian DFAT, has stated in past years: “We believe that the multilateral system offers the greatest benefits for a medium-sized economy with diverse exports to a wide range of markets” (Calvert, 2000). As a consequence, Australia is active today in a range of multilateral institutions on the international stage which address these issues – the UN, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), APEC, the WTO.
and many others in which New Zealand also takes part. Indeed, Australia is a member of sixteen multilateral issue groups in these areas, of which New Zealand also has membership, with the addition of several others in which New Zealand does not participate.\(^\text{23}\)

However, as to the question of Australia’s preferred means of diplomacy more generally, it is in fact bilateral diplomacy, not multilateralism, that is Australia’s “diplomatic instrument of choice” (Kelton, 2006, p. 232) and which is considered ‘the bedrock’ and first priority of the nation’s international engagement (Advancing the National Interest, 2003). As the 2005 Australian White Paper states:

Bilateral relations are fundamental, including for multilateral cooperation...Australia depends on the strength of its bilateral relations around the world to advance its national interests. The greater part of the day-to-day work of Australia’s foreign and trade policy is bilateral advocacy (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 7).

Indeed, so preponderant is bilateralism in Australia’s approach to International Relations, that even in the areas of security and trade where multilateralism is employed most readily, there is a greater emphasis on bilateral ties and agreements as the over-arching diplomatic strategy rather than multilateral engagement, which seems to rank as a kind of back-up network working to reinforce Australia’s pre-existing bilateral arrangements. In terms of security, for instance, Australia’s bilateral ties with important security partners like the US, Japan and Indonesia are perceived to be of greater importance than general multilateral regional arrangements (Kelton, 2006, p. 232). Likewise in the area of global trade, Australia has long been active in pursuing bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to underwrite multilateral ones such as the 2003 SAFTA with Singapore, 2004

\(^{23}\) Australia and New Zealand are members of the Cairns Group, Friends of Fish, World Wine Trade Group, Australia Group, CANZ, JUSCANZ, Margineers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement, Biosafety Commodity Exporters Group, Umbrella Group, Valdivia Group, Whale Protection Group, Consular Colloque and Five Nations Conference. Australia is moreover a member of the Geneva Group concerning UN reform , and the Zangger Committee concerning the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons through tightening export controls on sensitive nuclear items (‘Australia’s Global Diplomacy’, Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 150-153).
TAFTA with Thailand and more famously the 2004 AUSFTA with the United States\textsuperscript{24} (‘Foreign and Trade policy, 2006), a course of action taken in the belief that FTAs can bring gains “more quickly and more extensively” than those available through multilateral channels – including the WTO – and that bilateral trade initiative help “to set benchmarks” for multilateral negotiations anyway (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. xiv, 49; Calvert, 2000).

2. Secondly, whereas the New Zealand Government continually reasserts the multilateral process as the only legitimate means of solving the Iraq problem, and the UN especially as the collective body through which the matter of Iraq must be addressed, the Australian speeches show that the Australian Government is much less fixed on this point. Instead of such a declaration, the Australian statements merely announce, on the one hand, the Government’s strong preference that the issue be resolved in a multilateral way, with the backing and authorization of the UNSC, and on the other hand, express the desire that the UN be given at least ‘a chance’ to come up with a decisive solution to Iraq’s non-compliance. The former can be seen in Howard and Downer’s statements that “we want the [multilateral] process to work” (Howard, 2003 [1]) and “we have supported a leading role for the United Nations in addressing this threat” (Howard, 2003 [2]). In the same way the latter is similarly illustrated in the Australian Government’s assertions that “we should give the United Nations process an opportunity of working” [Emphasis added] (Howard, 2003 [1]), that “this matter should be worked through to the maximum extent feasible by the United Nations…to the maximum degree possible” [Emphasis added] (Howard, 2003 [1]), and “I want the United Nations process to be given a go” [Emphasis added] (Howard, 2003 [1]).

This strong preference for UN involvement in world issues can be seen in the way that “strongly supports the efforts of the United Nations to promote multilateral cooperation in core areas” (Australia in Brief, 2003), not only in the arenas of international peace and security, but also in the development of international legal instruments and norms, the provision of humanitarian assistance, and the protection of the environment and sustainable development. Indeed, while the UN is not considered the ‘golden panacea’,

\textsuperscript{24} Australia is also still in the midst of negotiations for the first preferential trade deal with the so-called ‘economic powerhouse’ the People’s Republic of China – in competition with New Zealand – as well as in bilateral negotiations with Japan to form a supplementary arrangement to that already attained under the ASEAN Free Trade Area regional agreement (AFTA) (Kelton, 2005; ‘Foreign and trade policy’, 2006;)}
able to dealing effectively with all global problems and evils of the twenty-first century, the Australian Government nevertheless continues to regard the institution as “the most important framework the world has to achieve a secure and peaceful world” (Howard, 2003 [5]). In fact, Australia’s strong commitment to the UN can be seen in the nation’s record of large and regular peacekeeping deployments under the auspices of the organization since 1947, during which time Australia has participated in UN peacekeeping missions all over the world. For instance, Australia has over the decades taken part in peacekeeping deployments in Indonesia, Zimbabwe, the Middle East, Iran, Namibia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Rwanda, Somalia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and East Timor among others (Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 30). Indeed, as Howard points out, Australia’s support and commitment to the UN is demonstrated today in the fact that Australia presently has 1,200 ADF personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations around the globe (Howard, 2003 [5]). Additionally, however, this Australian support for the UN can be seen in its efforts to address the many issues thought to compromise and hinder the efficacy of the UN system, for instance in addressing its outdated Cold War structure with disproportionate representation within the UN Security Council (UNSC) – the heart of the organization, its unrepresentative electoral groups which biases the election of member-states to important UN bodies including the UNSC, and its failure to cope with problems of collective security from the time of the Vietnam War and ensure the security of all the members of the collective – its purpose for existing (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 24-25). Indeed, Australia has set in motion an Australian government UN treaty body review, and become a member of the Geneva Group promoting UN management and fiscal reform in order to strengthen the UN treaty body system and bring about the “radical and fundamental change” needed to ensure a “more focused and efficient UN system” (Calvert, 2000; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 151; Hawke, 2004a).

3. The third area of disparity between New Zealand and Australia concerns the Australian Government’s view that the multilateral process ought to be used not necessarily because it is the best or most legitimate means of resolving international disputes or problems, or indeed the most appropriate or legitimate ‘force for good’ in the world, but because there are often merits or advantages in doing so in pursuit of a desired goal. As Howard stated in reference to his conversations with US President George W. Bush in the months prior to the war, “I then argued to him the merits of
working through the United Nations. That has been the steady theme of a strong diplomatic effort by Australia, ably led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs" [Emphasis added] (Howard, 2003 [2]). In fact, though encased in subtle language, it seems a striking feature of the Australian discourse that while recourse to multilateral methods is considered both desirable and beneficial in dealing with international problems, nevertheless, owing to the inherent problems involved in trying to formulate a collective response and achieve consensus among nations of a wide variety of backgrounds, values, outlooks and religions, there exists the potential and realistic possibility that the process will fail completely, either through the said lack of consensus or lack of political will to sustain the process. Indeed, in stark contrast to assumptions regularly made in the wider world to the effect that the pair share the same worldview owing to their close physical proximity (O’Brien, 2005), New Zealand and Australia in actuality display major differences in their outlook on the world. As Terence O’Brien has stated: “Neighbours, allies and friends can indeed disagree quite profoundly about the big value-laden issues of peace and justice in the world. New Zealand and Australia are no exception, as their differences over non-nuclear policy also demonstrate” (O’Brien, 2005). This could be said to be true particularly towards the UN, which while useful, is not considered by Australia to be the primary force for good in the world today, as New Zealand advocates. Indeed, whereas New Zealand considers the UN multilateral system to be “our hope for the future” (Goff, 2003b) and “the greatest force for good in the modern world” (McElhatton, 2006), Australia sees movements towards a more active UN as still only a trend and seems to hold to the view that the UN is “not the definitive force for good in the world” (McElhatton, 2006). As McElhatton states: “Both nations fundamentally agree on the universal rights of man, they just do not necessarily agree on the right ways and means of achieving them” (McElhatton, 2006).

Primarily, this Australian perspective owes much to the belief that the multilateral process often fails, or the 2005 Australian White Paper Advancing the National Interest phrases it, “multilateral regimes do not always work” (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 44). This being so it is self-evident that the UN itself will likewise fail to deliver from time to time as had been the case in past decades. Indeed, it is exactly this point Downer attempts to underline during one particular speech delivered in February, in which he draws attention to the many instances in which the international community
and the UN as an organization has failed to address critical global problems multilaterally in a collective way. As he states:

We allowed the slaughter of one million people in Rwanda – the international community did not intervene until it was too late. We allowed slaughter in Bosnia and again, the international community did not intervene until it was too late. We allowed President Milosevic to murder Kosovars until the US-led coalition of the willing put a stop to it (Downer, 2003 [1]).

Indeed, the UN’s inefficiency and ineffectiveness in dealing with collective security crises in history is amply demonstrated in its failures over Vietnam, the Indo-Pakistan wars, the Soviet invasions of Afghanistan and Cambodia, the Iran/Iraq wars, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (i.e. Kosovo) in addition to Iraq (Anderson, 1998; Advancing the National Interest, 2003). In fact, the matter of UN failure and Iraq has itself become a sticking point between the Tasman neighbours. For though New Zealand and several other countries do not consider the UN’s inability to secure a further resolution authorizing force against Iraq to be a failure by the UN to perform, from the Australian Government’s point of view and that of its supporters, the UN’s refusal to authorize the explicit measures previously implied in Resolution 1441 amounted to nothing less than a complete failure, and a clear demonstration of the organization’s inability to function as it was intended to at times of great crisis. This being the case, it follows from the Australian standpoint that it is neither logical nor plausible for multilateralism to be thought of by Australia or the international community more generally as the only means of resolving world disputes, or the only legitimate one at that. It seems that, like the United States, which having been the supreme architect of the multilateral system in the 20th century has subsequently become “disenchanted” by its own creation (O’Brien, 2005), Australia has developed “a more cynical attitude” towards the internationalist approach and holds a more negative assessment of the feasible perimeters of multilateralism in international affairs (McElhatton, 2006).

4. The fourth theme in the Australian discourse on Iraq regarding its position on multilateralism concerns the idea of multilateralism and authority. It is not the Australian Government’s view that all actions taken by states on the international stage must
proceed from a multilateral body or be sanctioned by the UN in order to be appropriate or legitimate. Inherently this belief is linked to the Australian conviction that multilateralism - and specifically the UN - often fails.

In situations where the multilateral process does fail, the Australian Government considered it to be in the interests of national and global security that Australia and other concerned nations act to right the balance and perform where the UN or other collective security bodies can not through lack of political will or consensus among its members. This is especially true where the issue is regarded as being of utmost importance for maintaining global security as was the Australian view on Iraq, with the intelligence community’s consensus prior to the war that this rogue regime possessed illegal WMD stockpiles. In fearing that Saddam might pass this technology and weapons on to international terrorist groups to use against America and the Western democracies - Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network and its affiliates being of chief concern among them – Australia believed it was the duty of concerned nations to act against such a threat, regardless of the UNSC’s ultimate verdict on the matter. In fact this belief was hinted at early on in the debate by Downer when he said that while “it remains our aim to work with our friends and allies, through the UN Security Council, for such an [peaceful] outcome”, nevertheless “we have a responsibility to deal with the facts, and the facts speak for themselves” (Downer, 2003 [2]). Later on, following the events of early March when UNSC member France voiced its determination to veto any further resolution authorizing force against Iraq “no matter the circumstances” (‘France, Russia threaten war veto’, 2003, March 10), the point was expressed more clearly by Downer on 18 March 2003 in a speech to the Australian parliament, that was effectively a declaration of war, when he affirmed that the veto:


denied the Security Council any further role in the disarming of Iraq – but it did not deny, and it could not deny, the clear and immediate threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction to global security. And it can not deny responsible members of the international community the legal capacity to act together to protect international peace and security, and to enforce existing Security Council resolutions (Downer, 2003 [3]).
Or as Howard affirmed early on in the international crisis, in reaching its final decision the Australian Government would be influenced not only by its WMD proliferation concerns and its US alliance, but “also importantly by the past practice of nations which have taken collective military action in the interests of world or regional security” (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Indeed, the very concept of multilateralism itself is understood differently by the Tasman neighbours. From the Australian vantage point, multilateral actions may consist of those undertaken under authorization by a collective security organization like NATO or the UN, as New Zealand likewise asserts. However, they may additionally also involve operations executed and legitimised by a ‘concert of nations’, comprised of a good number of like-minded sovereign nations that, being in agreement on a certain principle, cooperate with each other and act together to achieve a mutually agreed objective or outcome. Thus in working together with the US, the UK, Spain, Poland and Denmark, with the support of a further forty-four nations from every geographical region in the world (Statements of Support’, 2003; Rice, 2003)25, including several from Australia’s own home region of the Asia-Pacific - the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, Thailand and East Timor (Downer, 2003 [3]), Australia considered the invasion of Saddam’s Iraq to be both a legitimate and a multilateral war. As Downer states, “I can say to you that we are not alone, either in our concern or in our preparedness, ultimately, to act if necessary. The international community – not just one or two countries - is serious about his compliance with UN resolutions" (Downer, 2003 [1]), and more emphatically on March 18, two days before the war against Iraq commenced:

It is also wrong to say that Australia is one of only very few countries prepared to assist in the forceful disarmament of Iraq. The fact is that a broad international coalition will assist to this end. It is expected that tens of countries will join this coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq [to do for the UN what it could not achieve itself]” (Downer, 2003 [3]).

25 As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states on the official website of the White House: “Nearly 50 nations are committed to ridding Saddam Hussein's regime of all its deadly, destructive and illegal weapons. To put this in perspective, the combined population of coalition countries is approximately 1.23 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of approximately $22 trillion. These countries are from every continent on the globe, representing every major race, religion, and ethnicity in the world. Diverse as this coalition is, each member shares a common goal. We seek nothing less than safety for our people. Many members have suffered from terror themselves; all understand the awful price of terrorism and the potentially catastrophic danger from weapons of mass destruction” (Rice, 2003).
Indeed, this disparity of understanding on what is meant by the term ‘multilateralism’ can also explain such statements as those made in reference to criticisms about America acting ‘unilaterally’ with the help of Australia, where Downer states that “To those who accuse us of backing US unilateralism, I would say that in Europe last week I worked to extend the coalition of concerned countries” (Downer, 2003 [1]), and Howard’s argument that “The United States has also been falsely accused of acting unilaterally and thus in contemptuous disregard for the role of the United Nations” (Howard, 2003 [2]).

This Australian willingness to act outside the UN to safeguard national and global security also raises another matter in relation to multilateralism. From the Australian perspective, when forced to act in situations where the multilateral process or the UN itself has malfunctioned, Australia does not view such an undertaking to contravene international law, unlike New Zealand. This is because the nations involved are regarded as acting on behalf of the failed institution in order to both enforce member nations compliance to the resolutions passed by that institution, as well as restore the legitimacy and status of the collective body itself. This point is illustrated most emphatically in Howard’s March 2003 speeches in his declaration that, should military action become necessary, “Australia’s strong preference is that it takes place pursuant to a new Security Council resolution” (Howard, 2003 [2]), it is made clear at the same time that such a wish “is not because Australia believes, as a matter of international law, that a new resolution is required” (Howard, 2003 [2]). Or more explicitly, upon embarking with the US and Britain in the overthrow of Saddam’s regime, his statement that in taking this option "Australia and the other members of the coalition are therefore still acting under the authority of the United Nations Security Council resolutions [and thus within international law]" (Howard, 2003 [5]).

5. Finally, the fifth theme in the Australian discourse regarding Australia’s beliefs about multilateralism concerns the idea of global order and the way that failure by multilateral bodies, such as that of the UN over Iraq, essentially corrode not only the organizations’ authority and respectability, but also their role as enforcers of global order and central actors in the international system. In particular this relates to the way that the UN’s performance in international affairs is critical to its perceived role, authority and purpose on the world stage. As Downer stated on this point in relation to Iraq: “If the
Security Council is unable to assert its own authority, then that will be detrimental to the prospects for Iraqi disarmament. Moreover, it also will have a long lasting and negative impact on the standing of the Security Council itself” (Downer, 2003 [2]). Or as both Howard and Downer warned prior to the war, "if the United Nations doesn't match its responsibilities it will do itself a grievous injury and will I think leave a legacy of a more precarious world" (Howard, 2003 [1]), and “this is not just an issue about Iraq – it is about our future. It is about whether the international community’s will as expressed through the Security Council, amounts to any more than words” (Downer, 2003 [3]).

Indeed, from the Australian viewpoint, collective security organizations are only considered to preserve their vested authority when they function effectively and fulfill the purpose for which they were created. In this sense, failure amounts to not only an erosion of its authority and a possible sidelining or reduction of its role in world affairs, but also to a diminished position and status on the world stage. Evidence of this belief can be found scattered throughout Howard and Downer’s speeches on Iraq. Consider, for example, Howard’s statements following what he regarded as a damning Blix Report that “if the United Nations is to retain its authority it has to match by deeds the rhetoric of its own resolutions. You can’t pass a resolution like 1441 and when it gets a bit difficult walk away from it without damaging your credibility” (Howard, 2003 [1]), or his assertion that the members of the UNSC “now have a responsibility to match the rhetoric of that resolution with action. If they don’t do that, then they will deliver an enormous blow to the authority and the prestige of the United Nations” (Howard, 2003 [1]) – “excessive delay or indifference, risk crippling its own authority” (Howard, 2003 [2]). Or indeed its additional warnings that failure to take action would be “a humiliation of the United Nations” (Downer, 2003 [2]), that would “undermine the concept of collective security, and years of efforts through the UN Security Council to disarm Iraq” (Downer, 2003 [2]), and which would “also make a mockery of the support for the United Nations, in particular those [other nations] who regard it as the only legitimate vehicle for achieving and maintaining peace and stability” (Downer, 2003 [2]). As Downer states, "If they do not – or cannot - act to ensure compliance with Resolution 1441, they will damage not only the trust the international community places in them, but also the very institution they serve" (Downer, 2003 [1]).
Australia’s view of the UN following the Iraq war is an apt illustration of this belief. By failing to deal effectively and finally with Iraq’s non-compliance and achieve that country’s disarmament, Australia considered the UN to have relegated itself a smaller, less powerful role in world affairs through inefficacy. In the months following the war this can be clearly seen in the way that the Government was “deeply disappointed” that the UNSC was “unable to maintain a unity of purpose on the issue of Iraq” (Howard, 2003 [5]) and “extremely disappointed that the Security Council has been unable to demonstrate the necessary resolve to confront Iraq’s continued defiance of the United Nations” (Howard, 2003 [5]). Or additionally, in a diminished belief expressed among the Coalition partners in the UN’s ability to play a realistically powerful role in Iraq’s reconstruction, other than endowing a sense of legitimacy to those other nations who equate international law with that institution’s passed resolutions. As the Australian Government expressed on the matter in May: “The Security Council will need to act much more constructively than it has to date if the United Nations is to have any meaningful role in rehabilitating Iraq” [Emphasis added] (Howard, 2003 [6]). From the Australian point of view, their deepest misgivings and apprehensions regarding the multilateral process and collective security through the UN had been shown to be correct and rightly founded.

Additionally, however, this withdrawal from emphasizing only the role of multilateral institutions in the world can be explained in the way the Australia generally tends to hold the view anyway that the pivotal forces shaping the world today are globalization and the primacy of the US in a ‘balance of power’ unipolar world, rather than the UN or multilateral institutions as New Zealand contends (O’Brien, 2005; Patman, 2005). Consequently, since world order and globalization are considered to centre on the United States, as the sole superpower in the world today, close relations with Washington are esteemed to be of greater consideration in Australia’s foreign affairs that just multilateral institutions, and the better means by which Australia can harness the benefits of globalization (Patman, 2005, p. 59). Moreover, Australia’s large size and the perception of its “middle-power” status in world affairs has relegated a smaller role for multilateral institutions in Australia’s outlook on International Relations. This is primarily because large size insulates the country from feeling a need to operate predominantly in a multilateral way and does not promote the notion of close UN ingratiaton being fundamental to national security or the attainment of its national interests on the world
stage. This has meant that Australia not only does not reap the same sense of psychological security from engaging in the multilateral process as New Zealand does, but also that it tends to put more weight on the ‘balance of power’ paradigm and the logic of powerful alliances (Patman, 2005, p. 50).
Chapter Four:  
Case Study: The Use of Force

The Iraq speeches are even more revealing as regards a somewhat more controversial issue in International Relations – the use of military force in resolving international disputes or problems. Due to the rise of terrorism since 9/11, as well as to the inherent complexity of the post-Cold War world with its ‘incessant challenges to statecraft’, the use of force has become more prevalent as a political tool in the twenty-first century world (Grant, 2005). In the Gulf War, the chaos of fragmenting Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan and most recently in Iraq, the incidences where force has been employed by one of more states against another have increased noticeably since the end of the Cold War (Grant, 2005), even as paradoxically multilateralism and non-traditional forms of conflict and approaches to security have become more widespread. In the Pacific Ocean, New Zealand and Australia seem to have developed quite disparate attitudes towards the use of force in international affairs today. While the Clark government has adopted an idealistic and internationalist approach to force, stating that “military force is not the method of choice” for New Zealand since force involves “difficult political and moral judgements” (Defence Policy Framework, 2000, cited in McElhatton, 2006), the Howard Administration in Australia has opted for a realpolitik approach in the realist tradition indicating in its Defence 2000 White Paper that as “armed force will remain a key factor in international affairs”, Australia’s task is to prepare the ADF to engage in future conflicts and to decisively apply military force wherever international constraints prove ineffective, whether these conflicts arise from traditional inter-state and non-traditional non-state sources (McElhatton, 2006).

There are five themes in both the New Zealand and Australian speeches that appear on this topic, which explicitly relate to the use of force as a political tool and the conditions under which each nation considers such action to be justified. These will be discussed in the following. In addition, the Governments of both nations each express their own particular views of war itself in the speeches, and since their different approaches to the idea are related to the matter of force in global politics generally, each nations’ perspective of and experiences with war will also be touched on where relevant.
The New Zealand Perspective

1. The first theme to appear in the New Zealand discourse regarding the use of force concerns the Government’s strong preference for diplomatic solutions to international problems and its deep-rooted aversion to the implementation of force in international affairs. From the New Zealand point of view, peaceful methods of conflict resolution should be given as much time and room as possible, that the diplomatic process might run its course to the furthest extent realistically attainable.

Certainly, this was New Zealand’s definite preference on the issue of Iraq’s disarmament. As both Goff and Clark emphasized during the Iraq crisis, “the New Zealand Government has a very strong preference for a diplomatic solution to this crisis” (Goff, 2003 [2]), “we place considerable weight on the inspection and disarmament process” (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18). Indeed, throughout the speeches the New Zealand Government repeatedly urged the Security Council and all its members “that the diplomatic process be allowed to run its course” (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18). In fact New Zealand’s belief that diplomatic options be given full reign in disarming Saddam’s regime is so fervent, when combined with the view that “while many questions remain to be answered, real progress is also being made” by the weapons inspectors (Goff, 2003 [3]), that time and again New Zealand insists the inspectors work be allowed to continue, for as long as their work is “useful” (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18). Goff indicates that this position was arrived at, not due to a wish to indulge or tolerate Iraq’s behaviour (Clark, 2003 [1]), but by: “a dispassionate assessment of whether progress could continue to be made by means other than war” (Goff, 2003 [4]); a real desire that “the catastrophe of war” (Goff, 2003 [3]) not be visited on Iraq’s people; and a firm conviction that “all alternative avenues of achieving Iraqi disarmament should be exhausted before war is considered” (Goff, 2003 [4]). Not surprisingly then, as a consequence of such a stance, the news that diplomatic options had been discarded in favour of force by the Coalition was received by New Zealand with “deep” and “profound regret” (Clark, 2003, March 18; Clark, 2003, March 20).

This aversion to war and the use of force in international affairs can be seen not only in New Zealand’s rhetoric but also in its behaviour in its foreign affairs. For instance, in the way that, though avowing it is not a pacifist nation, New Zealand has displayed a deep
conviction that war is a tragic waste of human life and seems singularly unwilling to commit NZDF personnel to theatres of conflict where military war-fighting capabilities will be required. Indeed, since 1999 the New Zealand Government has shown a clear preference for the ‘softer’ military option of participating only in multinational peacekeeping and peace support activities under the auspices of NATO, the EU or most especially the UN, in accordance with its key foreign policy and defence objective of contributing to “global security and peacekeeping through participation in the full range of UN and other appropriate multilateral peace support, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations” (‘Peacekeeping – Overview’, 2007). Yet, as noticeably apparent here, New Zealand’s commitments tend towards low-level missions such as after-the-fact or post-conflict reconstruction operations, such as those presently being undertaken by New Zealand in East Timor, Afghanistan and Tonga, as opposed to more combative high-level peace-making operations as those that took place initially in both Bosnia and Afghanistan.26 In so doing, New Zealand considers itself to be not only supporting the role of the UN in maintaining peace and security, but also providing “practical expression” of its commitment to multilateralism (Goff, 2002 ; ‘Peacekeeping – Overview’, 2007). Today New Zealand is the 22nd largest contributor of peacekeeping forces to the UN with 751 NZDF personnel presently in operation on 18 missions worldwide, which span 13 different countries across the globe27 (‘Tour of Duty’, 2006; Goff, 2002; ‘Peacekeeping – New Zealand’s Contributions to Peace Support Operations’, 2007).

2. This leads in to the second theme in the New Zealand discourse regarding force in international affairs – the strongly held view that the use of force is in itself not only undesirable, but also a particularly dislikeable and distasteful course of action for the New Zealand Government. For while it acknowledges the occasional usefulness of threatened force as a tool in global politics, for example in effectively coercing Iraqi cooperation with the UNSC, as Goff affirms saying “without the threat of military force there would not be the degree of compliance with disarmament requirements we have

26 The sole exception being the deployment of three rotations of SAS personnel to Afghanistan in 2002, 2004 and 2005 which were actively engaged against the Afghan Taleban resistance in support of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (OEF) against terrorism led by the United States (Burton, 2005c; ‘New Zealand and the Campaign against Terrorism’, 2007).
27 In fact, as a small nation New Zealand has a remarkable international record of contributing to fifty peacekeeping operations in support of collective security since 1991(‘Peacekeeping – Overview’, 2007). By the end of the 1990s New Zealand’s level of deployment overseas at 10% of the NZDF was the highest since the Vietnam War (Adamson, 1999), a figure which has risen greatly in the last decade.
so far seen" (Goff, 2003 [4]), nevertheless in general the Government sees force as a negative solution that on the whole can “exacerbate that threat” (Goff, 2002 [1]) and leads to the "loss of innocent lives" (Goff, 2003 [4]). Consequently, the use of force in international affairs is considered to be “very much a last resort… [that]…should only be contemplated when all other options have failed” (Goff, 2003 [1]).

In fact the New Zealand Government’s strong repulsion from the idea of military force in international affairs is inherently related New Zealand’s view and experiences of war – a fact made evident in the tension between the two nations over the significance of the joint NZ-Australian ANZAC memorial in Canberra in April 2001. As Patty O’Brien and Bruce Vaughn have pointed out, war leaves its mark on nations in an infinite number of ways (O’Brien & Vaughn, 2005, p. 10). This is particularly apparent in the trans-Tasman relationship: throughout its history Australia has venerated their war history and its war heroes, New Zealand has instead buried them in a cloak of tragedy and forgotten them. This fact can be seen in the way that New Zealand’s ‘Unknown Warrior’ of World War I was not brought home for over eight years (finally interned in 2004); that New Zealand’s greatest Resistance fighter of World War Two, Nancy Wake, remains largely unknown and unrecognized; and in the way that many New Zealanders are still unaware of Passchendaele’s place in our national history as New Zealand’s bloodiest battle in its military history (‘Capital at standstill for unknown warrior’s final journey’, 2004; McNaughton & NZPA, 2007; Harper, 2000, p. 10). Indeed, as John Terraine has pointed out, while the tragedy of Passchendaele “has evoked more horror and loathing than any other battle-name” in the United Kingdom and Canada, in New Zealand the disaster is largely an untold story (John Terraine, in Harper, 2000, p. 10). Indeed, as an editorial of The Dominion Post made clear this year, ‘Anzac Day’ in New Zealand is a day for "somber reflection and remembrance…that war is a murderous affair of loss and unspeakable suffering", or in Colin James’ words, “a day to commemorate, not celebrate, war” (‘A day of reflection’, 2007, B4; James, 2006c). For New Zealanders war has become a metaphor for personal and national tragedy, devastation, unspeakable suffering and the squandering of life, or as Colin James summed up World War I: “Mud,

28 While the Australians were very clear on the purpose of the memorial as a commemoration of the ANZAC bonds forged between New Zealand and Australia through war, New Zealand refused to see the kete flax basket memorial as a war memorial per se and rejected the theme of war as the bond between them, stating that “Although New Zealand and Australia’s shared military history should be reflected in some way, a memorial which expresses only this dimension of the relationship would be unacceptable” (Hunter, 2002, p. 333-334).
death, sadism” (James, 2007c). This emphasis on the tragedy of war has not surprisingly led New Zealanders to conclude that “war is a problem not a solution”, and to believe that even when war is absolutely necessary, as against Hitler and Imperial Japan in WWII or Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, ‘wars do not make the world better, only defend it from being worse’ (James, 2006c). Consequently, the lesson drawn from New Zealand’s experiences of war is the need for international collectivity to prevent war, so that by creating a “just and peaceful” world “those who gave their lives did not do so in vain” (Adamson, 1999; Goff, 2007c). As Winston Peters stated in his address this year at the Anzac Chunuk Bair ceremony: “We should honour their memories by striving for a just and peaceful world, where disagreements between nations are settled by diplomacy, rather than warfare” (Peters, 2007b).

3. The third New Zealand view in regard to the use of force concerns what is in actual fact meant by the term ‘last resort’, which, as cited above, is the only justification under which New Zealand will support the use of force to resolve global problems. From the New Zealand Government’s point of view, a general threat to world peace does not constitute a time of ‘last resort’ (Goff, 2002 [1]). ‘Last resort’ instead relates to situations in which firstly, a clear and imminent danger exists in the global sphere, and secondly, that danger can not be resolved through peaceful diplomatic means. Goff makes this point clear in a statement on March 13, stating that: “The use of force however is very much a last resort. It should only be contemplated when all other options have failed, or when the threat faced by the country it is directed against is both real and imminent” (Goff, 2003 [4]). For this reason New Zealand judged the situation in Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist attacks to be a time of last resort justifying the use of force, as the Taleban Government had refused to act against Al Qaeda when that terrorist organisation had “very clearly demonstrated the threat it posed to international security and the lives of innocent people targeted by its terrorist attacks” (Goff, 2003 [4]), meaning that from the New Zealand perspective there was “no option to the use of force in the circumstances” (Goff, 2003 [4]). In regard to Iraq, however, New Zealand did not judge the situation to represent either a ‘real and imminent threat’, nor one that could not be resolved diplomatically. As Goff sums up the New Zealand position:

We were not persuaded the point had been reached that force could be justified as a last resort. In our view, the weapons inspection process still
had some way to go...And, especially in the absence of clear and immediate danger (Goff, 2003 [10]).

New Zealand’s judgement prior to the onset of war, therefore, was that since “we do not believe the point has yet been reached where there are no other alternatives” (Goff, 2003 [4]), and “options other than military action are still available to achieve disarmament” (Goff, 2003 [4]), “the threshold for the use of force had not been reached” (Clark, 2003 [2]). The Iraq war was consequently considered to be unjustified, from the New Zealand Government’s point of view, and this is a judgment that remains strongly held by the Government to this day.

