

## **ISAF APPENDIX 6:**

### **Compiled List of the Full Range of Known National Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Armed Forces Deployed to ISAF in Afghanistan, 2001-2012**

(\*Please note: Where national caveat restrictions belong to two or more of the following 21 caveat categories, the rule has been placed in the category of greatest significance)

This list was compiled by Dr Regeena Kingsley and is taken from her PhD research thesis in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled, *'Fighting against Allies: An Examination of "National Caveats" within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.'*

The list was created based on the national caveat information gathered during the course of this doctoral research from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF mission on their deployed armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

For more information on "national caveats" and the impact of national caveat constraints on the effectiveness of the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, in addition to previous UN-led and NATO-led multinational security operations in Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, Mali, Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, please visit [www.militarycaveats.com](http://www.militarycaveats.com) or refer to Dr Regeena Kingsley's full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from

Massey University's official website here:

<http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984>.

## **Compiled List of 215 ISAF National Caveats in Afghanistan**

### **(1) Mission Caveats (ISAF vs OEF, or other NATO missions)**

#### **LIMITING:**

(None)

#### **PROHIBITING:**

1. The participation of any national ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> [Spain, Germany, Turkey]
2. The participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> [Spain, Germany, Turkey]
3. The provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission).<sup>3</sup> [Germany]
4. Participation of national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> [France and Germany, prior to June 2009]
5. The deployment of national NATO officers to other NATO missions, including NATO's training mission in Iraq.<sup>5</sup> [Spain]

## **(2) Theatre of Operations Caveats (Afghanistan vs Pakistan)**

### LIMITING:

6. Deployment within one kilometre (half a mile) of the Afghan border with Pakistan, unless the national government is consulted and approval granted.<sup>6</sup>

### PROHIBITING:

7. The participation of national forces in operations occurring outside of Afghanistan (beyond the Afghan area of operations).<sup>7</sup>
8. The deployment of national forces within one kilometre of the border with Pakistan (unless national government approval has been specifically sought and given on a case-by-case basis).<sup>8</sup>
9. The participation of national air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.<sup>9</sup> [Germany]

## **(3) Geographical Caveats**

### LIMITING:

10. Any deployment to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare 'time-limited' occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.<sup>10</sup> [Germany, Italy, Spain]
11. Caveat limiting any deployment to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on a temporary case-by-case basis where the deployment is considered 'absolutely necessary' for the ISAF mission and national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.<sup>11</sup> [Germany]

### PROHIBITING:

12. The deployment of national forces to the 'hostile south' of Afghanistan.<sup>12</sup>
13. The deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.<sup>13</sup>  
[Finland, Norway, Germany, Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey]
14. The deployment of national forces anywhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.<sup>14</sup>  
[Germany]

15. The deployment of national forces to the east of Afghanistan, specifically into RC-East.<sup>15</sup> [Finland]
16. The deployment of national forces nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.<sup>16</sup> [Sweden, Norway, Spain]
17. The deployment of national forces outside of designated regional command sectors into the south or east of Afghanistan, even in cases of emergency.<sup>17</sup> [Germany, Sweden, Belgium, France, Italy, Austria]

#### **(4) Regional Caveats**

##### LIMITING:

18. Any deployment of national forces outside RC-West, without a 72-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.<sup>18</sup> [Italy]
19. Any deployment of national forces outside RC-West, without a 6-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.<sup>19</sup> [Italy]
20. Any deployment of national forces outside RC-North unless the deployment is temporary, 'necessary for the success of the ISAF', and approved by the government Minister of Defence.<sup>20</sup> [Germany]

##### PROHIBITING:

21. The deployment of national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines (RC-Capital, RC-North, RC-West, RC-South or RC-East), even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.<sup>21</sup> [Greece, and most of the other 25 NATO nations between 2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
22. The deployment of national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector (RC-Capital, RC-North, RC-West, RC-South or RC-East), except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* agreement (made November 2006 at the NATO Riga Summit).<sup>22</sup> [Imposed by many of the 26 NATO nations]
23. The deployment of national forces outside RC-Capital sector boundaries, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations (post-Riga *in extremis* agreement).<sup>23</sup> [France, Italy, Austria, Greece. Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, moreover, due to

on-going arguments about the interpretation of 'emergency' between 2006-2009, especially France]

24. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations (post-Riga *in extremis* agreement).<sup>24</sup>  
[Germany, Sweden, Belgium. Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, moreover, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of 'emergency' between 2006-2009, especially by Germany]
25. The deployment of national forces outside of RC-West sector boundaries, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations (post-Riga *in extremis* agreement).<sup>25</sup> [Italy, Spain. Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, moreover, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of 'emergency' between 2006-2009 by both Italy and Spain]

## **(5) Area of Operations (AO) Caveats within Regional Commands**

### LIMITING:

26. The deployment of Danish national forces outside a defined AO in RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations, without government approval first being sought and given.<sup>26</sup> [Denmark]

### PROHIBITING:

27. The deployment of national forces outside Kabul City into the surrounding areas of Kabul Province.<sup>27</sup> [Canada]
28. The deployment of national forces outside a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City.<sup>28</sup> [Greece]
29. The deployment of force personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside the airport compound.<sup>29</sup> [Greece, France, Luxembourg, Belgium]
30. The deployment of national forces outside originally assigned suburbs or districts of Kabul City.<sup>30</sup> [France]
31. The deployment of national forces outside of the specific Province within the Regional Command in which contingent was originally based.<sup>31</sup> [Caveat imposed by 17 TCNs in April 2010]
32. The deployment of national forces outside Kabul Province in RC-Capital.<sup>32</sup> [Austria, Italy]

33. The deployment of national forces outside Hirat Province in RC-West.<sup>33</sup> [Italy]
34. The deployment of national forces outside Badghis Province in RC-West.<sup>34</sup> [Spain]
35. The deployment of national forces outside Ghor Province in RC-West.<sup>35</sup> [Lithuania]
36. The deployment of national forces outside Baghlan Province in RC-North.<sup>36</sup> [Hungary]
37. The deployment of national forces outside Uruzgan Province in RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.<sup>37</sup> [The Netherlands, 2006]
38. The deployment of national forces into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.<sup>38</sup> [Germany, 2009]
39. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces in RC-West beyond a specified distance from Herat City into Hirat Province (less than 100 kilometres).<sup>39</sup> [Italy]
40. The deployment of national forces outside protective military bases.<sup>40</sup> [Greece]
41. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national personnel at Kandahar airbase to hostile areas outside the 'secure environment' of the base.<sup>41</sup> [Slovakia]
42. The deployment of national forces beyond a specified distance from the Pol-e Khomri PRT within Baghlan Province (RC-North).<sup>42</sup> [Hungary]
43. The deployment of national forces outside of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province.<sup>43</sup> [Sweden]
44. The deployment of national forces within RC-North more than two hours distant from well-equipped hospitals with emergency surgery facilities.<sup>44</sup> [Germany]
45. The deployment of national forces to 'hostile' or 'high-risk' zones within provinces or districts.<sup>45</sup>

## **(6) Force Numbers Caveats concerning the Force Strength or Size of ISAF Force Contingents (including during Troop Rotations)**

### LIMITING:

(None)

### PROHIBITING:

46. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 365 troops.<sup>46</sup> [Sweden]
47. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 375 troops.<sup>47</sup> [Sweden]
48. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 475 troops.<sup>48</sup> [Sweden]
49. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 600 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency).<sup>49</sup> [Sweden]
50. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency).<sup>50</sup> [Sweden]
51. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 690 troops.<sup>51</sup> [Spain]
52. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops.<sup>52</sup> [Spain]
53. The deployment of national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,000 troops.<sup>53</sup> [The Netherlands]
54. The deployment of national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1200 troops.<sup>54</sup> [The Netherlands]
55. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,500 troops.<sup>55</sup> [Spain]
56. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,000 troops.<sup>56</sup> [Spain]
57. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops.<sup>57</sup> [Italy]
58. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,500 troops.<sup>58</sup> [Germany]
59. The deployment of national forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 4,500 troops.<sup>59</sup> [Germany]
60. Force contingents from exceeding troop ceiling within Afghanistan, even temporarily during force rotations.<sup>60</sup> [Germany, prior to October 2008]
61. The deployment of any further troops to existing ISAF national contingent.<sup>61</sup> [Greece, Spain]

