

ISAF APPENDIX 8(b):

**Compiled List of Known National Caveats Imposed on
ISAF Major Force Units by Lead & Supporting TCNs in Afghanistan,
December 2001 – December 2012**

(*Please note: Caveats applying to more than one of the force units described below
have been repeated within each of the respective force unit categories)

This list was compiled by Dr Regeena Kingsley and is taken from her PhD research thesis in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled, *'Fighting against Allies: An Examination of "National Caveats" within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.'*

The list was created based on the national caveat information gathered during the course of this doctoral research from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF mission on their deployed armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

For more information on "national caveats" and the impact of national caveat constraints on the effectiveness of the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, in addition to previous UN-led and NATO-led multinational security operations in Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, Mali, Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, please visit www.militarycaveats.com or refer to Dr Regeena Kingsley's full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from

Massey University's official website here:

<http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984>.

Compiled List of Known National Caveats Imposed on Major Force Units within the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

Ground Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs), comprised of Major Combat Units (>700) and Minor Combat Units (<700 troops)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The conduct of patrols by national combat ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital. ¹ [Italy]
2. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.² [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³ [Canada, 2002-2004]
4. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴ [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵ [Canada, 2002-2004]
6. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁶ [Canada, 2004]
7. The engagement of national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. ⁷ [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

8. The participation or engagement of national combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. ⁸ [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), and Romania (prior to Riga Summit 2006)]
9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of national ground combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South. ⁹ [The Netherlands, prior to the Riga Summit]
10. Engagement of national infantry in kinetic combat operations, except in cases of emergency whereby national personnel have been attacked by Enemy forces (Only Special Forces permitted to conduct kinetic combat operations).¹⁰ [Australia]
11. National infantry from provoking any offensive engagement or ‘fire-fight’ with the Enemy. ¹¹ [Australia]
12. Participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents.¹² [Italy]
13. National infantry from leading offensive operations (units may only act in support of ANA, where ANSF take the lead).¹³
14. Participation of national ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ¹⁴ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]
15. The conduct of combat operations by infantry on days of national significance, such as national statutory holidays.¹⁵ [Italy]
16. Participation of combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.¹⁶ [Germany]
17. Any deployment of national combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).¹⁷ [Germany]
18. The transport of military combat personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹⁸ [Germany]
19. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).¹⁹
20. The participation or engagement of national ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ²⁰ [Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
21. The support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ²¹ [Turkey]

22. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.²² [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
23. Participation or engagement of ground infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.²³ [France]
24. Any lead role of national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).²⁴ [Germany]
25. Participation of national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).²⁵ [Germany]
26. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.²⁶
27. Caveat prohibiting national forces from sharing equipment with another ISAF ally in a joint area of operations (a PRT in RC-North).²⁷ [Bulgaria]
28. National ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations, e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations.²⁸ [Italy, Germany]
29. The conduct of joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).²⁹ [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province , RC-Southwest]

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of the national Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-Capital boundary lines, without explicit approval from the national Chief of Defence.³⁰ [Portugal]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

2. The participation of national forces in the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) rapid response entity or its operations.³¹ [Iceland]
3. The participation of any QRFs deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.³² [Spain, Germany]
4. The deployment of the Regional Command Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests , enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).³³ [Norway, Germany, Portugal]
5. The transfer of national QRF forces to Lead Nation operational control within the Regional Commands.³⁴ [Norwegian QRF personnel in reference to Lead Nation Germany in RC-North from 2009 onwards, American forces with regard to Lead Nation Britain in RC-Southwest 2010 –present]
6. Participation of QRF forces in combat operations outside Regional Command sector boundaries.³⁵ [Norway, Germany]
7. Participation of QRFs in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.³⁶ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]
8. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.³⁷ [The Dutch – and it is likely also the Portuguese - QRFs in RC-South]

Special Forces (SOF) Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁸ [Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.³⁹ [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. Any specific deployment of Special Forces outside RC-North, even upon request of the COMISAF, without explicit case-by-case approval and consent by the national Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate.⁴⁰ [Germany, including post-Riga]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