More broadly, this kind of perspective of the use of force being only justified in times of extreme last resort can be seen in New Zealand stance on force and terrorism. While New Zealand has acknowledged the need for force in the campaign against terrorism, as demonstrated in its triple deployment of NZ SAS personnel to Afghanistan to take part in the anti-terrorist campaign there, it nevertheless repeatedly emphasizes the point that military force is only “one facet” of countering terrorism and stresses international multilateral initiatives as the most important, effective and legitimate means for the world to combat terrorism (Goff, 2001b, p. 12-13). In fact under the Labour-Alliance coalition government of 1999-2001, the Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Matt Robson, actually declared that the Alliance party in the Government Coalition supported patience rather than a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taleban in Afghanistan following 9/11, stating that “there is no need to take precipitate action since “Osama bin Laden has nowhere to go” (Robson, 2001c, p. 8). Moreover, New Zealand has rejected and condemned the new US doctrine of ‘pre-emptive first strike’29 in the War on Terror, a new military tactic developed by the Bush Administration in response to the 9/11 attacks, as “a new and dangerous precedent” in world affairs (Clark, 2003 [2]). This is despite explanations provided by the United States that such a strategy is

29 ‘Pre-emption’ is defined by Charles Kegley Jr. & Eugene Wittkopf as “a quick first-strike attack that seeks to defeat an adversary before it can organize a retaliatory response” (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004, p. 510). First used by Israel in response to threats along its border in the 1960s (‘Israel Country Brief’, 2007), pre-emption was adopted by the US, UK and Australia as a valid military strategy for use against Saddam Hussein in 2003 on the grounds that Iraq, as a state sponsor of terrorism, had to be prevented from obtaining weapons of mass destruction for use against the United States and because Saddam was considered too irrational for deterrence (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004, p. 504). As the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, stated: “We do not have the luxury of doing nothing” (cited in Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004, p. 504).
now necessary since “traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness” and “we are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002, cited in Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004, p. 510). Similarly, it is this attitude that force is not an option of ‘last resort’ and thus the wrong approach to terrorism that led the New Zealand Government to equally condemn the terrorist organization Hezbollah and Israel in their resort to force in the six-week Israel-Lebanon conflagration in 2006, since in New Zealand’s view, force only implies “extensive breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law” in an already volatile region (‘New Zealand and the Arab/Israel conflict’, 2007). Likewise, this preference for a non-forceful approach to terrorism can also be seen in New Zealand’s attitudes towards the Israel-Palestine problem and its condemnation of many of Israel’s actions in the past eight years where it has used force in order to protect itself from sustained terrorist attack and territorial incursions (‘New Zealand and the Arab/Israel conflict’, 2007). In fact, according to New Zealand, slow progress on a ‘just, enduring and comprehensive’ solution to the Arab-Israel conflict is the result of just such a recourse to force and violent tactics against each other, a view which has led New Zealand to call on both Israel and the PLO to ‘renounce violence’ in the dispute between them (‘New Zealand and the Arab/Israel conflict’, 2007).

30 In contrast, as a self-described “close friend and unapologetic supporter of democratic Israel” (Howard, 2005), Australia has long defended Israel’s right to live in security and at peace in its troubled region of the world, and “rejects unequivocally” the on-going use of terror against it in the form of Palestinian suicide bombings (Howard, 2005; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 106). Indeed, while “supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians, including for a Palestinian state” (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 106), Australia has supported Israel’s right to take decisive measures in order to defend itself from all terrorists seeking to destabilize the state, including through the use of force and the construction of a security barrier along its Palestinian border (‘Israel Country Brief’, 2007). In fact Hezbollah has been listed by the Australian Government as a terrorist organization since 2003 (‘Country Brief Lebanon’, 2007). Moreover, in the Australian view the failure to form a Palestinian state is blamed on the PLO’s rejection of the 2000 Roadmap under Yasser Arafat and Hamas’ unwillingness to recognise or fulfill conditions laid down by Israel and the Quartet (US, UN, EU and Russia) in their 2002 Roadmap for Peace (‘Israel Country Brief’, 2007).

31 Additionally, the Government does not recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital city (calling Israel’s possession of Jerusalem ‘illegal’), considers the Golan Heights and the West Bank to be occupied territory, and has opposed the construction of a security wall (‘New Zealand and the Arab/Israel conflict’, 2007).
4. A fourth theme regarding New Zealand’s view of force in international affairs concerns yet another consideration deemed necessary for the New Zealand Government to officially approve the use of force in international affairs. Not only must the impending threat be considered one of ‘last resort’, as understood according to the definition held by the New Zealand Government, but it must furthermore be confirmed as such by the UNSC and the use of force subsequently authorized in an official resolution prior to the onset of military action.

Indeed it is this strongly-held view regarding explicit UN authorization for force in international relations that can clearly be said to have contributed to New Zealand’s position on the Iraq crisis and the war that ensued. Since the New Zealand Government could not “agree with military action unsupported by a specific United Nations mandate” (Goff, 2003 [10]), it did not and could not “support military action against Iraq without a mandate from the Security Council” (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18). As Goff stated on the matter:

> If the point comes where it can no longer be progressed because of lack of Iraqi cooperation and force has to be considered, we believe that a further resolution by the UNSC should be moved to explicitly authorise the use of force. A further resolution would most clearly provide the authoritative and sound legal basis for direct action (Goff, 2003 [1]).

As he has stated elsewhere, it is New Zealand’s belief in the necessity of UN authorization for force to be considered legitimate that “forms the basis of New Zealand’s strong opposition to any military action – whether unilateral or in concert with approving states – taken without UN sanction32” (Goff, 2006a). It is this departure from New Zealand’s historical record of war contributions taken in the years since 1999 under the Clark governments which can explain why, despite having a record of collaboration and participation in every major military conflict involving the US, the UK and Australia since the end of the 19th century, the country absolutely refused to become involved in the unsanctioned US-led operation to overthrow Saddam in Iraq in March 2003. As Winston

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32 Or at the least, if not authorized by the UN, then sanctioned by a collective security organization or operation that is in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (‘Annual Report 2005’, 2005, p. 15).
Peters has explained, “For New Zealand, collective action is imperative” and “the principle of collective security in world affairs can only be achieved through the UN” (Peters, 2006a).

In fact, New Zealand’s commitment to UN-authorized force is so strong, that even in scenarios where New Zealand does not agree that military force is justified in addressing any impending threat to world security, as a loyal and faithful member of the UN it will nevertheless submit to the decisions and edicts of the UNSC and comply with its orders. Goff makes this quite apparent in a speech made on 11 February where he states:

> It is not acceptable that the procedures of the UN and the rules of international law should be observed only when it suits the purposes of, or has the agreement of, a particular party. A country, as a citizen, is bound by the law, whether they agree with it or not…. A Security Council decision has the force of international law and must be complied with (Goff, 2003 [1]).

Indeed, recognising that “the Security Council must be able to authorize force as a last resort to uphold resolutions” (Goff, 2003, February 19; Goff, 2003, March 12; Clark, 2003, March 18), without which “compliance with its resolutions could not be secured, and it could never achieve the purpose for which it was established ” (Goff, 2003 [1]; Goff, 2003 [4]), New Zealand has pledged itself to always “uphold the Council’s decisions” (Goff, 2003 [2]), whatever is decided. According to Goff, this allegiance is based on New Zealand’s strong support for multilateralism, the international rule of law, and our respect for the authority of the Security Council” (Goff, 2003 [2]), but also comes with New Zealand’s strong urging that the members of the Council “ensure that all available diplomatic means are used” to pursue adherence to UN resolutions (Goff, 2003 [2]).

Nevertheless, despite such a commitment to comply with the UN’s determinations no-matter what the Government’s own view may be, New Zealand reserves the right to make its own decisions regarding what form of deployment New Zealand’s commitment will be. Goff makes this definite preference clear, emphasizing in reference to its support for UN resolutions that since “it is…up to each individual country as to what
practical form that support takes” (Goff, 2003 [1]). Today New Zealand’s strong preference in any given conflict situation requiring a military solution - unlike in past times - is to participate for the most part only through post-conflict peacekeeping, rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance activities as opposed to traditional war-fighting and peace-making tasks. Goff neatly illustrates this point following the Iraq war, articulating that even once UN authorization was obtained for supporting military activities in Iraq, New Zealand would only be willing to be involved in Iraq through activities that are “likely [to] be confined to medical, humanitarian and logistical assistance” (Goff, 2003 [1]).

**The Australian Perspective**

1. The first theme to appear in the Australian speeches concerning the use of force in International Relations regards the Australian Government’s view of war as an abhorrent and most undesirable phenomenon of world politics. As Prime Minister Howard emphatically states time and again, “armed conflict is a terrible thing” (Howard, 2003, March 14; Howard, 2003, March 18), “If it occurs the agony and the deaths of people are many” (Howard, 2003 [4]), and “the death of innocent people – especially children – should always shock and sadden us lest we lose our basic humanity” (Howard, 2003 [6]). In fact, Howard describes “a common abhorrence of war” as “the one thing that unites us all…every Australian” (Howard, 2003 [2]). As Australians, he states, “we all hate the very thought of war in any form. Our natural instinct is to recoil from it” (Howard, 2003 [2]). Indeed, later on Downer also cites the way that “many Australians – in legitimate, peaceful protest - have voiced their concern about a war with Iraq” (Downer, 2003 [2]) to be evidence of this national distaste for military conflict.

It is for this reason that the Australian Government strongly prefers that all international problems, including that of Iraq, be resolved peacefully through diplomatic channels. Howard makes this point very clear in one speech in particular during the Iraq crisis, stating:

> I don't want to see military conflict. I hate the very idea of it. It's an abomination. I don't like it one bit. Anybody who thinks that this Government is keen to have military conflict has got rocks in their heads (Howard, 2003 [1]).
Instead, as both Howard and Downer affirm, "the most intense desire of us all is that this challenging issue is resolved without war. No one wants war. We all hope it can be avoided" (Howard, 2003 [2]), and "the Government shares the desire of Australians for a peaceful end to the situation in Iraq" (Downer, 2003 [2]). "We want Iraq disarmed, we'd love to see it occur peacefully" (Howard, 2003 [3]). Australia's inclination to employ multilateral diplomacy most extensively in the realm of security, and its preference for a UN solution to the problem of Iraq are both examples of this belief affecting Australia's foreign policy behaviour in international affairs.

2. In spite of this strong predilection against the use of force, however, the second theme in the Australian discourse is the Australian Government's conviction that though unfortunate, oftentimes the application of military force is a useful tool in the complex world of foreign affairs. This argument, as expressed in the Australian speeches, can be divided into two main camps or lines of thought: the first pertaining to the usefulness of force above all as a means of coercing cooperation from non-compliant or stubbornly resistant nations of the international community; and second, alternatively as a measure that can alleviate human suffering through ousting abusive regimes and setting up democratic humanitarian ones in their stead. In short, war can have positive results.

In regard to the former and Iraq, for example, Howard emphasizes the fact that it was through sustained military pressure on Iraq through the build-up of American forces in the Gulf that Saddam was coerced to allow the UN weapons inspectors back into the country to do their work (Howard, 2003 [1]). As he attests:

Kofi Annan has stated publicly that in his opinion if the Americans had not applied military pressure through the build-up of forces in the Gulf, the weapons inspectors would not now be in Iraq. There can be no stronger statement of the diplomatic value of the military deployment.... Like the Secretary-General, we recognise the value of this strategy (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Hence, in understanding force to be "the only certain way to maintain pressure on Iraq" (Howard, 2003 [4]) and that "if those forces were withdrawn any Iraqi co-
operation...would evaporate immediately” (Howard, 2003 [4]), the Australian Government pre-positioned elements of its own ADF in the Gulf for a second time since the Gulf War (Howard, 2003 [2]). By doing so, Australia believed it could reinforce and increase the chances of success for diplomatic efforts (Howard, 2003 [1]), by adding to the pressure a military presence on the borders of Iraq would bring to bear on Saddam Hussein’s decision-making (Howard, 2003 [2]). Indeed, it is Australia’s deep conviction on the power of force as a coercive agent that evoked the Government’s strong criticism and accusation against its opponents – Dominique de Villepin, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder in particular – for undermining its coercive power in that, while they recognise along with Hans Blix and Kofi Annan “the fact that had it not been for the American military build-up, the inspectors would not be back in Iraq” (Howard, 2003 [4]) and “that the threat of military action has been the only way to elicit a positive response from Iraq” (Howard, 2003 [5]), “yet they squander the leveraging power of a military force by clearly demonstrating they are never prepared to actually use it. This strategy not only is illogical but also ignores the practical reality” (Howard, 2003 [5]).

As far as the latter humanitarian argument is concerned, moreover, the Australian Government avers that force can similarly be useful in removing despicable regimes with terrible track records of human rights abuses. As Howard reiterates on the subject of Iraq, “the humanitarian arguments do not always hang on one side” (Howard, 2003 [4]), “when you put human suffering into the balance on this issue, there is a very powerful case that human suffering in Iraq will, in fact, be greater if Saddam Hussein remains in power in that country” (Howard, 2003 [5]). And again, “I get a bit tired of the humanitarian argument all being on the one side. It’s about time that the humanitarian argument was put into a better balance and people understand what a monstrous regime we are dealing with” (Howard, 2003 [4]):

Perhaps it’s become unpalatable or unfashionable to be reminded that the Iraqi people are oppressed by this current regime. There is no chance of normalcy in a nation where torture and rape and genocide and killing are standard practice (Howard, 2003 [4]).

Indeed, though as Howard determines the Australian government could not “justify on its own a military invasion of Iraq to change the regime...Much in all as I despise the
regime” (Howard, 2003 [4]), nevertheless should military action be required to achieve Iraq’s disarmament, making it “axiomatic that such action will result in the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime” (Howard, 2003 [5]), then Australia would give its unequivocal support for the removal of the regime. This support would be given in the strong belief that there would be “enormous humanitarian cost, not least to the people of Iraq, of Saddam Hussein remaining in charge” (Howard, 2003 [4]) and that a continuation of the failing policy of containment “would do nothing to relieve the suffering of the people of Iraq” (Howard, 2003 [4]) and “do nothing to provide them with a more hopeful, happy and peaceful life (Howard, 2003 [4]).

As with New Zealand, Australia’s views on the usefulness and potential positivity of war can also be linked to Australia’s own experiences of war. New Zealand’s Ambassador to the United States, John Wood, once said that those who know warfare best do not celebrate war but rather dwell on “the fundamental springs of action: courage; obligation to one’s fellows; a sense of duty to country and to the beliefs one holds true; endurance and dogged determination to do the best once can through the most testing and frightening of trials” (Wood, 2002, p. 27-28). This is an accurate description of Australia’s different perspective on war and its divergent attitude towards Anzac Day. Not for Australia is Anzac Day a day of gloom and doom, but rather a day of remembrance and gratitude, and a day on which Australians assert their love of country and offer their respect to those who have answered the call to defend it (‘Values of the Anzacs serve Australia still’, 2005, p. 10). As The Australian newspaper proclaims, Anzac Day “serves a far greater purpose” than commemorating the Anzac’s badly managed landing in Gallipoli during World War I: “It is a day for us to remember the achievement of Australians on active service in Europe and Africa, Asia and the Pacific over 90 years. And it is a day to celebrate the values that have endured down the decades and serve us still” (‘Values of the Anzacs serve Australia still’, 2005, p. 10).

Indeed, for Australia war is a noble tradition in Australian history in which, through the valiant self-sacrifice for others and for their nation, the Australian ‘diggers’ of all generations have bought Australia its security, its freedom and its hopeful confidence in the future – “we are young and we are free” (Nelson, 2007). As the Australian historian, Charles Bean, states: “ANZAC stood and still stands for reckless valour in a good cause, for enterprise, resourcefulness, fidelity, comradeship and endurance that will never admit defeat” (‘Ancient heritage, modern society’, 2006). It is for this inheritance of values –
courage, mateship, discipline, tenacious commitment and a willingness to risk all for the
defence of a loved country and people – together with the “extraordinary sacrifice” and
“heroic deeds” of their war dead that Australia honours and remembers around the world
each year (Howard, 2007). As for Australia’s lesson from its experience of war, this is
best summed up by the Australian Minister for Defence, Brendan Nelson, who stated at
Anzac Cove this year: “They forged values that are ours and make us who we are,
reminding us that there are some truths by which we live that are worth defending”
(Nelson, 2007).

No occasion so aptly sums up this great difference in perspective between New Zealand
and Australia on the subject of war than the 2005 Anzac Day dawn service held at
Anzac Cove in Gallipoli. As an article in the Dominion Post expressed in regard to the
vastly different conclusions Australia and New Zealand articulated on this occasion: “In
thinking about the same shared battle, speaking from the same podium, inhabiting
neighbouring countries with similar histories, these two countries’ leaders drew plainly
different conclusions” (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005). On the New Zealand side PM
Helen Clark and the Chief of the NZDF, Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, used the occasion
to emphasise Gallipoli’s significance as a warning against war, as a campaign that
demonstrated not only the “folly” of the British High Command, under whom the New
Zealanders served, but also the “tragedy” of the Anzacs sacrifice and the “squandering
of life” (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005). Indeed, according to the Government, New
Zealand drew two lessons from the conflict: firstly, the importance of a small nation
shaking off “the shackles of colonial dependence” and asserting its own national
sovereignty and independence in its foreign and strategic policies; and secondly, the
responsibility of New Zealanders, as the successors and descendants of the Anzac
soldiers, “to work for a world in which future generations will not face the horror which
these brave men faced with bravery and with honour” (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005). In
stark contrast, when the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and his Defence
counterpart, General Peter Cosgrove, stepped to the podium to commemorate Gallipoli,
it was not to convey a message of the futility or tragedy of war. Indeed, from the
Australian Government’s perspective, the Anzac’s demonstration of courage and
sacrifice under tribulation had had positive effects for Australia: creating a lasting sense
of national identity, sharpening “our democratic temper and our questioning eye towards
authority”, and attaining glory not only for themselves but also for Australia (‘Two
Different Dreams’, 2005). In the same way, they proclaimed, the great “spirit of Anzac” now works as in the past to “ennoble Australia” through the “valour and sacrifice of Australia’s young men and women who serve their country and fight on in the scrub in the Solomon’s, in the villages of Timor, in the deserts of Iraq and the coast of Nias” (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005). Indeed, The Australian attacked New Zealand for its “sour note” on Anzac Day, especially Ferguson’s “bizarre and puerile speech”, as representing “a great arrogance of ignorance” reflective of New Zealand’s opting for “isolation, irrelevance and military irresponsibility” (Sheridan, 2005, p. 11). As Sheridan states:

It’s a sad commentary on New Zealand that this form of politically correct adolescent pouting finds expression at the top of its military...[the cliché] that all war is futile, sounds profound but is really very stupid33...the Anzacs did not die in vain, or in an unjust cause or in someone else’s war. They died to protect Australia [and New Zealand] and everything we hold dear (Sheridan, 2005, p. 11).

Perhaps this decidedly pessimistic attitude on the part of New Zealanders about the value of war, and the more positive outlook on its merits apparent amongst Australians, can be explained by different historical points of reference on the subject of war. For while the two nations participated in the same wars from the Boer War right through both World Wars to the Korean and Vietnam Wars, their experiences were different and came to reflect disparate connotations about war. For instance, Australia’s more optimistic outlook may come from Australia’s experience of successfully battling the Japanese out of its own Pacific backyard in WWII, in tandem with the Americans – an experience which has no equal equivalent in New Zealand’s modern history. Indeed, while the Australians victoriously fought for Australian interests on its home turf, New Zealand’s ‘boys’ underwent the trial of being enmeshed along the grim and bloody front lines of France and Belgium or trapped in the islands and inlets of Greece, all in defence of

33 As he argues, “If all war is futile, then it was futile to resist Adolf Hitler and we should have let the Nazis rule the world...You might as well say all police work is futile because it’s better to convince a murderer to act peacefully than to lock him up. And after you’ve locked him up, there are still other murderers, so you haven’t solved the problem of murder. But if it’s your family that’s being murdered, you want the police there quick smart. And if they can save your family by the use of force you quickly cease being a pacifist....War is certainly hellish but it is nonsense to say it is always futile” (Sheridan, 2005, p. 11).
primarily British interests. Perhaps on this subject of war, it is as McLean so fittingly states - that “after a hundred years of federation, the gulfs in political experience are almost as wide as the Tasman sea” (McLean, 2003, p. 245).

3. The third, and most extensively reoccurring theme of the Australian discourse regarding force, centres on the point that force is not only useful in international affairs, but also a necessary measure in some situations - even at times constituting the best or indeed the only real option for the resolution of grave international problems, incorporating as it does an ability to achieve definite and immediate objectives and being remarkably effective where diplomacy alone has failed to produce the desired result. As Howard has firmly avouched: “Peace-loving peoples must sometimes act forcefully if freedom is to be secured” (Howard, 2005). As the Australian Government enunciates on the issue of Iraq, “It is easy to say that we should disarm Iraq peacefully. But it hasn't happened, despite our best efforts [diplomatically], for 12 years” (Downer, 2003 [2]), "In other words doing nothing about Iraq, potentially, is much more costly than using force, if necessary, to ensure… Iraq’s disarmament" (Howard, 2003 [4]).

This belief in the necessity of war has been reflected in Australian’s past and present actions in the realm of international peace and security. For instance, in regard traditional state-to-state or intrastate conflicts, the Australian Government has not only designed its armed forces to possess war-fighting capabilities but has shown a willingness to deploy the ADF to actual combat ‘peace-making’ situations in the global security environment where the use of force is specifically required, as well as to the full range of other UN or NATO-sanctioned peacekeeping and peace support operations. To illustrate using the ADF’s own record of participation in global security operations, in addition to traditional peacekeeping and peace-monitory activities in Kosovo, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, Australia took part in combative peace-making activities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia under UNPROFOR in 1992, as well as in the NATO-sanctioned IFOR force in the Balkans from 1994-1996, and in the Australian-led INTERFET intervention in East Timor beginning in 1999 (‘The Australian Defence Force’s Involvement in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping Operations 1947 – Present’, 2007).
The war on terrorism, moreover, is another area which Australia considers will necessitate ongoing military force in its international affairs. Indeed, the Australian Government contends that force has become a necessity in confronting the present realities of the 21st century world in which the West is menaced by the destructive force of world terrorism. As Howard articulates on this point, “One of the difficulties of the world in which we now live is that it’s not quite as black and white in terms of conflict as it once used to be…we now live in a world where the threat of terrorism is borderless and it’s different and you’ve got to confront it in a different way” (Howard, 2003 [3]). And furthermore:

The temptation to turn our backs on the problem and hope it will go away is great. Yet the realities of the world in which we now live do not permit us that luxury. We all know that history is replete with examples of the community of nations retreating from difficult decisions through fear of the immediate consequences only to find that those difficult decisions must ultimately be addressed and at an infinitely greater cost (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Consequently, due to this belief in the necessity of force in defeating terrorism, Australia has not only built up its ADF to incorporate new anti-terrorist combat capabilities but has also officially endorsed the doctrine of pre-emption in the War on Terror. Indeed, Australia considers the use of military force to be at the ‘hard-edge’ of combating terror in the world and has developed the ADF to have new capabilities in fighting terrorists, which have been put to work in the military campaign against international terrorists in both Afghanistan and Iraq (Winning in Peace, Winning in War, 2004, p. 5; Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004, p. 79). To illustrate, following 9/11 Australia deployed Australian Special Forces Teams (SASR) into Afghanistan to perform extensive air bombing campaigns against the ruling Taleban, in concert with British, German and the United States, with the aim of overthrowing the fundamentalist regime that was sheltering Osama Bin Laden and the deadly Al-Qaeda terrorist network there (‘The Australian Defence Force’s Involvement in Peacemaking’, 2007). Indeed, in employing such techniques against terrorists, the Australian Government considers its ADF personnel to be “truly a force for good” in Australia and the world (Winning in Peace, Winning in War, 2004, p. 24). As Australia’s 2004 Transnational Terrorism document spells out:
We make the choice to join our international partners in taking the fight to the terrorists to protect our country, our people, our way of life, our values and our freedom...it is our only option for peace and security...Protecting ourselves against terrorism is a fundamental human right – the right to life and human security (Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia, 2004, p. 76-77).

Furthermore, however, this different approach to the necessity of force as it relates to terrorism between the Tasman neighbours might also be explained in reference to the two nation’s disparate experiences of terrorism: it is Australians – not New Zealanders – who have suffered and been impacted the most by terrorist attacks whether in New York 2001, Bali in 2002 and again in 2005, Jakarta in 2003, or the London tube bombings of 2005. As the records show, 88 Australians were killed in the Bali Bombings of October 2002 compared with 3 New Zealanders, thus leading Howard to take a more aggressive stance on terrorism in response to the fact that “we know the threat to our country is very real” (Howard, 2005; Mulrooney & Watkins, 2003; Kelton, 2006, p. 240). As Doig et al. assert, though post-2001 Australia had already accepted the new US pre-emption doctrine, the Bali bombings gave it new meaning and gave the Government a greater sense of urgency in the war against terrorism (Doig et al., 2007, p. 32).

Looking at the case of Iraq from this position on terrorism, moreover, it is evident that Australia saw the alternative option to force – on-going containment of Iraq - as not only “a false historical comparison” to the way it was successfully employed during the Cold War between two well-armed nuclear superpowers, but also one that “misstates completely the character of the threat that the world now faces” and the “fundamentally different world we now live in as a result of the 11th of September 2001” (Howard, 2003 [4]). For whereas containment was the preferred and only sensible option in dealing with the Soviet Union at that time, as the cost of engaging the USSR in nuclear conflict would have been much greater than the cost of doing nothing and working on the principle of containment (Howard, March 14), in Iraq’s case “now you have a completely reversed situation where the cost of nothing is potentially much greater than the cost of doing something” (Howard, March 14). Perhaps it is Howard’s own concluding statement on
18 March – two days before military action commenced – that best summarises the Australian position on the ensuing war in this regard:

This decision has been taken by the government in the belief that it is in the long-term interests of this country. It has been taken against a background of a world environment changed forever by the events of 11 September. The world now faces new and previously unknown menaces. Old notions of aggression and responses to aggression do not necessarily fit our new circumstances. Yet one thing remains constant - the responsibility of governments to protect its citizens against possible future attacks, wherever they may come from. It is in that spirit, against that background and in that context that the government has taken the decision it has, and I commend the motion to the House (Howard, 2003 [5]).

4. Linked to this concept is the fourth theme in the Australian speeches regarding the use of force, a concept that serves to act as a restraint or check on the strongly-held views described above. This theme concerns the notion that even when force is deemed necessary, nevertheless it is the Australian Government’s view that force not be resorted to until all diplomatic options have been attempted and seen to fail in achieving the desired objective. Or in other words, force should only be used as a ‘last resort’ and only when it becomes clear that no other method will succeed in securing the international community’s set objective.

This belief can be traced throughout the Australian Government’s Iraq speeches - often side-by-side with those formerly expressed about the usefulness and oft-times necessity of force. Consider, for example, Downer’s statement that “war of course, remains an option of last resort. We are still working with our allies to avoid such a course” (Downer, 2003 [2]), or likewise Howard’s relation that “military action is always a last resort and one that we all hope can be avoided” (Howard, 2003 [1]). Indeed, in recognition of the fact that “there is no more serious decision for any government than to commit its forces to military conflict abroad” (Howard, 2003, March 18; Howard, 2003, March 10), Howard expresses this evident Australian hope of a peaceful resolution to the Iraq crisis stating:
We, all of us, hope that it will still prove possible to find an outcome acceptable to the international community without military force being used. The government will not make a final decision to commit to military conflict unless and until it is satisfied that all achievable options for a peaceful resolution have been explored (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Unfortunately, however, from the Australian vantage point all diplomatic options attempted to achieve Iraq’s “immediate and unconditional and total disarmament” (Howard, 2003 [3]) were indeed seen to fail and prove ineffective in disarming Saddam’s regime, thereby rendering the situation one of ‘last resort’ and validating force as the only option left to obtain the required goal set by the international community through the UN. As Howard articulates on this point, “we have tried sanctions and containment. Sanctions can be a very powerful instrument of persuasion but have little influence over a dictator who cares nothing for the well-being of his people” (Howard, 2003 [2]), “for 12 years the United Nations sought to cajole and coerce Iraq into compliance” (Howard, 2003 [6]), but “let’s face it, we’ve got nowhere” (Howard, 2003 [4]). As Downer likewise echoes on this point: “The diplomatic effort to ensure Saddam Hussein disarmed peacefully is now over...All avenues for a peaceful resolution have been tried and have failed. Iraq must now be forced to comply with its obligations“ (Downer, 2003 [3]).

Indeed, from the Australian Government’s point of view, force was considered necessary to achieve Iraq’s disarmament as a particular case for two reasons: firstly, because of the type of threat Iraq posed in the world; and secondly, because Iraq’s past behaviour had shown that it is susceptible only to the threat or actual use of military force. As Howard states in reference to the former, “if Iraq is not effectively disarmed not only could she use chemical and biological weapons against her own people again, [but] other rogue states would be encouraged to copy her” (Howard, 2003 [4]) and “the spread of those weapons would multiply the likelihood that terrorists would lay their hands on them” (Howard, 2003 [4]). And similarly as to the latter: “There is only one form of pressure that Saddam Hussein understands - the threat of military force... the most effective, and perhaps the only, means of attracting President Hussein's attention” (Howard, 2003 [2]):
The events of the last four months, Iraq's history, and its 12 years of defiance have convinced the government that the only way to deal with this challenge is by force. Sadly, the government is not surprised that it should have come to this. Force has been the only language that Saddam Hussein's regime has ever understood (Howard, 2003 [5]).

As a consequence, in recognizing both that "Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations in Resolution 1441 for immediate, unconditional and active compliance with the UN weapons inspectors" (Downer, 2003 [3]) and that "if Saddam Hussein was to be disarmed – we had to be prepared to resort to force" (Howard, 2003 [6]), Australia pledged its support and joined the Coalition in a final bid “to bring this long-running conflict to an end once and for all” (Howard, 2003 [5]). As Downer explains the Australian position:

The international community has been left with no choice but to disarm Saddam Hussein by force. To step back from dealing with Saddam Hussein now, would be the easy option. And it would leave the greatest risks and the toughest decisions for others to make after us – when the consequences could be far more damaging...We will support the brave Australians who play a professional role in what seems to be inevitable - a regrettable but necessary military action (Downer, 2003 [3]).

5. The fifth and final theme in the Australian discourse concerning the use of force in International Relations concerns the way that, unlike its small neighbour, Australia has shown itself to be supportive not only of the usual UN or NATO-sanctioned peacemaking operations stemming from a multilateral centre, but also of the use of force undertaken

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34 It is of some importance to note here that in opting for force as the last resort to finally disarm the Iraqi regime, Australia considered the blame for such a measure to fall fully and squarely on the shoulders of the despot leader Saddam Hussein himself. This is illustrated by the following statements: "there is one country in the world that could solve all of this, and that's Iraq. Iraq is the only country acting alone that can guarantee a peaceful outcome to this" (Howard, 2003 [1]); “we have arrived at this day because Iraq has continued to defy the international community in its pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” (Downer, 2003 [3]); “this was Iraq's choice and it has turned its back on a peaceful outcome" (Downer, 2003 [3]). Nevertheless, despite these facts, it was not Australia’s intention to punish the Iraqi people for their leader's mistakes. In fact, from the outset the Australian Government declared their hope that “if a military conflict occurs that civilian casualties are the absolute minimum, we all hope and pray for that” (Howard, 2003 [3]) and expressed their resolution to assist the Iraqi people in rehabilitating the country following military action there and “stand ready” to provide humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of the conflict (Downer, 2003 [3]).
either unilaterally by a single state or by a coalition of like-minded nations - without authorization by a collective security organization - providing the state or group of nations involved are considered by Australia to have reasonable grounds for resorting to force. In fact, Australia rejects the notion that the UN organization is the sole determinant of how and when force can or should be used in international affair, and has reserved the right to enter into bilateral, multilateral or even unilateral decisions to take part in combat action concerning security matters (Advancing the National Interest, 2003). Consequently, in being compelled to resort to force in order to disarm Iraq, a new UN resolution authorizing military force under the UN banner - though highly desirable - was not in itself considered necessary or required by the Australian Government to legitimate military action against Iraq by a group of nations. As Howard stresses:

> We supported, and would have preferred, a further Security Council resolution specifying the need for such action. We did so to maximise the diplomatic, moral and political pressure on Iraq, not because we considered a new resolution to be necessary for such action to be legitimate (Howard, 2003 [5]).