## **(7) Command Caveats concerning Command Arrangements and National Commanders**

### LIMITING:

- 62.** The National Commander of force contingent from exiting immediate vicinity of Kabul City, without permission from the national chain of command in the capital.<sup>62</sup> [Canada]
- 63.** The National Commander of force contingent to travel in any vehicle not agreed to by the national chain of command, regardless of the commander's own preference or recommendation (e.g. one commander was compelled to travel in an armoured vehicle rather than his own choice of a more COIN-suitable sports utility vehicle).<sup>63</sup> [Canada]
- 64.** The requisition of national aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.<sup>64</sup>
- 65.** The COMISAF from over-riding any decision made by National Commanders of national contingents without direct communication with the national government in the capital.<sup>65</sup> [Canada, during occasions 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

### PROHIBITING:

- 66.** The deployment of National Commanders outside Kabul City.<sup>66</sup>
- 67.** The transfer of national forces to ISAF operational control (from national command and control directed from national capitals).<sup>67</sup>
- 68.** The transfer of national QRF forces to Lead Nation operational control within the Regional Commands.<sup>68</sup> [Norwegian QRF personnel in reference to Lead Nation Germany in RC-North from 2009 onwards, American forces with regard to Lead Nation Britain in RC-Southwest 2010 –present]
- 69.** The deployment of national forces under U.S. command.<sup>69</sup> [Spain]
- 70.** Any decision to deploy national forces outside of an assigned PRT area made by ISAF commanders in the field, acting under the authority of the COMISAF (each deployment outside the PRT area must instead be ordered by commanders in the capital city of the home country outside the Afghan theatre of war).<sup>70</sup> [Sweden]

71. Personal travel by 'peacekeeping' military commanders and personnel individuals into danger zones.<sup>71</sup> [Iceland]

## **(8) Weaponry and Lethal Force Caveats relating to the Use of Certain Weapons and Other Military Equipment, in addition to the Use of Force**

### LIMITING:

72. National forces from carrying any weapon at all, without express authorisation (only police officers and explosive ordnance disposal unit personnel authorised to carry weapons).<sup>72</sup> [Iceland]

### PROHIBITING:

73. The use of heavy weapons against adversaries.<sup>73</sup> [Germany, 2001-2009]
74. The use of riot control agents, such as tear gas.<sup>74</sup>
75. National forces from carrying or using automatic weapons.<sup>75</sup> [Iceland]
76. National forces from carrying arms at all (only unarmed personnel permitted).<sup>76</sup> [Iceland]
77. National forces from wearing, 'battle dress' or helmets (appearing like a 'warrior' rather than a 'peacekeeper').<sup>77</sup> [Iceland]
78. National forces from wearing military uniforms (only civilian peacekeeping specialists permitted to deploy to the ISAF mission).<sup>78</sup> [Iceland]
79. The use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence).<sup>79</sup> [Germany, Finland, Norway]
80. Firing weapons at adversaries except in self-defence.<sup>80</sup> [Hungary, Iceland, Germany]
81. Firing weapons at adversaries in self-defence while Enemy forces are moving, either to retreat or re-position.<sup>81</sup> [Germany]
82. Inclusive or joint/combined applications of force (only 'exclusive' applications of force permitted).<sup>82</sup> [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

## **(9) General Operations Caveats relating to Unauthorised Activities by Force Contingents within the ISAF mission (excluding Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics activities)**

### LIMITING:

- 83.** The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>83</sup>  
[Canada, 2002-2004]
- 84.** The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>84</sup> [Canada, 2002-2004]
- 85.** The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>85</sup> [Canada, 2002-2004]
- 86.** The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>86</sup> [Canada, 2002-2004]
- 87.** The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that national personnel ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>87</sup> [Canada, 2004]
- 88.** The engagement of national forces in any activity that went ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.<sup>88</sup>  
[Canada, 2005-2006]

### PROHIBITING:

- 89.** The engagement of national personnel in any activity apart from duties conducted at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul Province.<sup>89</sup> [Austria]
- 90.** The engagement of national personnel in any activity apart from duties conducted at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul Province (RC-North) and Afghan election support.<sup>90</sup> [Austria]

91. The participation or engagement of national forces in any activity other than humanitarian assistance tasks (giving forces a strictly 'stand-aside' role in the mission).<sup>91</sup>
92. The participation or engagement of national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work at PRTs (giving forces a strictly 'stand-aside' role in the ISAF mission).<sup>92</sup>  
[Spain, with regard to personnel at Qal'eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West ]
93. The participation or engagement of national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work and counter-narcotics projects at PRTs.<sup>93</sup> [Spain, with regard to personnel at Qal'eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West ]
94. The participation or engagement of personnel in any activity apart from PRT tasks and force protection duties.<sup>94</sup> [Singapore]
95. National forces (including combat forces) from conducting 'peace-making' activities, as opposed to 'peace-keeping' activities within the ISAF mission.<sup>95</sup> [Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Switzerland]
96. The engagement of national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role, only civil reconstruction and humanitarian work permitted).<sup>96</sup> [Spain, Slovakia, Hungary, Turkey]
97. The participation of national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).<sup>97</sup> [Iceland, Germany (2001-2009), Italy]
98. The participation of national forces in the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rapid response entity or its operations.<sup>98</sup> [Iceland]
99. The participation or engagement of national forces in PRTs.<sup>99</sup> [France]
100. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of national forces in mine clearing.<sup>100</sup>  
[Italy, Hungary, 2009-2012]

**(10) Ground Combat Operations Caveats relating to Combat and Combat Support Operations against Insurgents, conducted by Ground Forces (SOFs, infantry Combat Manoeuvre Units, and QRFs)**

LIMITING:

- 101.** The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in 'significant activities', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>101</sup> [Canada, 2002-2004]
- 102.** The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital that 'might risk collateral damage', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>102</sup> [Canada, 2002-2004]
- 103.** Any specific deployment of Special Forces outside RC-North, even upon request of the COMISAF, without explicit case-by-case approval and consent by the national Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate.<sup>103</sup> [Germany, post-Riga]
- 104.** The deployment of the national Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside RC-Capital boundary lines, without explicit approval from the national Chief of Defence.<sup>104</sup> [Portugal]

PROHIBITING:

- 105.** The engagement of Special Forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation.<sup>105</sup> [Slovakia]
- 106.** The participation of Special Forces in any operation, other than force-protection missions (excludes offensive operations and training ANSF forces).<sup>106</sup> [Slovakia]
- 107.** The participation of Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces.<sup>107</sup> [Germany]
- 108.** Operations by Special Forces outside RC-North, even under the authority of the COMISAF.<sup>108</sup> [Germany]
- 109.** The deployment of the Regional Command Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies 'AOR wide' across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).<sup>109</sup> [Norway, Germany, Portugal]

- 110.** The participation or engagement of national combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.<sup>110</sup> [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), the Netherlands (prior to Riga Summit), Romania (prior to Riga Summit)]
- 111.** Engagement of national infantry in kinetic combat operations, except in cases of emergency whereby national personnel have been attacked by Enemy forces (Special Forces only allowed to conduct kinetic combat operations).<sup>111</sup> [Australia]
- 112.** National infantry from provoking any offensive engagement or 'fire-fight' with the Enemy.<sup>112</sup> [Australia]
- 113.** Participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal 'counter-insurgent' operations against insurgents.<sup>113</sup> [Italy]
- 114.** National infantry from leading offensive operations (units may only act in support of ANA, where ANSF take the lead).<sup>114</sup>
- 115.** National ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support).<sup>115</sup> [Germany]
- 116.** National ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support), except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations.<sup>116</sup> [Italy]
- 117.** The conduct of joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only 'independent' combat operations permitted).<sup>117</sup> [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

## **(11) Ground Security Operations Caveats conducted by Ground Combat Forces (apart from combat and combat support operations), such as Protection and Reconnaissance Patrols**

### LIMITING:

- 118.** The conduct of patrols by national combat ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital.<sup>118</sup> [Italy]

