

ISAF APPENDIX 7(b):

**Compiled List of Known National Caveats by Category
Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces,
December 2001 – December 2012**

(*Please note: Some caveats apply only to specific force units within the national contingent, whereas others apply to all forces generally including a range of different force units. In the latter case, these nations' caveats may consequently appear in several different categories listed below)

This list was compiled by Dr Regeena Kingsley and is taken from her PhD research thesis in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled, *'Fighting against Allies: An Examination of "National Caveats" within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.'*

The list was created based on the national caveat information gathered during the course of this doctoral research from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF mission on their deployed armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

For more information on "national caveats" and the impact of national caveat constraints on the effectiveness of the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, in addition to previous UN-led and NATO-led multinational security operations in Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, Mali, Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, please visit www.militarycaveats.com or refer to Dr Regeena Kingsley's full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from

Massey University's official website here:

<http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984>.

Compiled List of Known National Caveats by Category

Albania

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 - October 2007*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from October 2007 – December 2012*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Armenia

- *ISAF TCN from October 2009 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from October 2009 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Armenia's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Australia

- *ISAF TCN from July 2006 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from July 2006 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Australia's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

1. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Australian national infantry in kinetic combat operations, except in cases of emergency whereby national personnel have been attacked by Enemy forces (Special Forces only allowed to conduct kinetic combat operations).¹
2. Caveat prohibiting Australian national infantry from provoking any offensive engagement or 'fire-fight' with the Enemy (personnel must also sign documentation attesting that they have not provoked firefights during their deployment in Afghanistan).² [Australia]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Australian national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction.³ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Austria

- *ISAF TCN from April 2004 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from April 2004 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Austria's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

1. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of the 10 Austrian personnel working in ISAF Headquarters outside of Kabul Province.⁴ [2001-2006]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

2. 'Mission employment' caveats prohibiting the engagement of the 10 Austrian personnel deployed to ISAF Headquarters in any activity apart from duties conducted at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul Province (RC-Capital).⁵
3. 'Mission employment' caveats prohibiting the engagement of 70 Austrian military personnel deployed to Kunduz Province in RC-North in any activity apart from election support during their temporary three-month deployment prior to and following the 18 September 2005 Afghan elections.⁶

Azerbaijan

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Azerbaijan's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Bahrain

- *ISAF TCN from January 2012 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from January 2012 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Bahrain's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Belgium

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Belgium's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines (RC-Capital), even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.⁷ [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian national forces outside RC-Capital, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).⁸
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations (2009).⁹

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the 24 Belgian force personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside the airport grounds (2003-2012).¹⁰

ANSF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Belgian OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines (RC-North) alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).¹¹

Bosnia-Herzegovina

- *ISAF TCN from March 2009 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from March 2009 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Bosnia-Herzegovina's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Bulgaria

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – June 2009*
- *Caveat –Free Nation from June 2009 – December 2012*
- *Bulgaria is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO's November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) 'Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats', as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.¹²*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Bulgarian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹³ [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Bulgarian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post-November 2006).¹⁴

ISAF COOPERATION:

3. Caveat prohibiting Bulgarian forces from sharing equipment with ISAF ally Hungary in their joint area of operations at the Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province (RC-North).¹⁵ [2003-2009]

Canada (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2005/July 2011 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from January 2006 – July 2011*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹⁶ [2001-2005]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside of Kabul City into the surrounding areas of Kabul Province.¹⁷ [2002-2004]

COMMAND:

3. Caveat *limiting* the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent from exiting immediate vicinity of Kabul City, without permission from the national chain of command in the Canadian capital of Ottawa.¹⁸
4. Caveat *limiting* the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent to travel in any vehicle not agreed to by the national chain of command, regardless of the commander's own preference or recommendation (e.g. one commander was compelled to travel in an armoured vehicle rather than his own choice of a more COIN-suitable sports utility vehicle).¹⁹
5. Caveat *limiting* the requisition of Canadian aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.²⁰
6. Caveat *limiting* the COMISAF from over-riding any decision made by National Commanders of the Canadian national contingents without direct communication with the national government in the capital.²¹ [Between 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES CAVEATS:

7. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that 'might risk collateral damage', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.²² [2002-2004]
8. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain 'potential for lethal force', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.²³ [2002-2004]
9. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'significant casualties' amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.²⁴ [2002-2004]
10. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'strategic failure', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.²⁵ [2002-2004]
11. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in 'significant activities', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.²⁶ [2002-2004]
12. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a 'reasonable belief' that Canadian force units 'may be exposed to a higher degree of risk' than

in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.²⁷
[2004]

13. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.²⁸
[2005-2006]
14. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].²⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁰
[2002-2004]
16. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³¹ [2002-2004]
17. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³² [2002-2004]
18. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³³ [2002-2004]
19. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁴ [2002-2004]
20. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁵
[2004]
21. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.³⁶
[2005-2006]
22. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].³⁷

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

23. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁸ [2002-2004]
24. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁹ [2002-2004]
25. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴⁰ [2002-2004]
26. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴¹ [2002-2004]
27. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴² [2002-2004]
28. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴³ [2004]
29. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.⁴⁴ [2005-2006]
30. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].⁴⁵