This difference in attitude on the part of the Australia Government in comparison with the views held by New Zealand can be explained in the way that the Howard Administration is much more cautious about relying on the international system to achieve international security, and a lot less trusting of the abilities of the UN (McElhatton, 2006). As Howard stated in 2005: “Australia recognises that there are cases where the United Nations can leverage effective cooperation for peace and security, as was demonstrated successfully in East Timor. But we also know that there are times when this is not possible, as we saw in the Balkans” (Howard, 2005). Indeed, as the 2000 defence White Paper makes explicit, it is the Australian belief that when “swift and decisive action is needed to deal with threats to international order” and “the United Nations has not been able to respond, as in the case of Kosovo”, coalitions formed by concerned countries will continue to play a central role in ensuring global security (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 46). In these situations, the Paper concludes:
it has fallen to states with the capacity and the willingness to take action to preserve peace and security. In deciding whether to participate in such coalitions, the Government will be guided by whether an Australian role will advance Australia’s national security and our global interests (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 46).

Indeed, in circumventing the UN and participating in the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, Australia did not – unlike New Zealand - regard itself or the other Coalition members to be either acting in a ‘new’ unprecedented manner that set new and dangerous standards of behaviour on the world stage, or in participating in either an unjustified or illegal war. As regards the former, for example, Howard cites the previous precedent of the NATO countries’ bombing attacks against Serbia in 1999 which was an action undertaken without any kind of direct Security Council authorization (Howard, 2003 [2]). Similarly to the Iraq scenario, he states, “that authority was never sought because of an apprehended Russian veto” (Howard, 2003 [2]) and yet later on "the Security Council was taken to have acquiesced in the NATO action” (Howard, 2003 [2]). As to the latter, Australia considers the Iraq war to be fully justified, firstly, because diplomatic measures had failed to achieve the objective therefore rendering it necessary that force be applied, and secondly, due to the nature of the threat Iraq posed to the world in being an inherently dangerous rogue regime with access to WMDs and connections to terrorist groups. This conclusion on the justness of the war against Saddam was strongly emphasized on two separate occasions in Howard’s speeches. As he states, "The cause is just. The action is legitimate" (Howard, 2003 [5]):

Australian military forces participated with just cause, in an action properly based in international law, which resulted in the liberation of an oppressed people…Through its actions in Iraq the coalition has sent a clear signal to other rogue states and terrorist groups alike - the world is prepared to take a stand. We do not for one moment regret that decision. It was right, it was lawful and it was in Australia’s national interest" (Howard, 2003 [6]).

Furthermore, in acting in this way the Australian Government did not consider itself to be behaving in an illegal way, but rather considered the Coalition’s actions to be completely
legal under international law. As Downer accentuates on the subject, following extensive national and international legal advice provided to the Australian Government:35

Such action is consistent with international law. Let there be no mistake, an 18th Security Council resolution is not necessary to provide a legal basis for action to enforce the previous 17 resolutions. Our legal advice is unequivocal. The existing United Nations Security Council resolutions provide for the use of force to disarm Iraq and restore international peace and security to the area (Downer, 2003 [3]).

As Michael Costello, a former Secretary of DFAT, concluded: “This is not unlawful, this war, if it takes place. It is already authorised by the UN. This is the simplest international legal issue I have ever seen. It is clear, uncomplicated, straightforward, the legal authority is there” (Costello, cited in Downer, 2003, March 18). Indeed, as Howard underscores, it was under the belief that “adequate legal authority existed for that deployment and any subsequent military action under then existing resolutions of the Security Council” (Howard, 2003 [2]) and “that existing Security Council resolutions clearly allow for the use of military force” (Howard, 2003 [5]) that Australia deployed troops to the Gulf in 1998. Just as it was on the same understanding that the Clinton Administration, much like the current Bush Administration, undertook Operation Desert Fox to push Iraq back out of Kuwait – an operation in which Australian servicemen and women took part (Howard, 2003 [5]). Equally it was in this same spirit, argues Howard, that the present Australian Government decided to commit elements of the ADF to the international Coalition of military forces in 2003, with the purpose of enforcing “Iraq's compliance with its international obligations under successive resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, with a view to restoring international peace and security in the Middle East region” (Howard, 2003 [5]).

35 Provided by the head of the Office of International Law of the Australian Attorney-General's Department, the senior legal adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, a former Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and former leader of the opposition Mr Michael Costello, and additionally by the UK Attorney General Lord Goldsmith.
Chapter Five

Case Study: Relations with the United States

The third and final area of crucial importance in the separate directions New Zealand and Australia seem to be travelling in their International Relations concerns each country’s relationships with the world’s only superpower in this monopolar global age – the United States of America. The US, Australia and New Zealand are often said to share much in common: they are each nations of the Pacific; they incorporate similar societies founded on the ‘pioneer spirit’ and embracing the same values and beliefs such as freedom and democracy; and they have each undergone similar experiences not only in their early colonization but also in participating together in the same ways throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, so close were the bonds between the three nations that during World War II, when the Americans were considering whether or not to abandon the Antipodean nations to the advancing Japanese, advisors to the President Roosevelt made the case that: “We cannot, in honour, let Australia and New Zealand down. They are our brothers, and we must not allow them to be overrun by Japan” (cited in Gustafson, 1997, p. 105). As a result the United States adapted its strategy to protect its Pacific allies, making Australia its main base and New Zealand its South Pacific headquarters, meaning that at least 150,000 American personnel were stationed in Australia in 1943 and a further 200,000 stationed in New Zealand at some time between 1941-1945 (Gustafson, 1997, p. 107; Dunn, 1984, p. 139). Following Japan’s defeat and the end of the war, these three countries had become such close allies as to cement their friendship and security commitments to each other in a formal security treaty known as the 1951 ANZUS alliance. It was chiefly owing to this alliance - in addition to shared security interests and fears regarding the spread of Communism in the Asia-Pacific - that Australian and New Zealand sent their servicemen to fight together with American forces in Vietnam in the decades that followed.

This close record on three-way inter-cooperation came to an abrupt end in the mid-1980s, however, when New Zealand banned US ship visits on the basis of its new anti-nuclear policy and the United States reciprocated by suspending its security commitments to NZ under ANZUS. New Zealand was officially demoted from the status
of American “ally” to just a “friend”. In the years that followed the US and Australia nursed hopes that the small nation would eventually reverse its anti-nuclear legislation and thereby reactivate its part in the security alliance (Gustafson, 1997). However, such a reversal did not come rendering the two remaining ANZUS partners to be noticeably uncomfortable with New Zealand’s position on defence ever after (Gustafson, 1997). While on the one hand, Australia has worked from this time forward to maintain a strong bilateral defence relationship with its neighbour at significant cost to itself (Gustafson, 1997, p. 113), the American-New Zealand relationship has been hampered and weakened by the nuclear issue ever since. This has meant that, while the three countries have at times come together again to cooperate militarily such as in the Gulf War and today in the War on Terror, New Zealand and Australia remain at odds not only in the degree of closeness in their relations with the US, but also in their respective attitudes and policies towards the superpower too with tangible consequences in the international sphere, especially in the realms of intelligence and defence (Calvert, 2003). Indeed, according to the former New Zealand Defence Force Chief, Bruce Ferguson, New Zealand’s strained military relationship with the US is not only impacting negatively on the NZ-US relationship, but also hurting our defence links and military cooperation with Australia (Marshall, 2005).

Much like a photo snapshot that captures one moment in time, the Iraq speeches provide an interesting glimpse into the tone, breadth and depth of each Tasman’s relationship with the United States as they were in the early years of the 2000s. There are five themes that appear on this subject in both the New Zealand and Australian speeches on Iraq, each of which reflect the distinctive and varying type of relationship the two have with the world’s only superpower. These themes will be discussed in the following in the hope of providing a broad overview of the important factors and areas of symmetry and difference in Washington’s relationships with the Antipodes today.

**Wellington & Washington: the NZ-United States Relationship**

It is one of those interesting paradoxes that New Zealand, the country which its early settlers believed would “daily Americanise” to develop a similar society with similar traits (Sinclair, 1986, p. 15) and which had more contact with America than its larger neighbour right up until the 1980s (Blainey, 1987, p. 329), would eventually become the
Tasman nation with the weakest relationship with the US. As McElhatton neatly describes the current state of affairs between the two Tasman nations and the superpower: “Australia is firmly committed to the United States as a strategic partner. New Zealand is not” (McElhatton, 2006). There are five different dynamics of the NZ-US relationship which are addressed in the Iraq speeches, all of which together paint a fuller picture of where exactly Wellington stands with Washington today.

1. The first theme in the New Zealand discourse concerning New Zealand’s relationship with the US centres around the idea that the two countries are “friends” (Goff, 2003 [10]), who share a “longstanding friendship” (Goff, 2003 [3]) and a mutual sense of respect (Goff, 2003 [10]). This friendship in turn is based on a long tradition of shared values, history, and common threads. As Goff states, it is “important to remember how many values we share” with the United States (Goff, 2003 [10]), “we share many common threads with our traditional partners formed over many years of shared history and values. These are partnerships that have endured. They will continue to do so” (Goff, 2003 [10]). Indeed, as PM Clark stresses, “the shared values based between Australia, and New Zealand, and Canada, and Britain, and the US, could not be closer” (Clark, 2003 [1]), “it is...important to emphasise our strong sense of shared values with all western democracies” (Clark, 2003 [2]). Perhaps it was this sense of friendship and common heritage that enabled New Zealand, in Clark’s words, to “fully understand the frustration, impatience, and outrage felt by the United States” and New Zealand’s other traditional allies during the Iraq crisis, “at Iraq’s slowness to comply and resistance to complying with UN resolutions. I do believe that Iraq would strain the patience and tolerance of a saint” (Clark, 2003 [2]). Indeed, New Zealanders share many values with Americans, such as democracy, the rule of law, economic liberty and freedom of expression as well as admiration for the same qualities of independence, confidence and freedom (Swindells, 2005; Anderton, 2005). As Colin James states: “While not allied, we are aligned – by dint of history, heritage and kin” (James, 2006a).

Nevertheless, despite these assertions there is no denying the weakness of the New Zealand’s relationship with the US in contrast with Australia, nor the noticeable note of strain in the New Zealand discourse wherever the relationship is mentioned. One good illustration of this reality is the way that when the incoming Labour Government released its Defence Policy Framework in June 2000 the defence document was conspicuous for
its exclusion of any mention the United States at all, while making reference to many other states with whom New Zealand cooperates militarily such as Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and even some Pacific Island states (McElhatton, 2006). When this fact is considered in light of not only America’s defence of New Zealand during World War II, but also New Zealand’s dependency on American protection during the Cold War and its history of participation in US-led operations such as in Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf, “this is a startling, and telling, omission” (McElhatton, 2006). Indeed, as McElhatton points out, even where the United States does appear, such as in the 2000 Foreign & Security Policy Challenges paper, references to this nation are made “in a detached and vaguely hostile manner” and characterised by “a subtle apathy, almost a desire to see American power diminish” (McElhatton, 2006), which of course is hardly the kind of tone or attitude one would expect to find between “friends”. Even today in September 2007, moreover, the official Government website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade omits the United States as a key country, instead lumping the superpower into a vague ‘North America’ category, and neglects to even provide a basic historical overview of the NZ-US relationship and the main areas of cooperation and disagreement. When compared with Australia’s close relationship with the United States, this difference between the Tasman pair is stark indeed.

2. The second theme of the speeches is illustrative of this state of affairs between Wellington and Washington and concerns the way that, despite this long tradition of friendship (of sorts), New Zealand and America often find themselves at odds with each other over issues on the international agenda. These clashes stem from acute but genuine differences of view and opinion, usually concerning not aims or desired outcomes but rather the means or appropriate methods used to achieve them. These differences, when they appear, tend to have the result of souring the relationship and producing manifold negative effects. Indeed, differences of view between New Zealand and the US have a tendency to result in heightened emotions on both sides, as well as a predilection to concentrate only on the aspect of the relationship where the point of difference exists between them. Goff highlights this aspect of the relationship, manifestly apparent over Iraq, in his statement that “there is currently a disproportionate focus on one issue on which we have disagreed” (Goff, 2003 [10]) stemming from the way that on both sides “emotions focus on our points of difference” (Goff, 2003 [10]).
The nuclear issue is one such area of difference that has become a highly-charged matter and a major obstacle between New Zealand and the US in furthering the relationship. The former American Ambassador, Charles Swindells, for instance, called the nuclear ban “the main stumbling block” to improving the relationship, while his new successor recently announced that New Zealand would have to move first by relaxing the ban in order to bring the two-decade stand-off to an end, stating that “the ball is in your court” (Swindells & McCormick, cited in Kay, 2005). New Zealand’s reaction, as epitomized in PM Clark’s response to such comments, has long been that responsibility for improving relations rests on both sides and that such a reconciliation between the two countries had to be done “within the framework of the nuclear-free legislation” (Clark, cited in Kay, 2005). Exacerbating this stalemate in NZ-US relations, moreover, is the list of international issues on which the two nations likewise disagree in the international sphere. In the last decade, particularly, New Zealand has increasingly been at variance with American foreign and security policy on issues such as UN reform, the ABM treaty, the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC), the “Star Wars” National Missile Defence umbrella project, the Kyoto Protocol, and America’s intention to develop new types of nuclear weapons.

In the last two years, however, there seems to be greater movement towards reconciliation by both parties, even with the prospect of New Zealand’s nuclear policy remaining unaltered. Primarily the “pivotal” reason for such a change of heart by the United States, as explained by US State Department official Randy Schriver, is the way that National has adopted a bipartisan stance on the nuclear policy, meaning that the policy is likely to stay intact regardless of future changes in government as something now deeply ingrained in the psyche of New Zealanders (Young, 2007). Additionally, however, the United States is increasingly in need of friends in the both the War on Terror and in ensuring global security and order in areas such as the Pacific. Consequently, though outgoing US Ambassador Swindells intimated in his parting speech that the US is “starved of trust” in its relationship with New Zealand36, a problem that could only be addressed through a “comprehensive dialogue” between the friends,

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36 See Gustafson’s article ‘If you ever need a friend, You have one’, in Patty O’Brien & Bruce Vaughn (eds.), Amongst Friends: Australian and New Zealand voices from America (2005), for a blow-by-blow account of the ANZUS affair and how Lange’s flip-flopping and false promises to American Ambassador Schultz over the USS Buchanan resulted in the impression in Washington that the New Zealand Prime Minister had lied and his country was not to be trusted.
the new American Ambassador, William McCormick, has asserted that the United States would no longer press for a change of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, thus indicating a new attitude within the American Administration to ‘let bygones be bygones’ in the NZ-US relationship. As McCormick states: “You are a sovereign nation. You have made the decision. It is carved into law for the last 20 years. I’m not here to change that” (cited in Kay, 2005).

The matter of Iraq was likewise an issue of heated dispute and contention between New Zealand and the United States. Just as in the past and equally today “there remains an issue of difference between us on nuclear policy” that both sides openly acknowledge (Goff, 2003 [10]), the issue of Iraq’s disarmament revealed another difference of view between New Zealand and the United States on “how to handle the Iraq crisis” (Clark, 2003 [2]). Indeed, the two nations’ divergent perspectives and actions on the matter injected even more strain into an already rather fragile relationship, made worse by PM Clark’s back-handed derogatory comments about the US President and Commander-in-Chief, George W. Bush - for which she was forced to apologise in Washington – in addition to further criticisms to the effect that “Iraq was not a haven for terrorist prior to the war there. It certainly is now” (Houlahan, 2006b). Some New Zealanders believe it was these earlier comments that were responsible for the way that New Zealand’s bid for an FTA with the US was scuttled in Washington later that year, especially given Ambassador Swindell’s remarks that ‘trade could not be separated from foreign and security policy. For America’s part, Washington’s attitude towards such comments and New Zealand’s policy of non-involvement in Iraq can probably best be summarized in new US Ambassador William McCormick’s comments that “is always disappointing when there isn’t participation by a freedom-loving country…in a very important matter” (cited in Kay, 2005). The central matter of dispute between these two nations was of course the judgement made by the United States, Britain, Australia and Spain, following weeks of political wrangling within the UN that: firstly, force - in the form of an allied military invasion - was necessary to achieve Iraq’s disarmament; and secondly, that the provision of more time to the weapons inspection process would not result in more cooperative behaviour from Saddam. These were two perspectives which the New Zealand Government thoroughly opposed.

Evidence of this can be clearly seen in New Zealand’s Iraq speeches. For instance, while New Zealand articulates its shared desire with the US, the UK and Australia to bring about the disarmament of Saddam’s regime (Goff, 2003 [10]), nevertheless the two
friends were divided over the means and timetable for the attainment of such an objective. This fact can be seen in Clark’s statements that while New Zealand is one of many who have shown “overwhelming support” (Clark, 2003 [2]) for the core objective of disarming Iraq, there is a “difference of opinion and approach arising over the means and the timetable for meeting the objective” (Clark, 2003 [2]). Or in Goff’s words, “all members of this Council share the same objective: the disarmament of Iraq. Debate has raged not over the objective, but over the timetable for and means of achieving it” (Goff, 2003 [3]). More specifically, this difference of opinion, from the New Zealand standpoint, concerned the Government’s two opposing beliefs that: firstly, “options other than military action are still available to achieve disarmament” (Goff, 2003 [4]), namely “that Iraqi compliance could be achieved by force of international opinion” (Goff, 2003 [4]); and secondly, that since the mid-February Blix Report “suggests that Iraq has moved at least in part to accommodate some of the inspectors’ requests” (Goff, 2003 [2]), the international community could still hold out hope that with more time “the inspection process will be able to keep up traction and keep momentum” (Clark, 2003 [1]) to achieve Iraq’s disarmament.

In addition, however, judging from New Zealand’s Iraq speeches, it seems the New Zealand Government considered an Iraq in possession of WMDs to be more of a serious problem than an imminent threat, as maintained by Australia and the US. As Clark stated at that time “Iraq is a problem, Iraq has been a problem for rather a long time” (Clark, 2003 [1]). Indeed, if Iraq was considered a threat at all by the New Zealand Government, it was more in the sense of it being a threat to world peace and to the multilateral fabric of international society today (Goff, 2002 [1]) rather than to the West or global security at large as the US contended. Thus in choosing to refrain from any Iraq War (and equally in maintaining a policy of non-involvement since 2004), New Zealand has considered itself to be not only opting for peace as opposed to war, and the maintenance of the status quo within the international community, but also to be occupying the moral high ground within the international community. However, according to the US, Australia and Britain this stance was in direct contrast seen not as a position of strength but of weakness, and one based more on naiveté rather than wisdom in refusing to face facts. Indeed, in considering that such a position did not take into account either the type of person Saddam Hussein was and the kind of regime he ruled over, or the proven failure of a policy of patience towards Iraq, or indeed the risk to
the world inherent in the provision of more time, it was rejected outright as a valid option in the Iraq Crisis by New Zealand’s traditional allies, foremost among whom was the United States.

As usual, the outcome of yet another “great division” (Clark, 2003 [2]) between New Zealand and the United States on an important international issue was a great deal of strain and tension between the two countries. Indeed, the resultant divide between New Zealand and the US stemming from divergent points of view over Iraq was then, and is still today, distressing but very real. As Goff admitted in a speech in May following the war, “the Government’s position on Iraq has led some to question our relations with our more traditional partners. Our difference of view over how to deal with Iraq was real and principled” (Goff, 2003 [10]). Certainly both Goff and Clark reflect on the deteriorating state of affairs between New Zealand and America in their speeches from the time of mid-March 2003 onwards. To illustrate, while Goff indicates that “It is distressing to my government that the debate has strained longstanding friendships between nations. That strain will be magnified if the next steps taken to resolve the crisis do not have broad international support” (Goff, 2003 [3]), Clark goes so far as to publicly and officially “note our concern at the strain this division over Iraq has placed on longstanding friendships and alliances between western democracies” (Clark, 2003 [2]).

3. Nevertheless despite stark differences such as these on issues within the international arena, it remains New Zealand’s wish that the friendship it shares with the United States not be damaged in the long-term by any short-term differences of opinion between them. As a statement by Clark well illustrates over the Iraq split, “our government is determined that this difference of opinion, substantial as it is, will not damage longstanding friendships which we value” (Clark, 2003 [2]). Or as Goff is similarly seen to assert, at the official end of the Iraq war signalled by the US declaration of the cessation of hostilities:

It is time to move on. Democracies and friends can have differences of view, sometimes quite fundamental differences, but still respect one another and work closely on the many points of shared interest. New Zealand has already signalled its willingness to play its part in meeting humanitarian needs and in the reconstruction of Iraq (Goff, 2003 [10]).
Indeed, despite their occasional differences, New Zealand and the United States share many points of common interest and cooperate closely together wherever the two find shared goals or objectives. One former New Zealand diplomat, Michael Powles, has commented on this fact, stating that “although we have differences with the US on some issues addressed in multilateral forums, on others we seek the same results, and support each other’s efforts (cited in Goff, 2005). Or as Goff has similarly stated, it is “important to remember how many values we share and the extent of our on-going co-operation” (Goff, 2003 [10]), “there are many areas where we cooperate closely, which do not make headlines” (Goff, 2003 [10]). This cooperation is particularly forthcoming and observable in the international sphere - and frequently alluded to in the speeches - in regard to three particular areas in the realm of global politics: the War on Terror; the non-proliferation of WMDs; and the stability of the Pacific Island region.

As regards the first area, following the horrific attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, in which two Kiwis were among the 3000 killed, the New Zealand Government responded to President Bush’s declaration of war on Al Qaeda and global terrorism by pledging “a solid contribution” to the US-led campaign, in pursuit of the shared goal of closing down the terrorist network Al Qaeda and its affiliates through diminishing and removing their key sources of support and supply, especially in terms of finances and arms. (Patman, 2005, p. 57). As Clark has stated on the matter, “in New Zealand, we saw the attacks as attacks on humanity. We resolved to work with the United States and other nations to make a stand against this evil and those responsible for it” (Clark, 2002). Indeed, the New Zealand Government considers the emergence of international terrorist groups as a “significant event” whose actions have shocked not only the US - “the primary victims of the attack” (Goff, 2002 [1]) - but also the entire international community at large (Goff, 2002 [1]). According to Goff, such a demonstration of “premeditated and callous mass murder of 3000 people from 79 different countries” as displayed on 9/11 by Al Qaeda, in addition to “their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical or nuclear, - should they gain access to them” (Goff, 2002 [1]), has made terrorist groups one of the most serious threats in the world today and “made our world a more dangerous place” (Goff, 2002 [1]). This subsequent contribution included the deployment of a New Zealand Special Air Services (SAS) unit and air force Hercules aeroplane to Afghanistan, an ANZAC frigate and an Orion...
surveillance aircraft for use in patrolling the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, and an additional 242 NZDF personnel to a Canadian-led force patrolling that region (Patman, 2005). In the years since 9/11, moreover, New Zealand has continued to show its support for anti-terrorist measures, as shown in the deployment of two additional rotations of NZ SAS squads and 60 post-conflict reconstruction army engineers to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, the latter to work in combination with its naval frigate in the Gulf of Oman, in addition to peacekeeping forces to assist in humanitarian assistance and nation-building activities (Clark, 2002; Goff, 2006b). These measures were taken because, as Helen Clark stated, "we wanted to ensure that Afghanistan could not provide a base for terrorists to operate from" (Clark, 2002).

Furthermore, following the cessation of hostilities in Iraq in 2003, New Zealand initially deployed a team of 20 NZDF personnel to Iraq to assist in clearing landmines, setting up medical programmes and rebuilding sanitation services (Goff, 2006b).

The way that this kind of terrorism has been brought into New Zealand's own neighbourhood of the Asia-Pacific, moreover, beginning with the Bali Bombing of 12 October 2002, seems to have reinforced the nation's commitment to the international campaign (Goff, 2003 [4]) and strengthened New Zealand's determination "to play a role in the wider campaign against terrorism; eliminating Al Qaeda, and strengthening regional counter-terrorism efforts" (Goff, 2003 [10]). As a consequence New Zealand has joined with the US and Australia to assist Pacific Island Countries (PICs) to raise and strengthen their counter-terrorism capabilities (Clark, 2002). Indeed, in seeing 9/11 as "a sharp warning to us" (Goff, 2002 [1]) of the destructive potential of such groups and the threat they pose to global peace and security, the New Zealand Government has quite substantially supported its strong verbal commitment to the US-led War on Terror in being "very active in the campaign against terrorism" (Goff, 2003 [10]), and in fact, as a small nation New Zealand prides itself on such a record of sustained and successful contribution to Afghanistan. As Goff asserts, New Zealand's contribution to the War on Terror has "set us apart as one of a relatively small group which made that contribution" (Goff, 2003 [10]). Certainly, New Zealand's commitment to the War on Terror has become so significant as to now be considered one of the most "important developments in New Zealand's foreign relations" from 2002 onwards (Goff, 2003 [4]). Nevertheless, while these commitments have eased the strain in the relationship somewhat, it has not in fact altered the perception within the US that New Zealand is not
a “full participant” in the War on Terrorism. Indeed, there has been criticism from several quarters on this point to the effect that by parting ways with its traditional allies over Iraq, New Zealand has indulged in “a frivolous moral exercise that needlessly jeopardized New Zealand’s national interests” (in Patman, 2005, p. 58). As Patman states: “According to the government’s critics, the terrorist bomb blasts in Bali in October 2002, killing three New Zealanders and 190 Australians, and the reluctance of the Bush administration to negotiate a free-trade deal with New Zealand, confirmed that the government was not doing enough in the war against terrorism” (Patman, 2005, p. 58).

The second area cited in the speeches, where New Zealand cooperates well with the US on a matter of common interest, concerns the non-proliferation of WMDs. These weapons in themselves are of great concern to New Zealand, perhaps tying in to the country’s identity and status as one of the few self-declared nuclear-free nations in the world. However, the fact that international terrorist groups seek to gain access to such weapons to use in attacks against the US and the West (Goff, 2002 [1]), as well as North Korea’s “own provocative stance on weapons of mass destruction” (Goff, 2003 [4]), have together served to make the issue of greater concern and higher import on New Zealand’s foreign policy agenda (Goff, 2003 [4]). This being the case, New Zealand continues to work on the matter of non-proliferation and is especially active in “situations where weapons of mass destruction threaten the peace and stability of our region, such as North Korea” (Goff, 2003 [10]).

Lastly, the third area of mutual interest and cooperation between the United States and New Zealand regards the Pacific Island region itself. As two Pacific nations – both situated on the fringes of the Pacific – this is a natural sphere of mutual interest. A trend of increasing instability in the Pacific Islands, as well as encroaching terrorist networks and crime rings, have served to make the region of even greater interest and concern to each nation in recent years, especially so in the case of New Zealand as the region’s nearest neighbour and benefactor (Goff, 2003 [4]). Indeed, New Zealand considers Pacific instability to be one of the key “questions of concern in the world today” (Goff, 2003 [4]). Consequently, New Zealand has been working along with the US to stabilize the region and has been making efforts towards the shared goal of progressing towards a more stable and peaceful Pacific (Goff, 2003 [10]) in the hope of ensuring “a more secure, just and harmonious world” (Goff, 2003 [10]). This significant New Zealand
contribution and concern to Pacific affairs has been noticed and appreciated by the United States, and indeed, seems to have signalled a rapprochement in NZ-US ties in the years since. As the US Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill, said at the US-NZ Partnership Forum in Auckland this month: “There is no question that the United States has a good partner in New Zealand, and it is widely recognized and appreciated throughout the government, from the very top, that New Zealand makes valuable contributions to peace, stability, and economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region” (Hill, 2007).

4. The fourth theme of New Zealand’s Iraq speeches that sheds light onto the country’s relationship with the US concerns the importance to New Zealand of a good working relationship with America. In fact, obtaining and maintaining such a relationship with the US is described in one particular speech as being of “vital concern to New Zealand” (Goff, 2003 [10]). As Goff elaborates on this subject:

> Relations with the US are important. Our links are broad-ranging. We have extensive people-to-people contacts. The economic relationship is very significant for New Zealand (Goff, 2003 [10]).

As a result of this predicament, it is considered to be in New Zealand’s interests that progress be made towards this end of nurturing good US relations (Goff, 2003 [10]). Indeed the speeches disclose the great extent of New Zealand’s commitment to such an endeavour and the substantial amount of energy expended in pursuit of it, as the following statement by Goff well illustrates:

> This Government is committed to a sound relationship with the US. It has worked hard to advance New Zealand’s interests with Washington. In the past twelve months not only has the Prime Minister visited Washington, but also the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Sutton on several occasions, and I have been there to hold discussions with colleagues in the Administration (Goff, 2003 [10]).
Indeed, it seems in recent years that New Zealand has come to the belated realization that relations with the United States - in every sphere of politics, economics and defence - are of fundamental importance to this country, requiring the same attention and energy as that invested into deepening the trans-Tasman relationship (Anderton, 2005), so much so in fact that NZ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Winston Peters, announced in November 2006 that ameliorating the NZ-US relationship had become the government’s top priority (Peters, 2006c). As he has himself stated on this foreign policy shift: “It is increasingly evident that there is a growing awareness of the fundamental importance of New Zealand’s relationship with the United States” and a “renewed commitment made by both sides to review our cooperation across a broad spectrum of engagement to ensure we are working together as effectively as we can be” (Peters, 2006i). It seems New Zealand is eager to restore the relationship to that of being “very, very, very good friends”, as Colin Powell once rather optimistically described the two countries prior to their falling-out over Iraq (cited in Bassett, 2003). Certainly, as a result, there have been many tentative steps made on both sides towards an improved NZ-US relationship.

For instance, due to New Zealand’s contribution to the War on Terror, especially in Afghanistan, the US showed its gratitude by lifting a ban on joint exercises and training of NZ SAS troops was lifted on three separate occasions in 2005-2006, raising hopes that the ban may be permanently waived (James, 2006b). PM Clark later reciprocated by extending an invitation to President Bush to visit New Zealand after attending the APEC summit in Sydney in 2007 (‘Clark invites Bush to visit’, 2005). In July 2006, moreover, New Zealand Foreign Minister, Winston Peters, visited Washington in where he had talks with US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and other leading US politicians – hoped to be the first of a regular series of annual get-togethers reminiscent of the annual New Zealand-Australia/Australia-United States dialogues (James, 2006a). During these meetings it was indicated that the US, like New Zealand, would like to “move forward” and expand the bilateral relationship beyond the 20-year nuclear impasse (‘US ‘has welcome mat out’ for Peters’, 2006; Houlahan, 2006a), an olive-branch substantiated with an invitation to New Zealand to participate in the informal five plus five grouping on North Korea (Peters, 2006). In March this year, moreover, PM Clark made the third formal visit by a New Zealand Prime Minister to the White House in 24 years (Young, 2007a), where she met with President Bush and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. While the meetings confirmed the happy prospect that New Zealand’s nuclear
policy would no-longer be “a rock in the road” in the relationship but rather a matter for the two countries to work around in future, New Zealand still remains “a friend” rather than ally, continues to have sanctions imposed on it in terms of joint exercises with the US military, and the likelihood of an FTA seems still very remote (Llewellyn, 2007; Young, 2007b). As journalist Audrey Young has observed, the friendship is limited (Young, 2007c) Nevertheless there is more hope for a more amicable relationship between the Pacific pair than at any time since the ANZUS split. New Zealand’s signal for US help in dealing with the troubled Pacific37, the United States decision to render ANZUS “a relic of the Cold War” in regard to New Zealand, and the pair’s decision to concentrate on areas of positive cooperation such as in Afghanistan, the Pacific and Antarctica, bodes well for a more positive working relationship in the future, as exemplified perhaps in the new US-NZ student OE scheme struck between the two Pacific nations a few weeks ago on 11 September (McCormick, cited in Kay, 2005; Anderton, 2005; Espiner, 2007; Watkins, 2007c; Small, 2007). At last it seems a new era in NZ-US relations is in the air.

5. Nevertheless, despite such intentions and the way that New Zealand is now committed to “a sound relationship” with the superpower on the basis of respect for each other’s individual democratic decisions, the fifth theme of the Iraq speeches reveal that there is still likely to be trouble ahead for the NZ-US relationship. This is because New Zealand has on-going concerns and criticisms with regard to the United States and its policies and behaviour in the international sphere, not least its opposing stance on matters such as the Kyoto Protocol, National Missile Defence, the creation of an ICC, the pre-emption doctrine, Guantanamo, and the legitimizing authority of the UN for the use of force in ensuring global security.