### PROHIBITING:

- 119.** Participation of national forces in any security operations at Kabul Airport (only airport operations and training of Afghan air forces permitted).<sup>119</sup> [Iceland]
- 120.** National combat ground forces from conducting 'guard duty' at ISAF bases, airfields or other military installations in Afghanistan.<sup>120</sup> [Iceland]
- 121.** Participation in crowd/riot control operations.<sup>121</sup> [France, Canada between 2002-2004]
- 122.** The execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships).<sup>122</sup> [Germany]
- 123.** The conduct of security patrols without armoured vehicle support.<sup>123</sup> [Germany]
- 124.** The conduct of foot patrols outside Kandahar Air Field (KAF), unless the patrolling party is comprised of a set number of personnel, at a minimum.<sup>124</sup> [Romania]
- 125.** The deployment of national force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-West in the course of their security operations, except in cases of extreme emergency.<sup>125</sup> [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]
- 126.** The deployment or placement of force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from ever being placed 'in harm's way' in the course of their security operations.<sup>126</sup> [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]

**(12) Air Combat Operations Caveats relating to Combat and Combat Support Operations against Insurgents, conducted by Air Forces (fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and personnel)**

LIMITING:

- 127.** The deployment of bomber pilots and aircraft on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.<sup>127</sup> [Canada, 2002-2004]

PROHIBITING:

- 128.** The participation or engagement of national air forces in any ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation (defensive combat operations permitted).<sup>128</sup> [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), the Netherlands (prior to Riga Summit), Romania (prior to Riga Summit)]
- 129.** National air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.<sup>129</sup> [Germany]
- 130.** Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.<sup>130</sup> [Italy]
- 131.** The conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.<sup>131</sup> [Italy, 2001-2009]
- 132.** Providing air cover (conducting close air support) if ISAF ground forces are close to Afghan villages.<sup>132</sup>
- 133.** The conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.<sup>133</sup> [Italy, 2001-2009]
- 134.** National reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.<sup>134</sup> [Germany]
- 135.** Joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).<sup>135</sup> [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

### **(13) Other Air Operations Caveats relating to Other Air Operations within Afghanistan (apart from combat and combat support operations), including Transport and MEDEVAC Operations**

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

- 136.** The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).<sup>136</sup> [Germany]
- 137.** Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft).<sup>137</sup>
- 138.** The transport of Afghan civilians aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.<sup>138</sup>

### **(14) Time Caveats relating to a specific Time of Day or Date in the Year**

LIMITING:

(None)

PROHIBITING:

- 139.** Participation of national security ground forces in any security operation or patrol undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.<sup>139</sup> [Germany]
- 140.** Any deployment of national security ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).<sup>140</sup> [Germany]
- 141.** The participation of national security aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.<sup>141</sup> [Germany]
- 142.** The transport of national military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.<sup>142</sup> [Germany]

- 143.** The conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness. <sup>143</sup> [Germany]
- 144.** PRT security personnel from conducting security patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness. <sup>144</sup> [Germany, Hungary]
- 145.** PRT security personnel from deploying outside the PRT at night after nightfall (units must also return to base before nightfall). <sup>145</sup> [Germany]
- 146.** The conduct of any activity or task by PRT military and civilian development personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall. <sup>146</sup> [Germany]
- 147.** National military and civilian development personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall. <sup>147</sup> [Germany]
- 148.** The deployment of national forces outside of protective military bases on days of national significance, such as national statutory holidays. <sup>148</sup> [Italy in RC-West]

## **(15) Weather Caveats relating to Atmospheric Conditions**

### LIMITING:

(None)

### PROHIBITING:

- 149.** Participation of national ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. <sup>149</sup> [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]
- 150.** Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. <sup>150</sup> [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

## **(16) Counter-Terrorism Caveats relating to ISAF Counter-Terrorism (CT) Operations**

### LIMITING:

(None)

### PROHIBITING:

- 151.** The participation or engagement of national ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.<sup>151</sup> [Turkey, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
- 152.** The participation or engagement of national air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.<sup>152</sup> [Turkey, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
- 153.** The support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.<sup>153</sup>  
[Turkey]
- 154.** The support of ISAF aircraft or personnel in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.<sup>154</sup>  
[Turkey]
- 155.** The distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.<sup>155</sup> [Germany]

## **(17) Counter-Narcotics Caveats relating to Counter-Narcotics (CN) Operations**

### LIMITING:

(None)

### PROHIBITING:

- 156.** Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations.<sup>156</sup>  
[Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Turkey and others, imposed by a total of 17 TCNs in 2007 including 5 TCNs operating in RC-South ]
- 157.** Participation or engagement of ground infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.<sup>157</sup> [ France]
- 158.** Participation or engagement of Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.<sup>158</sup> [France]
- 159.** Participation or engagement of any PRT *military* personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.<sup>159</sup> [Lithuania, in regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province, Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
- 160.** Participation or engagement of any PRT *civilian* personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.<sup>160</sup> [Lithuania, in regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province, Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
- 161.** Any lead role of national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).<sup>161</sup> [Germany]
- 162.** Participation of national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).<sup>162</sup> [Germany]

## **(18) ISAF Cooperation Caveats relating to the Cooperation of National Ground and Air Forces with ISAF Personnel deployed by Other ISAF Force Contributing Nations**

### LIMITING:

(None)

### PROHIBITING:

- 163.** The participation of national forces in joint or combined operations in which national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival.<sup>163</sup>  
[Seemingly Greece with regard to both Turkey and Macedonia]
- 164.** Caveat prohibiting national forces from sharing equipment with another ISAF ally in a joint area of operations (a PRT in RC-North).<sup>164</sup> [Bulgaria]
- 165.** The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft.<sup>165</sup> [Germany]
- 166.** The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.<sup>166</sup> [Germany]
- 167.** The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).<sup>167</sup> [Germany]
- 168.** The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).<sup>168</sup> [Germany]
- 169.** The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).<sup>169</sup> [Germany]
- 170.** The communication of information through combined, inclusive communication systems (only 'segregated communication systems' may be used by U.S. forces).<sup>170</sup> [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

- 171.** Shared, inclusive reporting of information (only 'exclusive reporting' permitted by U.S. personnel).<sup>171</sup> [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

**(19) ANSF Cooperation Caveats relating to Cooperation of National Forces with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) (in particular constraining OMLT and POMLT teams in their task of training and mentoring Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units)**

LIMITING:

- 172. The deployment of OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital.<sup>172</sup> [France]
- 173. The deployment of OMLTs outside the immediate vicinity surrounding PRTs, without explicit authorisation from the national government in the capital.<sup>173</sup> [Sweden]
- 174. Participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour's drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.<sup>174</sup> [Germany]

PROHIBITING:

- 175. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.<sup>175</sup>
- 176. The transport of Afghan military personnel aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.<sup>176</sup>
- 177. Donations of lethal equipment to ANSF forces (for example, Kalashnikov AK-47's).<sup>177</sup> [Finland, 2006-2007]
- 178. Contributing national forces to battalion-level OMLTs, employed for the training and mentoring of ANSF forces.<sup>178</sup> [Finland]
- 179. The engagement of Special Forces in ANSF training or mentoring (which might as a matter of course also include offensive operations).<sup>179</sup> [Slovakia]
- 180. Special Forces from participating in the training or mentoring of ANSF units.<sup>180</sup> [Sweden]
- 181. The deployment of OMLTs nationwide outside Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).<sup>181</sup> [Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Sweden, France]
- 182. The deployment of OMLTs outside originally assigned AO locations (districts or provinces within Regional Commands), when conducting 'partnering' operations.<sup>182</sup> [Sweden, Germany, Hungary]

- 183.** The deployment of national OMLTs outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations.<sup>183</sup> [Greece]
- 184.** The embedding of national OMLT personnel within ANA ‘kandaks’ (battalions).<sup>184</sup> [Denmark]
- 185.** The participation of OMLTs from participating or engaging in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.<sup>185</sup> [Finland]
- 186.** The participation or engagement of national OMLT personnel in offensive operations alongside ANSF units, during ‘partnering’ operations.<sup>186</sup> [Hungary]
- 187.** National OMLTs and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces.<sup>187</sup> [Turkey]
- 188.** National POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is ‘purely civilian government activity’ (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).<sup>188</sup> [Germany]
- 189.** National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Regional Command sector boundaries.<sup>189</sup> [Germany with regard to RC-North]
- 190.** National POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.<sup>190</sup> [Germany]
- 191.** National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of assigned military base within Regional Command.<sup>191</sup> [Germany with regard to Kunduz base in RC-North]
- 192.** National POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.<sup>192</sup> [Germany]
- 193.** National POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.<sup>193</sup> [Germany]
- 194.** National POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.<sup>194</sup> [Germany]
- 195.** National POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.<sup>195</sup> [Germany]
- 196.** National POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.<sup>196</sup> [Germany]