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

31. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴⁶ [2002-2004]
32. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴⁷ [2002-2004]
33. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴⁸ [2002-2004]

34. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'strategic failure', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴⁹ [2002-2004]
35. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a 'reasonable belief' that Canadian force units 'may be exposed to a higher degree of risk' than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵⁰ [2004]
36. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes 'outside the boundaries' of the Chief of Defence Staff's guidelines contained in the 'Letter of Intent', without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.⁵¹ [2005-2006]

OTHER AIR OPS:

37. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that 'might risk collateral damage', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵² [2002-2004]
38. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain 'potential for lethal force', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵³ [2002-2004]
39. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'significant casualties' amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵⁴ [2002-2004]
40. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'strategic failure', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵⁵ [2002-2004]
41. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a 'reasonable belief' that Canadian force units 'may be exposed to a higher degree of risk' than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵⁶ [2004]
42. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes 'outside the boundaries' of the Chief of Defence Staff's guidelines contained in the 'Letter of Intent', without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.⁵⁷ [2005-2006]

Croatia

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – October 2007*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from October 2007 – December 2012*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Czech Republic

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Czech national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.⁵⁸ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Denmark

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006/June 2007 –December 2009*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – June 2007/ December 2009 –December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. The deployment of Danish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.⁵⁹ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Danish national forces outside a defined AO in RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency

security situations, without government approval first being sought and given [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit].⁶⁰

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

3. The participation or engagement of Danish combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.⁶¹ [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. The participation or engagement of Danish combat air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.⁶² [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

5. The participation or engagement of Danish ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁶³ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
6. The participation or engagement of Danish air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁶⁴ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Danish national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction.⁶⁵ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

ANSF COOPERATION:

8. The embedding of Danish national OMLT personnel within ANA 'kandaks' (battalions).⁶⁶

El Salvador

- *ISAF TCN from October 2011 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from October 2011 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of El Salvador's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Estonia

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003- December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

1. The participation or engagement of Estonian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.⁶⁷ [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

2. The participation or engagement of Estonian combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.⁶⁸ [2001-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

3. The participation or engagement of Estonian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁶⁹ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
4. The participation or engagement of Estonian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁷⁰ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Estonian national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction.⁷¹ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Finland

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006/April 2008 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – April 2008*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.⁷²
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces to the east of Afghanistan, specifically into RC-East.⁷³

FORCE/WEAPONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence).⁷⁴ [2008-2012]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

4. Caveat prohibiting Finnish national forces (including combat forces) from conducting 'peace-making' activities, as opposed to 'peace-keeping' activities.⁷⁵

ANSF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the donation of lethal equipment to ANA or ANP forces (for example, excess Kalashnikov AK-47's).⁷⁶ [2006-2007]
6. Caveat prohibiting Finnish forces from contributing to battalion-level OMLTs, employed for the training and mentoring of ANSF forces.⁷⁷ [2010]
7. Caveat prohibiting Finnish OMLTs from participating or engaging in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.⁷⁸

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

8. Caveat prohibiting Finnish PRT security forces from participating or engaging in ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operations.⁷⁹ [In reference to Finnish forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

9. Caveat prohibiting Finnish PRT security forces from participating or engaging in ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operations.⁸⁰ [In reference to Finnish forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].

France (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – June 2009*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from June 2009 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.⁸¹

GEOGRAPHIC:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the south of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the *in extremis* agreement).⁸² [With the exception of French fighter planes which were transferred to Kandahar Airfield in 2008 to shorten flight times]
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the east of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the *in extremis* agreement).⁸³ [At least between 2001 and July 2008, after which one French combat battalion was authorised to deploy to Kapisa Province in RC-East, subsequently followed in 2009 by all French combat ground and air forces].

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations (2001-2006, pre Riga Summit agreement).⁸⁴
5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga *in extremis* agreement).⁸⁵ [Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French force personnel outside Kabul International Airport.⁸⁶
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside of originally assigned suburb/district of Kabul City.⁸⁷

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in crowd/riot control.⁸⁸
9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in PRTs.⁸⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the French RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies 'AOR wide' across the entire theatre of Afghanistan, regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests (enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).⁹⁰
11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.⁹¹

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French forces in riot control operations.⁹²

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

13. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.⁹³

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

14. Participation or engagement of French infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.⁹⁴
15. Participation or engagement of French Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.⁹⁵

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital.⁹⁶ [France]
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).⁹⁷

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – January 2007*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from January 2007 – December 2012*

Specific types of national caveats imposed are still unknown. However, during 2006 Macedonia was reported to have seven caveats imposed continuously on eight separate rotations of approximately 151 Macedonian forces deployed to the ISAF mission. The caveats were cited by U.S. Embassy officials as being 'significant'. Five of these were lifted by December 2006, and the remaining two caveats were eliminated in January 2007.⁹⁸

Georgia

- *ISAF TCN from November 2007 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation for the duration, November 2007 - December 2012*

No caveats imposed on Georgian forces deployed to the ISAF mission.