Indeed, as shown in the Iraq speeches, America’s attitude towards and position within the UN organisation – an organisation that has come to occupy such a preeminent and central place in New Zealand’s foreign policy outlook – is one crucial area of most noticeable disapproval and annoyance on the part of the New Zealand government towards the US. New Zealand seems to have three criticisms in particular on this matter: first, “the enormous influence and pressure that the United States as the world’s

37 A more diplomatic request than Peter’s outburst to the US in 2006 to ‘give us credit we deserve’ in the Pacific as New Zealand is “doing our bit” (Young, 2006; Kay, 2006).
super-power is able to exert on other countries” within the UN (Goff, 2003 [5]); second, its willingness to act outside the UN whenever deemed necessary; and thirdly, America’s criticism of the UN organization as “not being a responsible body” (Goff, 2003 [5]). In reference to the first criticism lodged here most especially, New Zealand seems to share or at the least express more than a nod towards the view that had the second resolution proposed by the UK, the UK and Spain passed within the UNSC on the Iraq issue, “many around the world would have dismissed that outcome” (Goff, 2003 [5]) as an example of America’s overwhelming power to influence within the UN, and consequently: “It would not therefore have been regarded by some within the international community as properly legitimising the use of force or of being a genuine exercise in multilateral decision-making” (Goff, 2003 [5]). Additionally, the United States’ track record of “opting out of the multilateral process” (Goff, 2003 [5]) and its receptiveness to the idea of using force to solve problems in International Relations – as demonstrated in the way that it was determined with the Coalition “that Iraq should be disarmed by force if after a short period of time it failed to comply with Resolution 1441” (Goff, 2003 [5]) – constitute two other areas in International Relations on which New Zealand finds itself continually at odds with the United States.

Issues like these will inescapably continue to be sources of tension and strain in the relationship, especially if any future challenge arises to call UN authority into question in the years to come. Additionally, if the NZ-US relationship is to become stronger and more of a central feature in New Zealand’s foreign and security policy, then New Zealand will need to address the matter of rising anti-Americanism in New Zealand among those who, in McLean’s words, being small “do not like being pushed around by the large and are even more resentful of being told that the exigencies of the ‘real world’ present no alternatives” (McLean, 2003, p. 185). In fact anti-Americanism has been a feature of the Left of the political spectrum in this country since the Vietnam War, with strains still evident now and then even among the members of the present Government. Unavoidably, this destructive force within New Zealand society will need to be addressed on both social and political levels if a fuller more developed relationship with the US based on common values and interests is ever to eventuate between the two nations.
Canberra & Washington: the US-Australian Relationship

Similarly, examination of Australia’s Iraq speeches provides an interesting overview of the unique and rather full-bodied relationship that Australia shares with the United States.

1. The first theme in the Australian discourse concerns the more intimate type of relationship Australia has with the superpower. As a close ally of the United States, rather than just a “friend”, and one that has maintained a strong working relationship with the superpower for over sixty years, Australia has a very close relationship with the United States. As Howard emphatically declared in early 2003, “we have a close relationship with the United States and I don’t make any apology” (Howard, 2003 [1]), "Australia is a close ally of the United States” (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Indeed, Australia considers itself to have a 'special relationship' with the United States. Not only does it have a shared sense of heritage and common values and interests with the United States, exemplified in a long record of cooperation and shared sacrifice in common causes on the battlefield, but it also has a very strong trade relationship38, a shared strategic outlook and a security alliance that has lasted over fifty years (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86). As Australia’s 2003 DFAT publication Australia in Brief expresses:

Australia’s alliance with the United States is founded on a long tradition of defence cooperation, shared liberal democratic values, extensive economic ties and other common interests. The relationship remains fundamental to Australia’s security and prosperity – and complements and reinforces Australia’s practical commitment to the wider Asia-Pacific region (Australia in Brief, 2003, p. 10).

Indeed, this intimacy of connection extends back as far as 1908 when the then Australian Prime Minister wrote to the US diplomatic representative, “I doubt whether any two peoples are to be found who are in nearer touch with each other or likely to benefit more

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38 Strengthened even further since Australia’s attainment of an FTA with the United States in 2004, a deal that ensures A$20 billion economic gain for Australia over the next 20 years and is expected to boost Australia’s GDP by about 4 billion (0.4%) by 2010 and by $31 billion in twenty years time (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 91).
by anything that tends to knit their relations more closely” (Deakin cited in Downer, 1996a). Or as Theodore Roosevelt once said, “Australia and the United States are the warmest of friends” (cited in Downer, 1996a). More than fifty years on, this sentiment is still being expressed, for instance, by Dick Cheney who stated on his 4-day visit to Australia this year that as “people who speak plainly and honestly” Australia and America are “natural friends” (Cheney, 2007). As he expressed: “Australia and America see the world from similar perspectives…We were born in the same era, sprang from the same stock, and live for the same ideals. Australia and America share an affinity that reaches to our souls” (Cheney, 2007).

This means that, owing to the great strength and closeness of this relationship, Australia possesses a formidable advantage that neither New Zealand nor many other nations in the world can profess to enjoy – the ability to influence US policy decisions. In a speech given on 4 February 2003, Downer speaks explicitly of this Australian power to influence Washington and the consequent benefits to Australia in the international sphere, stating:

Let us be clear. Australia and the United States share alliance commitments and obligations, and we benefit greatly from the influence we have in Washington, which enables us to help shape international approaches” (Downer, 2003 [1]).

Indeed, when the Iraq issue re-emerged as a matter of concern to the Bush administration and first began to make waves in the international political circuit, Australia tangibly demonstrated its influence at the heart of the US, in encouraging the American Administration to take the matter of Iraq’s non-compliance and the need for its disarmament to the UN. That the United States heeded Australia’s advice is evident in the way that President Bush did indeed shortly afterward go to the UN General Assembly, presenting America’s ten concerns regarding Iraq to the Assembly on 12 September 2002, as a first port of call in its efforts to deal with Iraq’s recalcitrance (‘President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly’, 2002). Howard recounts this intervention by Australia to influence the Bush Administration’s course of action on Iraq in the following statement:
The Australian government has consistently argued that the United Nations needs to deal with Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of the Security Council's authority. This was the view I put to President Bush shortly before his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations, in September last year. I then argued to him the merits of working through the United Nations. That has been the steady theme of a strong diplomatic effort by Australia, ably led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Howard, 2003 [2]).

As he accurately concludes: “our close relationship and our ready access to the US administration has meant that our views are heard and respected” (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Indeed, the closeness of the relationship between Australia and the United States is so great between the Pacific pair, that during those tumultuous days when Iraq was a highly inflammable issue, the Australian Government was willing to not only publicly support the US in its position on Iraq, but also speak out in defense of its major ally. As Howard states, for instance, in February 2003: "Mr Speaker, over the past few months there has been sustained criticism from some quarters, both here and abroad, regarding the role of the United States on this whole issue. So much of that criticism has been either wrong, unfair or downright prejudiced" (Howard, 2003 [2]).

The issue of Iraq is now before the Security Council precisely because of the actions and pressure of the United States. For almost four years the Security Council had left Iraq in the too hard basket...Unless, therefore, it is regarded as provocative and contemptuous of the United States to charge the United Nations with the obligation of enforcing its own decisions, this allegation against the United States is without any substance (Howard, 2003 [2]).

And again, later on:

No criticism is more outrageous than the claim that US behaviour is driven by a wish to take control of Iraq's oil reserves. Self evidently, if cheap oil supplies were America’s dominant motive, then years before now the United States would have done a deal with Iraq to lift the sanctions in return for
plentiful supplies of low-priced oil. I have no doubt that the driving force behind American policy towards Iraq now is that, in the wake of the events of 11th September, they have a justifiable concern that the twin evils of weapons of mass destruction, in the hands of rogue states, and international terrorism come together with horrific consequences (Howard, 2003 [2]).

2. The second theme relating to the Australian-American relationship, as discernable in Australia’s Iraq speeches, concerns the way that a close US-Australian bilateral relationship is considered to be essential to Australia, a notion expressed not only by the present Howard Government but also by a long line of preceding Australian Governments extending back into history as far as the Second World War. Howard expounds on this subject in the course of his Iraq speeches saying, “Australians should always remember that no nation is more important to our long-term security than that of the United States” (Howard, 2003 [4]). Australia’s relationship with the United States is:

one of the most important relationships we have and, in an increasingly globalised and borderless world, the relationship between Australia and United States will become more rather than less important as the years go by (Howard, 2003 [5]).

Indeed, no nation in the world matters more to Australia than the United States - strategically, economically, and politically - which is why the US alliance is considered so vitally important to Australia. As Howard explains:

Our long-standing security alliance with the United States provides a solid and reliable basis for us to cooperate on addressing these [world] issues. The shared intelligence and the access to cutting edge defence and security technologies that the alliance facilitates are vital to ensuring Australia’s security, and will only become more important in the future (Howard, 2003 [6]).

It is for this reason that Australian Government’s have traditionally factored the US alliance and America’s position on any international issue of the day into any major
governmental decision concerning Australian foreign affairs. As Howard relates on the matter, "Australia has a long standing association with the United States and whenever these [international] issues are under consideration the nature of that relationship should be factored in" (Howard, 2003 [1]), “the crucial long-term value of the US Alliance should always be a factor in major national security decisions taken by Australia" (Howard, 2003 [2]). Moreover, he states, this has been:

the policy of successive governments in Australia of both political persuasions. It's not only Coalition governments in office [that] have paid regard to the American alliance. So have Labor governments and that's good because there's no association which is more important to Australia's permanent security than our association with the United States (Howard, 2003 [1]).

In understanding this fact, it becomes more understandable why the US alliance played such a significant role in Australia’s decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003. Proof of this consideration in the Australian decision-making process can be found throughout the Australian Iraq speeches. Before the war, for instance, Howard alludes frequently to this aspect of the US-Australian relationship: stating in January of 2003 "We have a close relationship with the United States and…It's not the dominant reason, it's not the major reason but it's an important consideration in this whole issue [of Iraq] (Howard, 2003 [1]); in February furthermore that "Australia's alliance with the United States has been and will remain an important element in the government's decision making process on Iraq" (Howard, 2003 [2]); and in March, just prior to the war, “Of course our alliance with the United States is also a factor, unapologetically so" (Howard, 2003 [4]). Indeed, Howard’s statement in the final hours before the commencement of hostilities against Iraq proves beyond doubt the impact of Australia’s US alliance on his Government’s decision on Iraq. As he emphasises:

Our alliance with the United States is unapologetically a factor in the decision that we have taken. The crucial, long-term value of the United States alliance should always be a factor in any major national security decision taken by Australia (Howard, 2003 [5]).
Or as Downer likewise confirms:

> We make no apology for our strong alliance relationship with the United States. The ANZUS alliance is the bedrock of our security. American leadership and military power contributes to a stable security environment in the region (Downer, 2003 [3]).

In point of fact, the ANZUS alliance is considered to be not only fundamental to Australia’s national security, in both securing its own defence and ensuring stability within the Asia-Pacific region (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 88), but is also considered the bedrock of Australian foreign and defence policy (Kelton, 2006). As Australia’s Defence 2000 document spells out, Australia’s alliance with the US is “one of our great national assets” (cited in McElhatton, 2006), a long-held view made apparent in the way that Australia has had such a long history of solidarity with the US, fighting alongside the US in every one of its major conflicts since World War I (Devine, 2006). The alliance is of vital importance to Australia not only because it symbolizes and formalizes a close alignment of enduring strategic values, interests and ‘balance of power’ thinking between the nations (Downer, 1996a; O’Brien, 2001), however, but also because it forms the basis for Australian-American military cooperation and interoperability involving military exercises and facilities (i.e. Pine Gap), personnel exchanges, the sharing of intelligence and strategic assessments, annual meetings between Australian foreign and defence ministers with their US counterparts (AUSMIN), and access to valuable logistics and unrivalled military technology, all of which enable the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to maintain its “qualitative edge” (Calvert, 2000; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 87-88). As Defence Update 2003 states, “Australia’s defence capability is enhanced through access to US information and technology”, which not only increases Australia’s ability to contribute effectively to coalition operations, but also “adds further weight” to the alliance owing to America’s current military and political dominance in the world, enabling the two countries to “jointly benefit from, and contribute towards, global stability and prosperity” (Defence Update 2003, 2003, p. 9). Indeed, by the new millennium the two countries’ respective

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39 Including in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, in which wars New Zealand did not take part.
security policies were considered to be so close as to be “virtually indistinguishable” (O’Brien, 2001, p. 33). As Howard explains:

> Our long-standing security alliance with the United States provides a solid and reliable basis for us to cooperate on addressing these [world] issues. The shared intelligence and the access to cutting edge defence and security technologies that the alliance facilitates are vital to ensuring Australia’s security, and will only become more important in the future (Howard, 2003 [6]).

These security linkages between the two states are set to become even tighter in future years, moreover, thanks to Australia’s agreement in February this year to host a new US military satellite communications base at Kojarena, Western Australia, and to store US weapons and supplies in the north of Australia (‘Australia to host US signals base’, 2007; ‘Australia okays US military base’, 2007), in addition to their new treaty, announced at the Sydney APEC summit this month, which will allow improved access to United States defence equipment and technology and to bolster US-Australian personnel exchanges with 15,000 Australians able to travel to the US annually under the new deal (‘Aust, US agree to defence deal’, 2007). In fact, in 2004 Howard’s determination to keep close ties between Australia and the Bush Administration during his tenure as Prime Minister has even earned him the nickname in Asia of America’s “deputy sheriff”, a notion reinforced in the years since in light of Howard’s refusal to withdraw its troops from Iraq on the basis that such an act would be “the biggest threat” to Australia’s alliance with the US (‘Storm erupts over Howard’s Obama views’, 2007; ‘Australia to host US signals base’, 2007). Australia therefore remains in 2007 a “valuable and respected partner” of the United States with the US-Australian alliance considered by both parties to be “as important now as it has ever been” (Cheney, 2007; ‘Strengthening our alliance with the United States’, Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86).

3. The third theme in the Australian Iraq speeches centres around the many commonalities and similarities of perspective between Australia and the United States, which are said to form the basis of their close friendship. Predominant in this list of shared features, as articulated in the Iraq speeches, are the two nations’ shared view of
the world, their shared values, and their common history – with the latter being inherently connected to both the former.

Firstly, for instance, Australia and the United States are declared in the speeches to have a common view of the world. Howard emphasizes this point saying that “the friendship between us is based above all else on a commonality of views. We share a view of the world that values freedom and individual liberty” (Howard, 2003 [6]). Indeed, it seems that it is this commonality of views, this quality of like-mindedness, that has caused Australia to so often join forces with the United States both diplomatically and militarily whenever international crises have arisen in world history. Secondly, Howard and Downer both refer to shared values between Australia and the US in the speeches. Howard states, for example, that “our value systems - while far from identical are nonetheless similar. We share common democratic values” (Howard, 2003 [2]), while Downer likewise reiterates the same point saying that “we also share common values and interests – and we value US global leadership in defending and promoting them” (Downer, 2003 [1]).

It could be argued that this mutual set of values is also linked to the third aspect of similarity between the pair, their record of common historical experiences, much of which concerns their joining together in times of war to defend these deeply-held values and their shared worldview. To illustrate, in one of the Australian Iraq speeches PM Howard expresses his nation’s gratitude to the US stating “Australians will never forget the vital assistance we received from the United States during World War II” (Howard, 2003 [2]) in reference to that great global value-struggle in which Australia and the United States both participated in the fight for freedom and democracy, and in order to defeat the policies of oppression, aggressive expansion and brutality enforced by both Imperial Japan and the Hitler's Nazi regime in Europe at that time. Historical liaisons between the US and Australia are not solely limited to the twentieth century however. In the modern era too Australia and the United States continue to create history together in frequently making common cause towards common interests. For instance, Howard outlines that the two nations not only “have made common cause in the fight against terrorism” (Howard, 2003 [2]) and that “Australia and the United States have a common interest in preventing the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” (Howard, 2003 [2]) - causes that are still on-going at this time. Australia’s joining with the United
States as a major participator in the Coalition of the Willing, that would ultimately wage war against Saddam and lead to that dictator’s downfall in 2003, is another example of the two nations forging common national histories in an historical event.

In fact this combination of shared worldview, values and defining historical moments have together served to form two rather like-minded Western nations over the decades, as well as nations that work well together. This has meant, in turn, that Australia and the United States have tended to see world issues and problems in a similar – if not the same – way, and to be in sync in many of their perspectives on major actions or decisions taken in the international sphere. Indeed, there is a strong argument that it is this quality of like-mindedness that has given rise to Australian agreement and support of many US actions, tactics or viewpoints on international affairs. Certainly there are many examples of this Australian tendency in the international sphere. In terms of foreign policy, for instance, Australia and the United States share many of the same perspectives and positions on issues in the international sphere which is a trend that extends back to the 1970s (Ansley, 2001). For instance, on the one hand, both countries have supported UN reform, the National Missile Defence (NMD) project, the development of new nuclear technology and the logic of nuclear deterrence, while on the other hand, the two nations have both opposed the creation of an International Criminal Court, have been slow to respond to calls to address the issue of climate change, and have refrained from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, Jim George has gone so far as to call Australian support for US policy the nation’s “traditional mantra”, reflective of the prevailing view that “Australia’s national interests are best served when integrated with those of our ‘great and powerful friend’” (George, 2003, p. 235).

4. The fourth theme of the Australian discourse on the subject of US-Australian relations, and one related in many ways to the idea of shared perspectives above, concerns the two nations’ many similarities in the realm of threat perception. Indeed, both countries not only share a strong sense of vulnerability, but the two states are also - as a result of this vulnerability - noticeably alive to the major threats in the world today, with a shared view of what these main threats to global security actually are, and shared perspectives and judgments concerning them.
Firstly, in regard to vulnerability, in the post-9/11 world both the US and Australia have come to feel keenly their own national vulnerability and susceptibility to attack. As the storm clouds gathered within the international circuit over the Iraq issue, Downer spoke of this new sense of vulnerability, saying:

On September 11, terrorists turned civil aircraft into missiles and brought a new and threatening challenge to our security and to our way of life. This change has inevitably brought with it a new sense of vulnerability. A sense that is not unique to the United States, but applies equally to countries such as Australia. For Australia is not immune from the threats posed by irrational actors and new and devastating categories of weapons (Downer, 2002, 17 September).

Or as Howard more poignantly expressed on the matter several months later:

The atrocity in Bali demonstrated something Australia had never fully understood until then - that we are truly vulnerable. In light of this we have reappraised the way we view and deal with the threat of terrorism. We understand the danger of leaving threats unaddressed (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Chiefly, this pervasive sense of vulnerability stems back to that fateful day of 9/11 2001, when twenty-two Australians and 3,000 Americans were killed when terrorists flew planes into the Twin Towers of the commercial World Trade Centre, as well as the Pentagon in Washington D.C. (Williams, 2002, p. 17). Indeed, due to the fact that PM Howard happened to be in the United States at the time on an official visit, the horror of 9/11 impacted the Australian Government more deeply than might otherwise have been the case. As Amin Saikal comments on this fact: “[Howard] was not only shaken but also moved to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with what he had been promoting as Australia’s number one ally” (Saikal, 2002, p. 29). This sense of vulnerability in Australia and the United States has only been augmented in the years since, through shared experiences of further terrorist attacks in Bali, Jakarta and London, as well as in ongoing suicide bombings in Afghanistan (and now Iraq).
Secondly, as a result of this awareness of national vulnerability, Australia and the United States have both been noticeably alert to the threat of attack in the post-9/11 years and have subsequently come to share the same perspectives on what the main menaces are on the world stage today. Indeed, there are ample illustrations in the Iraq speeches pointing to the fact that Australia and the United States are united in what they consider to constitute the greatest and most pressing threats in the world in the 2000s - namely, terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and ambitious rogue states. As Howard states, “both our nations recognise the threat posed to our communities by international terrorists. We understand the dangers of leaving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction unchecked” (Howard, 2003 [6]). Or as Downer asserts “Today, terrorism and the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons pose the greatest threat of all to our security” (Downer, 2003 [2]), and “today, the thought that rogue states might use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has become a new public fear” (Downer, 2003 [2]). Indeed, in frequently being referred to in Australia’s speeches, these three threats seem to truly loom large in the minds of both Governments on either side of the Pacific.

This symmetry between Australian and American perspectives on world threats extends much further, however, than mere consensus on their name or number. The two nations additionally also seem to possess a shared outlook on each individual threat and have made the same judgments concerning them and how they ought to be addressed.

**Terrorism**

In regard to terrorism, firstly, Australia and America agree that the kind of international terrorism so vividly and destructively demonstrated in New York and Bali is a phenomenon that originated in the ethnic fragmentation and envy of western prosperity so prevalent after the fall of the Berlin wall at the close of the Cold War (Howard, 2003 [4]). As hostility towards the West and its values grew, international terrorism also rose “in strength and incidence and activity through the 1990s” (Howard, 2003 [3]), manifesting itself firstly in an attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993, then later in numerous attacks on American facilities worldwide, such as those that took place in East Africa that claimed over 300 lives (Howard, 2003 [4]), and “culminating in the horrific attacks in New York and Washington” (Howard, 2003 [4]). Both nations also believe Islamic terrorism to be a movement that “is based on a blind hatred of western civilization and western values” (Howard, 2003 [3]) and motivated by “a detestation of
western values" (Howard, 2003 [4]), meaning that those who use terror “seek to undermine free societies, the values we share and to harm our citizens” (Downer, 2002, 17 September). Indeed, in the minds of the Australian and American Governments these terrorist jihadists feature as ruthless killers who will use any and all means at their disposal in this global struggle for domination. As Downer affirms, “they care not a whit for innocent lives: they are happy to kill and maim as many civilians as they can in pursuit of their extreme agendas” (Downer, 2003 [2]). Or as Howard likewise concludes, “the events of 11th September 2001 and the atrocity in Bali have clearly demonstrated that international terrorists have no regard for human life” (Howard, 2003 [6]). This being the case, Australia considers international terrorism to be not only an imminent threat, but one that is particularly grotesque in being “contrary to all civilized values” (Downer, 2002, 17 September).

Indeed, according to Australia and the US, the fact of this new and disturbing reality of global terrorism has had two effects: it has “changed the world and changed the way in which the world must look at terrorism” (Howard, 2003 [3]). As Howard states in regard to the former:

> We now understand, after the events in Bali and those of 11th September 2001, that we are living in a world where unexpected and devastating terrorist attacks on free and open societies can occur in ways that we never before imagined possible. There is a new dimension to international relations and we cannot ignore it (Howard, 2003 [2]).

As to the latter, Howard underscores the subsequent change within the policy-making communities of the US and Australia after 9/11 in the broadening of security outlooks from a more localized scope in the pre-9/11 years, to one that now takes in the entire globe to include all worldwide terrorist networks and their sponsors and benefactors, and the adoption of new military methods and tactics such as pre-emption. As Downer expounds on the matter:

> On September 11, terrorists turned civil aircraft into missiles and brought a new and threatening challenge to our security and to our way of life...Responsible governments, Mr Speaker, are compelled to respond and
address this vulnerability. We must identify those who use terror and those who have the capacity and the motive to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction….We need to challenge those who challenge international order. As the Prime Minister has emphasised, we can no longer afford to leave such threats unattended. (Downer, 2002, 17 September)

Illustrations of such a recognition for the value of military action in combating terrorism are plentiful in the international sphere. For instance, Australia and the United States have frequently used force to quash terrorists in Afghanistan, in the caves along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and in Iraq. As Howard expresses on the subject, “we now live in a world where the threat of terrorism is borderless and it's different and you've got to confront it in a different way” (Howard, 2003 [3]). In fact, since the extreme type of terrorism demonstrated in New York, Bali and London is based on a blind hatred of Western civilisation and Western values, the Australian and American Governments concur that any “calibration of responses to that will not automatically buy immunity” (Howard, 2003 [3]). This understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat, the way that terrorist extremists know no compromise and are totally committed to one destructive end - the destruction of the Western way of life, provides another explanation for Australia and America’s adoption of such a hardline on terrorists and terrorist supporters. To their mind any other tactic, any other softer option - whether this is diplomacy, negotiation, mediation or even patience – would be self-defeating and absurd. For to the Australian and American way of thinking, this battle is nothing other than a fight to the death – either of the terrorists or the United States and its allies.

**The Proliferation of WMDs**

The second matter considered by the US and Australia to constitute one of the greatest threats to the world today is that of WMD proliferation. Prior to 9/11 Australia has been a staunch advocate of non-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes in the international arena for some time, a fact made evident in Howard’s declaration that Australia has a “powerful desire to stop the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” (Howard, 2003 [2]) and is “vehemently opposed to the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” (Howard, 2003 [2]). As he explains, “we do not possess these weapons and we wish to ensure that they do not become an acceptable
part of every nation’s arsenal” (Howard, 2003 [2]). Indeed, since “successive Australian
governments have worked long and hard to contain the spread of weapons of mass
destruction, on the basis that they pose a fundamental threat to our national security”
(Downer, 2003 [3]), Downer considers opposition to the spread of WMDs to be an
Australian tradition in foreign policy. However, since the onset of the global War on
Terror the proliferation of such treacherous weapons has become an even greater
matter of concern to both US and Australian governments.

There are six main reasons for this augmented fear regarding WMDs in Australia’s Iraq
speeches. The first concerns the destructive potential of the weapons being proliferated
around the globe. As Howard stresses:

They are too dangerous. Their destructive power is hundreds of times greater
than conventional weapons - terrible as they may be. Their destructive force
is not easily contained or controlled and their effects can span the
generations. These are no ordinary weapons (Howard, 2003 [2]).

The second reason relates to the way that as WMDs spread, the potential and possibility
for their use becomes much greater. As Howard states on the matter: “We know the
lessons of history: the more nations that have these weapons, the more likely they are to
be used. That is why we fear proliferation” (Howard, 2003 [5]). Lastly, the third concerns
the fear that if proliferation is allowed to become widespread, state possession of WMD
 arsenals will become the norm among nation-states in the international community. As
Howard has expressed on this point, “we should all be deeply concerned about a world
in which weapons of mass destruction become the norm” (Howard, 2003 [2]), “that these
weapons may become commonplace in arsenals of sovereign states is frightening”
(Howard, 2003 [5]). The fourth factor, that likewise serves to increase the threat potential
of WMD proliferation for Australia as well as for the US, is the real possibility that as
WMDs proliferate and become the norm, they will spread to America and Australia’s own
regions to become a neighbourhood menace. Both Howard and Downer highlight this
point in their speeches, Howard stating “we are very concerned about the potential for
the proliferation of these weapons in our own region (Howard, 2003 [5]), and Downer
likewise articulating that “If we allow countries in other parts of the world to develop
weapons of mass destruction, then these weapons will turn up in our own
neighbourhood” (Downer, 2003 [1]). Fifth, the spread of WMDs in itself will raise the stakes of global politics and will across the board “make the world a much more dangerous place for all of us” (Howard, 2003 [2]). As Howard elaborates, “every time a nation is allowed to undermine the international treaties and agreements put in place to restrict or prohibit the spread of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, the world becomes more dangerous for all nations” (Howard, 2003 [2]). Lastly, the sixth and final factor concerns Australia’s “greatest fear”, shared equally with the United States, that these weapons will find their way into the hands of terrorists (Downer, 2003 [2]). As Downer relates in one of his speeches on Iraq, “those same weapons now risk spreading further, beyond rogue states, to terrorist groups” (Downer, 2003 [2]), “And because nuclear, chemical or biological weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists, we have even more reason to be fearful” (Downer, 2003 [2]).

Indeed, the rise of international terrorism in recent years and the potential spread of these weapons to terrorists groups have made support for non-proliferation of even greater - in some respects critical - importance to the United States and its allies. Certainly, the combination of WMDs with terrorist extremists is a frightening and deplorable proposition, as the US and Australia and many other nations of the world are well aware. When married to the Australian-American understanding of terrorist motivations, however, the possibility of such a thing takes on even greater meaning and become all the more appalling and calamitous to the Western way of life that these great democracies enjoy. Howard speaks of this grim reality in his Iraq speeches saying, “that these weapons may become commonplace in arsenals of sovereign states is frightening enough, but it would be a nightmare for the international community if they were to find their way into the hands of terrorists” (Howard, 2003 [5]). This is because, as Downer explains:

Unlike states, terrorist groups do not want nuclear, chemical or biological weapons for prestige, power, or for deterring others. Terrorist groups want nuclear, chemical and biological weapons so that they can use them. They want to tear down the structures of civil society – government, industry, community – in liberal democracies such as ours (Downer, 2003 [2]).
Indeed, as the Australian Government has expressed: “After the terror of September 11 in New York and October 12 in Bali we can clearly see that the only encumbrance on the atrocities of these terrorists will be the weapons available to them” (Downer, 2003 [2]). Indeed, the fact that terrorists are actively seeking to gain control of these weapons to use against the West in this War on Terror has been such an unthinkable possibility of even greater concern. As Howard avers, “Terrorist organisations like Al Qaeda want these weapons. And make no mistake – if they obtain them they will use them” (Howard, 2003 [6]):

We know as a matter of fact that terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda want to obtain weapons of mass destruction. They are actively seeking them and they desire them because of their potency. With such weapons at their disposal, terrorists could target entire cities or regions. Their victims would not number in the hundreds or the thousands but potentially even more (Howard, 2003 [5]).

Consequently, since the “possession of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by terrorists constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people” (Howard, 2003 [5]), as well as to the US and its citizens all over the world, the two nations remain adamant that “the world must take decisive and effective steps” (Howard, 2003 [5]) to prevent proliferation.

**Rogue States**

Thirdly, the US and Australia are in complete agreement concerning what is regarded as the third great threat on the world stage today – rogue states. As insular states usually governed by despotic dictators and characterised by dismissiveness towards the outside world, while oppression and repression is on-going within its state boundaries, rogue regimes are in themselves a grave matter of concern in international relations, and rightfully so, though not generally of the kind that inspires radical corrective action by the international community. Australia and the United States have long shown a marked dislike for such regimes in International Relations. However in recent times rogue states have begun to feature even more prominently than usual in the discourse of both nations due to the augmented risk potential of these volatile states in terms of their status as
concerns WMDs and proliferation, and additionally, as concerns their real or potential links with terrorist networks in the war against terrorism.

As far as the connection between rogue states and proliferation is concerned, firstly, in light of the fact that a number of rogue states on the world stage have either expressed a strong desire to acquire WMDs, are in active pursuit of such weapons, or have already acquired WMDs, it is rather self-evident why Australia and the United States consider these states to be of such concern in the twenty-first century world. As Downer emphasized during his Iraq speeches:

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are now in the hands of maverick states – states that have little regard for the clear international consensus against such weapons established since World War II. If we don't act, we face a 21st century afflicted by dangerous and unaccountable dictators armed with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (Downer, 2003 [2]).

Or as Howard likewise reiterated:

There has always been a fear that the more nations that possess these weapons, the more likely they will eventually be used. This fear is compounded when they are in the hands of regimes that show a total disregard for common humanity and the rule of law, aggressive and belligerent regimes like that overseen by Saddam Hussein (Howard, 2003 [6]).

Add to these scenarios of unease a second consideration – and one worse than the first - the fact that some rogue states are already known to have links with terrorist networks, making the prospect of WMDs being passed on into the hands of Al Qaeda-type terrorists a real possibility, and one can see why such a recipe for disaster has become of utmost priority to the Australian and American governments, especially in the context of the global War on Terror. Indeed, the fear that rogue regimes might form the ‘middle-link’ with both the ability and inclination to pass their weapon stockpiles on to anti-Western terrorist groups has evoked strong rhetoric and action against such regimes by
Australia and the US, as well as Britain and other concerned allies, as the Iraq war can well attest. As Howard states: “We must do everything we can to contain the capacity of rogue states to possess chemical and biological weapons because amongst other things they may give those weapons to terrorists” (Howard, 2003 [3]). It is in this vein of thought that the Australian Prime Minister, like President Bush of the United States, declares himself to have “the strongest possible belief that the world must confront the twin evils of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to rogue States” (Howard, 2003 [4]), since “the danger of those would be to me and to my Government the ultimate nightmare. It is a new and sobering reality” (Howard, 2003 [4]).