## **(20) PRT Security Operations Caveats relating to Security Operations conducted by PRT Security Units in and around Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Locations**

### LIMITING:

- 197.** National personnel from mounting an armed response to insurgency-related security situations, except in self-defence.<sup>197</sup> [Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
- 198.** National personnel from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital.<sup>198</sup> [Italy with regard to the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]
- 199.** National personnel from making excursions into 'insecure districts' of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital.<sup>199</sup> [Spain with regard to districts within Badghis Province, RC-West]

### PROHIBITING:

- 200.** National personnel from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).<sup>200</sup> [Germany, prior to October 2008]
- 201.** National personnel from conducting security operations outside of PRTs.<sup>201</sup> [Germany]
- 202.** National personnel from patrolling beyond a defined distance from the PRT (for example, between 10-80 kilometres, often preventing joint international patrols from PRTs).<sup>202</sup> [Turkey, Singapore]
- 203.** National personnel from deploying beyond a specified distance from the PRT within Baghlan Province.<sup>203</sup> [Hungary]
- 204.** National personnel from conducting security patrols on terrain other than the main roads around the PRT.<sup>204</sup> [Hungary]
- 205.** National personnel from executing foot patrols within PRT townships (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).<sup>205</sup> [Germany]
- 206.** National personnel from conducting patrols within PRT townships without armoured vehicle support.<sup>206</sup> [Germany]
- 207.** Military personnel at PRTs from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.<sup>207</sup> [Spain]

## **(21) PRT Stability Operations Caveats relating to Stability Operations conducted by Military-Civilian Humanitarian and Development Aid Personnel at Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Locations**

### LIMITING:

- 208.** National personnel from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital.<sup>208</sup> [Italy with regard to PRT personnel based at the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]
- 209.** National personnel from making excursions into 'insecure districts' of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital.<sup>209</sup> [Spain with regard to PRT personnel based at the Qal'ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]

### PROHIBITING:

- 210.** Civilian personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working with national military forces in Afghanistan.<sup>210</sup> [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]
- 211.** Civilian aid personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working near to localities where national military forces operate or are based.<sup>211</sup> [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]
- 212.** The deployment of civilian personnel outside of a PRT's immediate surrounding area.<sup>212</sup> [Sweden with regard to Mazar-e-Sharif PRT in Balkh Province]
- 213.** National military and civilian personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.<sup>213</sup> [Germany]
- 214.** National military and civilian development personnel from staying outside the PRT base AO overnight.<sup>214</sup> [Hungary]
- 215.** Military and civilian development personnel from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.<sup>215</sup> [Spain with regard to the Qal'ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]

## ENDNOTES

- 
- <sup>1</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05MADRID395, Spain On Afghanistan, ISAF Stage II Contribution*, 2 February 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/02/05MADRID395.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', a paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, New York, United States, (15-18 February) 2009, p. 7, <http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf>. (accessed November 18, 2009); U.S. Embassy Ankara (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09ANKARA1713, Turkey: Rolling Out The Message On Afghanistan*, 2 December 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ANKARA1713&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf%20turkey>, (accessed 18 July 2013).
- <sup>2</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid, *Cable 05MADRID395, op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 7; U.S. Embassy Ankara (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09ANKARA1713, Turkey: Rolling Out The Message On Afghanistan*, 2 December 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ANKARA1713&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf%20turkey>, (accessed 18 July 2013).
- <sup>3</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BERLIN882, German Out-Of-Area Deployment Update*, 21 July 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BERLIN882&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20france>, (accessed 18 July 2013); U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1108, German Out-Of-Area Deployment Update*, 13 August 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08BERLIN1108.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
- <sup>4</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1255, Germans Remain Wary About Expanding ISAF's Authority on Counternarcotics*, 12 September 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08BERLIN1255.html>, (accessed 22 September 2011); U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1387, Germany: Bundestag Set To Renew A Beefed-Up ISAF Mandate And A Scaled-Down OEF Counterpart*, 10 October 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08BERLIN1387.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
- <sup>5</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05MADRID1141, Spain: Scene Setter For Deputy Secretary Visit to Madrid*, 23 March 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05MADRID1141.html>, (accessed 12 July 2012).
- <sup>6</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *Reuters AlterNet*, 26 November, 2006. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165>, (accessed 18 November 2009).
- <sup>7</sup> Garamone, J. 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *American Forces Press (AFP) Service*, 7 October 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18122>, (accessed 26 January 2009); Boot, M. 'Proactive Self-Defense', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 3 July 2006, [http://www.cfr.org/publication/10985/proactive\\_selfdefense.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10985/proactive_selfdefense.html), (accessed 4 February 2010)
- <sup>8</sup> S. McNamara, 'Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan', *The Heritage Foundation*, 3 December 2009, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/nato-allies-in-europe-must-do-more-in-afghanistan>, (accessed 26 July 2010).
- <sup>9</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1542, Germany Remains Stubborn On MAP And Additional Troops For Afghanistan*, 14 November 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08BERLIN1542.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
- <sup>10</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387, op. cit.*; J. Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *DefenseNews*, 21 September 2009,

---

<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4286208>, (accessed 23 September 2009); Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1108*, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> J. Broph & M. Fisera 'National Caveats' and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic'. *Univerzita Obrany*, 29 July 2007,

[http://www.vabo.cz/stranky/fisera/files/National\\_Caveats\\_Short\\_Version\\_version\\_V\\_29%20JULY.pdf](http://www.vabo.cz/stranky/fisera/files/National_Caveats_Short_Version_version_V_29%20JULY.pdf). (accessed November 18, 2009)

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08HELSINKI155*, *Thoughts on Finland As I Depart Post*, 7 April 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08HELSINKI155.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Mission NATO HQ (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07USNATO98*, *North Atlantic Council Readout February 14, 2007*, 15 February 2007, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07USNATO98&q=caveat%20isaf%20london%20uk>, (accessed 1 August 2013); U.S. Embassy Kabul (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07KABUL2987*, *Norway Noncommittal On Deployment With Dutch, Committed To Follow Through On Development Projects In The North And On Energy Projects*, 6 September 2007,

<http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07KABUL2987&q=norway%20qrf>, (accessed 26 July 2013); J.J. Lok, 'Growing Anger over National Caveats in Afghanistan', *AviationWeek.com*, 10 October 2007,

<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp>, (accessed 14 January 2011); U.S. Embassy Ankara (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05ANKARA353*, *Afghanistan: Turkey Considering UK Request to Take Over PRT in North*, 19 January 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/01/05ANKARA353.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011).

<sup>14</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 7; D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', a paper prepared for presentation at the *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Toronto, Canada, (2-5<sup>th</sup> September) 2009, p. 8, 2009,

[www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf](http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf), (accessed 18 March 2013);

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Embassy Helsinki, *Cable 08HELSINKI155*, *op. cit.*

<sup>16</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*, *Sweden Likely To Up ISAF Troops By 100; Bill Delayed Until Mid-November*, 10 November 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08STOCKHOLM752.html>, (accessed 12 July 2012); U.S. Mission NATO HQ, *Cable 07USNATO98*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 07KABUL2987*, *op. cit.*; U.S. State Department (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09STATE31102*, *Requesting Specific Contributions to Afghanistan*, 1 April 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09STATE31102.html>, accessed 12 July 2012; U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Pentagon, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan - Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended*, April 2010, p. 18, [http://www.Defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report\\_Final\\_SecDef\\_04\\_26\\_10.pdf](http://www.Defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf), (accessed 14 January 2013).