Germany (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Germany's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**MISSION:**

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.⁹⁹
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel OEF mission in Afghanistan.¹⁰⁰
3. Caveat prohibiting the provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission).¹⁰¹
4. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.¹⁰² [Prior to June 2009]

THEATRE:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.¹⁰³

GEOGRAPHIC:

6. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of German forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on a temporary case-by-case basis where the deployment is considered ‘absolutely necessary’ for the ISAF mission and national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.¹⁰⁴ [2003-2009]
7. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of German national forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions in which national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.¹⁰⁵ [2003-2009]
8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into the hostile RC-South.¹⁰⁶ [2003-2009]
9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces anywhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.¹⁰⁷

REGIONAL:

10. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of national forces out of RC-North unless the deployment is temporary, ‘necessary for the success of the ISAF’, and approved by the government Minister of Defence.¹⁰⁸
11. Caveat *limiting* any specific deployment of Special Forces outside the originally assigned Regional Command, without explicit consent of the government Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate.¹⁰⁹
12. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of Special Forces units outside of own assigned ISAF Regional Command, even upon request of the COMISAF, without specific case-by-case approval from the Minister of Defence (post-Riga).¹¹⁰
13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside RC-North boundary lines for any reason, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹¹¹ [2001-2006]
14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (following the November 2006 Riga *in extremis* agreement).¹¹² [2006-2012]
15. Caveat prohibiting operations by German KSK Special Forces outside RC-North command sector, even under the authority of the COMISAF.¹¹³ [2008]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

16. The deployment of German national forces into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹¹⁴ [2009]
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces within RC-North more than two hours distant from well-equipped hospitals with emergency surgery facilities.¹¹⁵

FORCE CEILING:

18. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,500 troops.¹¹⁶
19. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 4,500 troops¹¹⁷
20. Caveat prohibiting the force contingents from exceeding troop ceiling within Afghanistan, even temporarily during force rotations.¹¹⁸ [Prior to October 2008]

FORCE/WEAPONS:

21. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence).¹¹⁹ [2001-2009]
22. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries, except in self-defence.¹²⁰ [2001-2009]
23. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries in self-defence while Enemy forces are moving, either to retreat or re-position.¹²¹ [2001-2009]
24. Caveat prohibiting the use of heavy weapons against adversaries.¹²² [2001-2009]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

25. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).¹²³ [2001-2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

26. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the German Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside RC-North boundary lines, to respond to emergencies 'AOR wide' across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).¹²⁴ [2008]
27. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.¹²⁵
28. Caveat prohibiting German ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support).¹²⁶
29. Caveat prohibiting German combat ground forces from deploying into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹²⁷ [2009]

30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German KSK Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces.¹²⁸ [2008]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

31. Caveat prohibiting the execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships).¹²⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

32. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.¹³⁰
33. Caveat prohibiting German national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.¹³¹
34. Caveat prohibiting the national reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.¹³² [2008-2009]

OTHER AIR OPS:

35. Caveat prohibiting the solo flight of any German armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).¹³³

TIME:

36. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.¹³⁴
37. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of German combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).¹³⁵
38. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of patrols by security ground forces at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.¹³⁶
39. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national combat aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹³⁷
40. Caveat prohibiting the transport of German military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹³⁸
41. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹³⁹
42. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.¹⁴⁰
43. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRTs after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).¹⁴¹
44. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of any activity or task by German PRT civil-military personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.¹⁴²

45. Caveat prohibiting German civil-military personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.¹⁴³

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

46. The participation or engagement of German national ground or air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴
47. Caveat prohibiting the distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by German reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.¹⁴⁵

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

48. Caveat prohibiting any lead role of German national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).¹⁴⁶
49. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).¹⁴⁷

ISAF COOPERATION:

50. Caveat prohibiting the transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on German national aircraft.¹⁴⁸
51. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.¹⁴⁹ [2008-2009]
52. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).¹⁵⁰
53. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).¹⁵¹
54. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).¹⁵²

ANSF COOPERATION:

55. Caveat *limiting* the participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour's drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.¹⁵³
56. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside specific missions within certain districts or provinces within RC-North, when conducting 'partnering' operations with ANSF forces.¹⁵⁴

57. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).¹⁵⁵
58. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹⁵⁶ [2009]
59. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is 'purely civilian government activity' (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).¹⁵⁷
60. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of RC-North sector boundaries.¹⁵⁸
61. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.¹⁵⁹
62. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Kunduz military base within RC-North.¹⁶⁰
63. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.¹⁶¹
64. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.¹⁶²
65. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.¹⁶³
66. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.¹⁶⁴
67. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.¹⁶⁵

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

68. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).¹⁶⁶ [Prior to October 2008]
69. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting any security operation outside the borders of the German PRTs.¹⁶⁷
70. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).¹⁶⁸
71. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support.¹⁶⁹
72. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any German PRT security personnel based at Meymaneh PRT into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹⁷⁰ [2009]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

73. Caveat prohibiting German Civil-military personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.¹⁷¹

74. Caveat prohibiting the any German PRT stability personnel based at Meymaneh PRT from travelling into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹⁷² [2009]