From this understanding then, it is clear that it was these areas of convergence in threat perception which motivated the two countries go to war together twice in the early years of the twenty-first century, Australia invoking the ANZUS treaty for the first time in 2001, in committing 1,500 Australian troops to take part in the war against the Taleban of Afghanistan as well as the wider anti-terrorism campaign (Saikal, 2002, p. 29), and again in 2003 when it formed part of the US-UK-AUS “Coalition of the Willing” invasion of Iraq. Similarly, it has also been these shared views and shared vulnerabilities that have seen Australian and American personnel work together to nurture Iraq’s first experience of democratic government in the years since 2003, a collaboration that is not expected to end for some time. Indeed, in reference to the Iraq War specifically, through understanding what comprise the three most grievous threats to the United States and Australia, it becomes clearer why Iraq was of such concern to these Governments and considered to pose a ‘grave and gathering’ threat, not only to these nations themselves, but also to the wider world. The speeches show that the Coalition members’ main fear about Iraq was in fact this prospect that the three greatest global threats – terrorism, WMDs and rogue regimes - could actually “sooner or later come together” (Howard, 2003 [2]) into one single attack either against their own homelands, or those of their allies and friends – what Howard has called the ultimate nightmare scenario “with terrifying consequences for the world” (Howard, 2003 [2]).

Firstly, Saddam’s Iraq had for 20 years already been a key concern for the international community because of its maintenance of an illegal stockpile of weapons, including WMDs, in direct disobedience to UNSC resolutions. Secondly, Saddam’s Iraq was not only armed with WMDs, but what is worse, was also at the same time - by definition - a rogue regime in itself. As the Australian Government articulated on this point “Iraq is demonstrably, to use my language, a rogue state (Howard, 2003 [4]), “all agree that the Iraqi regime is one of the most repressive and cruel in the world” (Howard, 2003 [5]), and one in which WMDs are considered by Saddam to be “essential both for internal repression and to fulfill his regional ambitions” (Howard, 2003 [5]).
Governments considered the war to be part of the wider War on Terror. As Howard confirmed in a speech made early March during the Iraq Crisis:

I see disarming Iraq as being part of the wider war against terrorism because of Iraq’s past and continuing assistance to terrorist organisations. And because if chemical and biological weapons ever got into the hands of terrorists we could have even more horrific outcomes than occurred in Bali…One day you will have the fatal cocktail of those weapons being given to international terrorists. So that is the ultimate nightmare and that is the reason why I believe the world has to act firmly and bring about the immediate and unconditional and total disarmament of Iraq (Howard, 2003 [3]).

5. Lastly, the fifth and final theme of the Iraq speeches regarding Australia’s relationship with Washington concerns another aspect of this bilateral relationship - and one that may in fact work to balance out any excessive preponderance of American positions in the Australian decision-making process - that of Australian independence. For though it is apparent that the US alliance is factored into every major decision on Australian foreign policy, and that the two nations often share similar perspectives, this does not automatically equate to Australian concord or conformity with any stance taken by America. Australian decisions are still independent decisions, formed on an independent basis. As Howard states on the matter, "alliances are two-way processes and our alliance with the United States is no exception" (Howard, 2003 [4]), "neither nation seeks to promote this relationship at the expense of another" (Howard, 2003 [6]).

Thirdly, in regard to the global fight against terrorism Iraq constituted a threat because it not only had “clear” and “proven links to terrorism” (Downer, 2003 [3]; Downer, 2003 [2]), but also was “a strong backer of terrorist organizations” (Downer, 2003 [1]) with “a long history of state-sponsored terrorism” (Downer, 2002 [1]). As Downer explains, “Saddam Hussein has consistently used terror as a key instrument of his regime’s policies and has supported its use by others. The Iraqi regime has long supported, hosted, funded and trained Palestinian and other terrorist groups” (Downer, 2002 [1]), including the Abu Nidal Organisation, responsible for major terrorist attacks in twenty countries (Downer, 2002 [1]) and Mujaheddin-e-Khalq which was responsible for a terrorist attack against Iranian diplomats in Canberra, Australia, in 1992 (Downer, 2002 [1]). As Downer concluded, "the international community is without doubt confronted with a grave threat" (Downer, 2002 [1]): “Iraq, through its efforts to amass nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, threatens its neighbours and the Middle East region. And by thumbing its nose at the repeated efforts of the international community, through the United Nations Security Council, Iraq is undermining global security” (Downer, 2003 [2]).
Indeed, even on the issue of Iraq, an issue over which Australia has borne the brunt of much criticism in following America’s lead, Howard fiercely defends Australia’s independent choice on the matter. "Well we haven't been lent on rather heavily by the Americans", he declares in one speech in January. In fact, “we haven't been leant on” at all (Howard, 2003 [1]). Or as Downer firmly enunciates on this point:

But the idea that our position on Iraq reflects some kind of blind loyalty to the United States is wrong. Equally I do not assert that all those who oppose the position the Americans have taken on Iraq are driven by a blind hatred of the United States. This Government will always act in accordance with Australia’s national interest (Downer, 2003 [1]).

It seems clear from this then, that though the security alliance with the US was “an important consideration” in the decision to commit Australian troops to a war in Iraq, it was not the only, nor the dominant consideration in the matter (Howard, 2003 [3]). As Downer stresses, "there are other compelling reasons behind why we feel so strongly about this issue” (Downer, 2003 [1]). In reaching its final decision the Australian government is described by Howard as being influenced not only by Australia’s alliance with the US, but also by “our powerful desire to stop the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” and “also importantly by the past practice of nations which have taken collective military action in the interests of world or regional security” (Howard, 2003 [2]). Indeed, even in reference to the decision to participate in a second Iraq war, Howard describes his Government’s independence in arriving at a decision. According to Howard, his Cabinet debated and discussed the matter together, weighing everything up (Howard, 2003 [3]), before coming to the conclusion that Australian involvement was “the right decision in the Australian national interest” (Howard, 2003 [3]) since “we cannot walk away from the threat that Iraq’s continued possession of weapons of mass destruction constitutes to its region and to the wider world” (Howard, 2003 [5]).

There are other indicators in the speeches of Australia’s independent attitude in its decision-making too. Consider, for example, Howard’s remark that “we do what we do because we judge it to be the right thing for Australia to do. Other countries do what they do because of judgements they make” (Howard, 2003 [1]). This point is reiterated later too when he says “we made our decision based on our own assessment. I mean, as to
what the British do is a matter for Britain. What we do is a matter for us” (Howard, 2003 [4]). In fact, even after the ADF deployed to the Gulf Australia’s desire to preserve its independence can be seen in the way that Australian forces operating in conjunction with the Americans and British were to be subject to uniquely Australian rules of engagement and would fight “under separate national command”, something “that has been the case in the past and it will be the case in the future” (Howard, 2003 [4]). As Howard emphatically declares:

In the past, and I can assure you it will be the same in the future, the rules of engagement under which any Australian forces might fight in the future in any conflict, will be our own. They will not be dictated to by any country. There will be separate Australian rules of engagement in any conflict, and indeed there would be separate targeting policies (Howard, 2003 [4]).

In this way Australian independence would be safeguarded even during military operations as “we would have our own say in relation to what we would be involved in and whether that coincided with the policies of allies, well we'll just have to wait and see” (Howard, 2003 [4]). Perhaps the best example of Australia’s attitude of independence in the Iraq speeches though is Howard’s press conference quip, in speaking of out-dated views on aggression and the new and different menace that has changed the world since 9/11:

I've given, I believe, a clear enunciation of why we’re adopting the policy we have… I’m not going to adopt yours or anybody else’s language. I choose my own. I’ve explained the reasons. I hope they are clear and compelling (Howard, 2003 [4]).

The veracity of these statements regarding Australia’s independence of thought and action can be seen in the way that it is likewise apparent, not just in the Government’s rhetoric, but also in the tangible foreign policy sphere too. Indeed, Australian independence has given rise to several areas of disagreement and frustration between the Australia and the US in their foreign affairs in past years. For instance, Australia disagrees with the US over America’s reluctance to implement the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, its economic protectionism especially in terms of agricultural trade, and the United States China-Taiwan policy (George, 2003; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86; Kelton, 2006). Equally, the US is not particularly happy about Australia’s commitment to intensify ties with Beijing in parallel with the US – called Australia’s ‘US plus’ approach, nor with Australia’s refusal to support American opposition to the European’s Union’s relaxed arms embargo to China, or indeed Australian non-participation in the Halibut talks where US allies discussed the rise (and threat) of China (Kelton, 2006, p. 231). However, though Australia affirms that, like New Zealand, it “will continue to stand up for our interests where our views differ from US views” (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86), Australia prefers to employ ‘quiet diplomacy’ with Washington on these matters (Patman, 2005), emphasizing that “we have never been better placed to put our views to the United States – and have them heard” ((Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 86).

Consequently on the whole, as Maryanne Kelton has observed, “the centrality of the US in the floor plan of relations in foreign policy” have remained in place over the last few years (Kelton, 2006, p. 229). In fact, due to the two nations’ mutual agreement on the principle of force in International Relations and the specific necessity of promptly applying force to achieve Iraq’s complete disarmament, along with their subsequent military collaboration in the invasion of Iraq, the relationship between Australia and the United States has been bolstered further to unprecedented new heights in recent years. Howard describes this development in a speech given in May that proclaimed the end of military hostilities in Iraq. As he states:

My talks last week with President Bush underlined the deepening and strengthening relationship between our two nations. The relationship between Australia and America has never been stronger. This relationship is not forced or contrived. We are allies because we are friends (Howard, 2003 [6]).

Or as Dick Cheney said of the Australian-US relationship earlier this year: “Over time, that deep affinity has grown into a great alliance. Yet the United States and Australia do not take each other for granted. This alliance is strong because we want it to be, and
because we work at it, and because we respect each other as equals” (Cheney, 2007). Indeed, today Australia not only prepares for the future with the great satisfaction of having its “closest alliance” with the superpower, (‘Aust, US agree to defence deal’, 2007), but also shoulder-to-shoulder with the US as two Pacific powers that are “strong allies” and fully-fledged partners on the world stage that “stand together in the decisive struggle against terrorism” (Cheney, 2007). In Cheney’s words: “Once again, we choose to face challenges squarely. And once again, we go forward - as allies, as comrades-in-arms, and, above all, as friends” (Cheney, 2007).
Chapter Six

Theoretical Applications: Explaining Trans-Tasman Divergence

This chapter seeks to explore possible explanations for these substantial differences between the Tasman neighbours in their different perspectives, judgements and actions in world affairs today. At present there are two orthodox theories in mainstream academic discourse that according to conventional wisdom offer the best explanations for trans-Tasman divergence in their international relations. The first is Hugh White’s theory of divergent ‘strategic perception’, and the second David McCraw’s theory of contrasting political ideologies among successive governments on either side of the Tasman. However, though both explanations form logical and compelling arguments, and do succeed in explaining particular aspects of trans-Tasman divergence, they nevertheless fall short in some way since they each fail to account for the full range of government policies or actions on either side of the Ditch. Indeed, when tested against historical scenarios over the past thirty years, the explanations seem in some cases to be contradicted entirely by history, while in other instances the underlying constructs that form the basis of their arguments fail to hold up altogether. This chapter will provide a brief summary and critique of these two orthodox explanations, and then offer a third alternative way of explaining trans-Tasman difference and divergence in their foreign affairs.

Hugh White’s Theory of Strategic Perception

According to Hugh White, a Professor of Strategic Studies and Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University (ANU), the deep seated differences in New Zealand and Australia’s foreign and security policy, and respective defence postures in particular, can be explained with reference to their contrariety in what he calls ‘strategic perception’ – namely, the way they think about their strategic environment (White, 2003). White considers this strategic geographical environment or ‘geopolitical context’ to be comprised of two elements ‘physical geography’ and ‘political geography’, the former referring to the factors of geographical location and size, and the
latter referring to ‘threat perception’\textsuperscript{41} and a country’s ‘national psychology’, which involves historical experiences of military aggression and war in addition to population size and diversity (White, 2003).

In terms of political geography, firstly, like Paul Dibb who argues that a country’s geography “is the mother of strategy and one of the most important factors driving military posture and force structure” (Dibb, 2006, p. 247), White argues that differences in geographical location and size form one component of the Tasman pair’s aptitude to think differently about their strategic environments and adopt disparate defence postures. Australia is the hot, wide, brown continent with an empty heartland, thirty times the size of its tiny neighbour and located nearer to Southeast Asia and particularly to the southern end of the Indonesia archipelago (McLean, 2001b, p. 21; McLean, 2003, p. 31, 35). White argues that this, combined with the fact that large divergent Asia lies close by and is easily accessible while the Polynesian Pacific is further away and therefore of less concern, has meant that Australia’s strategic focus is more Asia-oriented while also involving much wider interests and a broader focus in its strategic outlook than New Zealand (White, 2002b; White 2002c). Moreover, as a nation of large size Australia looks to Indonesia as its closest neighbour of significance and to the United States as the most similar nation with whom to form a close alliance, while also tending to wield a greater ability to influence decision-makers in the region through the projection of power than does New Zealand, thus explaining its employment of coercion rather than simply diplomacy in advancing its national interests (White, 2002c). New Zealand by contrast is a small narrow finger of “steep green isles” with a cooler climate and empty shores (McLean, 2001b, p. 21; McLean, 2003, p. 31, 35), surrounded only by vast areas of ocean is remote not only from the events of Asia in being situated closer to the South Pacific region but also even from Australia itself (1200 miles separate the Tasman nations and the distance between Wellington and Canberra is the same as between Paris and Moscow), causing it to have a much narrower and more limited strategic outlook and sphere of influence (White, 2002c). This has prompted the nation to withdraw from the wider world, and more particularly the wider Asia-Pacific region by focusing more on the issues and concerns affecting the South Pacific and its resident populations there, in addition to creating a tendency among New Zealand governments

\textsuperscript{41} Referring to the presence or perceived likelihood of emergent military attacks on either national territory or interests.
to rely on diplomacy to advance its interests in the world rather than the power projection of its larger neighbour (White, 2002b; White, 2002c).

Secondly, White argues that trans-Tasman divergence in their foreign and security policies can be explained by profound differences in threat perception. Australia’s huge territory is considered to generate a great deal of anxiety about its protection and security among Australian governments. As Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating once glowered revealingly: “We’ve got a continent of our own down there you know Mate, you don’t pick up one of those everyday so we aim to look after it” (cited in White, 2003). According to White, this anxiety is generated not only from Australia’s size, however, but also from the reality that due to the predominant ethnic heritage of Australia’s population of 20 million people, the country is a bastion of Western Anglo-Saxon culture located in “a sea of Asian cultures” (Dalrymple, cited in Templeton, 2004).

In fact, the way that Australia lies in an impoverished, resource-poor, densely populated region (White, 2002a) while being itself a prosperous society inhabiting an under-populated, resource-rich continent, has created what Dibb calls a kind of “strategic paranoia” (Dibb, 2006). This is especially the case in view of Australia’s near ‘indefensibility’ in the region (owing to its vast size) when contrasted with its exceedingly well-armed Northern neighbours. Indeed, unlike in Europe, defence spending in Asia has risen by about one quarter in real terms since the mid-1980s, meaning that “Things that no longer seem credible in Europe are still possible here” (White, 2002a). Indeed, as Gerald Hensley and Colin James point out, today Australia considers the Asia-Pacific region to comprise a mass of countries that may be sources of terrorism, transnational crime, pandemics, and to be a region prone to conflict and rivalry (as between China and Taiwan) as well as potentially or actually failed states (Hensley, 2001, p. 97; James, 2006d).

In comparison, possessing a small population size (of approximately 4 million people, equivalent to the population of Melbourne) and one of increasingly ‘Pacific orientation’ in its demography, while also enjoying the protection of distance and remoteness from the affairs of Asia, New Zealand has developed a pervasive feeling of security in its

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42 In the mid-1980s for instance, while the armed forces of Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, India and the Philippines each boasted three million persons, Australia’s defence force could muster only 80,000 (Mack, 1985, p. 69).

43 (McKinnon, 1993).
isolation and correspondingly quite a different rationale of threat perception. Indeed, the presence of a large friendly Australian neighbour to its near north, that tends to act like a buffer zone between the small country and the wider world, has only served to augment the sense of protection among New Zealanders (White, 2003). For not only can Australia always be relied on to be secure, being so committed to its own security throughout its history and also tending to deal with any emerging threats as a matter of course through attending to its own interests, but also the likelihood of war between the Tasman neighbours is so unthinkable as to make the chance of a military attack on New Zealand territory very slim indeed (White, 2003). Furthermore, due to the fact that New Zealand is considered by many to be too distant, small and insubstantial to be of strategic interest to any of its other more powerful neighbours in the region (James, 2006d), it is the absence rather than the presence of threat that has come to characterize New Zealand’s strategic outlook in recent decades. As White’s take on the Japanese proverb makes clear – “Same bed, different nightmares”: While New Zealand’s nightmare is economic insecurity and insignificance, Australia’s is of a threat to its territorial integrity, national interests or way of life.

Augmenting and reinforcing these differences in threat perception and ‘national psychologies’ regarding security between the neighbours, moreover, are disparate historical records in terms of experiences of foreign aggression and warfare in the region. While New Zealand remained on the periphery of Pacific events during the Second World War, Australia was a major participant in the fighting that went on in the region and was brought up against the realities of power in Asia in a way that New Zealand has never experienced (McKinnon, 1993, p. 34). In fact Australians possess bitter memories of the war with Japan. Not only were Australian servicemen extensively and dramatically involved in fighting the Japanese in the region, during the course of which many servicemen were interned in notorious Japanese Prisoner of War camps across occupied-Asia, but the country also underwent an experience of feeling acutely vulnerable to attack with the Australian town of Darwin being repeatedly attacked and bombed by the Japanese and Imperial submarines prowling Australian waters44 (White, 2002b; White, 2002c; Sutton, 2001; McLean, 2003). By contrast, New Zealand has

44 A recent documentary by 60 minutes screened on New Zealand television in September this year revealed that three Japanese midget-submarines, designed specifically for use in Sydney Harbour, were found patrolling the harbour during the war, one of which torpedoed and destroyed a ferry docked at anchor in the harbour killing around ten people.
never undergone the trauma of foreign bombardment or attack and had limited experience of having to defend oneself against military invasion from a foreign aggressor. In fact New Zealand’s experience of foreign infiltration into the country’s territory or affairs in the past century can be boiled down to German mine-laying off Auckland and Wellington harbours during the Second World War and French sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior, that killed one man, in 1985 (Mclean, 2003, p. 257). As for the Pacific War, New Zealand’s moment of danger was very brief and the sense of its own vulnerability faded away very quickly – much more quickly than it did for Australia - causing the war’s main impact on the country to be not a heightened sense of threat in the Asia-Pacific, but rather a reinforcement of the notion that “foreign relations was something that someone else looked after, the Americans if not the British, better still the United Nations, if one didn’t want to be forced to choose” (McKinnon, 1993, p. 32).

Indeed, according to Malcolm McKinnon, New Zealand has had little if any experience of peril in the twentieth century - the country has never been invaded, nor undergone sustained aerial bombardment, war fought across its territory, unconstitutional or violent transfer of power, revolution, civil war or insurrection, famine, hyperinflation (McKinnon, 1993, p. 26). In fact New Zealand’s history is a story of continual protection and security, whether as a sheltered and protected Dominion of the British Empire, a member of the Commonwealth and then ANZUS, or as a state greatly involved in a range of international organizations committed to making war inconceivable as an instrument of policy (McKinnon, 1993, p. 27). All this has meant that the threat of war against New Zealand hardly ranks as a possibility among New Zealanders, while across the Ditch Australians tend to be a great deal more wary, suspicious and fearful of future aggression against Australia, its people or its interests. It is these differences in threat perception, White argues, that have motivated Australian governments, on the one hand, to continually request a greater scale of ADF protection capability across all three air, sea and land forces and to invest such hefty sums in upgrading their combat capabilities, while on the other hand, New Zealand has not maintained a defence force of high combat capability across land, air and sea, nor spent large sums on military defence,

45 As journalist David Groves wrote on the subject in 1993: “New Zealand has not been a fascist state; has not been invaded very recently; has not, this century, had armed warfare between its citizens; has not kicked out a monarch; has not had a huge communist part around which it was impossible to form an alternative collation; has not lived in close proximity to left and right dictatorships; has not had to withstand a massive terrorist assault on its institutions; has not had an entrenched Mafia; has not had unemployment and internal migration on anything like the same scale [as Italy and other countries]”(cited in McKinnon, 1993, p. 26).
since such protection to New Zealand’s vital interests of territorial security is not required (White, 2003).

According to White then, it is owing to these two factors of political geography and threat perception that New Zealand and Australia have become so disparate in their international affairs. As White concludes, “different adjustments to different realities explain the divergence” (White, 2003). As a consequence, trans-Tasman security cooperation has been hampered by an inability to have close integration on defence postures, since “we didn’t in the end believe enough in the same things” (White, 2003).

**Criticisms**

Despite the convincing character of White’s explanation for trans-Tasman divergence, there have nevertheless been many criticisms lodged against this theory of strategic perception that together reveal the gaps and weak points in such an account. There are five main criticisms in particular which will be discussed in the following.

1. **Geography**

The first major criticism of White’s theory concerns the factor of geography. Mark O’Neill argues that the assertion that a nation’s geography is the mother of strategy is completely false. Not only are there many other factors that are equally relevant to the formation of a state’s strategy, including those of national wealth, development, population, culture, religious beliefs, alliances, and systems of government (O’Neill, 2006a, p. 360), but also the idea of strategic planning based on geography is often contradicted by history or the fact of current realities. For instance, while inhabiting entirely different strategic and geopolitical environments, Australia and the United States have formed foreign and national security policies that are “virtually indistinguishable” (O’Brien, 2001, p. 33). New Zealand and Australia too have always been located in the same Asia-Pacific region and impacted by these same variables such as proximity or distance from foreign neighbours, yet it has only been in the last three and a half decades that the Tasman pair have been seen to diverge. This leads one to conclude that it can not be *external* factors that influence trans-Tasman policies, but rather *internal* factors, such as the way the two countries view the external world. As O’Neill sums it up in reference to Australia over the past twenty years: “Our geography has not changed, but what it means to Australian security has changed” (O’Neill, 2006a, p. 359).
2. Size & Population

The second criticism involves a rejection of White’s assertion that national size is a driver of security policy. This is because national size is in reality partly illusion. For instance, although it is true that Australia is almost thirty times the size of New Zealand, much of the inner heart of the country is empty uninhabitable desert, and therefore cannot be said to impact Australia’s strategic outlook. As Blainey states: “The bulk of the Australian continent is so dry and so far from efficient transport that it has had small effect on Australian history – except perhaps on the emotions” (Blainey, 1987, p. 317). Indeed, even in regard to the size of resident populations, although the Australian population is about five times the size of New Zealand’s, it is not well dispersed and is actually concentrated on the South-Eastern rim of the country in a curve that virtually mirrors that of New Zealand’s population (McLean, 2003, p. 26, 77). Moreover, according to Terence O’Brien and Allen Behm, it is no longer dangerous to be a small country with many small nations now able to ‘punch above their weight’ in international affairs (O’Brien, 2001). Consider, Ireland, Norway and Singapore, for instance, which “do not use size as an excuse for inaction or irrelevance”, but rather have become respectively have each respectively become one of the IT hubs of Europe; a leader in the international effort to find a solution to the controversial Palestinian question; and one of the strongest economies in southeast Asia (Behm, 2002, p. 99-100). Indeed, in the twenty-first century it is the large countries, as opposed to the small ones, that are having to confront internal disruption, threat from terrorism and economic recession (O’Brien, 2002, p. 110-111). As Behm states: “Size is not the point. Capacity to influence events is” (Behm, 2002, p. 100).

3. New Zealand & Isolation

The third criticism relates to the idea of New Zealand’s isolation as a key determinant in the way it views the world and forms its more limited defence posture. As O’Brien writes “New Zealand’s physical situation is one of remoteness not isolation. Isolation is not a mere geographical definition; it describes a state of mind and as such is totally alien to New Zealand’s vital needs and global interests” (O’Brien, 2002, p. 110-111). Indeed, New Zealanders have throughout their history never been isolationist, and successive New Zealand governments have continued over a century to participate constructively in international affairs and to show their support in both foreign and security policy to the international quest to find collective solutions to international problems (O’Brien, 2002).
Furthermore, in a world that is continually globalizing and in which modern technology have served to make ideas accessible to millions over the Internet, while at the same time modern transport systems are transforming once long journeys into overnight affairs, the old precept of isolation can certainly no longer be relevant in the twenty-first century (O’Neill, 2006a).

4. Threat Perception

The fourth criticism contends that since White’s theory does not hold up when compared with the full historical record, threat perception based on perceived risks posed to a nation by its surrounding security environment can not provide an accurate explanation for trans-Tasman divergence in their security policies. For instance, according to O’Neill, while White’s strategic perception theory implies that Australia’s important fights should only occur in its region of local strategic interest, such an assertion “does not stand up to scrutiny of the historical context within which Australians have fought” which includes the Boer War of South Africa, the First World War fought in Western Europe or even the 2003 Iraq War in the Middle East (O’Neill, 2006a, p. 360). Likewise in reference to New Zealand, the isolation and seemingly ‘benign environment’, that White now considers to be one of the principal reasons for New Zealand’s downgrades to the combat capability of the NZDF, is contradicted when one considers that these same factors have been used to justify completely opposite actions in the security sphere. To illustrate, the reality of having no pressing security concerns on the home front was considered a ‘unique freedom and opportunity’ for New Zealand to make significant contributions to the First and Second World Wars, and to provide strong support for its allies in the Asian wars of the Cold War (McLean, 1980). Indeed, in 1961 the lack of any immediate threat to New Zealand was used to justify expenditure on the NZDF and the development of large ground forces in order that it might play its part in combating the communist threat in southeast Asia by ‘plugging the gaps’ of allied forces (who were strong in naval and air capability but weak in land forces) (Henderson, 1980a, p. 42). Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, when divergence between the Tasman neighbours first began to appear, New Zealand did not at all see its strategic environment as benign nor was it inclined to see its defence force as being of low priority, due to an acknowledgement among New Zealand governments of a simple fact: “Should their strength and influence be removed, New Zealand would be unable to defend itself against attack from outside, or to maintain its national independence and way of life” (Henderson, 1980a, p. 41-43).
On considering these facts one must conclude then that strategic environment can not be the sole guiding principle of nations’ force structures, nor explain New Zealand’s divergence from Australia in its external policies.

5. Strategic Perception Approach

Finally, according to Beath, White’s theory of strategic perception is “hopelessly outdated” (Beath, 2002, p. 118). This is because strategic geography has been generally discarded in Australian defence circles over the past few years, with the recent Minister of Defence, Senator Robert Hill, proclaiming that “geography is no longer relevant” (Dibb, 2006, p. 248). For example, in the years since the publication of Australia’s 2003 ‘Defence Update’, bids for expensive military projects have been made without any reference at all to strategic necessity or force structure requirements; changes in Australia’s strategic environment have not been mirrored by fundamental alterations to the size, structure or role of the force structure (Dibb, 2006, p. 248). Indeed, even Australia’s deployment of ‘Operation Astute’ to East Timor in May 2006 reflected a flexibility made possible only by a defence force that had been structured around the likely nature and scale of required military operations, rather than just geography (O’Neill, 2006a, p. 361-362). In New Zealand too, contrary to White’s claims, globalization and the rise of East Asia has resulted in New Zealand taking a much broader perspective in its foreign and security policy than White’s theory would have been predicted (O’Brien, 2001, p. 32). As Dibb and Beath have concluded, “the nexus between strategic geography and force structure priorities is now broken” (Dibb, 2006, p. 248), “it is strategic guidance that is out of step, not reality” (Beath, 2002, p. 127).

In fact, White’s theory has been criticized not only for being outdated, but also in being in some ways incomplete in failing to include many other factors that are argued to be either central or in some way involved in the growing divergence between New Zealand and Australia in their foreign and security policies. As Dibb asserts, in the years since 2003 some Australian policymakers have come to believe that the contrasting defence postures of the Tasman pair stem more from a variance in devotion to and reliance on strong allies and alliances, than it does on strategic geography (Dibb, 2006). This implies that there are more factors involved in trans-Tasman divergence than White’s theory of strategic perception allows.
David McCraw's Theory of Disparate Political Ideologies

David J. McCraw, an academic with expertise in Political Science, provides quite another theory to explain the growing divergence in external policies between the Tasman neighbours over the last three and a half decades. According to his argument, New Zealand’s retreat from Australia through the formation of disparate foreign and security policies has been caused by oppositional political philosophies or ideologies at work among successive New Zealand governments under the leadership of the two dominant political parties – National and Labour. This is because the National and Labour parties’ conflicting philosophies motivate disparate values, global outlooks, and approaches to foreign affairs, leading National- and Labour-dominated governments to not only form distinctively different foreign and security policy priorities and objectives when in power, but also establish fixed intra-party traditions of external policy behaviour (McCraw, 2003).

For instance, as a party established by the trade union movement and founded on a liberal internationalist philosophy, the Labour party incorporates an optimistic –if not idealistic- view of the world. In believing that nations of the world have more commonalities than differences – thereby making the potential for international cooperation high - Labour advances both humanitarian and internationalist ideals and advocates a large role for New Zealand in world affairs, believing rather radically that the country can be part of ‘changing the world’ for the better (McCraw, 1994; McCraw, 2006a). Consequently, because the Labour party embraces the foreign policy values of anti-militarism, internationalism, human rights, and liberal democracy, Labour governments have developed foreign policy traditions of behaviour that champion independence over military or political alliances with traditional allies, morals over trade, diplomacy and peacekeeping over the overt use of military force, and broad outlooks in its foreign affairs over narrow ones (McCraw, 1994). This has resulted in New Zealand not only being highly active in the international sphere under Labour governments but has also lead to its championship of causes like multilateralism, disarmament, human rights, and the centrality of international organizations like the UN and international law in its international relations (McCraw, 2002; McCraw, 2003). By contrast, as a conservative party founded on a philosophy of realism or realpolitik with a broad support base composed of large sections of the farming and business community, the National
party not only exhibits a more pessimistic view of the world, in the belief that the international system is more prone to conflict that cooperation as states pursue their own national interests, but also considers New Zealand to have a more limited role in the world owing to its small size and power on the world stage (McCraw, 1994; McCraw, 2006a). As a result, National governments have formed foreign policy traditions that emphasise maintenance of traditional alliances over assertions of independence, trade over moral concerns, openness towards military solutions to international problems as well as diplomacy (expressed through a willingness to contribute to traditional warfare and peacemaking ventures as well as non-combative peacekeeping operations), and finally a more conservative role for New Zealand in world affairs as a small country on the world stage (McCraw, 2000). Consequently, under National governments New Zealand tends to be less active in the international sphere, though on better terms with its traditional allies Australia, the US and the UK, with priority given to the realms of trade, security and the pursuit of New Zealand’s national interests in its external policies (McCraw, 1994).

These are all observations which McCraw has exemplified through multiple illustrations drawn from New Zealand’s record in foreign and security affairs over the past five decades. For instance as a recent example, McCraw has shown that it is Labour’s ideology of humanitarianism, multilateralism and the anti-militarism, in the belief that “security can be achieved primarily by non-military means”, that has driven Labour’s decision to reorganize the NZDF, downgrade its war-combat capabilities and disband the combat air wing of the Air Force (McCraw, 2006a; McCraw, 2006b, p. 23-25). Moreover, the Labour government’s strong condemnation of Speight’s anti-democratic coup in Fiji in 1999 (and again in 2006-2007 against General Bainimarama) can be ascribed to Labour’s tradition of upholding democratic values and human rights (McCraw, 2002), and Labour’s refusal to participate in the Iraq war attributed to its traditions of anti-militarism and multilateralism. In a similar way, it can be argued that it is National’s tradition of emphasising strong relationships with traditional allies that has led Bill English to call for New Zealand’s reengagement and realignment with Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom (English, 2002).46 Indeed, according to the

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46 As English argues: “As important as the United Nations is as an international forum, there are other international relationships that for us are more strategic. Vital is an even better word. The United Nations is like a Justice of the Peace who signs off legal acts and statements. Australia, on the other hand, is more like a sibling, and the United States is more like an older, bigger, much more worldly cousin. The United Kingdom, I
National party, New Zealand needs to shed Labour’s tradition of UN worship and “selective reliability” by repairing our relationships with Canberra and supporting our allies in ridding the world of menaces like Saddam Hussein (English, 2002). “We need to realign and reintegrate with the international friends whose lot we will share as long as we exist as a nation”, he stresses, and the ‘proper path’ back to both reliability and trustworthiness as a small ally, and healthy strong relationships with Washington and London, “goes through Canberra” (English, 2002). Indeed, McCraw’s theory forms a strong and convincing case for New Zealand’s disparate handling of foreign affairs issues under different governments being the result of divergent political philosophies.