<sup>17</sup> J. de Hoop Scheffer, 'Press Briefing on NATO's Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer', *NATO Online Library*, 24 November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s06112a.htm>, (accessed 1 December 2009); S. Sloan, 'NATO in Afghanistan', UNISCI Discussion Papers, *Redalyc, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espana/University of Madrid*, no.22, (Enero-sin mes/January-March) 2010, pp. 51; U.S. State Department, *Cable 09STATE31102*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1604*, *Germany/Afghanistan: November 26-27 Meeting of ISAF RC-North Chiefs Of Defense In Berlin*, 1 December 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08BERLIN1604.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BERLIN1162*, *Germany's Next Foreign Minister?: The World According To FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle*, 18 September 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09BERLIN1162.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1542*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*,

*op. cit.*; U.S. State Department, *Cable 09STATE31102*, *op. cit.*; Brophy & Fisera, “National Caveats” and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, *op. cit.*; International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), *Institute for the Study of War: Military Analysis and Education for Civilian Leaders*, <http://www.understandingwar.org>, (accessed 30 June 2009); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable AFG20070530n787, Afghanistan: Italy Planning Additional ISAF Contributions – Must Be Worked Discretely at Technical Level*, 30 May 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/AFG20070530n787.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ROME1021, SceneSetter for the Vice President’s September 4-10 Trip To Italy*, 12 August 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08ROME1021.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*, p. 27; McNamara, ‘Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ATHENS896, U.S./Greece Mil-to-Mil Cooperation: The Good, The Bad, and the Necessary*, 24 June 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08ATHENS896.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09ATHENS1665, Greece Will Look at ISAF’s OMLTs, But Not Keen On Further Contributions*, 27 November 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09ATHENS1665.html>, (accessed 22 September 2011); U.S. Embassy Vienna (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05VIENNA1152, Austrian Defence Minister To Recommend Austrian Deployment To Kunduz For Election; Will Review Caveats*, 8 April 2005, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05VIENNA1152&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf>, (accessed 31 July 2013);

<sup>18</sup> Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> P. D. Thruelsen, ‘NATO in Afghanistan - What Lessons Are We Learning, and Are We Willing to Adjust?’, *Danish Institute for International Affairs (DIIA)*, 2007 (14), p. 21, <http://subweb.diiis.dk/sw45914.asp>, (accessed 20 June 2009); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 10ROME172, SecDef Meeting with Italian Minister of Defence*, 12 February 2010, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10ROME172&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf>, (accessed 12 July 2012).

<sup>20</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06ATHENS1058, SceneSetter: Your April 27 Visit to Athens*, 19 April 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06ATHENS1058.html>, (accessed 22 September 2011); de Hoop Scheffer, Press Briefing on NATO’s Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, *op. cit.*; United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), Defence Committee, *UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07(HC408)*, 18 July 2007, p. 18. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselet/.../408.pdf>, (accessed 5 August 2010).

<sup>22</sup> ‘NATO signals new Afghan approach’, *CNN.com*, 29 November 2006, <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/11/29/nato.wrap/index.html>, (accessed 18 November 2009); U.K. HoC, *UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07(HC408)*, *op. cit.*, p. 18; ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*; C. Scott, ‘Assessing ISAF: A Baseline Study of NATO’s Role in Afghanistan’, *British American Security Information Council (BASIC)*, March 2007, p. 5, <http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan.pdf>, (12 April 2009); U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05MADRID171, Spain On Relations With USG: “We Want Back In”*, 15 January 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/01/05MADRID171.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>23</sup> Brophy & Fisera, “National Caveats” and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, *op. cit.*; ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, *This Is London*, 26 November 2006, <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23376029-makeshift-rorkes-drift-unit-of-medics-and-engineers-holds-out-taliban.do>, (accessed 4 August 2010); ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy

- Rome, *Cable AFG20070530n787*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ROME1021*, *SceneSetter for the Vice President's September 4-10 Trip To Italy*, 12 August 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08ROME1021.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 27; McNamara, 'Backgrounder #2347; NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS896*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09ATHENS1665*, *Greece Will Look at ISAF's OMLTs, But Not Keen On Further Contributions*, 27 November 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09ATHENS1665.html>, (accessed 22 September 2011); U.S. Embassy Vienna (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05VIENNA1152*, *Austrian Defence Minister To Recommend Austrian Deployment To Konduz For Election; Will Review Caveats*, 8 April 2005, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05VIENNA1152&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf>, (accessed 31 July 2013); 'NATO signals new Afghan approach', *op. cit.*; ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>24</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1604*, *Germany/Afghanistan: November 26-27 Meeting of ISAF RC-North Chiefs Of Defense In Berlin*, 1 December 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08BERLIN1604.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BERLIN1162*, *Germany's Next Foreign Minister?: The World According To FDP Chairman Guido Westerwelle*, 18 September 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09BERLIN1162.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1542*, *Germany Remains Stubborn On MAP And Additional Troops For Afghanistan*, 14 November 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08BERLIN1542.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Stockholm (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*, *Sweden Likely To Up ISAF Troops By 100; Bill Delayed Until Mid-November*, 10 November 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08STOCKHOLM752.html>, (accessed 12 July 2012); U.S. State Department (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09STATE31102*, *Requesting Specific Contributions to Afghanistan*, 1 April 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09STATE31102.html>, accessed 12 July 2012.
- <sup>25</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome, *Cable AFG20070530n787*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07MADRID911*, *SceneSetter For US-Spain High Level Defense Talks*, 14 April 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07MADRID911.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); C.A. Kupchan & B. Gwertzman, 'Bush Second Term Repairs Damage to European Relations', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 16 June 2008, [http://www.cfr.org/publication/16550/bush\\_second\\_term\\_repairs\\_damage\\_to\\_european\\_relations.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/16550/bush_second_term_repairs_damage_to_european_relations.html), (accessed 4 February 2010); U.S. State Department, *Cable 09STATE31102*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>26</sup> Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and it's impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; 'Makeshift 'Rorke's Drift' unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban', *op. cit.*
- <sup>27</sup> Auerswald & Saideman. 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- <sup>28</sup> U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ATHENS313*, *FM Bakoyannis On Macedonia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Visa Waiver*, 4 March 2008, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ATHENS313&q=caveat%20isaf%20macedonia>, (accessed 26 July 2013); U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS896*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 09ATHENS1665*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>29</sup> J. Miranda-Calha (Portugal), General Rapporteur, 'Draft General Report: Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E', *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* 17 March 2006, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=997.2-3.>, (accessed 14 December 2011); U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 09ATHENS1665*, *op. cit.*; 'Belgium Begins Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal', *Afghanistan News Center*, 6 August 2012, <http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2012/august/aug62012.html#a9>, (accessed 2 October 2013).

<sup>29</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; ISAF, *About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions*, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php>, (accessed 24 January 2013); 'Belgium Begins Afghanistan Troop Withdrawal', *op. cit.*

<sup>30</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.* p. 27; 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *ibid.*; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and it's impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*

<sup>31</sup> U.S. DoD, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, April 2010, p. 18.

<sup>32</sup> U.S. Embassy Vienna (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05VIENNA1152, Austrian Defence Minister To Recommend Austrian Deployment To Konduz For Election; Will Review Caveats*, 8 April 2005, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05VIENNA1152&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf>, (accessed 31 July 2013); U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable AFG20070530n787, Afghanistan: Italy Planning Additional ISAF Contributions – Must Be Worked Discretely at Technical Level*, 30 May 2007, <http://wikileaks.iz.rs/afg/report/2007/05/AFG20070530n787.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011);

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07MADRID911, SceneSetter For US-Spain High Level Defense Talks*, 14 April 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07MADRID911.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); B. Roggio, 'Operation Achilles: NATO's offensive in Helmand province', 6 March 2007, *Long War Journal*, [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/operation\\_achilles\\_n.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/03/operation_achilles_n.php); International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 'ISAF Placemat', *About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions*, 2 January 2007, 5 December 2007, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/>, (accessed 14 October 2013).

<sup>35</sup> U.S. Embassy Vilnius (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06VILNIUS1032, 'Lithuania Looks Towards Riga Summit'*, 16 November 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06VILNIUS1032.html>, (accessed 12 July 2012).

<sup>36</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09KABUL1239, Afghanistan: A Snapshot Of The Northeast*, 17 May 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KABUL1239>, (accessed 22 August 2013).

<sup>37</sup> Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and it's impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; Mr. Mark Lancaster (North-East Milton Keynes, Con.), cited in United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), *Hansard Debates for 30 Nov 2006*, 30 November 2006, 30Nov2006:Column1249, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm061130/debtext/61130-0008.htm>, (accessed 4 August 2010).

<sup>38</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BERLIN431, New U.S. AF/PAK Strategy Generates Good Will, But Not Many New German Contributions*, 10 April 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BERLIN431.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>39</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09ROME177, Getting Italy To Do More In Afghanistan*, 13 February 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ROME177&q=caveat%20france%20isaf>, (accessed 26 July 2013).

<sup>40</sup> U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07ATHENS685, My Way: Greece and NATO Transformation*, 4 April 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07ATHENS685.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011).

<sup>41</sup> U.S. Embassy Bratislava (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BRATISLAVA447, SceneSetter For Visit To Slovakia Of Assistance Secretary of Defense*, 16 October 2009, [cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BRATISLAVA447&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf%20kandahar](http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BRATISLAVA447&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf%20kandahar), (accessed 27 August 2013).

<sup>42</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.*

<sup>43</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM51, op. cit.*

- <sup>44</sup> McNamara, 'Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 8.
- <sup>45</sup> Boot, proactive self-defense, *op. cit.*
- <sup>46</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM51*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>47</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>51</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid, *Cable 07MADRID911*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>52</sup> E. Burke, 'Spain's War in Afghanistan', *Atlantic-Community.Org*, 24 February 2010, [http://archive.atlantic-community.org/index/Open\\_Think\\_Tank\\_Article/Spain's\\_War\\_in\\_Afghanistan.](http://archive.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/Spain's_War_in_Afghanistan.), (accessed 14 January 2013).
- <sup>53</sup> U.S. Embassy The Hague (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05THEHAGUE2064*, *Netherlands: Dutch Thinking On ISAF III; Future of Dutch Navy, JSF*, 27 July 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/07/05THEHAGUE2064.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>55</sup> Burke, 'Spain's War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>56</sup> H. Heckle, 'Spain ready to boost Afghan troops', *The Seattle Times*, 30 July 2009, [http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2009570939\\_apeuspainafghanistantroops.html](http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2009570939_apeuspainafghanistantroops.html), (accessed 19 March 2013).
- <sup>57</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ROME1406*, *Scene Setter For Your December 3 Visit To Rome*, 19 November 2008, (U.S.), <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08ROME1406.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
- <sup>58</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1108*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>59</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1255*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>60</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>61</sup> U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 07ATHENS685*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07MADRID208*, *Spain: Zapatero's Decision on Afghanistan Firm*, 7 February 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07MADRID208.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).
- <sup>62</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
- <sup>64</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>65</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.
- <sup>66</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- <sup>67</sup> R.E. Hunter, 'NATO Caveats Can Be Made To Work Better for the Alliance', *European Affairs*, vol. 9, no. 1-2, (Winter/Spring) 2008, <http://www.europeaninstitute.org>, (accessed 17 May 2011).
- <sup>68</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1604*, *Germany/Afghanistan: November 26-27 Meeting of ISAF RC-North Chiefs Of Defense In Berlin*, 1 December 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08BERLIN1604.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); L. Jacobson, 'U.S. had some success in curbing restrictions, but point is mostly moot now', *Tampa Bay Times PolitiFact.Com*, 14 January 2013, <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/164/work-to-end-nato-restrictions-on-forces-in-afghani/>, (accessed 23 March 2013).
- <sup>69</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid, *Cable 05MADRID395*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>70</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08STOCKHOLM272*, *Three Issues For MOD Tolgfors April 17 Call on SecDef Gates*, 11 April 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08STOCKHOLM272.html>, (accessed 13 July 2012).

<sup>71</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08REYKJAVIK195, Iceland: Peacekeeping Takes On a More Civilian Look After Report On 2004 "Chicken Street Incident"*, 9 September 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08REYKJAVIK195.html>, (accessed 13 July 2011).

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>73</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>74</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Boot, "Proactive Self-Defense", *op. cit.*

<sup>75</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06REYKJAVIK431, Iceland: Peacekeeping Policy at a Crossroads*, 27 November 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06REYKJAVIK431.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011).

<sup>76</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, *Cable 08REYKJAVIK195, op. cit.*; U.S. State Department, *Cable 08STATE63686, 'U.S.-Iceland Security Dialogue Meeting, April 30*, 12 June 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08STATE63686.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011).

<sup>77</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, *Cable 06REYKJAVIK431, op. cit.*

<sup>78</sup> <sup>78</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, *Cable 08REYKJAVIK195, op. cit.*

<sup>79</sup> H. Smith, 'U.S. Seeks Sweeping Changes in Command Structure for Afghanistan', *The Captain's Journal* [web blog], 18 September 2008, <http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/09/18/us-seeks-sweeping-changes-in-command-structure-for-afghanistan/>, (accessed 25 June 2010); German Special Forces in Afghanistan – Not Licensed to Kill', *Insurgency Research Group*, 20 May 2008, <http://insurgencyresearchgroup.wordpress.com/2008/05/20german-special-forces-in-afghanstan.htm>, (accessed 18 November 2009); U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 10HELSINKI15, Comprehensive Approach Easier Said Than Done: Finland's Crisis Management Efforts*, 13 January 2010, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10HELSINKI15.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Kabul (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06KABUL725, ISAF Response To Anti-Cartoon Riots: "Restraint", Reliance on ANP, And Gaps In Capability*, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06KABUL725&q=faryab%20prt>, (accessed 9 October 2013); U.S. Embassy Oslo (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06OSLO690, C-RE6-00473; Norway, ISAF And The Faryab PRT*, 26 May 2006, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06OSLO690&q=caveat%20isaf%20norway>, (accessed 26 July 2013).

<sup>80</sup> U.S. Embassy Budapest, (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BUDAPEST771, Hungarian PRT – How (In)Effective?*, 21 October 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09BUDAPEST771.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, PRT Chachcharan: Plan Afoot to Withdraw Icelandic Mobile Liaison Observation Team from Chaghcharan PRT*, 15 December 2006, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/12/06REYKJAVIK5855.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011); Smith, 'U.S. Seeks Sweeping Changes in Command Structure for Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>81</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>82</sup> D.V. Mastriano (COL), 'Strategy Research Project: Faust and the Padshah Sphinx: Reshaping the NATO Alliance to Win in Afghanistan', *U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks*, p. 17, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518150>, (accessed 15 August 2013).

<sup>83</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>85</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> Cited in D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Toronto, Canada (September 2-5<sup>th</sup>, 2009), p. 15, 2009, [www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf](http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf), (accessed 18 March 2013).

<sup>88</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>89</sup> U.S. Embassy Vienna, *Cable 05VIENNA1152, 'Austrian Defence Minister To Recommend Austrian Deployment To Konduz For Election; Will Review Caveats'*, 8 April 2005, (accessed 31 July 2013) <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05VIENNA1152&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf>.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> Boot, Proactive self-defence, *op. cit.*;

<sup>92</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Boot, Proactive Self-Defense, *op. cit.*; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and it's impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *05MADRID395, Spain On Afghanistan, ISAF Stage II Contribution*, 2 February 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/02/05MADRID395.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>93</sup> U.S. Embassy Madrid (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05MADRID395, Spain On Afghanistan, ISAF Stage II Contribution*, 2 February 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/02/05MADRID395.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>94</sup> LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 September 2010, New Zealand High Commission, London, United Kingdom.

<sup>95</sup> U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09HELSINKI360, Finnish Commitment To Afghanistan Weathers Firefights in Mazar-e-sharif And Sniping in Helsinki*, 1 October 2009, <https://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09HELSINKI360.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, *Cable 06REYKJAVIK431, op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Stockholm (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08STOCKHOLM51, Swedish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Leaders on Afghanistan, Kosovo*, 22 January 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08STOCKHOLM51.html>, (accessed 13 July 2012); United Nations (UN), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 'Afghanistan: Swiss aid to continue despite military withdrawal', *IRIN Asia: Humanitarian News and Analysis (a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)*, 28 November 2007, <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=75554>, (accessed 9 April 2013).

<sup>96</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Boot, "'Proactive Self-Defense'", *op. cit.*; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and it's impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; Burke, 'Spain's War in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Bratislava, *Cable 09BRATISLAVA497, 'Das Quarnud in Slovakia'*, 27 November 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BRATISLAVA497&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20slovakia>, (accessed 18 July 2013); U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Ankara (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09ANKARA1713, Turkey: Rolling Out The Message On Afghanistan*, 2 December 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09ANKARA1713&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf%20turkey>, (accessed 18 July 2013).

<sup>97</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, *Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, op. cit.*; U.S. State Department, *Cable 08STATE63686, op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.*; 'German Special Forces in Afghanistan – Not Licensed to Kill', *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 8; U.S. Embassy Rome, *Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.*

<sup>98</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, *Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, op. cit.*

<sup>99</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>100</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome, *Cable 09ROME177*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy, *Cable 09KABUL1239*, *op. cit.*

<sup>101</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>103</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387*, *op. cit.*

<sup>104</sup> U.S. Embassy Lisbon, (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08LISBON35*, *Portugal's ISAF Caveats*, 7 January 2008, [http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LISBON35\\_a.html](http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08LISBON35_a.html), (accessed 9 October 2013).

<sup>105</sup> U.S. Embassy Bratislava, *Cable 09BRATISLAVA497*, *op. cit.*

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387*, *op. cit.*

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> de Hoop Sheffer, Press Briefing on NATO's Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General; U.S. Embassy Oslo (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 06OSLO627*, *Norway Will Look Again At ISAF Caveats*, 15 May 2006, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06OSLO627&q=national-caveat%20norway>, (accessed 22 September 2011); U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08BERLIN1604*, *Germany/Afghanistan: November 26-27 Meeting of ISAF RC-North Chiefs Of Defense In Berlin*, 1 December 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08BERLIN1604.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); 'US Army (USA) Captain (CPT) Edward Delatejera (right) of the Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF76) Quick Reaction Force (QRF) meets with Portuguese Soldiers from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)', *OPA – Online Public Access* (10 September 2005), <http://research.archives.gov/description/6657360>, (accessed 9 October 2013); United States Central Command (CENTCOM), 'Portugal', 16 August 2006, <http://centcom.ahp.us.army.mil/portugal/>, (accessed 9 October 2013); 'Portuguese paratroopers in Kandahar' (14 September 2006), *MilitaryPhotos.Net*, <http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?91439-Portuguese-paratroopers-in-Kandahar>, (accessed 9 October 2013).

<sup>110</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Boot, Proactive Self-Defense, *op. cit.*; Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; 'Makeshift 'Rorke's Drift' unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban', *This Is London*, 26 November 2006, <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23376029-makeshift-rorkes-drift-unit-of-medics-and-engineers-holds-out-taliban.do>, (accessed 4 August 2010; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; Mr. Mark Lancaster (North-East Milton Keynes, Con.), cited in House of Commons (HoC), *Hansard Debates for 30 Nov 2006*, *op. cit.*; U.K. HoC, *UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07(HC408)*, *op. cit.*, p. 18; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>111</sup> Smith, 'U.S. Seeks Sweeping Changes in Command Structure for Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ROME454*, *Italy: Pressing Our Priorities With The Next Government Starting Next Week*, 11 April 2008, <https://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08ROME454.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011);

<sup>114</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>115</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>116</sup> Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>117</sup> Mastriano, 'Strategy Research Project: Faust and the Padshah Sphinx: Reshaping the NATO Alliance to Win in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>118</sup> Beste, von Hammerstein & Szandar, 'The Discount War: ISAF is Failing in Effort to Secure Afghanistan on the Cheap', *op. cit.*

<sup>119</sup> U.S. Embassy Reykjavik, Cable 06REYKJAVIK5855, *op. cit.*

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>122</sup> ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.*; Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>123</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>124</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul (released by Wikileaks), Cable 06KABUL2342, PRT/Qalat Q Romanina Interest in Provincial Reconstruction Team Should Be Considered with Caution, 23 May 2006, [https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KABUL2342\\_a.html](https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06KABUL2342_a.html), (accessed 22 September 2011).

<sup>125</sup> U.S. Embassy Ljubljana (released by Wikileaks), Cable 10LJUBLJANA36, Slovenia: SceneSetter for Codal Voinovich, 10 February 2010, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10LJUBLJANA36&q=caveats%20slovenia>, (accessed 26 July 2013); ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.*

<sup>126</sup> U.S. Embassy Ljubljana (released by Wikileaks), Cable 10LJUBLJANA1, Slovenia: OMLT On Order For OCT 2010, Logistics Next On The Menu, 4 January 2010, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10LJUBLJANA1&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20hungary%20isaf>, (accessed 22 August 2013); U.S. Embassy Ljubljana (released by Wikileaks), Cable 10LJUBLJANA32, Investing In An Ally: Support For Slovenia's Expanded Mission In Afghanistan, 4 February 2010, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10LJUBLJANA32&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf>, (accessed 31 July 2013); U.S. Embassy Ljubljana (released by Wikileaks), Cable 10LJUBLJANA36, Slovenia: SceneSetter for Codal Voinovich, 10 February 2010, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10LJUBLJANA36&q=caveats%20slovenia>, (accessed 26 July 2013).

<sup>127</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>128</sup> Garamone, 'U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Boot, Proactive Self-Defense, *op. cit.*; Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; 'Makeshift 'Rorke's Drift' unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban', *op. cit.*; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and it's impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; Mr. Mark Lancaster (North-East Milton Keynes, Con.), cited in House of Commons (HoC), *Hansard Debates for 30 Nov 2006, op. cit.*; U.K. HoC, *UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07(HC408), op. cit.*, p. 18; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28.

<sup>129</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>130</sup> Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>131</sup> U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, *op. cit.*

<sup>132</sup> Etienne de Durand, cited in J. Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>133</sup> U.S. State Department, Cable 09STATE31102, *op. cit.*

<sup>134</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, Cable 08BERLIN1387, *op. cit.*

<sup>135</sup> Mastriano, 'Strategy Research Project: Faust and the Padshah Sphinx: Reshaping the NATO Alliance to Win in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>136</sup> Saideman, 'CIPS Policy Brief #6: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations', *op. cit.*, p. 2; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>137</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.* .

- <sup>138</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 8; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*, p. 18.
- <sup>139</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *ibid.*; Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; McNamara, 'Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; L. Michel & R. Hunter, 'Keeping our allies on our side in Afghanistan', *Los Angeles Times*, 27 October 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/27/opinion/oe-michelhunter27>, (accessed 31 January 2013); Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 8.
- <sup>140</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.
- <sup>141</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>142</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *ibid.*; Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>143</sup> J. Starkey, 'They came, they saw, then left the Afghan war without a single mission', *The Scotsman (U.K.)*, 9 October 2008, <http://news.scotsman.com/world/They-came-they-saw-4573584.jp>, (accessed 14 January 2011)
- <sup>144</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; D. Levy & V. Small, 'Afghanistan attack: No pressure on Hungary', 7 August 2012, *Stuff.co.nz*. <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/national/7429056/Afghanistan-attack-No-pressure-on-Hungary>, (accessed 8 August 2012).
- <sup>145</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.
- <sup>146</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *ibid.*
- <sup>147</sup> ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*
- <sup>148</sup> Member of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS), [Identity Protected], Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, 12 June 2009, Wellington New Zealand.
- <sup>149</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*; McNamara, 'Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>150</sup> 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *ibid.*; ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*; McNamara, 'Backgrounder #2347: NATO Allies in Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>151</sup> U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, *SceneSetter: Your Visit to Turkey*, 13 October 2009, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/search.php?q=09ankara1472>, (accessed 12 July 2011); Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7.; Miranda-Calha, 'Draft General Report: Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E', *op. cit.*
- <sup>152</sup> U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7; Miranda-Calha, 'Draft General Report: Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E', *op. cit.*, p. 2.
- <sup>153</sup> U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, *op. cit.*
- <sup>154</sup> U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, *op. cit.*
- <sup>155</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7.
- <sup>156</sup> U.S. Embassy Ankara, Cable 09ANKARA1472, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Kabul, Cable 09KABUL1239, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Budapest (released by Wikileaks), Cable 09BUDAPEST749, *Update for FY10 1206 Funds Request for Hungarian Special Forces Capability Development*, 14 October 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09BUDAPEST749.html>, (accessed 22 September 2011); U.S. Embassy The Hague (released by Wikileaks), Cable 07THEHAGUE125, *Netherlands/Afghanistan: Dutch Views Leading Up To NATO Ministerials*, 24 January 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/01/07THEHAGUE125.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. DoD, *Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, April 2010, p. 18; A.de Borchgrave,

---

'Commentary: NATO Caveats', *United Press International (UPI)*, 10 July 2009, [http://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2009/07/10/Commentary-NATO-caveats/UPI-47311247244125/](http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Analysis/de-Borchgrave/2009/07/10/Commentary-NATO-caveats/UPI-47311247244125/), (accessed 7 October 2009); C. Karp & R. Ponzio, 'Chapter 12: NATO, SSR and Afghanistan' in Law, D. (ed.), *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007, p. 227.

<sup>157</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239*, *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.* p. 28.

<sup>158</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239*, *ibid.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>159</sup> U.S. Embassy Vilnius (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05VILNIUS837*, *GOL: ISAF Mandate Adequate, As Is; Concerns about Counter Narcotics Mission*, 11 August 2005, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05VILNIUS837.htm>, (accessed 22 September 2011). U.S. Embassy Budapest, *Cable 09BUDAPEST749*, *op. cit.*

<sup>160</sup> U.S. Embassy Vilnius, *Cable 05VILNIUS837*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Budapest, *Cable 09BUDAPEST749*, *op. cit.*

<sup>161</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1255*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1387*, *op. cit.*

<sup>162</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1255*, *ibid.*

<sup>163</sup> Shared by a LTGEN Andrew Leslie of the Canadian Army, a deputy COMISAF now serving as both the Chief of Canada's Land Staff and the Commander of the Canadian Army (cited in D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, 'Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan', a paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, New York, United States, (15-18 February) 2009, p. 8, <http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf>. (accessed November 18, 2009); Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 9).

Greece's troubled and inimical relationship with Turkey & Macedonia is mentioned in the following sources: Boot, 'Proactive Self-Defense', *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS313*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 08ATHENS469*, *SceneSetter: Admiral Fitzgerald Visits Athens*, 31 March 2008, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08ATHENS469.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011); and U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS896*, *op. cit.*

<sup>164</sup> U.S. Embassy Sofia (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07SOFIA218*, *Bulgaria Seeks Guidance On Hosting Next V-10 Meeting*, 16 February 2007, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07SOFIA218&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20hungary%20isaf>, (accessed 22 August 2013).

<sup>165</sup> Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; P. H. Gordon, 'Winter in Afghanistan', *Brookings Institute*, 1 March 2006 (accessed 14 January 2011)

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/03afghanistan\\_gordon.aspx?p=1](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/03afghanistan_gordon.aspx?p=1); 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>166</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>167</sup> S. Sprenger, 'NATO Scrambling to Improve Intel Sharing, But Obstacles Remain', *World Politics Review (WPR)*, 26 October 2006, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/296/nato-scrambling-to-improve-intel-sharing-but-obstacles-remain>, (accessed 1 October 2008).

<sup>168</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p.7

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>170</sup> Mastriano, 'Strategy Research Project: Faust and the Padshah Sphinx: Reshaping the NATO Alliance to Win in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>172</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>173</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM272*, *op. cit.*

<sup>174</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09BERLIN382*, *Germany: Supportive of Proposed AF/PAK Deliverables For NATO And U.S.-EU Summits*, 31 March 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09BERLIN382.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>175</sup> Etienne de Durand, cited in J. Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*

<sup>176</sup> ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War*, *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'Caveat Emptor: Multilateralism at War', *op. cit.*, p. 8; Brophy & Fisera, "'National Caveats" and its impact on the Army of the Czech Republic', *op. cit.*; 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*; U.K. HoC, *UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07(HC408)*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>177</sup> U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07HELSINKI321*, *Finland's New Government: Turning a Promising New Tone Into Substance*, 4 May 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07HELSINKI321.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07HELSINKI416*, *SceneSetter: Finnish FM Kanerva's Visit To Washington*, 1 June 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07HELSINKI416.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 07HELSINKI530*, *GOF Preparing Report Aimed At Increased ISAF Commitments*, 11 July 2007, <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07HELSINKI530>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Helsinki Cable (released by Wikileaks), *07HELSINKI689*, *SceneSetter: PDA's Volker's Sept. 13-15 Visit To Helsinki*, 7 September 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07HELSINKI689.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>178</sup> U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 10HELSINKI36*, *Finland To Announce Increased Afghan Support At London Conference*, 25 January 2010, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10HELSINKI36.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011).

<sup>179</sup> U.S. Embassy Bratislava, *Cable 09BRATISLAVA497*, *op. cit.*

<sup>180</sup> U.S. State Department, *Cable 09STATE31102*, *op. cit.*

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1108*, *op. cit.*; 'You Don't Negotiate with Murderers - Spiegel Interview with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer', *Spiegel Online*, 9 October 2007, [www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,518druck-505152,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,518druck-505152,00.html), (accessed 24 February 2009); Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 22; U.S. Embassy Rome, *Cable 10ROME172*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Rome (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 10ROME174*, *SecDef Meeting With Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi*, February 6, 2010, 12 February 2010, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10ROME174.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011); U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS469*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS896*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*, *op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>182</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 09BERLIN882*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Budapest, *Cable 09BUDAPEST771*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Budapest, *Cable 09BUDAPEST855*, *op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239*, *op. cit.*

<sup>183</sup> U.S. Embassy Athens, *Cable 08ATHENS469*, *op. cit.*

- <sup>184</sup> U.S. Embassy Copenhagen (released by Wikileaks), *Cable AFG20070606n888, Danish DEFMIN Cautious on New ISAF Commitments*, 6 June 2007, <http://wikileaks.org/afg/event/2007/06/AFG20070606n888.html>, (accessed 12 July 2011).
- <sup>185</sup> U.S. Embassy Helsinki, *Cable 08HELSINKI155, op. cit.*; U.S. Embassy Helsinki, *Cable 09HELSINKI360, op. cit.*
- <sup>186</sup> U.S. Embassy Budapest, *Cable 09BUDAPEST855, op. cit.*
- <sup>187</sup> United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), C. Taylor, 'SN/IA/5227 Military Campaign in Afghanistan', *International Affairs and Defence Section, U.K. House of Commons Library*, 14 July 2010, p. 23, <http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn05227.pdf>, (accessed 17 January 2013).
- <sup>188</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 10BERLIN138, Maximizing Germany's Contribution To The Training Of Afghan National Security Forces*, 1 February 2010, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BERLIN138.html>, (accessed 11 July 2011);
- <sup>189</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- <sup>190</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 10BERLIN138, op. cit.*
- <sup>191</sup> Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- <sup>192</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 09BERLIN382, op. cit.*
- <sup>193</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 10BERLIN138, op. cit.*
- <sup>194</sup> *Ibid*
- <sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>197</sup> U.S. Embassy Budapest, *Cable 09BUDAPEST771, op. cit.*
- <sup>198</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome, *Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.*
- <sup>199</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09KABUL3765, Spanish Ambassador To Deliver MOU For Madrid's Review, Offers Pessimistic View Of Afghanistan*, 24 November 2009, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09KABUL3765&q=afghanistan%20caveat%20isaf%20spain>, (accessed 18 July 2013).
- <sup>200</sup> U.S. Embassy Berlin, *Cable 08BERLIN1108, op. cit.*; P. D. Thruelsen, 'NATO in Afghanistan - What Lessons Are We Learning, and Are We Willing to Adjust?', *Danish Institute for International Affairs (DIIA)*, 2007 (14), p. 21, <http://subweb.diiis.dk/sw45914.asp>, (accessed 20 June 2009).
- <sup>201</sup> Thruelsen, *ibid.*, p. 21.
- <sup>202</sup> LTCOL Roger McElwaine, Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, 26 February 2009, Whararata, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand; LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, *op. cit.*; J. Miranda-Calha (Portugal), General Rapporteur, 'Draft General Report: Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E', *NATO Parliamentary Assembly* 17 March 2006, p. 2 <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=997.2-3.>, (accessed 14 December 2011).
- <sup>203</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL1239, op. cit.*
- <sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>205</sup> ISAF, *Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.*
- <sup>206</sup> Hale, 'Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*
- <sup>207</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL3765, op. cit.*
- <sup>208</sup> U.S. Embassy Rome, *Cable 09ROME177, op. cit.*
- <sup>209</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL3765, op. cit.*
- <sup>210</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM752, op. cit.*
- <sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> U.S. Embassy Stockholm, *Cable 08STOCKHOLM51*, *op. cit.*

<sup>213</sup> Sloan, 'NATO in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, pp. 34-55.

<sup>214</sup> Miranda-Calha, 'Draft General Report: Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E', *op. cit.*

<sup>215</sup> U.S. Embassy Kabul, *Cable 09KABUL3765*, *op. cit.*