Greece

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006/April 2007 – December 2012*
- ***Caveat-Free Nation** from November 2006 – April 2007*
- *Greece is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO's November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) 'Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats', as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.¹⁷³*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.¹⁷⁴ [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

REGIONAL:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹⁷⁵ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside RC-Capital, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).¹⁷⁶

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City.¹⁷⁷ [2003-2007/2007-2009]
5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside of the airport compound.¹⁷⁸ [2006-2007/2007-2009]
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Greek national forces outside of protective military bases.¹⁷⁹

FORCE CEILING:

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any further Greek troops to existing ISAF national contingent.¹⁸⁰

WEATHER:

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Greek ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹⁸¹ [2006-2007/2007-2009]
9. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Greek air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹⁸² [2006-2007/2007-2009]

ISAF COOPERATION:

10. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national forces in joint or combined operations in which Greek national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival.¹⁸³
[In reference to troops from both Turkey and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia]

ANSF COOPERATION:

11. Caveat prohibiting Greek OMLTs from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-Capital alongside their ANSF units, when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).¹⁸⁴
12. Caveat prohibiting Greek OMLTs from deploying outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations.¹⁸⁵

Hungary

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003- November 2006/September 2008-December 2009/August 2012 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006-September 2008/December 2009- August 2012.*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces outside RC-North or RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹⁸⁶ [2003-2006]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).¹⁸⁷

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces outside Baghlan Province of RC-North.¹⁸⁸
4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Hungarian national forces beyond a specified distance from the Pol-e Khomri PRT within Baghlan Province (RC-North).¹⁸⁹

FORCE/WEAPONS:

5. Caveat prohibiting the firing of weapons except in self-defence.¹⁹⁰

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Hungarian forces in offensive operations against insurgents.¹⁹¹
7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Hungarian forces in mine clearing.¹⁹² [2009-2012]

TIME:

8. Hungarian PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.¹⁹³

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any Hungarian PRT civilian personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.¹⁹⁴ [With reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
10. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any PRT military personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.¹⁹⁵ [With reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
11. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any kind by Hungarian national forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁹⁶

ANSF COOPERATION:

12. Caveat prohibiting the Hungarian OMLT from deploying outside Baghlan Province of RC-North alongside ANSF units, during 'partnering' operations.¹⁹⁷
13. Caveat prohibiting the Hungarian OMLT in Baghlan Province from participating in offensive operations alongside ANSF units, during 'partnering' operations.¹⁹⁸

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

14. Caveat prohibiting PRT Security Units from deploying beyond a specified distance from the Pol-e Khomri PRT within Baghlan Province.¹⁹⁹
15. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols on terrain other than the main roads around the PRT.²⁰⁰
16. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols at night, under cover of darkness.²⁰¹ [2003-2006/2008-2009/2012]
17. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian PRT Security Units from mounting an armed response to insurgency-related security situations, except in self-defence.²⁰² [In reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

18. Caveat prohibiting Hungarian civil-military personnel from staying outside the PRT base AO overnight.²⁰³ [In reference to Hungarian Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]

Iceland

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003- December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Iceland's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Icelandic national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁰⁴ [2003-2006]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Icelandic national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).²⁰⁵

COMMAND:

3. Caveat prohibiting personal travel by 'peacekeeping' military individuals in danger zones.²⁰⁶

FORCE/WEAPONS:

4. Caveat *limiting* Icelandic national forces from carrying any weapon at all, without express authorisation (only police officers and explosive ordnance disposal unit personnel permitted to carry weapons).²⁰⁷
5. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic personnel from firing weapons except in self-defence.²⁰⁸ [2006-2012]
6. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from carrying or using automatic weapons.²⁰⁹ [2006-2008]
7. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from carrying arms at all (only unarmed personnel permitted).²¹⁰ [2008-2012]
8. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from wearing, 'battle dress' or helmets (appearing like a 'warrior' rather than a 'peacekeeper').²¹¹ [2006-2008]
9. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from wearing military uniforms (only civilian peacekeeping specialists permitted to deploy to the ISAF mission).²¹² [2008-2012]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

10. Caveat prohibiting Icelandic national forces from conducting 'peace-making' activities, as opposed to 'peace-keeping' activities.²¹³
11. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Icelandic national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).²¹⁴
12. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national forces in the QRF rapid response entity or its operations.²¹⁵

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

13. Caveat prohibiting Participation of national forces in any security operations at Kabul Airport (only airport operations and training of Afghan air forces permitted).²¹⁶
14. Caveat prohibiting National combat ground forces from conducting 'guard duty' at ISAF bases, airfields or other military installations in Afghanistan.²¹⁷

Ireland

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Ireland's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Italy (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – May 2009*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from May 2009 – December 2012*
- *Italy is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO's November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) 'Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats', as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.*²¹⁸

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:**GEOGRAPHIC:**

1. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of Italian national forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare 'time-limited' occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.²¹⁹ [2009]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.²²⁰ [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of designated regional command sectors into the south or east of Afghanistan, even in cases of emergency.²²¹ [2006-2009]