**Criticisms**

Nevertheless, despite the compelling nature of McCraw’s argument when matched with the examples he provides, a more extensive look at his theory when compared with a fuller account of New Zealand’s behaviour in international affairs, especially in recent times, reveals many contradictions between the two parties' rhetoric and practice when in government. As one of McCraw’s strongest critics, Michael Bassett, states: “The trouble with such categories is that objects in real life don’t always fit their boxes” (Bassett, 2002). Indeed, despite rhetorical evidence to the contrary, Bassett argues that factual practice actually paints a different story. Indeed, a closer examination of Labour and National’s foreign policy behaviour in the last three decades reveals the truth of this observation.

The fact that morality and human rights concerns do not always trump trade incentives within Labour governments is clearly illustrated in the Clark government’s full pursuit of an FTA with China since 2005\(^47\) “despite China’s determination to reincorporate Taiwan and its continuing widespread human rights abuses” (James, 2006a). As the Green co-leader, Rod Donald, has complained about New Zealand’s pursuit of a “quick and dirty deal” with China:

\(^47\) By the end of May 2005 three phases of negotiations for a New Zealand free trade agreement with China had been completed estimated to be worth $450 million (NZD) (Espiner, 2005b). Indeed, it is said that Helen Clark wants New Zealand to be the first developed nation in the world to attain an FTA with “the world’s fastest growing economy”, a desire perhaps demonstrated in Clark’s visit to Beijing in late May 2005 in a move “to court the new powerhouse of the world economy”, during which she vowed to push for a “comprehensive agreement” (Espiner, 2005a; Espiner, 2005b).
New Zealand was the first Western country to recognise China as a market economy when it clearly isn’t a market economy. Now we’re negotiating a preferential trade deal with China when it doesn’t deserve preference ahead of more civilised countries. We’re turning a blind eye to a range of abuses that China perpetuates on its people and somehow we say we should ignore that in the pursuit of trade (cited in Espiner, 2005a).

Moreover, following 9/11 New Zealand pledged its support to the United States in the War on Terror – its most estranged traditional ally - and has deployed NZDF troops to assist the Americans in Afghanistan every year since (Bassett, 2002), a fact that does not line up with McCraw’s assertion that Labour governments will advocate its own independence over support for traditional allies. Indeed, even McCraw has called this action a “Realist about-face” on the part of Labour (McCraw, 2002). As Bassett explains, 9/11 and the Bali bombings “revived a sense of realpolitik” in Labour’s foreign policies - an occurrence which contradicts McCraw’s conception of Labour’s ‘anti-nuclear, anti-militaristic, independent New Zealand’ ideology - but then as Bassett states in reference to Labour, “each bold assertion of idealism has usually been accompanied by an insurance policy” anyway (Bassett, 2002): global events do and always will undermine ideology, “even in remote places” (Bassett, 2002). Additionally, it has been the Labour-led governments of the 2000s that has been most active in emphasizing New Zealand’s small size and small abilities to play a large role in world affairs, as numerous speeches by Clark, Goff, Burton and Peters amply illustrate.

As for National’s foreign policy traditions, a closer examination likewise exposes many contradictions to McCraw’s theory. Academic and politicians of the centre-right often underline the fact that it has been under Labour governments that New Zealand has diverged most radically from Australia in its foreign and security policies, 48 a prime example of which is of course the Lange Labour’s governments imposition of the nuclear-ban which led to New Zealand’s expulsion from ANZUS. 49 However, even under National governments throughout the 1990s, namely the Bolger and Shipley

48 (See English, 2002; Prebble, 2002, Yang, 2003)
49 The Lange government’s rejection of port visits by the ships of an ally was an act considered by Labour to be one of national virtue and moral leadership that won admiration around the world. “So it did”, writes McLean, “among the many of diverse political stripes whose principal rationale is to be opposed to the United States and all its’ works” (McLean, 2003, p. 258).
governments of 1990-1999, New Zealand remained nuclear-free and did not rejoin ANZUS despite announced intentions to the contrary, and this in full knowledge of the fact that the country’s nuclear legislation was the major irritant and hindrance to closer relations with New Zealand’s traditional allies, resulting in New Zealand’s exclusion from regular military exercise with the US and Australia and reduced access to high-level intelligence (Bassett, 2002). As Bassett comments, in reality National governments have preferred “to follow public opinion on ship visits rather than lead it” (Bassett, 2002). Indeed, this maintenance of policies advancing independence over cooperation with traditional alliances, and a larger role rather than a smaller one for New Zealand, can be traced even further back into history to National governments of the 1970s when National Prime Minister Keith Holyoake advocated the idea that New Zealand needed to show “self-reliance and independent initiative” in its foreign affairs and needed to develop a “larger scope” in its international outlook (cited in Kennaway, 1991). Moreover, in terms of defence, despite National’s supposed tradition of open-mindedness towards militarism and the use of force, it was actually under National governments in the 1990s that defence spending underwent its worst decline with defence investment cut to a third in share-of-GDP, which impacted badly on the trans-Tasman ‘Closer Defence Relations’ (CDR) agreement and led to Australian complaints of Kiwi “freeloading” (James, 2006b).

In point of fact, John Key’s recent announcement that New Zealand’s nuclear-free status will remain intact under any future National government indicates a rather different view of New Zealand’s foreign policy under both Labour and National governments than McCraw advocates. Not only has he asserted “I do not intend to blindly follow an ideological path”51, as leader of the National party, but he has also alluded to the fact that since the Vietnam War there has been largely bipartisan support for the broad direction of New Zealand’s foreign policy, with the differences between the parties being mostly rhetorical (Kennaway, 1991; James, 2006b). As Key has stated: “Frankly when it comes to foreign policy Labour and National share a fairly bipartisan view to that”, “as a

50 In fact it has been Helen Clark’s Labour administrations since 1999, which, though initially deepening the despair in Washington and Canberra by disestablishing the fighter wing in 2000 and freezing at two the number of frigates, have set in train an extensive re-equipment of the army and of naval and air force logistical support capacity and in 2005 committed the country to a 10-year programme of modest year-by-year spending increases that should lift army numbers to two full battalions (James, 2006d).

51 Key: “I do not intend to blindly follow an ideological path without ever challenging the concept or considering its appropriateness in our unique New Zealand setting” (Berry, 2006b).
general rule, it’s in the best interests of New Zealanders that both major political parties approach [foreign affairs] on a bipartisan basis” (‘Downer: Don’t beat up on Bush’, 2007; Houlahan, 2006c). Indeed, this is a reality echoed by the Labour-led government too. As Winston Peters has said: “Historically, the broad direction of New Zealand’s foreign policy has received bipartisan support. In our recent past almost all foreign affairs legislation presented to Parliament has received near unanimous support” (Peters, 2006f). In addition, he states, “the people of New Zealand also have generally supported the main thrust of foreign policy, under successive governments. This is because New Zealand values and principles and unique New Zealand perspectives are reflected in our foreign policy” (Peters, 2006b). Indeed, as Bassett likewise argues, it is in truth New Zealand public opinion, made more powerful by the fact of the country’s remote location, that has both in the past and in the present served to influence and constrain New Zealand’s foreign policy decisions (Bassett, 2002).

Furthermore, even when applied more extensively to trans-Tasman divergence McCraw’s theory fails to be convincing. Following his argument one would expect, for instance, that is the divergent political composition of successive governments on either side of the Tasman, and the dissimilar traditions and philosophies that the dominant political parties in these governments represent, that is the crucial factor in whether a pattern of convergence or divergence results in New Zealand and Australian external policies. Along this vein of thought one would expect to find the greatest convergence between Australian and New Zealand external policies and the most harmonious relations between the neighbours during periods in which governments of both countries have embraced either the same or a similar variant of one particular political philosophy (i.e. when the New Zealand Labour party and the Australian Labor Party52, or conversely

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52 Although the Australian Labor Party (ALP) has never been run by the Left, does not promote a welfare state, and contains strong Irish Catholic influences, it nevertheless shares a common history with the New Zealand Labour party in being a social democratic party committed to a ‘just society for workers’, founded by the trade union movement and influenced by the doctrines of Liberalism and Marxism with a long history in national politics (created in the 1890s the ALP is the oldest political party in Australia, even forming part of Australia’s first federal government of 1901) (Salmond,1987, p. 305; Catley, 2001, p. 15; ‘Political Parties’, 2007). Similarly to the New Zealand Labour party, moreover, the ALP has not only has come to represent the urban working class and a growing proportion of the middle class sector of society but also tends towards independence and support for internationalism as opposed to the Liberals emphasis on traditional alliances and bilateralism (Catley, 2001, p. 15; ‘Political Parties’, 2007; ‘ALP’, 2007). For instance, new party leader Kevin Rudd has recently announced that the next ALP government will adopt a more ‘independent approach’ towards Australia’s alliances with traditional allies especially the USA, and will consider multilateralism and support for the UN as being of the utmost importance in an ALP government’s approach to International Relations (Banham, 2007).
the New Zealand National party and the Australian Liberals or Australian Nationals, have both held majority power in their respective governments) and the greatest divergence in external policies and the most tempestuous relations between governments of opposite political orientation on the political spectrum are simultaneously in power across the Ditch. Yet, this does not seem to be the case - the record contradicts such an argument. As the former Australian High Commissioner, Allan Hawke, has pointed out, relationships between trans-Tasman heads of governments have been most fraught “especially where the leaders have shared the same political philosophy” and cites the strained relations between Realist Prime Ministers John Fraser (1975-1983) and Robert Muldoon (1975-1984), and Socialist/Liberal Democratic Prime Ministers Bob Hawke (1983-1991) and David Lange (1984-1989) as prime examples (Hawke, 2006). In addition, where one would expect conflict to occur, such as between the Australian Prime Minister and leader of the Australian Liberals John Howard and the New Zealand Prime Minister and leader of the Labour party Helen Clark at the opposite end of the political spectrum, instead good relations seem to result. Indeed, the smooth rapport between the Clark and Howard governments, with the relationships between the Costello/Cullen and Downer/Goff duos likewise being “in good shape” since 1999, has caused this period of antipodean political history to be dubbed “the golden era” of trans-Tasman relations, and this despite the obvious and volatile schisms between the pair over PM Clark’s dismantling of the NZDF and the issue of Iraq (Hawke, 2006). In fact, as the former Australian ambassador to New Zealand Allen Hawke asserts, the fundamental divergence between New Zealand and Australia in the way the two nations view the world and their own place in it, as reflected in their disparate external policies, has been a trend that extends back to the Second World War and has continued under successive governments of Australia and New Zealand irrespective of their political persuasion (Hawke, 2006). This leads one to conclude that there are greater forces are at work concerning New Zealand’s external policies and the country’s divergence from Australia in its foreign affairs than merely conflicting political party philosophies.

Alternative Explanations

Besides Hugh White and David McCraw’s theories, then, what other explanations have been proffered amongst the intelligentsia that might better explain New Zealand and
Australia’s divergence and difference in International Relations? John Henderson has submitted that the trend can be explained through traditions of small state-craft within New Zealand and middle-power statesmanship in Australia, owing to disparate levels of power, strength and wealth (Henderson, 1980c; Henderson, 1991b).\(^{53}\) However, differences in power and wealth can not explain New Zealand’s dramatic changes in international behaviour, after all the country has always been small yet in first half of the twentieth century it was highly involved with the great Western powers and made an incredibly large contribution for its size to both world wars, while in the latter part of the century it incurred the wrath of its traditional allies by distancing itself from their nuclear policies and exiting ANZUS. Peter Kennedy has argued that it is in fact different economic motivations that drive trans-Tasman divergence (Kennedy, 2002; G. Hawke, 2001). However, the fact that New Zealand continues to opt for independence over political union with the Australian federation, even despite the potential for great economic advantages to the country\(^{54}\), would seem to contradict such an argument. Indeed, if economics drove New Zealand’s foreign policy decisions, the desire to attain an FTA with the United States would have motivated the country to join the Coalition of the Willing against Iraq – but that was evidently not the case. Terence O’Brien, Gary Hawke and Robert Ayson have suggested that external events and developments drive the differences between the Tasman pair in their international outlook (O’Brien, 2001; G. Hawke, 2001; Ayson, 2004). However, both countries rallied to the United States after 9/11, and though the rise of East Asia has inspired a great emphasis on Asian engagement in both countries in reality their respective prime regional focus – Asia for Australia and the Pacific for New Zealand - remains unchanged. Indeed, how can an external event like the end of the Cold War account for New Zealand and Australia’s different reactions in developing divergent defence postures in the years afterwards? It would seem that it is not the external events themselves, but rather the countries internal perceptions of and reactions towards them that actually play the larger role in this regard.

\(^{53}\) See Robert Kagan’s 2002 article entitled ‘Power and Weakness’ (Policy Review, June-July 2002) for a fuller explanation of this approach, as applied to the different behaviour exhibited in the international sphere between the United States and European countries.

\(^{54}\) See Bob Catley’s speech to the 2001 NZIIA, entitled ‘Politics’, published in Bruce Brown (ed.). *New Zealand and Australia – Where are we going?*. 

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There are in fact multiple explanations circulating in academic circles that do indeed focus on internal differences between the antipodean neighbours as key motivators of divergent external policies. In addition to White’s inclusion of ‘national psychology’ as a component in New Zealand and Australia’s divergent security policies, Gerald Hensley has asserted that trans-Tasman divergence stems from basic differences in judgment (Hensley, 2001), while David Dickens has argued that New Zealand and Australia have different ways of viewing war and dealing with conflict (Dickens, 2001). Allen Behm, meanwhile, has argued that trans-Tasman divergence is not driven by strategic perception or strategic interests at all but rather by values, while indicating further that it is differing national psyche’s and differences in military tradition, myth and history between Australia and New Zealand which have caused this great divide in security policy over the last decades (Behm, 2002). And finally, Lance Beath asserts that it is a variance in national ambitions or aspirations, combined with each country’s different ‘psyche’, method and means of pursuing them, which has created the divergence between New Zealand and Australia. According to Beath, while the two countries do not see the region very differently, “one reflects an excess of ambition, and the other too little of it” and as a consequence both have very different ideas about the destinations to which they are headed, and the way in which they each intend to arrive there (Beath, 2002, p. 119-120). As he concludes: “Destination is everything” (Beath, 2002, p. 120). Similarly, Derek Quigley and Jim Sutton have suggested that it is separate understandings of the countries’ respective destiny in the world which explains the divergence (Quigley, 2001; Sutton, 2001), Greg Ansley and Ashton Calvert make the case for disparate “national personalities” between New Zealand and Australia (Ansley, 2001; Calvert, 2003), and lastly, Denis McLean argues the phenomenon can be explained through the forces of nationalism in both countries (McLean, 2003).

In reality, all these attempts to use internal factors as explanations for the Tasman nations’ divergent behaviour in the international sphere can be summed up in one word: identity. Indeed it is Identity Theory that represents the best alternative explanation for trans-Tasman divergence in international affairs.
Chapter Seven: 
Introducing Identity Theory

Over the last two decades the constructivist concept of *identity* has gained increasing importance and interest amongst the various social sciences and humanities disciplines, including that of international relations. The growing consensus seems to be that identity plays a larger role in the domestic and international sphere of politics than previously acknowledged, a fact that is particularly relevant to the study of foreign policy which is, after all, the means through which states communicate their identities, interests and roles. In fact, according to Roger Smith identities are now considered to be among “the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics” (cited in Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston & McDermott, 2005, p. 143), a statement echoed by James Fearon who likewise indicates that “a rapidly growing literature sees “state identities” as crucial for understanding both foreign policies and the overall tenor of international politics” (Fearon, 1999, p. 221). This is because, as David Capie and Gerald McGhie state, “before a state makes a calculation about what is or is not in its national interest, it must first make decisions about what kind of a state it is, or wants to be, and how it regards others. These decisions are necessarily claims about identity” (Capie & McGhie, 2005, p. 231).

Indeed, a growing number of academics around the world have begun to view identity considerations as vital to an accurate understanding of state behaviour in world affairs. Alexander Wendt, for instance, has asserted that though the distribution of power and the anarchic nature of the international system will always affect a state’s external policies and calculations, how it does so largely depends on the state’s conception of itself and others on the international stage (Wendt, 1992, p. 71). Adler and Barnett similarly argue that a state’s behaviour can not be understood apart from how it sees itself in relation to others (Adler & Barnett, 1998, p. 47), while Huntington asserts that images of self are important since it is these self-images that shape a state’s behaviour (Huntingdon, 2004, p. 22). Wallace, furthermore, claims that identity is the “grand strategy” through which foreign policy is framed and defined, arguing that “foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad” (Wallace, 1991, cited in...
Aggestam, 1999, p. 318). Finally, Cooper proposes that since national interests are defined by what sort of country each wants to be in the world, it is in fact identity and a sense of purpose that actually drive foreign policy (Cooper, 2004, cited in Capie & McGhie, 2005, p. 231). Indeed, whereas in former times conventional theorists tended to conceive of identity influencing foreign policy only through constraint or when employed as ideological devices used by political elites to justify self-interested politics, constructivists are now exploring identity as an integral part of the cultural terrain that conditions what is possible and actual in foreign policy (Telhami & Barnett, 2002, p. 7). As Stephen Saideman states: “For constructivists, identities shape perceptions of oneself and of others, which in turn influence foreign policy. Identity defines a state’s reality – who it is, who the threats are, and which policies are possible” (Saideman, 2002, p. 178). In recent years constructivist scholars have increasingly been able to demonstrate just how important identity is in the foreign policies of states, such as Japan, Germany, China, France and Israel, in issues ranging from the environment to national security (Saideman, 2002, p. 196). Thus identities have been shown to be not only actively affecting state policies in countries of disparate regions around the world, but also very important to the study of foreign policy, even capable of determining a state’s potential allies and enemies in the international system (Saideman, 2002, p. 196).

Though there are many details and points of interest in this approach to understanding foreign affairs, not least the idea that nations act like ‘states-as-persons’ in the international sphere, using identity not only to define themselves but also to motivate and generate actions, national interests and external policies in foreign affairs (Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996; Fearon, 1999), it is unfortunately well beyond the scope of this thesis to present them here. However, an examination of New Zealand and Australia’s political history reveals multiple instances of identity motivating foreign policy behaviour in the international sphere. Indeed, identity is a constant theme in descriptions of the Tasman neighbours’ disparate foreign and security policy choices, not only throughout the past century but also today in the early 2000s, thus signifying the crucial importance of identity in contributing to - if not primarily driving - trans-Tasman divergence in International Relations.
Identity & Trans-Tasman Foreign Policy 1901-2007: An Overview

Identity & New Zealand Foreign Policy

In regard to New Zealand, evidence of the motivating force of identity as a crucial factor in the formulation of New Zealand’s foreign and security policies can be seen scattered throughout government discourse on its foreign and security policies. Indeed, identity can be seen to have strongly influenced every major foreign policy decision taken by the nation since the turn of the last century. For instance, as regards the question of federation with Australia at the turn of the century it was actually a desire to maintain a separate identity, rather than those famous 1200 miles\(^{55}\), that motivated New Zealand to stand apart from the Australian Commonwealth of 1901, a notion demonstrated in Prime Minister Joseph Ward’s statement at that time that New Zealand’s future destiny was as “distinct from that of Australia as the light to the dark” (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 91). Indeed, in having already nurtured the idea of a separate and supposedly ‘better’ identity\(^{56}\) than their Australian counterparts, New Zealanders feared that federation would “swamp” this sense of difference and thus “preferred ‘a destiny apart’ as a means of aspiring to a grander, nobler future” (I. Grant, 2001, p. 27; McLean, 2003, p. 22).

Since then New Zealand’s sense of national identity has actually evolved and altered several times as the nation has grown older, and its population larger and more varied. For instance, New Zealand’s national identity has evolved from being an Imperial nation and “Britain of the South” in the 1840s to the 1950s, to that of a “small, isolated, Western trading state” from the 1950s to the 1980s, to an “independent nuclear-free sovereign nation” from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, to a notion of New Zealand as an “independent, multilateral and Pacific nation” today. It is possible to trace these identity transitions throughout academic political discourse as well as in New Zealand’s foreign policy record dating back to the nineteenth century to the present day. Nevertheless, despite this ongoing evolution in New Zealand’s national identity, there are three themes

\(^{55}\) Despite the popular argument then that the 1200 miles between New Zealand and Australia equated to 1200 reasons why New Zealand should not join Australia, McLean argues that distance was really a good cover for New Zealand’s desire to stay separate from Australia. As he states: “If there had been the will to join Australia, distance would have been no impediment” (McLean, 2003, p. 221). Today too New Zealanders still prefer to pretend that “a wide and stormy sea allows them to keep their distance from their neighbour and thus maintain their presumptions of self-worth” (McLean, 2003, p. 27).

\(^{56}\) By the turn of the century the New Zealand colonials thought themselves far superior to the colonials in Australia, being ‘free from the convict stain’, descended of 90% of the ‘best British’ stock, and generally being “a superior breed of men” (Sinclair, 1991, p. 335-337).
existing in New Zealand's identity today which, while rising and falling to different
degrees of strength and weakness over the past century, have remained constant
factors in New Zealand's sense of itself since the nation first became a self-autonomous
Dominion in 1907. These themes are independence, idealism and multilateralism, and
their impact on New Zealand's external policy will be discussed in the following.

Independence
Historians all agree that New Zealand was probably one of the most reluctant
Dominion's in the colony to seize its own independence as a nation on the world stage.
For while New Zealanders revelled in being separate and independent of Australia and
Australians, the nation at the same time nursed a strong attachment to its ancestral
homeland - 'Mother England' - and the Empire of which it was part. Indeed, perceiving
itself to occupy a special place in the British Empire as not only the "Britain of the South"
but also "the cream of the British Empire" (Sinclair, 1991, p. 213), New Zealand had a
somewhat excessive devotion to Britain arising chiefly from a strong sense of emotional
attachment to Britain, as well as for practical reasons with Britain being "principal trader,
banker and insurer, defender and arbiter of standards in all aspects of public – and
private – life" (McLean, 2003, p. 64). Indeed, in considering the Empire much preferable
to the "Australian embrace" (I. Grant, 2001, p. 29), New Zealand's choice to identify with
Britain - rather than its near but less genteel neighbour - led New Zealand to enmesh its
external policies with British aims and interests from 1840 right up until the 1970s,
whether through New Zealand's offer to annex several South Pacific islands and thereby
extend the Empire into the South Pacific in the late 1800s, its declaration of war on
Germany only hours after Britain's proclamation in 1914 along with acceptance of British
leadership and military discipline for New Zealand troops, and its decision during the
Second World War to overlook its own security interests at British request by leaving
its men in Europe to fight on the English front from Libya to Trieste - a move that won New
Zealand little favour in Australia (Sinclair, 1991, p. 217; Kennedy, 2002; Brabazon, 2000,
p. 36). During this time independence was in many respects thought of as a dirty word

57 These actions can be attributed to a 'tradition of Empire' and a notion that the British were born “to expand
and rule the civilised world” which were both deeply-rooted in the New Zealand psyche from the outset. In
addition, Government policy from the 1880s up until the First World War consistently supported the British
campaign for imperial federation, which though supported by other colonial Governments, was whole-
heartedly and persistently pursued by New Zealand alone (Sinclair, 1991, p. 214). Indeed, New Zealand
considered itself "the most dutiful of Britain's daughters" in doing so (Sinclair, 1991). According to Keith
Sinclair, this sort of 'hysterical imperialism', compounded of 'a crude and intolerant racial prejudice and
in New Zealand’s political circles. For though the Dominion gained full independence and the right to exercise an independent foreign policy in 1947, sixty years after its transition from colony to Dominion, the step was taken reluctantly and without enthusiasm (‘New Zealand Sovereignty’, 2007). Indeed, unlike Australia which discontent to stay “clinging to the skirts of the mother country” had signalled early on its intent to chart an independent course of its own and had begun loosening its British ties from the 1930s onwards\(^{58}\) (Sinclair, 1986, p. 96), New Zealand “star-struck” by empire was more content “to ride on imperial coat tails” (Mclean, 2003, p. 88). As McLean states: “The British period of global ascendancy had stamped them both in very similar fashion, but had not forced them into the same mould” (McLean, 2003, p. 82-83).

It was not until the 1970s that New Zealand began to assert its independence from ‘Mother England’ and a wish to control its own destiny in the world. Until this time the country independence had only been asserted in regard to Australia, a fact most noticeable in New Zealand’s foreign policy through its sustained opposition to federation as well as to forming combined ‘Australasian’ contingents (a term much disliked in New Zealand due to its inherent Australian bias\(^{59}\) when performing in concert with the Australian military from the time of the Anglo-Boer war on (McLean, 2003, p. 93, 101; I. Grant, 2002, p. 137). The shock of Britain’s entry into the EEC in the early 1970s, however, forced the nation to distance itself from England and look for new trade markets elsewhere (Brabazon, 2000, p. 36; McLean, 2001b, p. 23; Kennedy, 2002). Consequently a national identity of ‘independence’ became of even greater import than ever before, economically as well as politically, combining with necessity to propel the country towards greater engagement with its Asia-Pacific neighbours and away from its traditional allies in the North Atlantic, with a growing recognition and acceptance within New Zealand society of its true geographical position in the world, its “Asia-Pacific

\(^{58}\) Through imposing high duties on English manufactured goods; setting out ‘Australian’ rules concerning the execution of Australian deserters in WWI; breaking away from Britain’s grand strategy in WWII; shifting its primary military allegiance to the United States of America, “free from any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom” (PM Curtin cited in Dunn, 1984, p. 141) from 1941 onwards; divorcing the English pound in 1949; diminishing its reliance on English exports after the war; and replacing England with Japan as its main trading partner, and the United States as its main supplier of technology and capital (Blainey, 1987, p.329; McLean, 2003, p. 88; Dunn, 1984, p. 154, 162; Kennedy, 2002).

\(^{59}\) ‘Australasia’ is a term that was coined by an eighteenth century French geographer, De Brosses, to denote Australia and its outlying islands, which according to McLean, is exactly why New Zealanders do not like it (McLean, 2003, p. 10).
destiny” and its bi-cultural heritage (Woolcott, 1993, p. 163; Villegas, 1996; McLean, 2003, p. 251-253). Thus New Zealand first began to actively assert its independence in its external policy, a notion which would ever after maintain a strong hold on New Zealand’s sense of itself and its conduct of foreign policy. This meant that by the time of the ANZUS dispute in the mid-1980s, New Zealand’s sense of independence had become so highly developed that it inspired a push for independence from all its traditional allies, including not only the United Kingdom but also her replacement the United States. This can be seen in New Zealand’s foreign policy not only in the introduction of anti-nuclear legislation in direct ‘disobedience’ to the wishes of its traditional allies, the US, Australia and the UK, but also in the way that the country soon afterward introduced legislation that “unilaterally revoked all residual United Kingdom legislative power” under the Constitution Act of 1986, making New Zealand a “free-standing constitutional monarchy whose Parliament has unlimited sovereign power” ('New Zealand Sovereignty’, 2007). Indeed, it could well be said that New Zealand’s behaviour over the ANZUS dispute was its own kind of ‘declaration of independence’ to the world, signalling an end to its legacy of dependence on powerful traditional allies and an assertion of freedom in the formulation of its own foreign and security policy.60

It seems an aversion to dependency is a notion that has continued to the present day in New Zealand’s foreign affairs (unless of course one considers New Zealand’s heavy devotion to the United Nations as a modern kind of New Zealand dependence on a more powerful partner). Today New Zealand remains fiercely independent, a fact demonstrated in repeated references to New Zealand’s independent identity and actions in foreign and security policy discourse, a prime illustration being Goff’s statement in 2006 when speaking on defence matters that: “We are a sovereign country…voicing an independent view. We reflect our own view of the world” (Goff, 2006b). This strong and rather intoxicating independence has been observed by New Zealand commentators and historians who remark, like McLean, that “an increasingly strong – even pugnacious – sense of national difference and an assertive independence has emerged” within New Zealand in the last few decades (McLean, 2003, p. 231). Indeed, some have even

60 A notion criticized in 1995 by a leading Australian foreign affairs commentator who said: “Real national independence involves dealing with reality, taking responsibility for your own situation, maximizing your effectiveness and pulling your weight. That New Zealand chose not to do this in the 1980s was a sign not of independence but of insouciance and irresponsibility…An irreplaceable skein of [New Zealand] credibility and respect was torn in Washington and in Canberra” (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 259).
suggested the nation has taken the notion too far in its foreign affairs. As McLean states: “Having for so long struggled to find a voice, it is as though New Zealander now need to use the megaphone to proclaim it” (McLean, 2003, p. 231). Indeed, from this perspective one could consider New Zealand’s refusal point-blank to join its traditional allies in the US-Australian-UK Coalition against Iraq as a contemporary example of the centrality of independence in New Zealand’s nation identity motivating New Zealand behaviour on the world stage. Most fundamentally, however, today as in the past, New Zealand’s legacy of independence is most muscular and visible in its continued refusal to endorse any notions of any kind of union with Australia. A prime example of this was the Clark Government’s outright rejection in 2006 of a repeated Australian proposals for political union and New Zealand’s adoption of the Australian currency, two measures which were advocated to New Zealand as “both desirable and realistic” by the Australian Federal Parliament Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (O’Neill, 2006b). The reason for such a refusal is that, just as a hundred years ago, New Zealanders fear the loss of its unique identity and sovereignty as an independent nation and once again prefer to be separate from their Australian neighbours as a means of preserving Kiwi sovereignty and independence. As Helen Clark summed up the general sentiment on this side of the Ditch: “I’m very happy with Kiwis having our own strong state and unique national identity. So [Australia is] a very close friend and cousin, but we’ve got our own place” (‘Aussies look at union with NZ’, 2006).

**Idealism**

The second recurring theme in New Zealand’s sense of self, as reflected in its external policies, is idealism. As McLean states: “Idealism has been and is a major influence on public life, especially on foreign policy” (McLean, 2003, p. 233). One of the strongest examples of New Zealand idealism impacting on the nation’s foreign affairs is that of anti-nuclearism. Indeed, the Lange Government’s ‘principle before pragmatism’

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61 As a spokesman for the Committee stated: “If Europe is able to get its act together then surely it should be much easier for Australia and New Zealand who have shared history, shared culture, shared values, and I believe, a shared future” (‘Aussies look at union with NZ’, 2006).

62 Exemplified in Michael Cullen’s statement that just as the idea had been “mooted before and rejected before”, unless Australia advocated a new Australasian ‘Anzac’ currency “we are not going to do that” (‘Cullen rejects Anzac currency idea’, 2006; Dick, 2006).

63 Reminiscent of Russell’s comments as a New Zealand delegate at the Australian Federation conference at the turn of the nineteenth century (already described by the Australians as “one of those maddening New Zealanders”) who concluded that federation with Australia would always be for New Zealanders “a marriage of convenience” rather than one of mutual affection, and also David Lange’s modern take that New Zealand would likewise be “always a mistress but never a wife” (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 79-80).
approach to ANZUS in 1985-1986, which saw New Zealand adopt a defiantly anti-nuclear stance, is a prime illustration of the motivating power of national identity – and more particularly the strains of idealism and environmentalism\(^6\) within this identity – in the formation of New Zealand’s external policies (I. Grant, 2001, p. 36). In fact, Richard Devetak and Jacqui True regard the non-nuclear issue in New Zealand as illustrative of “the power of a norm embedded in national culture to shape state identity through foreign policy regardless of the geopolitical and political and potentially economic costs associated with it” (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 254). Today this idealism and anti-nuclearism still continues to influence New Zealand behaviour in the international sphere. Due to the fact that anti-nuclearism is still considered to be one of the most defining characteristics of New Zealand’s national “personality” (Laidlaw, 2005), New Zealand remains strongly committed to anti-nuclear, non-proliferation and disarmament regimes in its foreign affairs to date, as well as its opposition to America’s National Missile Defence project, all pursued towards the ultimate - if idealistic - goal of ‘ridding the world of all nuclear weapons’. In fact a 2003 poll found that 81 per cent of New Zealanders were still opposed to letting nuclear-armed ships into New Zealand waters (Gentles, 2005). Indeed this ‘identity-influencing-policy’ effect can be seen as recently as this month when the new National Party leader John Key announced that since “independence on nuclear matters has become hard-wired into the New Zealand DNA,” becoming “profoundly symbolic” and a “part of our collective psyche”, his first important announcement as Leader of the National Party was to confirm that under a future National Government there would be no change to New Zealand’s nuclear legislation (Key, 2007).