4. The participation of any national Special Forces units, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.⁴¹ [Spain, Germany]
5. Operations by Special Forces outside RC-North, even under the authority of the COMISAF.⁴² [Germany]
6. The participation of Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces.⁴³ [Germany]
7. The engagement of Special Forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operation.⁴⁴ [Slovakia]
8. The engagement of Special Forces in ANSF training or mentoring (which might as a matter of course also include offensive operations).⁴⁵ [Slovakia]
9. The participation of Special Forces in any operation, other than force-protection missions (excludes offensive operations and training ANSF forces).⁴⁶ [Slovakia]
10. The participation or engagement of Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.⁴⁷ [France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and many other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
11. Special Forces from participating in the training or mentoring of ANSF units.⁴⁸ [Sweden]

Ground Security Units (Protection, patrol and guard duty units etc.)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁴⁹ [Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵⁰ [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵¹ [Canada, 2002-2004]
4. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵² [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁵³ [Canada, 2004]
6. The engagement of national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.⁵⁴ [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. Participation of national forces in any security operations at Kabul Airport (only airport operations and training of Afghan air forces permitted).⁵⁵ [Iceland]
8. National combat ground forces from conducting ‘guard duty’ at ISAF bases, airfields or other military installations in Afghanistan.⁵⁶ [Iceland]
9. Participation in crowd control or riot control operations.⁵⁷ [France, Canada between 2002-2004]
10. The conduct of foot patrols outside Kandahar Air Field (KAF), unless the patrolling party is comprised of a set number of personnel, at a minimum.⁵⁸ [Romania]

11. The execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships).⁵⁹ [Germany]
12. The conduct of security patrols without armoured vehicle support.⁶⁰ [Germany]
13. Participation of national security ground forces in any security operation or patrol undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.⁶¹ [Germany]
14. Any deployment of national security ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).⁶² [Germany]
15. Participation of national ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.⁶³ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]
16. The deployment or placement of force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from ever being placed ‘in harm’s way’.⁶⁴ [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]
17. The deployment of national force protection personnel at an ISAF base in RC-West from deploying outside the boundary lines of RC-West, except in cases of extreme emergency.⁶⁵ [Slovenia, with regard to force protection platoons at an Italian base in Hirat Province]
18. Caveat prohibiting ground security forces from sharing equipment with another ISAF ally in a joint area of operations (a PRT in RC-North).⁶⁶ [Bulgaria]
19. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.⁶⁷
20. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.⁶⁸ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
21. The participation of national forces in joint or combined operations in which national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival.⁶⁹ [Seemingly Greece with regard to both Turkey and Macedonia]
22. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of security forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all.⁷⁰

Air Combat Units (Fighter jets, attack helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft and personnel)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁷¹ [Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁷² [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁷³ [Canada, 2002-2004]
4. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁷⁴ [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.⁷⁵ [Canada, 2004]
6. The engagement of air forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.⁷⁶ [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. Participation of national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of originally assigned Regional Command.⁷⁷ [Italy]
8. The participation of national air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.⁷⁸ [Germany]
9. The requisition of national aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.⁷⁹

10. The participation or engagement of national air forces in any ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation (defensive combat operations permitted).⁸⁰ [Germany, Italy, France, Denmark (prior to Riga Summit 2006), Romania]
11. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly ‘non-combat’ role).⁸¹
12. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of national air combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South.⁸² [The Netherlands, prior to the Riga Summit]
13. National air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.⁸³ [Germany]
14. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.⁸⁴ [Italy]
15. Participation of national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of originally assigned Regional Command.⁸⁵ [Italy]
16. The conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.⁸⁶ [Italy, 2001-2009]
17. Providing air cover (conducting close air support) if ISAF ground forces are close to Afghan villages.⁸⁷
18. The conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.⁸⁸ [Italy, 2001-2009]
19. The participation of national aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.⁸⁹ [Germany]
20. National reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.⁹⁰ [Germany]
21. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.⁹¹
22. Joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).⁹² [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]
23. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).⁹³ [Germany]
24. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft).⁹⁴
25. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.⁹⁵ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]
26. The participation or engagement of national air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁹⁶ [Turkey, Italy, and the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, and Romania prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