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of Italian national forces outside of RC-West, without a 72-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.²²²
5. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of Italian national forces outside of RC-West, without a 6-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.²²³
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²²⁴ [2003-2006]
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside RC-West boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²²⁵ [2003-2006]
8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).²²⁶ [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of 'emergency' between 2006-2009]
9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-West sector (including into RC-North), except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement

(Post November 2006).²²⁷ [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Kabul Province in RC-Capital.²²⁸
11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Hirat Province in RC-West.²²⁹
12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces in RC-West beyond a specified distance from Herat City into Hirat Province (less than 100 kilometres).²³⁰

FORCE CEILING:

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops.²³¹

FORCE/WEAPONS:

14. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of national forces in mine clearing.²³² [2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Italian RC-West Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).²³³ [2006-2009]
16. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.²³⁴ [2001-2009]
17. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).²³⁵
18. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any operation occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West or RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South).²³⁶ [2005-2009]
19. Caveat prohibiting the participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents.²³⁷
20. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of combat operations by Italian infantry on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.²³⁸
21. Caveat prohibiting Italian ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support), except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations.²³⁹

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

22. Caveat limiting the conduct of patrols by Italian combat ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital in Rome.²⁴⁰ [Only 270 of 1,800 Italian soldiers were permitted to patrol in October 2007]
23. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian security forces in kinetic or offensive security operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).²⁴¹

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

24. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian national air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.²⁴² [2001-2009]
25. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.²⁴³
26. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West and RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South).²⁴⁴ [2005-2009]
27. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of 'close air support' missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.²⁴⁵ [2001-2009]
28. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of 'reconnaissance' missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.²⁴⁶ [2001-2009]

TIME:

29. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of protective military bases on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.²⁴⁷

WEATHER:

30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.²⁴⁸
31. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.²⁴⁹

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

32. The participation or engagement of Italian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁵⁰ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
33. The participation or engagement of Italian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁵¹ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

ISAF COOPERATION

34. The conduct of 'reconnaissance' missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.²⁵² [Italy, 2001-2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

35. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of OMLTs outside of RC-West and RC-Capital boundary lines (into RC-North, RC-South or RC-East) alongside their ANSF units, when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).²⁵³

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

36. Caveat *limiting* Italian PRT Security Units from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome.²⁵⁴

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

37. Caveat *limiting* Italian military-civilian personnel from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome.²⁵⁵

Jordan

- *ISAF TCN from November 2007 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from November 2007 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Jordan's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Latvia

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. The deployment of national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁵⁶
[2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Lithuania

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian national forces outside RC-West boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁵⁷ [2003-2006]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian personnel outside the boundaries of Ghor Province in RC-West.²⁵⁸ [Classed as a capacity-based caveat, rather than a ‘political’ caveat]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any PRT military personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.²⁵⁹ [2005-2006, with regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province of RC-West]
4. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of any Lithuanian civilian PRT personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.²⁶⁰ [2005-2006, with regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province of RC-West]

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian PRT Security Units outside the boundaries of Ghor Province in RC-West.²⁶¹ [2005-2006]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Lithuanian military-civilian personnel outside the boundaries of Ghor Province in RC-West.²⁶² [2005-2006]

Luxembourg

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Luxembourg's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Luxembourgish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁶³ [2003-2006]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Luxembourgish national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).²⁶⁴

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the 10 Luxembourgish force personnel based at Kabul International Airport outside the airport compound.²⁶⁵ [2003-2012]

Malaysia

- *ISAF TCN from November 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from November 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Malaysia's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Mongolia

- *ISAF TCN from March 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from March 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Mongolia's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Montenegro

- *ISAF TCN from February 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from February 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Montenegro's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Netherlands (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – November 2006/August 2010 – December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – August 2010*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside RC-South boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁶⁶ [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside Uruzgan Province of RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁶⁷

FORCE CEILING:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,000 troops.²⁶⁸
4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1200 troops.²⁶⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch ground combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South.²⁷⁰ [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch air combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South.²⁷¹ [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁷² [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁷³ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction anywhere within the Afghan AOR.²⁷⁴ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
10. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch personnel in narcotics eradication operations in Uruzgan Province.²⁷⁵ [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

New Zealand

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation for the duration of participation in the ISAF mission, from December 2001-December 2012*

No caveats imposed on New Zealand forces deployed to the ISAF mission.

Norway

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 - May 2006/July 2006-December 2009*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from May 2006-July 2006/December 2009-December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines (RC-North/RC-Capital) to the south or east of Afghanistan.²⁷⁶
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.²⁷⁷

REGIONAL:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces outside RC-North boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁷⁸ [2003-2006]
4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Norwegian national forces outside own RC-North sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).²⁷⁹

COMMAND:

5. Caveat prohibiting the transfer of Norwegian QRF forces to German Lead Nation operational control within RC-North.²⁸⁰ [In regard to the Norwegian-Latvian QRF battalion deployed in early 2009 to operate from Norway’s Maimana PRT]

FORCE/WEAPONS:

6. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, except in self-defence when an attack against Norwegian personnel is taking place or is imminent (the ‘right of imminent self-defence’).²⁸¹ [2006]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Norwegian RC-North Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).²⁸² [2006-2009]

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

8. Caveat prohibiting PRT Security Units from using lethal force, except in self-defence when an attack against PRT personnel is taking place or is imminent (the ‘right of imminent self-defence’).²⁸³ [2006]

Poland

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – October 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from October 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Polish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁸⁴ [2003-2006]

Portugal

- *ISAF TCN from February 2002 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from February 2002 – February 2007/ November 2007 –December 2009*
- ***Caveat-Free Nation** from February 2007 –November 2007/December 2009-December 2012*
- *Portugal is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO's November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) 'Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats', as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.*²⁸⁵

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Portuguese national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁸⁶ [2003-2006]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

2. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of the Portuguese RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-Capital boundary lines, without explicit approval from the Portuguese Chief of Defence.²⁸⁷ [*Listed by SHAPE as one of its seven priorities in terms of attaining caveat removal within the ISAF between November 2007 – April 2008]
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Portuguese RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-West boundary lines, to respond to emergencies 'AOR wide' across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).²⁸⁸ [2005-2006]

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

- *ISAF TCN from April 2010 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from April 2010 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of South Korea's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed by South Korea are still unknown. However, in 2009 South Korea was reported by U.S. State Department officials at the American Embassy in Kabul as imposing national caveats on the use of their military forces deployed to conduct operations at the Parwan PRT in RC-East. Nevertheless, the South Korean PRT security unit, or so-called 'protective forces' seem not to have been restrained by these same operational limitations however, since the United States expected the unit to be robust enough to: 'secure its own compound; provide security for its personnel conducting operations outside the PRT; perform patrols in the vicinity of the PRT to gain situational awareness; control coalition assets as required; coordinate its activities with coalition forces; and perform reporting as required by RC-East HQ and Task Force Cyclone'.²⁸⁹

Romania

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – November 2006*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – December 2012*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Romanian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²⁹⁰ [2003-2006]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

2. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.²⁹¹ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of foot patrols by Romanian personnel outside Kandahar Air Field (KAF), unless the patrolling party is comprised of a set number of personnel, at a minimum.²⁹² [2006]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian combat air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.²⁹³ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁹⁴ [2003-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁹⁵ [2003-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Romanian national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction.²⁹⁶ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

Singapore

- *ISAF TCN from January 2008 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from January 2008 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Singapore's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Singaporean PRT personnel at Bamyán PRT in RC-East in any activity apart from PRT tasks and force protection duties.²⁹⁷

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

2. Caveat prohibiting Singaporean PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond 10 kilometres from the Bamyán PRT in RC-East (preventing wider joint security patrols with New Zealand PRT military personnel within Bamyán Province).²⁹⁸ [2008-2012]

Slovakia

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Slovakia's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*
- In 2009 the 262 Slovakian troops operating within the ISAF mission were described by U.S. Embassy personnel in Bratislava as being 'subject to strict caveats', imposed by the 'insistence' of the Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico in order to keep the likelihood of casualties 'minimal'.²⁹⁹

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovakian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.³⁰⁰ [2003-2006]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovakian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).³⁰¹

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the 57-man Slovakian military engineering unit at Kandahar airbase to hostile areas outside the 'secure environment' of the base.³⁰² [2008]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

4. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Slovakian national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation at all (only civil reconstruction and humanitarian work permitted).³⁰³

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

5. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Slovakian Special Forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation.³⁰⁴
6. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Slovakian Special Forces in ANSF training or mentoring (which might as a matter of course also include offensive operations).³⁰⁵
7. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Slovakian Special Forces in any operation other than force-protection missions (excludes offensive operations and training ANSF forces).³⁰⁶

ANSF COOPERATION:

8. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of the 15 Slovakian OMLT personnel in Kandahar Province in any offensive or kinetic combat operation.³⁰⁷ [2008-2012]

Slovenia

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 –November 2006/August 2007 –December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from November 2006 – August 2007*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovenian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.³⁰⁸ [2003-2006]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Slovenian national forces outside own designated Regional Command sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).³⁰⁹ [2007-2012]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting the two platoons of some 69 Slovenian soldiers conducting force-protection at an Italian base in Hirat Province in RC-West from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-West, except in cases of extreme emergency.³¹⁰
4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment or placement of the Slovenian force protection platoons in Herat ‘in harm’s way’.³¹¹ [Unit is described by U.S. Embassy personnel in February 2010 as ‘a tightly-caveated force protection mission’]

Spain

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Spain’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*
- *Spain is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.*³¹²

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Spanish ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.³¹³
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Spanish aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.³¹⁴
3. Caveat prohibiting the redeployment of Spanish NATO officers to other NATO missions, including NATO's training mission in Iraq.³¹⁵
4. Caveat prohibiting the redeployment of Spanish NATO forces to participate in NATO operations in Iraq.³¹⁶

GEOGRAPHIC:

5. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of Spanish forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare 'time-limited' occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.³¹⁷
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.³¹⁸ [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.³¹⁹

REGIONAL:

8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.³²⁰ [2003-2006]
9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish national forces outside RC-West sector boundaries, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).³²¹ [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of 'emergency' between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces outside Badghis Province in RC-West.³²² [2005-2007]

FORCE CEILING:

11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 690 troops.³²³
12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,000 troops.³²⁴
13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops.³²⁵
14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Spanish forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,500 troops.³²⁶
15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any further troops to the existing Spanish ISAF national contingent, including to staff the ISAF XI HQ in Kabul.³²⁷

COMMAND:

16. The deployment of Spanish national forces under U.S. command.³²⁸

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

17. The engagement of Spanish national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation at all (only civil reconstruction and humanitarian work permitted).³²⁹ [2005-2010]
18. The participation or engagement of Spanish national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work at Qal'eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West (giving forces a strictly 'stand-aside' role in the ISAF mission).³³⁰
19. The participation or engagement of Spanish national forces in any activity other than civil reconstruction work and counter-narcotics projects at Qal'eh-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province, RC-West.³³¹

WEATHER:

20. Participation of Spanish ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.³³²
21. Participation of Spanish air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.³³³

ANSF COOPERATION:

22. The deployment of Spanish OMLTs outside RC-West boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).³³⁴

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

23. Caveat *limiting* excursions by Spanish PRT Security Units based at Qal'ey-ye Now PRT into 'insecure districts' of Badghis Province (RC-West) without prior approval from the Spanish government in Madrid.³³⁵
24. Caveat prohibiting Spanish PRT Security Units in Badghis Province (RC-West) from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.³³⁶ [PRT's effectiveness is reportedly limited by 'strict national caveats' in addition to short 4-month rotations]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

25. Caveat *limiting* excursions by Spanish PRT military-civilian personnel based at Qal'ey-ye Now PRT into 'insecure districts' of Badghis Province (RC-West) without prior approval from the Spanish government in Madrid.³³⁷
26. Caveat prohibiting Spanish PRT military-civilian personnel at Qal'ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province (RC-West) from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.³³⁸ [PRT's effectiveness is reportedly limited by 'strict national caveats' in addition to short 4-month rotations]

Sweden

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Sweden's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.³³⁹

REGIONAL:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish national forces outside RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations (post-Riga *in extremis* agreement).³⁴⁰

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish national forces outside of the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province (RC-North).³⁴¹ [Despite the PRT being responsible for development and reconstruction projects in Jawzjan, Sari Pul and Samangan Province in addition to Balkh Province.³⁴²]

FORCE CEILING:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 365 troops.³⁴³
5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 375 troops.³⁴⁴
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 475 troops.³⁴⁵
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 600 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency to better respond to 'unforeseen difficulties').³⁴⁶
8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 800 troops (a surge of an additional 200 personnel permitted in cases of emergency to better respond to 'unforeseen difficulties').³⁴⁷

COMMAND:

9. Caveat prohibiting any decision to deploy Swedish national forces outside the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area made by ISAF commanders in the field acting under the authority of the COMISAF (each deployment outside the PRT area must instead be ordered by Swedish military commanders in the capital Stockholm rather than inside the Afghan theatre of war).³⁴⁸

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

10. Caveat prohibiting Swedish national forces (including combat forces) from conducting 'peace-making' activities, as opposed to 'peace-keeping' activities.³⁴⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Swedish rifle brigade nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.³⁵⁰ [2007-2009]
12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of additional Swedish manoeuvre elements into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.³⁵¹ [2008-2009]
13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Swedish rifle brigade outside the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province (RC-North).³⁵² [2007-2009]

14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of additional Swedish manoeuvre elements outside the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT area in Balkh Province (RC-North).³⁵³ [2008-2009]

OTHER AIR OPS:

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish MEDEVAC helicopters and personnel into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations within RC-North.³⁵⁴

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Swedish OMLTs outside the immediate vicinity surrounding Mazar-e-Sharif PRT, without explicit authorisation from the national government in the capital Stockholm.³⁵⁵
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs nationwide into southern or eastern Afghanistan, or any other area of Afghanistan outside of originally assigned locations.³⁵⁶ [2008]
18. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs outside RC-North boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).³⁵⁷
19. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish OMLTs outside originally-assigned locations (certain districts or provinces within RC-North), when conducting ‘partnering’ operations.³⁵⁸
20. Caveat prohibiting Special Forces from participating in the training or mentoring of ANSF units.³⁵⁹

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

21. Caveat prohibiting Swedish civilian personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working together with Swedish military forces in Afghanistan.³⁶⁰ [Caveat imposed on the personnel of Sweden’s developmental aid government department, SIDA]
22. Caveat prohibiting Swedish civilian aid personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working near to localities where Swedish military forces operate or are based in RC-North.³⁶¹ [Caveat imposed on the personnel of Sweden’s developmental aid government department, SIDA]
23. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Swedish civilian personnel outside the immediate surrounding area of Mazar-e-Sharif PRT.³⁶²

Switzerland

- *ISAF TCN from August 2003 - March 2008 (full exit and troop withdrawal from ISAF mission).*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from August 2003 – March 2008 (representing the entire duration of Switzerland’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

1. Caveat prohibiting Swiss national forces from conducting ‘peace-making’ activities, as opposed to ‘peace-keeping’ activities within the ISAF mission.³⁶³
2. Caveat prohibiting Swiss national forces from participating in counter-insurgent operations.³⁶⁴

Tonga

- ISAF TCN from October 2010 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from October 2010 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Tonga’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

Turkey (ISAF Lead Nation)

- ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012
- Caveat-Imposing Nation from December 2001 – December 2012 (representing the entire duration of Turkey’s participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)
- Turkey is one of six ISAF nations that appeared on NATO’s November 2007 Supreme Headquarters (SHAPE) ‘Prioritized List of Operationally Restrictive Caveats’, as imposing caveats that should be lifted quickly (by the time of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit) in order to give the COMISAF maximum flexibility.³⁶⁵
- Turkey was also specifically requested by the U.S. Obama Administration to ‘remove operationally restrictive caveats to enhance operational effectiveness’ during April 2009 via diplomatic channels, but was subsequently described as still having ‘significant restrictions’ imposed on its national ISAF force contingent in September 2009 .³⁶⁶

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish ground forces deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.³⁶⁷
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.³⁶⁸

GEOGRAPHIC:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.³⁶⁹ [2003-2007, still in place after opening its first PRT in Wardak Province, RC-East, and in force at the time of the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.³⁷⁰ [2003-2006]
5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).³⁷¹

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).³⁷²

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

7. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).³⁷³

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).³⁷⁴

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

9. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).³⁷⁵

OTHER AIR OPS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).³⁷⁶

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.³⁷⁷ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.³⁷⁸ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
13. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.³⁷⁹
14. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF air forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.³⁸⁰

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

15. Caveat prohibiting the engagement or participation of any kind by Turkish national forces in counter-narcotics operations (although C-N training of ANSF forces is permitted).³⁸¹ [2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat prohibiting Turkish OMLT s and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces in RC-Capital from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or 'partnering' operations with ANSF forces.³⁸²

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

17. Caveat prohibiting Turkish PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond approximately 10 kilometres from Kowt-i-Ashrow PRT in Wardak Province of RC-East (preventing planned joint security patrols between the Wardak and Bamyan PRTs).³⁸³

Ukraine

- *ISAF TCN from March 2008 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from March 2008 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of the Ukraine's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

United Arab Emirates

- *ISAF TCN from September 2008 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from September 2008 - December 2012 (representing the entire duration of the UAE's participation as a TCN of the ISAF mission)*

Specific numbers and types of national caveats imposed still unknown.

United Kingdom (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation for the duration of participation in the ISAF mission, from December 2001- December 2012*

No caveats have ever been imposed on British forces deployed to the ISAF mission.

United States (ISAF Lead Nation)

- *ISAF TCN from December 2001 - December 2012*
- *Caveat-Free Nation from December 2001- January 2010*
- *Caveat-Imposing Nation from January 2010 – December 2012 (Relating to U.S. forces in Helmand Province, RC-Southwest)*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

COMMAND:

1. Caveat prohibiting the transfer of American national forces to British Lead Nation operational control within RC-Southwest [2010-2012, both the U.S. and the U.K. are designated Lead Nations of RC-Southwest] ³⁸⁴

FORCE/WEAPONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting inclusive or joint/combined applications of force (only 'exclusive' applications of force permitted by U.S. personnel). ³⁸⁵ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only 'independent' combat operations permitted). ³⁸⁶ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. Caveat prohibiting joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only 'independent' combat operations permitted). ³⁸⁷ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

ISAF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the communication of information by American national forces through combined, inclusive communication systems (only 'segregated communication systems' may be used by U.S. forces).³⁸⁸ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]
6. Caveat prohibiting shared, inclusive reporting of information by American national forces (only 'exclusive reporting' permitted by U.S. personnel).³⁸⁹ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

ENDNOTES

¹ H. Smith, 'U.S. Seeks Sweeping Changes in Command Structure for Afghanistan', *The Captain's Journal* [web blog], 18 September 2008, <http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/09/18/us-seeks-sweeping-changes-in-command-structure-for-afghanistan/>, (accessed 25 June 2010).

² *Ibid.*; H. Smith, 'NATO Cannot Be Rehabilitated', *The Captain's Journal* [web blog], 9 October 2008, <http://www.captainsjournal.com/2008/10/09/nato-cannot-be-rehabilitated>, (accessed 25 June 2010).

³ C. Karp. & R. Ponzio, 'Chapter 12: NATO, SSR and Afghanistan' in Law, D. (ed.), *Intergovernmental Organisations and Security Sector Reform*, Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007, p. 227.

⁴ U.S. Embassy Vienna (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 05VIENNA1152, Austrian Defence Minister To Recommend Austrian Deployment To Konduz For Election; Will Review Caveats*, 8 April 2005, <http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05VIENNA1152&q=austria%20caveat%20isaf>, (accessed 31 July 2013);

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ J. de Hoop Sheffer, 'Press Briefing on NATO's Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer', *NATO Online Library*, 24 November 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s06112a.htm>, (accessed 1 December 2009).

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