More generally, moreover, New Zealand’s tendency towards idealism can explain the country’s preference for an ‘influence through persuasion’ rather than coercive approach to foreign affairs, especially in its dealings with its Asia-Pacific neighbours, since New Zealanders tend to believe that most problems can be solved through reason and negotiation (a belief frustrated by realities such as Saddam Hussein’s twelve-year

\(^6\) New Zealanders aptitude for preservation of the New Zealand landscape and concern for the environment actually extends back to the early colonials in Aotearoa. This can explain why as the Cold War unfurled in the 1950s anti-nuclear sentiment and concern in New Zealand about the effects of radiation on the environment, and particularly within the South Pacific, took strong hold of the New Zealand national consciousness becoming one of the most defining characteristics of New Zealanders from that time on (Alley, 1980; Alley, 1991).
defiance of the UNSC and Fijian coup-leader General Bainimarama’s rejection of negotiations and New Zealand’s efforts to mediate the crisis). Certainly, it is also idealism, combined with negative historical experiences of war, that have caused the country to be so opposed to the use of force as a general tool in international relations, as well as idealism that has motivated such a positive outlook on New Zealand’s strategic environment and the belief not only that New Zealand will never be attacked by anyone, even in the context of a global war on terrorism, but also that state-to-state warfare is in itself becoming obsolete. In the same way, it could well be argued that it is idealism in New Zealand’s national identity that has caused the country to move away from a traditional defence structure and instead embrace the idea of becoming an expert international peacekeeping force resulting in the drastic remodelling of the NZDF. Indeed, it could also be argued to be this idealistic strain that continues to inspire New Zealand’s strong belief in the United Nations as “the hope for the future” and the one means through which war can be eradicated. Indeed, it seems that New Zealand’s national identity has become so vested with the affairs and reputation of the United Nations that any criticism of the UN organization is almost taken personally in New Zealand – Australia, the UK and the United States’ criticisms of the UN over Iraq and New Zealand’s hasty defence of the UN organization following criticisms made by the UK, the US and Australia over the body’s failure over Iraq being a prime illustration.

One negative by-product of such idealism, however, has been the parallel development of a sense of New Zealand moral superiority in international affairs, sometimes referred to as Kiwi ‘intellectual snobbery’ or as Robert Ayson describes it, “a soap box sort of preaching mentality” (Robert Ayson in Dobell, 2004). As the flip-side of idealism, this tradition of superiority has likewise had a long tradition in New Zealand, as illustrated as far back in 1904 when one visitor’s commented that New Zealanders exhibited “a curious form of a patriotic vanity, which makes the New Zealanders believe that the world expects much of them and that they must not be false to their destiny”, or in other words, “a blend of a too practical outlook with a too exalted sense of apostleship” (cited in McLean, 2003, p. 79). Over a hundred years later there is still, as McLean states, “a strong impulse to believe that the world needs leadership on many of its most vexing problems and that its people are there to provide it” (McLean, 2003, p. 184). In particular, this attitude of idealism-spawned superiority is directed towards Australia, a fact shown in New Zealanders scornful “best of the British” attitude towards their ‘convict’
neighbours in the early colonial years, most obnoxiously expressed in the assertion that New Zealand’s Maoris were a ‘better breed’ of natives than the Aborigines being “proud, indomitable and courageous” and treated better than any “other native or savage race on the face of the globe” (Russell cited in McLean, 2003, p. 79). Little has changed since then it seems. Confident in its own wisdom and proud of its achievements as a small and remote nation in the world, New Zealand seems to still exhibit a sort of smugness towards Australia, particularly where New Zealanders believe they are more “progressive” than Australians, such as in having rejected the logic of nuclear weapons and ratified the Kyoto Protocol (Trotter, 2005). Once ‘the best of the British’ and Britain’s ‘most loyal ally’ New Zealanders are now content to be at least ‘better than Australia’.

**Multilateralism**

The final and most recently asserted theme in New Zealand’s identity under the Clark governments is the notion of multilateralism. Increasingly the emphasis in New Zealand’s foreign policy today is on the country’s small size and its consequent need to act multilaterally as a “good international citizen” on the world stage (Goff, 2006b). As Devetak and True have argued: “New Zealand under the Clark government sees its state identity as intimately tied up with a principled commitment to the international rule of law and multilateralism” (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 254), thereby explaining not only New Zealand’s strong commitment to the UN and multilateralism, but also to its practical expression of multilateralism in the form of peacekeeping operations worldwide. However, New Zealand’s tendency to want to work multilaterally can be seen more than fifty years ago in New Zealand’s presence at the 1945 San Francisco conference which created the UN in 1945, where it was one of the few nations in the world to sign the UN Declaration of Human Rights (a fact of which New Zealand is very proud). Indeed, the existence of a multilateral strain in the New Zealand identity is repeatedly emphasized in speeches given by Goff or Peters, who each assert that New Zealand’s commitment to multilateralism today actually springs from “multilateral values” within the Kiwi cultural

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65 In fact this kind of one-upmanship towards Australia (symptomatic of an on-going hangover from its colonial era of being “the best of the best”) is frequently in appearance within New Zealand’s foreign policy. It seems New Zealand derives great satisfaction in appearing to be not just a ‘good international citizen’ but a ‘better international citizen’ – at least in regard to Australia.

66 Another motivation behind New Zealand’s decision to leave its troops in Europe during WWII – New Zealand saw the decision as an opportunity to show how much ‘more loyal’ New Zealand was to the British Empire than Australia.
identity. These values are those of fair play, respect and just treatment of others, commitment to the rule of law, and peaceful means of conflict resolution - principles argued to have been constant factors in the formulation of New Zealand’s foreign policies as far back as the Second World War (Peters, 2006a; Goff, 2005). Additionally, this emphasis on multilateralism could well be argued to be related to New Zealand’s increasingly diverse society as its demography has acquired a greater Pacific character in recent decades. Indeed, Colin James argues that with nearly a third of under-25s being of Pacific ethnicity, New Zealand’s growing Pacific identity will be “a growing distinction” and point of difference between New Zealand and Australia in future years. As he states: “It will make New Zealand even more incomprehensible to Australians than the Anzus breach did” (James, 2005a), “Australia looks on the Pacific. New Zealand looks on the world from the Pacific” (James, 2006d). It could well be that diversity has created a greater awareness of the needs and approaches of other ethnic groups and fostered a greater desire for a conciliatory multilateral approach to regional and global problems and issues. As Winston Peters has said, “The Pacific Way” is increasingly “the New Zealand Way” – “We are a Pacific nation” (Peters, 2005).

Indeed, it is this weight placed on New Zealand’s multilateral identity that could also, with idealism, be argued to explain the Clark governments remodelling of the NZDF as well as its decision not to join the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Iraq. This is because an NZDF designed around a defence strategy centred on multilateral peacekeeping, and opposition to the Iraq war on the grounds of support for rules-based multilateralism, were both actions considered by the government to better reflect New Zealand’s sovereign and multilateral identity (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 253). With regard to the former, for instance, consider Allan Behm’s observation that “New Zealanders do appear to mind spending much on defence” (Behm, 2002, p. 105) or the former Minister of Defence Mark Burton’s reference to the new NZDF as being a better reflection of the “part we wanted, and were able to play, in regional and global security” (Burton, 2005b) and “New Zealand’s place in the world” (Burton, 2004c). Likewise, in reference to the latter, the fact of identity influencing New Zealand decision on Iraq can be seen in Clark and Goff's

67 As the 2006 census revealed, the number of New Zealand Europeans residing in New Zealand has dropped from 80% to 67% since 2001, with a corresponding rise in numbers of Asian and Pacific island immigrants during the same period to 9.2% (48.9% increase) and 6.9% (14.7% increase) of the total population respectively (‘NZ population boosted by Asian and Pacific influx’, 2006; Cheng, 2006). As Colin James argues: “I have often felt Australians have puzzled about New Zealanders in much the way Henry Higgins did about women in My Fair Lady: “Why can’t a Kiwi be more like an Oz?”. The answer lies in the Pacific” (James, 2005a).
repeated references to multilateralism when explaining the New Zealand’s position at the height of the crisis. As Clark declared at that time, “New Zealand’s position on this crisis has at all times been based on its strong support for multilateralism and the rule of law, and for upholding the authority of the Security Council” (Clark, March 18). Indeed, more generally, national identity could also explain New Zealand’s view of terrorism and the fact that New Zealand’s foreign policy “has remained relatively unchanged” since 9/11 (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 253). This is because, as Campbell argues, “the government does not consider terrorism a reason to change its independent, nuclear-free stance [or identity]” (Campbell, 2005). In sum, New Zealand now sees itself as incorporating a ‘non-nuclear’, ‘independent’ and increasingly ‘Pacific’ identity which finds expression in an independent, nuclear-free and multilateral foreign policy.

**Identity & Australian Foreign Policy**

Similarly, identity can be seen to be behind many major external policy decisions taken by Australia in the international sphere also. However, unlike in New Zealand, Australia’s national identity has undergone fewer transitions over the last century, thereby rendering to Australian foreign policy a greater impression of consistency and stability. As Owen Harries has observed in his study of Australia’s external affairs: “If one considers the grand strategy of Australian foreign policy over the last century what strikes one is its essential simplicity and consistency” (Harries, 2006). In terms of foreign policy, for instance, Downer asserts that “Australian values” are at the core of Australia’s foreign policy, which not only affects Australian foreign policy decisions but also “guide our approach to the world” (Downer, 2006). As he states: “Our national identity informs our foreign policy, not the other way around. And that identity places a premium on freedom – freedom of speech, a free press, freedom of religion, liberal democratic values and liberal economic values” (Downer, 2006). Indeed, the responsibility to fight for Australia’s interests while also reflecting “the values and ethics of the Australian people” are considered “the twin pillars” upon which all of Australia’s foreign policy is based and the common thread across all Australian policies in international affairs (Downer, 2006). In an increasingly globalising world, moreover, these Australian values and ethics are considered to become even more important in the future with the Australian Government more and more developing its external policies less in relation to geography and “more in terms of developing functional affinities with countries and groups of countries with which we share specific interests and values” (Calvert, 2003).
In terms of security, moreover, identity is progressively becoming an accepted explanation for Australia’s approach to security among academics and strategists. Consider Hugh White, for instance, who without specifically referring to identity describes Australia’s enduring traditional concerns and needs in the realm of security - a strong predilection to alliances and independent self-reliance while at the same time showing a possessiveness of its neighbouring islands and a vulnerability and anxiety about invasion from the north – as stemming from “a deeply held sense of separateness from our regional environment” which “to most Australians…seem so natural as to appear self-evident” (White, 2002a, p. 257). As he explains: “A quick comparison with New Zealand, for example – so close and many other ways so similar – suggests that in fact this set of perceptions is very distinctively Australian” (White, 2002a, p. 257). It is identity factors then that can in reality provide the best explanation for the way these ideas about Australia’s security have been “curiously durable throughout Australia’s history as a self-conscious strategic entity” (White, 2002a, p. 257), and explain why “it would take a tectonic shift in Australian attitudes to align Australia’s defence policy with contemporary trends in Europe, New Zealand and Canada” (White, 2002a, p. 258).

This long-lasting national identity can be summed up in the words ‘an independent, realist and allied Australia’. Indeed, it seems independence, realism and alignment to powerful traditional allies have been principle drivers behind the formation of Australia’s foreign policy since the outset.

**Independence**

The primary importance of independence in the Australian identity and its influence on important political decisions can be traced back to the decades preceding federation to the 1880s, when Australia first began to develop a sense of nationalism. Primarily this was due to Australia’s settler population which was composed of a feisty mix of convicts - so-called “live lumber” - forcibly shipped to the colonies, in addition to masses of impoverished, down-trodden immigrants from England, Ireland and Scotland including a high percentage of Irish Roman Catholics, all of whom had no great love or affinity to the British Empire (McLean, 2003, p. 55; Dunn, 1984, p. 27-29, 32; I. Grant, 2001, p. 22). Additionally, however, having been founded earlier than New Zealand in 1788 rather than 1840, the Australian colony had by the time of federation existed for 113 years - 73 years more than its Tasman neighbour – during which time its inhabitants had had more
time to develop a sense of ‘Australian-ness’, namely, the perception of possessing uniquely Australian characters and perspectives in a distinctly Australian landscape and demography (Blainey, 1987; McLean, 2003). Consequently, instead of having nationalism “thrust upon them” as New Zealand did68, Australia, being sure of its identity, began early to push for its own independence and sovereignty in the wider world, seeing federation as a means of ensuring greater defensibility to the continent, reserving ‘Australia for the Australians’, and projecting a greater influence through being more powerful and respected (McLean, 2003, p. 66, 224). In this way Australian identity made its first exhibition of its power to influence Australian politics. As Smith & Hempenstall explain, for Australians “federation was more than a business deal: it was a matter of sentiment, a ‘sacred cause’ driven by a ‘desire for identity and status’ and a grander future” (Smith & Hempenstall, 2005).

This identity of an ‘independent Australia’ was ever-after to be a fundamental driver in Australia’s foreign policy decisions throughout its history to the present day. During the World Wars, for instance, it has been argued that it was this notion of independence and ‘separateness’ from Britain that led Australia to not only insist on ‘Australian rules’ for deserters during WWI, but also to withdraw its troops from the Imperial plan to instead deploy them alongside the Americans in the Pacific in defence of its own national interests (McLean, 2003). Likewise, it was a desire for greater expression of this independence that caused Australia to develop a truly ‘independent Australian foreign policy’ in the 1970s, indicating that it would no-longer automatically commit to the actions or interests of traditional allies, since Australia had its own interests and own sense of right and wrong in international affairs (Rawdon Dalrymple, in Anderson, 1998). Furthermore, Australia’s adoption of a defence posture centred on ‘independent self-reliance’ in the late 1980s, to replace its former doctrine of ‘forward defence’, can be attributed to a greater emphasis on Australia being as independent as it was feasibly able to be (Catley, 2001). In this sense Australia’s continuing independent security stance could be considered a more accurate reflection of Australia’s identity now than revealed in former years.

68 As Keith Sinclair states in reference to the aftermath of Britain joining the EEC in 1973, and New Zealand’s reluctance and slowness up until this time to attain full independence and control over its foreign policy: “Instead of an ennobling American revolution, New Zealand experienced a somewhat humiliating rejection of the Motherland. Of many New Zealanders it may be said that they were not born to it and did not achieve it, but had nationalism thrust upon them” (Sinclair, 1991, p. 340).
Realism
Similarly Realpolitik and a tendency to plan on the basis of ‘worst case scenario’ have long been a tradition in Australia’s foreign and security policy outlook. This tradition has its roots right back in the early days of the Australian colony when the Australian colonials feared invasion or attack by the Japanese “Yellow Peril”\(^{69}\), the Russians and the Germans in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Gordon, 1960; Dunn, 1984). In fact, Australian fear of invasion by one country or another has always been a central theme in the Australian psyche. This has resulted in two tendencies in Australia’s external policies: firstly, a tendency to keep potential aggressors at arms length; and secondly, a strong inclination to join with traditional allies, through usually significant military contributions per capita, to fight against emergent threats. One historical example of the former is the way that Australia was profoundly unhappy with Britain both when it forged a security alliance with ‘dangerous’ Japan in the early years of the 1900s and later when Britain asked Japan to provide an escort for the ANZAC troops on their way to Egypt in World War I (Gordon, 1960; Dunn, 1984). As for the latter, just as Australia was more proactive in providing Australian frigates for use by the British Navy in the early twentieth century, it has likewise, while sharing mutual goals with New Zealand, always been demonstrably keener in its security commitments, providing more resources and greater numbers of servicemen to its wars whether in the Second World War in 1939-1945, in Vietnam in 1965, in Afghanistan in 1980 (McKinnon, 1989) or today in the South Pacific.\(^{70}\) Though these differences in numbers can partly be attributed to great differences in population size, the fact remains that Australia has throughout its history always expressed a more willing and enthusiastic attitude towards its security commitments than its smaller neighbour, owing it seems to a greater sense of realism in its foreign affairs which saw the prospect of military attacks or invasions on the Australian homeland as being much more highly likely than New Zealand ever has.

\(^{69}\) This “startled consciousness” of the potential threat of Japan to Australia can be seen as far back as 1894 when Australia took part in military exercises in Sydney Harbour in preparation for any rendez-vous with Japanese warships following Japan’s defeat of China in battle that year (Gordon, 1960, p. 22).

\(^{70}\) During the Vietnam War, being “keener” and “more concerned about Asia”, the Australians maintained a force of 8,000 soldiers including conscripts in Vietnam, compared to a commitment of 800 men by New Zealand. Likewise during the 1980 Afghanistan War, the Australians were again more keen to commit to the war than their Antipodean counterparts, deploying a carrier task force to the Indian Ocean while New Zealand offered only naval and air support “as resources permit” (McKinnon, 1989, p. 22).
Additionally, during the Cold War it could be argued to be realism and an inclination to plan for the worst case scenario that saw Australia become host to at least four US military installations including the satellite-linked communications and surveillance facility at Pine Gap outside Alice Springs, which while adding to Australia’s sense of security, also made Australia a target of Soviet nuclear attack on home soil right up until the collapse of Communism in 1989-1991 (Dunn, 1984, p. 193-194; Boanas, 1989, p. 34). Today too, this difference between Australia’s tradition of realism and New Zealand’s tradition of idealism can be clearly seen in their disparate strategic outlooks, with Australia, on the one hand, preparing for a risky future in the Asia-Pacific and developing a traditional defence structure with high combat capabilities across all three branches of the ADF on the basis of 50-year plans, while on the other hand, New Zealand prepares for a continuing ‘benign’ environment, disbands the air-combat wing of the Air Force and diminishes naval combat capabilities, all in the pursuit of turning the NZDF into an international peacekeeping force whose main purpose is to defend other people in other people’s countries overseas. It is also Australia’s sense of realism that prompts the nation to continuously foster a strong working relationship with Indonesia as the most populous Muslim nation in the world located on Australia’s doorstep. Finally, it could likewise be argued to be a strong realist strain, when combined with a strong sense of threat in the War on Terror, that has enabled Australia to not only endorse the use of force as a general tool in International Relations, but also explains the nation’s willingness to use force wherever it deems it useful or necessary in international affairs, including the use of pre-emption in fighting global terrorists and those nations which host or sponsor them.

Finally, realism can account for the way that Australia has become so “enmeshed” with American global strategy since the end of the Second World War (Catley, 2001, p. 16), adopting American strategic values, interests and ‘balance of power’ thinking, which is said to have made the two nation’s foreign and security policies “virtually indistinguishable” (O’Brien, 2001, p. 33). Indeed, the US-Australian relationship is based on the core realist calculation within Australia that good relations with this pre-eminent global power is vital in advancing Australian security and interests in the world and securing the most benefits from the process of globalization. This belief stems from Australia’s belief that the pivotal forces shaping the world today are the primacy of the US in a unipolar ‘balance of power’ world and globalization, considered likewise to be
centred on the US (George, 2003; O’Brien, 2005; Patman, 2005). As Robert Patman has argued: “By presenting itself as Washington’s staunchest ally, Australia anticipates political, military and commercial favours coming its way in bilateral relations as well as increased clout in the global institutions such as the United Nations and the WTO, and greater respect and recognition from regional major powers like China” (Patman, 2001).

In short, as Harries similarly asserts, Australia’s alignment with the leading Western country makes “good realist sense” (Harries, 2006). Fundamentally, however, this assessment relates to America’s status on the world stage as not only the most powerful state within the international community, but also increasingly a hegemon rather than just a superpower (or “hyperpower” as some have named it). Indeed, being more powerful than ever before in its history with preeminent military capabilities incorporating the military latest technology, an annual defence expenditure of over US$320 billion (equating to more than twice the amount spent by the other NATO countries put together), immense wealth, and an extensive global reach in all three military, political and economic spheres, the United States is without doubt a force to reckon with in international affairs (Organski & Arbetman, 1993; Eliot Cohen, 2002, p. 37; Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 20). These facts combined have meant that the US-Australian alliance has remained - and will undoubtedly continue in the near future - to be a fundamental factor in Australia’s international relations.

Alliances

Finally, the desire and need to be allied with the great Western powers, particularly the one possessing the greatest power and influence on the world stage at any one time, is another theme within Australia’s national identity that has been reflected in its foreign and security policy decisions over the decades. As Owen Harries states, Australian foreign policy “has always consisted of allying oneself closely with a great power that is committed to preserving the existing international order against those who want to change it radically” (Harries, 2006). Identity provides a strong and consistent explanation for such a tradition in Australia’s foreign affairs, since “the need for a “great and powerful friend” is deeply embedded in the Australian psyche” (Harries, 2006). In fact the historical record is rife with allusions to this predominant emphasis on allies in the Australian state of mind. From its infancy to the middle of the twentieth century, the
Australian nation’s “mate”\textsuperscript{71} in international affairs was Great Britain for obvious reasons of history, heritage and kin. As the Second World War progressed, however, and the Empire began to unravel with British power increasingly being eclipsed by the United States, Australia’s shift in primary allegiance from England to America - its wartime companion and fellow-in-arms in the Asia-Pacific – was as inevitable as it was logical. Indeed, the notion of an ‘allied Australia’ theme in the national identity working to reinforce the US-Australian alliance can be seen in regard to Australia’s like-mindedness and loyalty to nuclear-policies along with the US in the ANZUS affair of the mid-1980s\textsuperscript{72}, which continues to this day, as well as Australia’s full participation in the War on Terror in the 2000s, as illustrated in Howard’s immediate promise of “full Australian support” for the United States following the September 11 terrorist attacks, which ultimately led to Australia’s involvement in both the Afghan and Iraq wars in subsequent years. As Harries states, in making such a pledge “even before he knew what the policy response of that country would be”, Howard was being true to the tradition of alliances and mateship in the Australian psyche – “he merely walked on an established path” (Harries, 2006).

While such a preoccupation over allies has been rather bitterly and cynically condemned by New Zealand commentators who denounce Australia for having a “national identity still over-reliant on the relationship they have forged with the two great Anglo-Saxon powers – the United States of America and the United Kingdom” (Trotter, 2005), it must be noted that Australia’s sense of national identity does not involve the “sceptical, prickly independence” and preciousness about sovereignty so often exhibited by New Zealand (as in the ANZUS affair which some consider left New Zealand in a state of “friendlessness”) (McLean, 2003, p. 16). For Australians, alliances do not equate to national dependence or subservience, but rather to strong but equal friendships in an uncertain and dangerous world. Independence and alliances are mutually compatible. Indeed, the idea of ‘mateship’ is a strong concept within the Australian national identity, evidence of which being not only John Howard’s repeated references to it as a fundamental Australian value throughout his tenure as Prime Minister, but also his

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{71} A “mate” being from Australia’s point of view not just a friend, but a friend with whom Australia shares many similarities and things in common (i.e. nations of a Western character or embracing Western values).
  \item \textsuperscript{72} Even despite rumblings of anti-nuclear sentiment among the parties in parliament, especially the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Templeton, 2004). The idea of strong alliances in the Australian psyche was stronger than dissent.
\end{itemize}
attempt to have the mateship notion inserted into the preamble of the Australian Constitution (Smith, 2005). Indeed, as a more recent illustration may show, consider Downer's response when quizzed during his visit to New Zealand on whether or Australia will leave its troops in Iraq. “In the case of Australia and the Americans, we are mates and we stick with our mates,” Downer expounded (‘Downer: Don’t beat up on Bush’, 2007):

It sort of gets to the notion of mateship in Australia really. Do you just abandon your mates? Do we say to the Americans you can do it all, we are just going to abandon you, or do we stick by them? I think we feel in the end we stick by our mates in difficult times (‘Pullout from Iraq would create chaos – Peters’, 2007).

This idea of ‘mateship’ has even been remarked on by the United States too, as Cheney expressed during his visit to Australia this year: “Americans know that for this country, "standing by your mate when he's in a fight" are more than words in a song, and they signify a way of life. Having Australia’s friendship makes my country very grateful and very proud” (Cheney, 2007).

Additionally, however, it is not just the fact of Australia’s emphasis on strong alliances within its national identity alone that has helped to make the US-Australian alliance what it is today. It is possible to go one step further and make the case that it is Australia’s identification with the United States since the Second World War, with both nations

73 It is interesting to note along this vein of thought that even Kevin Rudd, the new leader of the Australian Labor Party, has repeatedly confirmed his commitment to a strong US alliance, despite his many repeated protestations to the contrary, insinuating that he would implement a staged withdraw of ADF troops from Iraq (‘Costs and benefits of having a big friend’, 2007). The fact is, as the former leader of the ALP proclaimed in 2002, the ALP strongly supports the alliance and always has (Crean, 2002). Or as Kevin Rudd has himself said in past times on the matter, while asserting his desire to see the US-Australian alliance last for 100 years or more, “it would be self-delusional for Australians to consider any unilateral withdrawal from ANZUS”, that Australia should continue to support ANZUS “quite apart from the benefits which ANZUS delivers to Australia’s bilateral defence and non-defence relationship with the United States”, and that the only real challenge for the future is for Australians “to add to the traditional agenda of the relationship new areas of policy, including environmental management and global warming” (Rudd, 2001).

This means that the prospect of the US remaining Australia’s “mate” and featuring largely in Australian external policy in future years is all but certain. As also an example this month illustrates, following a 45-minute self-described “good-natured, very open discussion” with Bush during the APEC summit in Sydney. Asked if he thought he could develop a close friendship with President Bush, Rudd replied “I’m a friendly sort of guy” (‘Rudd keeps talks with Bush off record’, 2007).
embracing the same values and interests, that actually spurs on the US-Australian alliance. This has remained the status quo even with Australia’s changing demography and the way that it has become increasingly multicultural and of non-British origin in the post-war years. This is because Australia’s influx of migrants came predominantly from Southern Europe, the majority of whom embraced many of the same Western values and democratic traditions as the ‘original’ Australians, meaning that Australia has undergone no major challenge to its national identity and so continues to reflect a basically “Western make-up” and identity (McLean, 2003; Calvert, 2003). As Calvert and Harries have expressed on the matter, the two countries share “common strains of identity”, including common values, institutions and cultural similarities (Calvert, 2003; Harries, 2006), making a strong US-Australian friendship a mutually acceptable and agreeable state of affairs. Or as Howard has expressed on the matter: “Australians and Americans are people of determination, of moral courage, and decency. We are strong countries that have sacrificed greatly for peace and freedom at home and on distant shores. Our purposes in this world are good and right” (Howard, 2005). Indeed, it is this mutual identification which not only bolsters and propels the US-Australian relationship forward but also has given rise in the post-9/11 years to a muscular mutual desire “to defend those values, if necessary fight for them, and always to be ready to repel those who would seek to take those freedoms away” (Howard, cited in Cheney, 2007), especially as two countries who have been continuously democratic for the last 100 years. This compatibility in core national identities and interests is acknowledged not only in high-ranking political circles, however, but also on the ground within Australian society. The conclusions made by journalist Caroline Overington of The Australian last year on the US-Australian relationship is a primary illustration of this point. “The United States is not the enemy,” she writes. “The United States is a brave defender of democracy, which in turn means for the values that are important to Australians, such as liberty, dignity and the prosperity of man” (Overington, 2006).

Other Identity Considerations: Explaining Australia’s Behaviour on the World Stage

In fact, Australia’s sense of identity not only offers a comprehensive explanation for many of Australia’s trends and traits in its foreign and security policy, but provides strong

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74 Indeed, the balancing act between retaining Australia’s Western Anglo-Celtic outlook and status while at the same time engaging closely with Asia is considered today to be “at the heart of [Australian] foreign policy” (Calvert, 2003).
explanations for two of Australia’s most overt and controversial actions in the international sphere since 2001 - its “full participation” with the United States in the War on Terror, and its involvement in the Iraq war which saw the overthrow of Saddam’s authoritarian regime. As Howard stated in 2003:

Australia’s foreign policy must always serve our national interest…it must be constantly crafted and adjusted to promote the values, the security, and the prosperity of the Australian people. Our foreign policy should be pragmatic but it should also tell the world what we stand for and what we oppose (Howard, 2003).

In regard to terrorism, firstly, Australia saw the horrific events of 9/11 as “an attack on the lifestyle and democratic values of all Australians and of all peace loving people” (Downer, 2002), signifying the need for Australia, the US and other freedom-loving nations to join together to fight against terrorism and promote democracy and freedom around the world. Already considering itself a terrorist target owing to its unalterable identity as a Western nation, and named by Osama bin Laden as an enemy of Al Qaeda due to its intervention in East Timor (Howard, 2003 [4]), Australia’s large and expansive commitment to the War on Terror with its provision of political will, logistical support and troops on the ground (Downer, 2002) can be seen to be motivated by a strong desire to preserve the Australian national identity and way of life. As Downer states:

There has never been a time when Australia’s foreign policy was a more vital ingredient in forging our nation’s future or a more crucial factor in how we view ourselves. Today, Australian foreign policy must operate in a very unpredictable world, therefore now more than ever it must be a very Australian foreign policy (Downer, 2002).

Consequently, it is in defence of its identity and values in the War on Terror that Australia has endorsed such aggressive measures in tackling terrorists and those states which sponsor their activities, and been willing to use force as well as new tactics such as President Bush’s pre-emption doctrine. This is because Australia believes terrorism to be not a force that can be defeated through reason or the normal channels of
diplomatic negotiations. Terrorists are not in the Australian or American view rational or reasonable people - committed to force they must be met with force. Consequently, the Australian Government remains open to being a ‘pathfinder’ and breaking new ground when dealing with the complex scenarios of the war against terrorism, including that of wielding force in new and more extensive ways. As Downer asserts, “we must remain ambitious…to develop a positive and confident future for Australia in a world of change” through exercising “a strong, independent, responsive and pragmatic foreign policy” (Downer, 2002). Or as Howard expressed in reference to Iraq, “Peace-loving peoples must sometimes act forcefully if freedom is to be secured” (Howard, 2005): As he explains:

The responsibility of elected leaders is to serve the interests and promote the values of the people – as we see them and as best we can. This does not mean adjusting to opinion polls, but it does mean that foreign policy can never be conducted over the heads of our people (Howard, 2005).