27. The support of ISAF air forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ⁹⁷ [Turkey]
28. The distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts. ⁹⁸ [Germany]
29. The participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan. ⁹⁹ [Spain, Germany, Turkey]
30. The provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission). ¹⁰⁰ [Germany]
31. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations. ¹⁰¹ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
32. Participation of national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role). ¹⁰² [Germany]
33. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft. ¹⁰³ [Germany]
34. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations. ¹⁰⁴ [Germany]
35. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces). ¹⁰⁵ [Germany]
36. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF). ¹⁰⁶ [Germany]
37. The sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements). ¹⁰⁷ [Germany]
38. The communication of information through combined, inclusive communication systems (only ‘segregated communication systems’ may be used by U.S. forces). ¹⁰⁸ [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]
39. Shared, inclusive reporting of information (only ‘exclusive reporting’ permitted by U.S. personnel). ¹⁰⁹ [United States, 2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

- 40.** Participation of national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.¹¹⁰
[France and Germany, prior to June 2009]

Air MEDEVAC Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹¹¹ [Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹¹² [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹¹³ [Canada, 2002-2004]
4. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹¹⁴ [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹¹⁵ [Canada, 2004]
6. The engagement of air forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.¹¹⁶ [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. The conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹¹⁷ [Germany]
8. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).¹¹⁸ [Germany]
9. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft).¹¹⁹
10. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.¹²⁰

11. The transport of Afghan *military* personnel aboard national helicopters, even in case of serious injury.¹²¹
12. The transport of Afghan *civilians* aboard national helicopters, even in case of serious injury.¹²²
13. The transport of national military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹²³ [Germany]
14. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹²⁴ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]
15. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft.¹²⁵ [Germany]

Air Transport Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹²⁶ [Canada, 2002-2004]
2. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹²⁷ [Canada, 2002-2004]
3. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹²⁸ [Canada, 2002-2004]
4. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹²⁹ [Canada, 2002-2004]
5. The deployment of air forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹³⁰ [Canada, 2004]
6. The engagement of air forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.¹³¹ [Canada, 2005-2006]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

7. The solo flight of any armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).¹³² [Germany]
8. Participation of national aircraft, especially helicopters, in air operations above a specific altitude (due to poorly equipped aircraft).¹³³
9. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.¹³⁴
10. The transport of Afghan military personnel aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.¹³⁵
11. The transport of Afghan civilians aboard national helicopters, even in case of injury.¹³⁶

12. The transport of national military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹³⁷ [Germany]
13. Participation of national air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹³⁸ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]
14. The transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on national aircraft.¹³⁹ [Germany]
15. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁴⁰ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South

Afghan National Army (ANA) Operational Training and Mentor Teams (OMLTs)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. The deployment of OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital. ¹⁴¹ [France]
2. The deployment of OMLTs outside the immediate vicinity surrounding PRTs, without explicit authorisation from the national government in the capital. ¹⁴² [Sweden]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

3. Contributing national forces to battalion-level OMLTs, employed for the training and mentoring of ANSF forces. ¹⁴³ [Finland]
4. The participation or engagement of national OMLT forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation. ¹⁴⁴ [Finland]
5. The deployment of OMLTs into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South. ¹⁴⁵ [Finland]
6. The deployment of OMLTs to the east of Afghanistan, specifically into RC-East. ¹⁴⁶ [Finland]
7. The deployment of OMLTs nationwide outside Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide). ¹⁴⁷ [Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Greece, Sweden, France]
8. The deployment of OMLTs outside originally assigned AO locations (districts or provinces within Regional Commands), when conducting ‘partnering’ operations. ¹⁴⁸ [Sweden, Germany, Hungary]
9. The deployment of national OMLTs outside of a 60-kilometre radius from Kabul City alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations. ¹⁴⁹ [Greece]
10. The participation of OMLTs in joint or combined operations in which national forces would be required to deploy alongside ISAF troops contributed by a historical rival. ¹⁵⁰ [Seemingly Greece with regard to both Turkey and Macedonia]
11. The embedding of national OMLT personnel within ANA ‘kandaks’ (battalions). ¹⁵¹ [Denmark]
12. The participation or engagement of national OMLT personnel in offensive operations alongside ANSF units, during ‘partnering’ operations. ¹⁵² [Hungary]
13. National OMLT s and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces. ¹⁵³ [Turkey]

14. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁵⁴ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
15. Participation of OMLTs in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹⁵⁵ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain, Greece and Italy]

Afghan National Police (ANP) Operational Training and Mentor Teams (POMLTs)

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. Participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour's drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.¹⁵⁶ [Germany]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

2. National POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is 'purely civilian government activity' (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).¹⁵⁷ [Germany]
3. National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Regional Command sector boundaries.¹⁵⁸ [Germany with regard to RC-North]
4. National POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.¹⁵⁹ [Germany]
5. National POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of assigned military base within Regional Command.¹⁶⁰ [Germany with regard to Kunduz base in RC-North]
6. National POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.¹⁶¹ [Germany]
7. National POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.¹⁶² [Germany]
8. National POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.¹⁶³ [Germany]
9. National POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.¹⁶⁴ [Germany]
10. National POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.¹⁶⁵ [Germany]
11. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁶⁶ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]
12. Participation of POMLTs in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹⁶⁷ ['South European' nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]

PRT Security Units

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. PRT Security Units from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital.¹⁶⁸ [Italy with regard to the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]
2. PRT Security Units from making excursions into ‘insecure districts’ of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital.¹⁶⁹ [Spain with regard to districts within Badghis Province, RC-West]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

3. PRT Security Units from participating or engaging in ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations.¹⁷⁰ [Finland, with regard to its forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].
4. PRT Security Units from participating in kinetic or offensive security operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).¹⁷¹ [Italy, with regard to its forces at the Italian-led Herat PRT]
5. PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).¹⁷² [Germany, prior to October 2008]
6. PRT Security Units from conducting other security operations outside of PRTs.¹⁷³ [Germany]
7. PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond a defined distance from the PRT (for example, between 10-80 kilometres, often preventing joint international patrols from PRTs).¹⁷⁴ [Turkey, Singapore]
8. PRT Security Units from deploying beyond a specified distance from the PRT within Baghlan Province.¹⁷⁵ [Hungary]
9. PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols on terrain other than the main roads around the PRT.¹⁷⁶ [Hungary]
10. PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).¹⁷⁷ [Germany]
11. PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support.¹⁷⁸ [Germany]
12. PRT Security Units from conducting security patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.¹⁷⁹ [Germany, Hungary]
13. PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRT after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).¹⁸⁰ [Germany]

14. PRT Security Units from mounting an armed response to insurgency-related security situations, except in self-defence.¹⁸¹ [Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
15. PRT Security Units from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.¹⁸² [Spain]
16. Participation of PRT Security Units in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹⁸³ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]
17. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.¹⁸⁴
18. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁸⁵ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

PRT Military-Civilian Personnel

CAVEATS LIMITING:

1. Military-civilian personnel from deploying outside the PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital.¹⁸⁶ [Italy with regard to PRT personnel based at the Herat PRT in Hirat Province]
2. Military-civilian personnel from making excursions into ‘insecure districts’ of the PRT Province without prior approval from the government in the national capital.¹⁸⁷ [Spain with regard to PRT personnel based at the Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]

CAVEATS PROHIBITING:

3. Civilian personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working with national armed forces in Afghanistan.¹⁸⁸ [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]
4. Civilian aid personnel deployed to the ISAF by government development aid departments from working near to localities where national armed forces operate or are based.¹⁸⁹ [Sweden with regard to development aid SIDA personnel in RC-North]
5. PRT civil-military personnel from participating or engaging in ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations.¹⁹⁰ [Finland, with regard to its forces at the Swedish-led Mazar-e-Sharif and Norwegian-led Meymenah PRTs].
6. Closely cooperating or working with ANSF forces.¹⁹¹
7. Military-civilian personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.¹⁹² [Germany]
8. The deployment of civilian personnel outside of a PRT’s immediate surrounding area.¹⁹³ [Sweden with regard to Mazar-e-Sharif PRT in Balkh Province]
9. The conduct of any activity or task by PRT military-civilian personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.¹⁹⁴ [Germany]
10. Military-civilian personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.¹⁹⁵ [Germany]
11. Military-civilian personnel from staying outside the PRT base overnight.¹⁹⁶ [Hungary]
12. Military-civilian personnel from taking an active role in counter-insurgency operations.¹⁹⁷ [Spain with regard to the Qal’ey-ye Now PRT in Badghis Province]
13. Participation of military-civilian personnel in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall.¹⁹⁸ [‘South European’ nations, ostensibly Spain and Italy]

14. Participation or engagement of any PRT civilian personnel in counter-narcotics activities that could heighten the threat to national personnel.¹⁹⁹ [Lithuania, in regard to Chaghcharan PRT in Ghor Province, Hungary with regard to Pol-e Khomri PRT in Baghlan Province]
15. Participation of any kind by national forces in counter-narcotics operations.²⁰⁰ [Turkey, Hungary, the Netherlands, and 14 other ISAF nations, especially TCNs operating in RC-South]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

16. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).²⁰¹ [2001-2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES

17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the German Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-North boundary lines, to respond to emergencies 'AOR wide' across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).²⁰²
18. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.²⁰³
19. Caveat prohibiting German ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combat operations).²⁰⁴
20. Caveat prohibiting German combat ground forces from deploying into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.²⁰⁵ [2009]
21. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German KSK Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces.²⁰⁶ [2008]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

22. Caveat prohibiting the execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships).²⁰⁷

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

23. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.²⁰⁸
24. Caveat prohibiting German national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.²⁰⁹
25. Caveat prohibiting the national reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.²¹⁰ [2008-2009]

OTHER AIR OPS:

26. Caveat prohibiting the solo flight of any German armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).²¹¹

TIME:

27. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.²¹²
28. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of German combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).²¹³
29. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of patrols by security ground forces at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.²¹⁴
30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national combat aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.²¹⁵
31. Caveat prohibiting the transport of German military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.²¹⁶
32. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.²¹⁷
33. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.²¹⁸
34. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRTs after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).²¹⁹
35. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of any activity or task by German PRT civil-military personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.²²⁰
36. Caveat prohibiting German civil-military personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.²²¹

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

37. The participation or engagement of German national ground or air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²²²
38. Caveat prohibiting the distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by German reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.²²³

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

39. Caveat prohibiting any lead role of German national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).²²⁴
40. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).²²⁵

ISAF COOPERATION:

41. Caveat prohibiting the transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on German national aircraft.²²⁶
42. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.²²⁷ [2008-2009]
43. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).²²⁸
44. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).²²⁹
45. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).²³⁰

ANSF COOPERATION:

46. Caveat *limiting* the participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour's drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.²³¹
47. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside specific missions within certain districts or Provinces within RC-North, when conducting 'partnering' operations with ANSF forces.²³²
48. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).²³³
49. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.²³⁴ [2009]
50. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is 'purely civilian government activity' (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).²³⁵
51. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of RC-North sector boundaries.²³⁶
52. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas.²³⁷
53. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Kunduz military base within RC-North.²³⁸
54. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment.²³⁹
55. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from recruiting security contractors.²⁴⁰
56. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations.²⁴¹
57. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases.²⁴²
58. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support.²⁴³

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

59. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs).²⁴⁴ [Prior to October 2008]
60. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting any security operation outside the borders of the German PRTs.²⁴⁵
61. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted).²⁴⁶
62. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support.²⁴⁷
63. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any German PRT security personnel based at Meymaneh PRT into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.²⁴⁸ [2009]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

64. Caveat prohibiting German Civil-military personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.²⁴⁹
65. Caveat prohibiting the any German PRT stability personnel based at Meymaneh PRT from travelling into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.²⁵⁰ [2009]

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