Identity can easily be argued to have promoted Australia’s involvement in the Iraq war too, since Australia not only believed its foreign policy should never be fashioned to buy immunity from threat but rather to reflect Australian values (Howard, 2003 [4]), but also considered being a spectator and “sitting on the sidelines” to be neither “good for Australia” nor “the Australian way” (Howard, 2003 [4]). In fact, through its participation in the overthrow of Saddam, Australia not only considered itself to have acted in a way that best expressed the Australian identity in having “neither shirked the issues nor watered down our principles” (Downer, 2003, May 14), but also viewed its ADF personnel to be defending “our freedom, our values and our security” through its war-fighting in Iraq (Downer, 2003 [3]), a feat which Howard asserted had “done this country proud” (Howard, 2003 [6]). Indeed, identity can provide explanations not only for Australia’s participation in the war, but also for its on-going commitment to a democratic and stable Iraq, as shown in its continued deployment of ADF personnel to the Gulf and the Government’s refusal to withdraw its troops until “the job has been finished”. Australia

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75 In a related way, Australia’s desire to protect and promote its values and interests can more generally can also explain Australia’s more assertive approach than New Zealand to its international affairs including in the Asia-Pacific (as Australia’s raid of the Prime Minister’s office in the Solomon’s during RAMSI last year illustrates).
meets two needs within its core psyche in doing so: firstly, it is able to strengthen the US-American alliance by ‘sticking by its mate’ and proving itself to be a faithful ally in a friend’s time of need; and secondly, through its participation in Iraqi nation-building Australia is able to promote its own “Australian values” in the wider world – namely freedom, democracy, respect, ‘a fair go’ for all and a willingness to help others – all of which are considered by Australia to be the strongest most noble values in the history of man (Hawke, 2003b; Howard, 2005). Howard expressed this notion in 2005 when he said that as “one of the world’s oldest and continuing democracies” Australia’s involvement in Iraq contributes to Australia’s “fine tradition” and “proud history of supporting political and economic freedom” in the world (Howard, 2005). As he reflected on his Government’s decision two years earlier: “This was a difficult decision, but eight million brave Iraqi voters helped convince me it was the right one” (Howard, 2005). Moreover, through its involvement in overthrowing one of the world’s worst dictators and its subsequent assistance in helping to give Iraqis their first chance of establishing a fair democratic system of government, an event which without the Coalition of the Willing would not have been possible after all, Australia considers itself to not only have acted to preserve “the way of life that Australians...hold dear” (Calvert, 2003), but also ended the “myth of little Australia” (Kelton, 2005) showing how democracies can “find renewed power and purpose abroad from institutions and instincts at home” (Howard, 2005). As Howard explains: “Australia brings with its role in the world certain ideas and values. Our place in the international system is informed by who we are, and by what we stand for” (Howard, 2005).

In fact, Australia’s entire approach to foreign affairs can be summed up in the notion of promoting its identity as a “Good International Citizen”, a notion which though likewise expressed in Wellington, is regarded quite differently in Canberra (Devetak & True, 2006). Instead of New Zealand’s interpretation of being seen to act in an ‘internationally

76 In fact the importance of these Australian values have not only impacted Australia’s external policies, but also its approach to internal ones. Consider the Australian media frenzy in 2005 over the comments made by Federal Education Minister, Dr Brendan Nelson, who told Muslim educators who do not accept and teach Australian values to “clear off”. As he stated: “If you want to be an Australian, if you want to raise your children in Australia, we fully expect those children to be taught and to accept Australian values and beliefs. We want them to understand our history and our culture, the extent to which we believe in mateship and giving another person a fair go, and basically if people don’t want to support and accept and adopt and teach Australian values then they should clear off” (“Minister tells Muslims: accept Aussie values or ‘clear off’, 2005). 77 Consider the contemporary example of Cuba, for instance, where Fidel Castro’s demise has only led to the instatement of an equally dictatorial relative so that the cycle of oppression and repression goes on.
acceptable’ manner in its foreign affairs, primarily through extensive engagement in multilateral forums and institutions not least the UN, Australia considers good citizenry to be less about appearances and more about being ‘effective’ (Kelton, 2005). As Australia sees it, in a global community made up of an array of nations of different ethnicities, religions, values and backgrounds, it would be folly to try and ‘please the crowd’ as it would never be able to please everyone. Instead, Australia embraces its freedom of choice and commits to what it perceives to be the ‘right thing’ for Australia to do, whether to secure its own national security and interests, or the peace and security of the international community at large. As Downer describes this Australian approach: “We are not about trumpeting our own international good citizenry simply for the sake of it. That is a trap for the ideologues and the naïve. We are about good international citizenry where it can be shown to deliver tangible results for our interests and those of other people” (Downer, 2002).

Identity & the Antipodes: Explaining Trans-Tasman Divergence

In sum, there is a compelling case that New Zealand and Australia’s divergence in international affairs is being driven by notions of national identity rather than geographical, external or economic factors. Indeed, as Devetak & True argue, the differences arising between the Tasman nations in their foreign policy approaches, and their divergent responses to globalisation’s security challenges, such as the transnational threat of terrorism “are not reducible to material and geopolitical factors” nor “result solely from divergent national interests and different calculations concerning how best to respond to current geopolitical issues”. Rather, “more fundamentally, the foreign policy differences arise from different governmental worldviews and conceptions of state identity” (Devetak & True, 2006, p. 251, 254). These notions of national identity not only affect foreign policy behaviour and the way both countries see the world, however, but also the way they see themselves and their own role in that world. The Dominion Post aptly described this reality in 2005 in its observations of the Anzac ceremony at Gallipoli in 2005:

New Zealand dreams of itself as a pacifist country that rejects the US alliance, runs down its war-fighting capability and deploys forces only for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes. Australia sees itself as an active
participant in global power politics, a staunch ally of the US, with a combat capability ready to defend the interests of the country and its ally (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005).

“The two countries’ conceptions of themselves have grown apart”, it concluded. “The Japanese have a saying for this - same bed, different dreams” (‘Two Different Dreams’, 2005). Though such an explanation, in O’Brien’s words, “does not, yet, convince the sceptics” (O’Brien, 2002, p. 14), nevertheless there is a growing number of academics asserting the crucial role of identity in understanding state behaviour and foreign policy choices on the world stage. Such a development combined with the wealth of historical evidence now seen to support such an approach must signify then that it is in fact identity factors, when combined with matters relating to Hugh White and David McCraw’s respective explanations of strategic perception and disparate political ideologies in both Tasman governments (ideologies which in fact draw on different identity themes and traditions within the existing national identity pool to promote competing interpretations of New Zealand’s role in the world78), which best explains trans-Tasman divergence in foreign affairs today.

As McLean likewise concludes: “Contrary to any conventional wisdom that the two countries are like peas in a pod, the record suggests that separatist and localized notions have prevailed from the outset” (McLean, 2003, p. 17).

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78 See English and Prebble’s speeches to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs which each juxtapose the opposing interpretations of New Zealand’s national identity, one from the Left and the other from the Right in the political spectrum (English, 2002; Prebble, 2002).
Conclusion

In conclusion it seems that just as it is identity factors that are chiefly responsible for much of the strangeness in the trans-Tasman relationship, made manifest particularly in the odd dynamics of rivalry and indifference, it is likewise disparate national identities, when combined with strategic and political factors, that have been driving the widening divide between New Zealand and Australia in our International Relations. This has become particularly evident over the past decade, as New Zealand’s national identity has evolved into a stronger and more widely divergent type from Australian identity, than was the case previously in former years.

Fundamentally, on the New Zealand side, this increasing divergence in the international sphere stems from the strains of fierce independence, idealism and multilateralism within the core national identity today. These together have shaped the options available to the Government in the formation of its foreign and security policy, resulting in: a high emphasis on multilateralism as the way forward for New Zealand and the world; a propensity to avoid the use of force wherever possible; and a tendency to have a weaker more distant rapport with Washington. On the Australian side, by contrast, external policy has been most strongly influenced by the strain of strong independence, coupled with an equally sturdy and abiding commitment to nation-state ‘mates’, and a predominant streak of realism within the Australian national identity. These have in the same way motivated the development of external policies which incline towards: bilateral diplomacy over multilateralism; a willingness to use force where useful or necessary in global affairs; and a powerful and steadily-strengthening alliance with its closest friend and strategic ally, the United States. Indeed, so entrenched are these inclinations in the Tasman neighbour’s psyche and foreign policy, that in hindsight, their clash over the 2003 Iraq War was in many respects inevitable.

In reality, one could expect the same kind of political upheaval between the Antipodean pair wherever two or more of these areas of difference – multilateralism, use of force and relations with the United States – overlap or come together in an international issue, possibly even in the Pacific if and when the Tasman pair and the United States join forces more fully to address the problems and instability of the Pacific Islands in future years.
As for the question of how to improve the NZ-Australia relationship, there are a number of things that, in my view, need to be accepted or taken into account on both sides of the Tasman in order to revive the fading Anzac Spirit between our two countries.

Firstly, both nations – but especially New Zealand – need to realise that the trans-Tasman relationship can no-longer be taken for granted. Strong international relationships, like good marriages, are only happy and healthy when the two parties work at the relationship, expending time, energy and money into producing good results. At present this kind of commitment from within New Zealand’s political sphere comes sporadically, even half-heartedly when New Zealand Governments try to win domestic points by placating the home crowd at Australia’s expense. The present Labour Government’s deliberate sabotage of trans-Tasman relations this month over a rather trivial matter of Air New Zealand’s transportation of Australian servicemen to Iraq is a case in point. It follows that this kind of behaviour does not evoke the level of trust and faith Australia needs if it is to align itself more closely with New Zealand and with New Zealanders needs in economics or security. After all, owing to our small size and remote geography, we need Australia politically, economically and militarily. Indeed, New Zealand dilly-dallying over issues such as the creation of a single economic market only serves to sour an already precarious economic relationship. Likewise, it should go without saying that making defence decisions without taking into account the needs of our nearest neighbour and strongest security ally, or considering the effect on the NZ-Australian defence relationship, is negligent, precipitous and simply unwise – especially when Australia is the one country New Zealand relies on to come to our own defence should the need arise. New Zealanders all too often count on a sense of goodwill in Canberra that is in fact evaporating. The relationship is not set in stone – the time of flippancy is past.

Secondly, in order for a better friendship to develop between these old mates and rivals, Australians and New Zealanders need to stop impugning the other nation’s motives in the international sphere. All too often it is as though the Tasman relationship becomes infused with suspicion and laced with malice, seemingly under the belief that the choice of one particular course of action by one nation were taken to spite the other, rather than
being in fact based on separate national considerations combined with different national identity strains (for example, New Zealand’s nuclear policy and Australia’s FTA with the United States). As this thesis has shown, it is separate and different national identities between the Antipodean pair that can best account for New Zealand and Australia’s divergence in external policies on the world stage. Both nations therefore need to acknowledge and accept these differences, while also realising that it is these stark differences that will time and again prompt disparate behaviour within the international sphere, as on the National Missile Defence project and Iraq. While these differences will also inevitably hamper closer trans-Tasman relations, accepting and expecting such areas of disparity are key to safeguarding the friendship when such clashes occur in the international sphere. The aptitude of Howard, Downer and Clark to refrain from commenting on the other nations’ sovereign decisions over the past year is a good step forward in this regard.

Thirdly, New Zealanders especially need to not only drop ‘the superiority act’ in our dealings with Australia (so illustrative of a kind of colonial hangover), but also stop the obsession with staying “separate and different” from Australia, largely driven by fear and paranoia that any Australasian collaboration will in some way extinguish New Zealand’s own unique identity and culture. While such fears might have been more plausible in 1901, they are entirely unfounded and unnecessary today. Indeed, on the subject of sovereignty, both PM Howard and Alexander Downer have repeatedly affirmed their full acknowledgement of New Zealand’s sovereignty as a nation and its right to make its own choices and decisions in international affairs. There is in fact no need for New Zealand to still be asserting its national sovereignty on the world stage in the twenty-first century – such a fact is already accepted as a given, owing to New Zealand’s long history of self-government and independence. Repeated assertions of the fact are in truth rather passé. Moreover, New Zealanders and Australians will always be different, and perceived as different by outsiders as well as by each other, as was the case when the ANZACs fought together in World War I. Though similar in many ways, there are differences in age, landscape, size, political organisation and political development between our two nations that can not be erased, and similarly differences in ethnic heritage, indigenous peoples, pioneer experiences, legends and heroes, national characteristics and mindsets, experiences of war, current demographies, approach and manner, and linguistic expressions and accents between the two peoples. Wherever
and whenever we work or fight alongside each other, we will always display different characteristics that will set us apart. Consequently, New Zealanders have nothing to fear from greater NZ-Australian collaboration.

Fourthly, there needs to be a greater awareness within both countries of the many commonalities and areas of mutual compatibility that exist within our two national identities, which provide a firm foundation for greater cooperation and an endurably close relationship between our respective countries. We are both strong and stable democracies committed to the values of democracy and freedom in the form of democratic government and individual human rights and freedoms. We both embrace the same traditions of egalitarianism and a ‘fair go’ for all, and both promote the rule of law, collective security, and market liberalisation in the way of free trade. Both countries are also strategically united in their geography and security interests, and share a history of nobility in wartime, having never waged war in pursuit of foreign territory, but repeatedly launching joint peacekeeping operations in support of our neighbours, and regional or global stability, whether in East Timor, the Solomon’s, Tonga or Afghanistan. We are both also generous and compassionate in times of crisis, able and willing to work together to relieve human suffering such as in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombings or the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. Finally, New Zealanders and Australians are also two peoples greatly compatible in being adventurous, resilient, pragmatic, unsentimental, low-key and unassuming people free of grand designs or pretensions in the world. In short, in each other we have a mutual and natural ally.

Indeed, New Zealand and Australia have much to offer one another. While being close but separate nations, we have much to gain in greater political, economic and military collaboration, especially in the context of a shared Pacific neighbourhood of mutual concern to us both. On the one side of the Tasman, Australians could benefit greatly from New Zealanders legacy of good race relations and its greater cultural awareness, expertise and more conciliatory approach in dealing with the various Pacific cultures in the region. Likewise, on the other side of the Tasman, New Zealanders could learn from Australian experiences and examples politically, economically and militarily as a country 62 years older than itself, and use the Australian experience as a template for fostering our own national development in response to our own unique situation and needs, as has been the case often in New Zealand history. By way of illustration, New Zealand
learnt from the disorganised and chaotic Australian experience of settlement to implement a more orderly one in the 1800s, and followed Australia’s example by shedding the vestiges of British rule and developing new Asia-Pacific markets for trade during the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, in the Pacific Island region, New Zealand and Australia has a unique opportunity to work together much like a soft-cop, hard-cop duo, the efficacy of which approach any decent police force around the world will attest to.

Fifth, New Zealand and Australia need a new framework or structure for any future amelioration of trans-Tasman ties in order to better frame their relations with each other. It has been the lack of such an overarching plan or roadmap in which to define our relations with each other – once provided so effortlessly by the British Empire and then provided by American grand strategy during the Cold War – that has contributed substantially to the trend of spontaneous ad hoc policy-making on either side of the Tasman, and has proved so instrumental in destabilising and worsening NZ-Australian relations. In fact there is an overwhelming consensus in academic circles that a new widely-focused, outward-looking paradigm is exactly what is needed to ‘galvanize’ the two communities and spark a more cooperative defence relationship. The Asia-Pacific region combined with the growing unrest there is logically and naturally just such a wider context for improving trans-Tasman relations. This is a region in which New Zealand and Australia are singularly united in their common interests and desire for peace and stability, as their combined approach to Fiji’s General Bainimarama and that country’s ‘coup-habit’ well shows.

If a strong and effective collaboration is to result in the Tasman countries’ dealings with Pacific unrest and state-failure, however, then importantly New Zealand must look to its own Defence Force and fill the aerial and naval capability gaps which the current Clark administration has seen fit to lose. There are three reasons for this.

1. First, the loss of such hard-core, war-making, long-term capabilities has in fact impacted materially not only on New Zealand’s ability to carry out softer, short-term, peacekeeping operations, but also on its training and deployment of NZDF personnel, as well its ability to provide substantial air cover in combat. Or in other words, as an analogy may better explain, in having given away our ‘family car’ due to the fact that long-term trips to other cities are no-longer expected or foreseeable in the near future,
we have lost our ability to make short trips into town too and are forced into the position of having to rely on others, or indeed catch the bus or stay home. After all, New Zealanders may have inherited a strong strain of Scottish frugality, which bodes well for the country in times of financial hardship or difficulty, but it ought not to become the ordinary way of life.

2. Second, it is likely that in dealing with future crisis situations in the Asia-Pacific, whether in the Pacific Island countries or further afield in the Asian heartland such as potentially in Myanmar today, following the recent upheavals there, both Australia and these nations themselves will require more from New Zealand than a uniformed airfreight, search and rescue, or coastguard force, and desire greater combat capabilities from New Zealand than those that the country currently possesses. Indeed, New Zealand’s low defence capabilities in this regard have been an ongoing matter of concern within Australia, even having been called into question by potentially the next Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd. Additionally, should New Zealand wish to meet its full potential and play a greater role on the world stage in preserving global security in future years, it will be necessary for New Zealand to incorporate higher levels of combat capability across all three branches of the NZDF – army, navy and air force – and to possess the ability to use them effectively in combat. In any case, given human inability to predict the future and the future shape of the strategic environment, as 9/11 so starkly demonstrated, a policy of military preparedness for every eventuality will enable New Zealand to respond effectively to any global security development in future years.

3. And third, defence matters can not be quarantined from other aspects of the NZ-Australian relationship, as PM Howard has stressed. Those here in New Zealand must not forget that New Zealand’s ability to contribute to the defence of Australia has a tangible impact on attitudes in Canberra towards our country generally, and specifically in terms of New Zealand’s wider needs and interests in International Relations.

In sum, the shape and strength of the future trans-Tasman relationship will depend most on what New Zealanders make of it. What New Zealand reaps from the relationship will be proportional to what is invested in it. Of course this does not mean that there will not be differences and issues of variance and divergence between the Tasman pair on matters of external and internal policy, as our respective positions on the Iraq war and
the long-lasting dispute over allowing New Zealand apples into Australian markets well demonstrate. However, just as it has been shown time and again in the past, the trans-Tasman relationship is durable and flexible enough to outlast any minor skirmishes such as these. It will remain strongly and firmly intact whatever the future holds, if New Zealand and Australia will respect the differences and accept each other for the nations that we are. If we make the most of the relationship and all the commonalities that we share, there is no doubt that New Zealand-Australian relations will go from strength to strength in future decades.

**New Zealand’s National Insecurity: From One Kiwi to Another**

It behoves me, as a fellow Kiwi, to also say a few words here regarding New Zealand’s national identity, or rather our ‘national insecurity’, and what ought to be done about it if we are ever to go forward into the world as a stronger, more confident, more cohesive nation.

Insecurity has been an abiding feature of New Zealand life for over a century and continues to have a large impact on the way that we think and act as a nation today – especially in International Relations. Fierce independence and anti-nuclearism have becoming defining characteristics of New Zealanders in the 21st century. However, in my view, these notions are in fact convenient masks for a creeping underlying panic regarding who we are and what we are supposed to be in the world – a point of uncertainty to New Zealand ever since we were abandoned by our British parent joining the EEC. Indeed, this uncertainty has been brewing within society for a long time. Back in 1985 the editor of the *Listener* wrote:

> That cracking sound you hear is our break with the past. Anzus, All Black tours of South Africa, the familiar faces at the head of so many of our institutions for the last 20 years – gone, or going…Some look for explanation, some for reassurance. There is a sense of dislocation, a desire for new signposts. But the old familiar faces, the reassuring voices, are moving on (cited in McPhee, 1987, p. 283).

Twenty years later and New Zealanders are still searching for those new signposts about our destiny as a nation and as a people in the wider world. The lack of leadership
on this point has actually provoked some to call on New Zealanders to “stop relying on [politicians] for leadership and reach within themselves instead” (Olympic champion Paul Kingsman, in Peart, 2005). The ‘brain drain’ effect, in which 25-30,000 young New Zealanders leave our shores permanently each year to reside elsewhere in the world is strong evidence of such a pervasive sense of insecurity and unhappiness among New Zealanders on this point. Indeed, a Phillips Fox poll found in 2005 that 44% of New Zealanders of all ages have already considered leaving New Zealand for good (Bryant, 2005). Worse still, the 2007 ‘Quality of Life’ survey found that, while New Zealanders thought the quality of life in New Zealand was good overall despite growing concerns for our security, an immense 39% of New Zealanders said they were not proud of their country (‘Kiwis generally happy with life’, 2007). This is a serious indictment of New Zealand and its political and economic leadership today.

Since 2005, moreover, New Zealand’s sense of national identity has been challenged further with divisions appearing between Maori and Pakeha, citizens and immigrants, town and country, and liberals and conservatives – all exacerbated further by substantially changing demographics and a seeming shift away from our Western heritage and traditional allies towards the Asia-Pacific – a region that still today is for many New Zealanders a ‘foreign’ part of the world. We are increasingly becoming a divided nation. Recognising that it is identity that drives foreign policy, it seems evident then that this insecurity and uncertainty within New Zealand society has become perceptible in the nation’s foreign and security affairs too. Increasingly, there seems to be a gap appearing between those New Zealanders who want to retain the vestiges of our Western heritage including strong close political and military relationships with our traditional allies (including the US), and those who want to ‘cut our losses’, become a Republic, and move forward as a more pacifist “Pacific nation” looking predominantly to the Asia-Pacific. It is the struggle and confusion within New Zealand on this point that has resulted in such non-consensus within society regarding the ANZUS break-up in 1985, the disbanding of the high-level combat capabilities of the NZDF in 2000-2001, and again over the War on Terror and Iraq in 2001-2003 – with a great undecided majority being between the two poles of the spectrum (McPhee, 1987; ‘Australia and New Zealand: The Defence Policy Gulf’, 2000; Larkin, 2001). There can be no doubt that New Zealand is in an identity crisis – a crisis that will not just ‘go away’ without strong conciliatory leadership provided by those at the top of the political process.
Identity Matters

What appears to be most lacking in, and therefore driving, New Zealand’s national insecurity on this point, is a greater awareness across all sectors of society regarding what we have to offer in the world as a nation and as a people. In the hope of aiding the development of such a general consciousness among New Zealanders, several points for consideration will be provided in the following.

West-meets-East

First, there needs to be a greater awareness and acceptance of New Zealand’s present realities. One the one hand, we are a nation founded on Western values and traditions incorporating a strong British heritage, while on the other hand, we are a nation situated inescapably in the Pacific with vital interests in the Asia-Pacific to foster and protect. There will never be peace and confidence within New Zealand society unless we embrace a national identity that gives room and expression for both. The Asia-Pacific lobby can not politically or verbally force New Zealanders into some kind of denial of our heritage and history, while the pro-Western groups can equally no-longer deny the realities of our geographical position and our increasingly Asian-Pacific demography. The way forward is to incorporate aspects of both realities in our national identity, in acknowledgement of who we are and where we live, meaning neither moving forward to the future at the expense of our history and past, nor moving forward nostalgically to closer relationships with Western friends while ignoring the country’s present Asia-Pacific realities, nor the way that we and the world have changed in past decades.

In promoting this more balanced and cohesive sense of national identity, there is one, true, overarching and unifying theme in our history that will be of great assistance. Namely, that in New Zealand we are a nation of immigrants. Whether Maori, British, Pacifica, or Asian – and whether by canoe, ship, boat, or plane – we, or our forebears, all came to this country ‘over water’ to seek a better life and a brighter future in this land – a ‘land of milk and honey’.

Dependence & Independence

Second, in guiding this country forward New Zealanders need to be careful regarding the notions of dependence and independence. For most of our history New Zealand has
been a nation displaying a kind of clingy ‘dependency syndrome’, tying its hopes and identity to that of a more powerful, like-minded friend. As a result, New Zealanders have a tendency to want to immerse itself in the power of another, instead of retaining a sense of sovereign distance to which this country is without question entitled. After all, as an autonomous, self-governing nation for one hundred years now, this nation is well able to stand on its own two feet. At present I believe New Zealand has identified and tied its fortunes rather too closely with that of the UN organisation, meaning that our estimation of our own self-worth as a nation rises and falls on the fortunes of the UN. It would be much more judicious and sage for New Zealand to remember that the organisation was created as a collective security body to serve the needs of its members, not for the members to serve the needs of the UN, and while it is indeed a most important international forum and vehicle for progress in a host of issues, it is not New Zealand’s master. We are a sovereign nation.

As for the other matter of independence, New Zealand has tended to be rather too ferocious in its lauding of national independence. There is no-longer any need for New Zealand to be so vocal nor fight so hard to be considered independent. Today this fact is already taken for granted in international affairs. Just as it would be a silly thing for an athlete to keep sprinting having already won the race, it is equally unnecessary for New Zealand to be continually using a megaphone on this point.

What New Zealanders Have to Offer the World

Third, New Zealanders need to be reminded of just what kind of people we are in the world and all the wonderful qualities we possess which are both valued and needed in the world today. Whether of Maori heritage with forebears renowned for their advanced tribal development, their bravery, and excellent sea-faring and war-fighting abilities, or of Western heritage descended from the early New Zealand pioneers and adventurers, known for their courage, resilience, inventiveness, determination and modesty, or descended from Asian or Pacific immigrants who have grasped opportunities and worked to make a new life for themselves in a foreign land – New Zealanders are today a people that are warm, friendly, pragmatic, open-minded, innovative, technologically-savvy and well-grounded, enjoyed and liked in the world wherever we go. As such, New Zealanders already encompass many advantages and have much to offer the world.
In particular, due to our excellent war-time qualities of hardiness, discipline and courage-under-fire in addition to a merciful inclination and a highly-developed sense of morality, we are particularly the kinds of people that the world needs in times of crisis and conflict. Indeed, New Zealanders have won respect and admiration wherever they have engaged in battle for exactly these kinds of qualities, whether that be the exploits of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (NZEF) in Gallipoli and the battle of the Somme in World War I, or today in the valiance and ‘extraordinary heroism’ displayed by the NZ SAS squad of 2001-2006 in Afghanistan, for which it was awarded the distinction of a United States Navy Presidential Unit Citation in 2006. This suggests that New Zealand could play a more meaningful role in the world than just contributing to peacekeeping and nation-building operations – that it does in fact have great potential to be one of those few countries on the world stage willing and able to ensure global peace and security, administer justice, and further international political development by taking part in those military interventions deemed necessary by the international community in the future.

We might also be more vocal and active with other strong democracies in advancing the values of democracy and freedom – as once we did with regard to Apartheid – values which we not only already have and enjoy here in New Zealand, but upon which also our entire nation and society are based. Our great concern and passion for safeguarding the basic human rights of man should be a source of help and motivation in these respects. As a strong liberal democracy, moreover, New Zealand should never be afraid of developing close relationship with like-minded democratic nations in this quest wherever they are to be found – including with our traditional allies the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and even Canada – nations that are not only four of the strongest and most stable democracies in the world, but also nations with whom New Zealand shares many shared values and common strains of identity. Indeed, our commitment to democracy, and our history of sacrifice and commitment in its cause in the world, should render such a focus obvious for New Zealand in the future.

Additionally, however, as a well-travelled, internationally-adept people coming from a highly multicultural society, in which the idea of justice and fairness are essential elements, New Zealanders are also well placed to play a stronger role in international affairs that they do currently, able to contribute to global development and security in the areas of not only negotiation and advocacy in a legal context, but also in terms of mediation of international disputes, as it did with regard to Fiji this year. Norway’s
example of having become the world’s pre-eminent international mediator with a key role in the Israel-Palestine dispute, despite its small size and peripheral location, is a case in point.

In order to mediate effectively, however, New Zealanders must stop equally condemning all use of force in international affairs, and begin to place a greater weight on the important factor of ‘motive’ or ‘purpose’. The way that this crucial element of moral judgement has become of such little consequence in New Zealand society today in relation to the use of force, has in fact become increasingly apparent in the last year, as illustrated in the way that an Auckland gun-shop owner faced criminal charges for shooting an armed intruder in self-defence, that New Zealanders were ‘outraged’ at the idea of police using Taser-guns likewise in self-defence against the most aggressive criminals, and even in the political and social storm over the use of small and very limited force as a legitimate form of discipline in the child ‘anti-smack’ legislation. In fact, at present New Zealand does not seem to make a distinction between good and bad motives, or make allowances for differences in purpose for such a use of force, as demonstrated in New Zealand’s utter condemnation of both Israel and the terrorist Hezbollah organisation in their resort to force during the 2006 conflagration, regardless of the fact that one was using force to antagonize and destabilize a sovereign nation, while the other was applying force in fundamental self-defence and the preservation of its borders and future security. The two actions are not equal. If in New Zealand courts of law we can make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, then as a nation we ought to make the same distinction in our assessments about the use of aggressively ‘offensive’ and self-protecting ‘defensive’ force in international affairs.

Moreover, in a more general sense, New Zealand needs to more keenly accept the fact, as many democracies on the international stage already have, that in situations where leaders of threatening countries are unreasonable, as was the case with Prussian Emperor Wilhelm II, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Libyan Colonel and Dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi, and several others – and is today also the case with the present Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who persists in developing nuclear programmes while simultaneously desiring the annihilation of Israel and the genocide of its people, and to act in defiance of both the UN and the collective concern and will of the international community of nations – force is often the only resolving alternative for dealing with the threat posed, an unfortunate but ultimately
necessary option. The fact is that in some critical security situations, with certain unreasonable and recalcitrant leaders whose actions are impacting on the national security and survival of one or more nations or peoples on the world stage, force is the only language that is understood. In these situations, as the old maxim attests, decisive action often speaks louder than a barrage of well-meaning but ultimately powerless words.

A Refocused National Identity – A New National Day

Finally, there needs to be a shift in New Zealand society towards defining ourselves by what and who we are, rather than solely by what we are against (i.e. against nuclear power and dependence on superpowers). We need to become more confident and optimistic – about who we are, what we represent, the skills we have to offer, the values we embrace – and more generally aware of the fact that as a nation we have a lot going for us. This shift in general attitudes is not the work of a night. However, since as Identity Theory has shown, national identities are socially constructed, being comprised of ideas and notions that can and do change over time (Wendt, 1992; Fearon, 1999), a revitalisation and refocusing of New Zealand’s national identity in future years is both possible and feasible. This can be done from grass-roots up, with a greater social awareness of national identity issues, or from the top down, through future government’s guidance and direction towards the kind of country we want to be fifty years from now.

At present, while Labour Governments have continually stressed the strains of independence, idealism and multilateralism in the New Zealand national identity, there are other equally important strains within the national psyche that could be made better use of in future years, such as the strains of loyalty and common cause with allies, strong commitment to the spread of freedom and democracy, and wartime sacrifice for noble causes. It is possible that a future government’s adoption of a fuller range of identity strains and traditions with New Zealand’s sense of national identity will in fact be of great assistance in helping to heal the social divides that, much like our earthquake fault-lines, have crisscrossed the length and breadth of the country, dividing and menacing New Zealand society wherever they have gone. Undoubtedly too, a greater social awareness of the strategic Asia-Pacific environment we live in would greatly abet a fuller understanding among New Zealanders of the risks inherent in the region, the
need for a better-armed and structured Defence Force, and the kind of role New Zealanders would like and might need to play in the region in future years.

Most importantly, however, to consolidate and strengthen New Zealand’s sense of itself, and to promote a new, relaxed kind of confidence, optimism and forward-thinking among New Zealanders, about ourselves and our nation, we need to institute a new national day – a New Zealand Day – one that is not clouded with bicultural tension and hostility as is Waitangi Day, nor immersed in a cloak of tragedy and grief as is Anzac Day (completely unlike our Australian brothers, who remember the ANZACs with much more joyous pride than we do, and a greater, deeper, and more optimistic belief in the value of noble sacrifices for good and important causes in world history). These two national days each have their important purpose and place in New Zealand history and society – Waitangi Day is a day to remember the foundation document of our nation and to embrace our deeply-entrenched biculturalism, while Anzac Day is a day to remember and to honour those many New Zealanders over the century, who have sacrificed their lives to ensure our and other people’s freedom and security. However at present neither of these national days comprise the right kind of vehicle to celebrate and enhance a sense of New Zealand ‘nationhood’ and ‘togetherness’.

For my part, I would suggest the 26th November every year should be just such a new national holiday, since it was on this date one hundred years ago in 1907 that New Zealand first became a sovereign, self-governing Dominion. This day should be a day of celebration, positivity and pride, not only in the sorts of people we are, and the uniquely Kiwi identity, heritage and qualities we possess, but also in the kind of country that we and our forebears have successfully built up from scratch beginning 167 years ago with the arrival of those first immigrant ships in Wellington. On this day we could for once nationally enjoy the fact of being New Zealanders with all that that entails. A day to celebrate our culture, our heroes, our legends, our songs, our landscape, our successes, our innovation and our people. A day to celebrate all that we are and all that we can yet be.

This is the way for the future.

As the great New Zealand historian, J. C. Beaglehole, once concluded long ago:
the history of this country has been the history of its discovery – a discovery continuing still – of a tradition of its own (Beaglehole, 1954, p. 122).


No text provided.


(2001b) ‘Continental Drift’. In B. Brown (ed.) New Zealand and Australia – Where are we going?. Papers presented at the Seminar arranged by the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs at Victoria University, Wellington (July 4, 2001). Wellington: NZIIA.


(2002c, 8 October) ‘New Zealand and Australia – Foreign Policy and Armed Conflict’. Speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Victoria University of Wellington.


Case Study Speeches:


