

ISAF APPENDIX 10(b):

**Compiled List of Known National Caveats Imposed by the
8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands on
National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan over the
10-year period from 2002-2012**

This NATO “Lead Nation” caveat list was compiled by Dr Regeena Kingsley and is taken from her PhD research thesis in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled, *‘Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.’*

The list was created based on the national caveat information gathered during the course of this doctoral research from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF mission on their deployed armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

For more information on “national caveats” and the impact of national caveat constraints on the effectiveness of the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, in addition to previous UN-led and NATO-led multinational security operations in Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, Mali, Libya, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, please visit www.militarycaveats.com or refer to Dr Regeena Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from

Massey University’s official website here:

<http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984>.

KEY:	Caveat-Free Forces				Caveat-Fettered Forces				Temporary Caveat-Free Exceptions			
# ISAF TCNs	37	37	40	40	41	42	44	46	48	48	50	50
YEAR	JAN 2007	JUL 2007	FEB 2008	JUN 2008	FEB 2009	JUN 2009	FEB 2010	JUL 2010	FEB 2011	JUN 2011	JAN 2012	DEC 2012
LEAD NATIONS												
Canada	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,500	2,830	2,830	2,830	2,830	2,905	2,922	556	950
France	1,000	800	1,515	1,670 (600)	2,780 (600)	2,780	3,750	3,750	4,000	3,935	3,916	543
Germany	3,000	3,000	3,210	3,370	3,460	3,380	4,415	4,350	4,920	4,812	4,818	4,318
Italy	1,950	2,500	2,880	2,350 (60)	2,350 (60)	2,350	3,150	3,300	3,770	3,880	3,952	4,000
Netherlands	2,200	1,300	1,650	1,770	1,770	1,770	1,940	1,705	195	192	166	500
Turkey	800	1,200	675	760	700	730	1,755	1,710	1,825	1,786	1,845	998
United Kingdom	5,200	6,500	7,800	8,530	8,300	8,300	9,500	9,500	9,500	9,500	9,500	9,500
United States	14,000	14,750	15,000	23,550	24,900	28,850	47,085	78,430	90,000	90,000	90,000	68,000
<i>(Exception: Helmand)</i>							(15,000)	(15,000)	(15,000)	(15,000)	(15,000)	(15,000)
TOTAL ISAF FORCE	35,460	39,000	43,250	52,900	56,420	61,130	85,795	119,500	131,983	132,457	130,386	102,011

ISAF APPENDIX 10(a) – Table Displaying the Caveat-Free or Caveat-Fettered Forces of the 8 ISAF Lead Nations during 6 Crucial Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Years from 2007-2012

**Compiled List of Known National Caveats Imposed by the
8 NATO Lead Nations of ISAF Regional Commands on
National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan over the
10 Year Period from 2002-2012**

(*Please note: Some caveats apply only to specific force units within the national contingent, whereas others apply to *all* deployed national contingent forces generally including a range of different force units. In the latter case, these nations' caveats may consequently appear in several different categories listed below.)

FRANCE

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-Capital

- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003– June 2009 (5 ½ years)*
- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation from June 2009 – December 2012 (3 ½ years)*
- *Total number of known caveats by category: 17*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French national air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.¹

GEOGRAPHIC:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the south of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the *in extremis* agreement).² [With the exception of French fighter planes which were transferred to Kandahar Airfield in 2008 to shorten flight times]

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of designated regional command sector into the east of Afghanistan (in practice even in cases of emergency, despite the *in extremis* agreement).³ [At least between 2001 and July 2008, after which one French combat battalion was authorised to deploy to Kapisa Province in RC-East, subsequently followed in 2009 by all French combat ground and air forces].

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations (2001-2006, pre Riga Summit agreement).⁴
5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French national forces outside of RC-Capital sector (Kabul Province) boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (post-Riga *in extremis* agreement).⁵ [Forces frequently not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS

6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French force personnel outside Kabul International Airport.⁶
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside of originally assigned suburb/district of Kabul City.⁷

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in crowd/riot control.⁸
9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French national forces in PRTs.⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the French RC-Capital Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan, regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests (enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).¹⁰
11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.¹¹

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

12. Caveat prohibiting the participation of French forces in riot control operations.¹²

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

13. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of French combat air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.¹³

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

14. Participation or engagement of French infantry combat forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁴
15. Participation or engagement of French Special Forces in counter-narcotics operations.¹⁵

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Kabul Province, unless permission is sought and received from the national capital.¹⁶ [France]
17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of French OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting ‘partnering’ operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).¹⁷

TURKEY

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-Capital

- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – December 2012 (9 years)*
- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation: Never (0 years)*
- *Total number of known caveats by category: 17*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish ground forces deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.¹⁸
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any Turkish aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.¹⁹

GEOGRAPHIC:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.²⁰ [2003-2007, still in place after opening its first PRT in Wardak Province, RC-East, and in force at the time of the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.²¹ [2003-2006]
5. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Turkish national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of 'emergency' security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).²²

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).²³

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

7. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).²⁴

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

8. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national ground forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).²⁵

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

9. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).²⁶

OTHER AIR OPS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Turkish national air forces in any offensive or kinetic combat operations at all (Turkish forces are deployed in a strictly 'non-combat' role).²⁷

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

11. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁸ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
12. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Turkish air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁹ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
13. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF ground forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.³⁰

14. Caveat prohibiting the support of ISAF air forces in counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. ³¹

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

15. Caveat prohibiting the engagement or participation of any kind by Turkish national forces in counter-narcotics operations (although C-N training of ANSF forces is permitted). ³² [2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

16. Caveat prohibiting Turkish OMLT s and other national personnel involved in the training of ANSF forces in RC-Capital from conducting combat operations (or assuming any combat role) during training or ‘partnering’ operations with ANSF forces. ³³

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

17. Caveat prohibiting Turkish PRT Security Units from patrolling beyond approximately 10 kilometres from Kowt-i-Ashrow PRT in Wardak Province of RC-East (preventing planned joint security patrols between the Wardak and Bamyan PRTs).³⁴

ITALY

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-Capital & RC-West

- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – May 2009 (5 ½ years)*
- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation from May 2009 – December 2012 (3 ½ years)*
- *Total number of known caveats by category: 37*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

GEOGRAPHIC:

1. Caveat *limiting* any deployment to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions when national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.³⁵ [2009]
2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into RC-South.³⁶ [2003-2007, still in place by the October 2007 Noordwijk Summit]
3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of designated regional command sectors into the south or east of Afghanistan, even in cases of emergency.³⁷ [2006-2009]

REGIONAL:

4. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of national forces outside of RC-West, without a 72-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.³⁸
5. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of national forces outside of RC-West, without a 6-hour stand-down period prior to the deployment for the national government to give approval.³⁹
6. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside RC-Capital boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.⁴⁰ [2003-2006]
7. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of national forces outside RC-West boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.⁴¹ [2003-2006]
8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-Capital sector, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post

November 2006).⁴² [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside RC-West sector (including into RC-North), except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations as per the *in extremis* Riga agreement (Post November 2006).⁴³ [Forces not deployed during emergencies in practice, however, due to on-going arguments about the interpretation of ‘emergency’ between 2006-2009]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

10. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Kabul Province in RC-Capital.⁴⁴
11. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of Hirat Province in RC-West.⁴⁵
12. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces in RC-West beyond a specified distance from Herat City into Hirat Province (less than 100 kilometres).⁴⁶

FORCE CEILING:

13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 2,300 troops.⁴⁷

LETHAL FORCE/WEAPONS:

14. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of national forces in mine clearing.⁴⁸ [2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the Italian RC-West Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of Regional Command boundary lines, to respond to emergencies ‘AOR wide’ across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).⁴⁹ [2006-2009]
16. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.⁵⁰ [2001-2009]

17. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).⁵¹
18. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian combat ground forces in any operation occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West or RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South).⁵² [2005-2009]
19. Caveat prohibiting the participation of infantry forces in active, kinetic and lethal ‘counter-insurgent’ operations against insurgents.⁵³
20. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of combat operations by Italian infantry on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.⁵⁴
21. Caveat prohibiting Italian ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations, e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combined combat operations.⁵⁵

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

22. Caveat limiting the conduct of patrols by Italian ground forces, without explicit government authorisation from the national capital in Rome.⁵⁶ [Only 270 of 1,800 Italian soldiers were permitted to patrol in October 2007]
23. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian security forces in kinetic or offensive security operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).⁵⁷

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

24. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Italian national air forces in any ISAF ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operation.⁵⁸ [2001-2009]
25. Caveat prohibiting the national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations, except in combined operations led by ANSF forces.⁵⁹
26. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian national aircraft and personnel in operations occurring outside the boundary lines of RC-West and RC-Capital (particularly into RC-South).⁶⁰ [2005-2009]
27. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of ‘close air support’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.⁶¹ [2001-2009]
28. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of ‘reconnaissance’ missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.⁶² [2001-2009]

TIME:

29. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Italian national forces outside of protective military bases on days of national significance, such as Italian statutory holidays.⁶³

WEATHER:

30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian ground forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ⁶⁴
31. Caveat prohibiting the participation of Italian air forces in any operation taking place in winter conditions, such as after snowfall. ⁶⁵

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

32. The participation or engagement of Italian ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁶⁶ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
33. The participation or engagement of Italian air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.⁶⁷ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

ISAF COOPERATION

34. The conduct of 'reconnaissance' missions by national Tornado aircraft, to support ISAF ground forces engaging in combat operations.⁶⁸ [Italy, 2001-2009]

ANSF COOPERATION:

35. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of OMLTs outside of RC-West and RC-Capital boundary lines (into RC-North, RC-South or RC-East) alongside their ANSF units, when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).⁶⁹

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

36. Caveat *limiting* Italian PRT Security Units from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome. ⁷⁰

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

37. Caveat *limiting* Italian military-civilian personnel from deploying outside the Herat PRT without explicit government authorisation from the capital in Rome.⁷¹

GERMANY

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-North

- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – December 2012 (9 years)*
- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation: Never (0 years)*
- *Total number of known caveats by category: 74*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

MISSION:

1. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national ground forces (including Special Forces), deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.⁷²
2. Caveat prohibiting the participation of any national aircraft or personnel, deployed to the ISAF mission, in activities or operations conducted by the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission in Afghanistan.⁷³
3. Caveat prohibiting the provision of any intelligence, collected from reconnaissance aircraft deployed to the ISAF operation, to the neighbouring OEF operation – except where doing so directly supports ISAF operations (intelligence must be distributed solely within the ISAF mission).⁷⁴
4. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in the NATO-proposed air traffic coordination and dispersal Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) mission in Afghanistan.⁷⁵ [Prior to June 2009]

THEATRE:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German air crews in any controversial cross-border operations into Pakistan.⁷⁶

GEOGRAPHIC:

6. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of German forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on a temporary case-by-case basis where the deployment is considered

‘absolutely necessary’ for the ISAF mission and national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.⁷⁷ [2003-2009]

7. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of German national forces to the hostile southern provinces of Afghanistan, except on specific, rare ‘time-limited’ occasions in which national government approval has been sought and explicitly granted.⁷⁸ [2003-2009]
8. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces into southern Afghanistan, specifically into the hostile RC-South.⁷⁹ [2003-2009]
9. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces anywhere south of the Hindu Kush mountains.⁸⁰

REGIONAL:

10. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of national forces out of RC-North unless the deployment is temporary, ‘necessary for the success of the ISAF’, and approved by the government Minister of Defence.⁸¹
11. Caveat *limiting* any specific deployment of Special Forces outside the originally assigned Regional Command, without explicit consent of the government Minister of Defence, as specified in the ISAF mandate.⁸²
12. Caveat *limiting* any deployment of Special Forces units outside of own assigned ISAF Regional Command, even upon request of the COMISAF, without specific case-by-case approval from the Minister of Defence (post-Riga).⁸³
13. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside RC-North boundary lines for any reason, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.⁸⁴ [2001-2006]
14. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces outside of RC-North sector boundaries, except in cases of ‘emergency’ security situations (following the November 2006 Riga *in extremis* agreement).⁸⁵ [2006-2012]
15. Caveat prohibiting operations by German KSK Special Forces outside RC-North command sector, even under the authority of the COMISAF.⁸⁶ [2008]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

16. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.⁸⁷ [2009]

17. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German national forces within RC-North more than two hours distant from well-equipped hospitals with emergency surgery facilities.⁸⁸

FORCE CEILING:

18. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 3,500 troops.⁸⁹
19. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 4,500 troops⁹⁰
20. Caveat prohibiting the force contingents from exceeding troop ceiling within Afghanistan, even temporarily during force rotations.⁹¹ [Prior to October 2008]

LETHAL FORCE/WEAPONS:

21. Caveat prohibiting the use of lethal force, unless an attack is taking place or is imminent (permitted only in self-defence).⁹² [2001-2009]
22. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries, except in self-defence.⁹³ [2001-2009]
23. Caveat prohibiting firing weapons at adversaries in self-defence while Enemy forces are moving, either to retreat or re-position.⁹⁴ [2001-2009]
24. Caveat prohibiting the use of heavy weapons against adversaries.⁹⁵ [2001-2009]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES:

25. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in kinetic or offensive combat operations, except in self-defence (force-protection permitted).⁹⁶ [2001-2009]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

26. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of the German Quick Reaction Force (QRF) entity outside of RC-North boundary lines, to respond to emergencies 'AOR wide' across the entire theatre of Afghanistan (regardless of SACEUR and COMISAF requests, enforced prior to and even following the Riga agreement).⁹⁷
27. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat ground forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.⁹⁸

28. Caveat prohibiting German ground forces from supporting offensive ground operations conducted by other ISAF nations (e.g. through providing combat support, except in support of ANSF forces in Afghan-led combat operations).⁹⁹
29. Caveat prohibiting German combat ground forces from deploying into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹⁰⁰ [2009]
30. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German KSK Special Forces in any operation apart from tracking down insurgents responsible for recent attacks on national forces.¹⁰¹ [2008]

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

31. Caveat prohibiting the execution of foot patrols within Afghan cities (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted in townships).¹⁰²

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

32. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of German combat air forces in any ISAF 'war-fighting' offensive combat operation.¹⁰³
33. Caveat prohibiting German national air forces from supporting offensive ground or air operations conducted by other ISAF nations.¹⁰⁴
34. Caveat prohibiting the national reconnaissance Tornado aircraft from performing any combat role.¹⁰⁵ [2008-2009]

OTHER AIR OPS:

35. Caveat prohibiting the solo flight of any German armoured helicopter on operations (air operations must be conducted in pairs, involving a minimum of two aircraft).¹⁰⁶

TIME:

36. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German combat ground forces in operations undertaken at night, under cover of darkness.¹⁰⁷
37. Caveat prohibiting any deployment of German combat ground forces from military bases after nightfall (all national troops must also return to base before nightfall).¹⁰⁸
38. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of patrols by security ground forces at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.¹⁰⁹

39. Caveat prohibiting the participation of national combat aircraft and personnel in security or reconnaissance operations conducted at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹¹⁰
40. Caveat prohibiting the transport of German military personnel on transport aircraft at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹¹¹
41. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) operations at night after dusk, or at any time under cover of darkness.¹¹²
42. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols at night, undertaken under cover of darkness.¹¹³
43. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from deploying outside PRTs after nightfall (unit must also return to base before nightfall).¹¹⁴
44. Caveat prohibiting the conduct of any activity or task by German PRT civil-military personnel within the PRT at night, after nightfall.¹¹⁵
45. Caveat prohibiting German civil-military personnel from exiting the PRT base at night, after nightfall.¹¹⁶

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

46. The participation or engagement of German national ground or air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.¹¹⁷
47. Caveat prohibiting the distribution of reconnaissance photographs taken by German reconnaissance aircraft to ISAF participating nations if there is a risk that the photographs might be used by these nations in ISAF counter-terrorism efforts.¹¹⁸

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

48. Caveat prohibiting any lead role of German national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan (only CN support activities permitted).¹¹⁹
49. Caveat prohibiting the participation of German national forces in any counter-narcotics operations or activities which do not also involve ANSF forces (preferably in a lead role).¹²⁰

ISAF COOPERATION:

50. Caveat prohibiting the transport of ISAF military personnel from other ISAF force contributing nations on German national aircraft.¹²¹
51. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which participate in ISAF offensive operations.¹²² [2008-2009]
52. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with other ISAF nations via the NATO CETRIXS or BICES computer networks (intelligence will be shared selectively with nations on the basis of bilateral intelligence sharing agreements).¹²³
53. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with ISAF participating nations which simultaneously contribute to the OEF mission (for example American, British or French forces).¹²⁴
54. Caveat prohibiting the sharing of insurgent-related intelligence gained from Tornado reconnaissance flights with individual military commanders involved in both the ISAF and OEF operations (for example, the COMISAF).¹²⁵

ANSF COOPERATION:

55. Caveat *limiting* the participation of national POMLTs in Focused District Development (FDD) police training programs, unless the district in question is within one hour's drive of a national PRT or other national military installation.¹²⁶
56. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside specific missions within certain districts or Provinces within RC-North, when conducting 'partnering' operations with ANSF forces.¹²⁷
57. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs outside of Regional Command boundary lines alongside their ANSF units when conducting 'partnering' operations (teams are not permitted to operate nationwide).¹²⁸
58. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of German OMLTs into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹²⁹ [2009]
59. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from partnering with Afghan ANP in operations beyond the scope of normal law enforcement, that is 'purely civilian government activity' (counter-insurgent or combat operations with the paramilitary ANP not permitted).¹³⁰

60. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of RC-North sector boundaries. ¹³¹
61. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations in conflict areas. ¹³²
62. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from deploying with ANP units outside of Kunduz military base within RC-North. ¹³³
63. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs deployed as part of the EUPOL contingent from exiting their military base for the duration of their deployment. ¹³⁴
64. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from recruiting security contractors. ¹³⁵
65. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from involving or participating with security contractors in the conduct of police training and mentoring operations. ¹³⁶
66. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting operations outside the immediate vicinity of military bases. ¹³⁷
67. Caveat prohibiting German POMLTs from conducting training or mentoring operations beyond the protection of national combat forces and medical support. ¹³⁸

PRT SECURITY UNITS:

68. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting regular patrols in the immediate area around PRTs (confined to activities only within PRTs). ¹³⁹ [Prior to October 2008]
69. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting any security operation outside the borders of the German PRTs. ¹⁴⁰
70. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from executing foot patrols within the PRT township (only patrolling within armoured vehicles permitted). ¹⁴¹
71. Caveat prohibiting German PRT Security Units from conducting patrols without armoured vehicle support. ¹⁴²
72. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of any German PRT security personnel based at Meymaneh PRT into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North. ¹⁴³ [2009]

MIL-CIV PRT PERSONNEL:

73. Caveat prohibiting German Civil-military personnel from operating outside the borders of PRT bases.¹⁴⁴
74. Caveat prohibiting the any German PRT stability personnel based at Meymaneh PRT from travelling into the southern Ghormach district of Badghis Province, RC-North.¹⁴⁵ [2009]

CANADA

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-South

- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – December 2005 (2 years) and from July 2011 – December 2012 (1 ½ years, making a total of 3 ½ years)*
- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation from January 2006 – July 2011 (5 years)*
- *Total number of known caveats by category: 42*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside Regional Command boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹⁴⁶ [2001-2005]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Canadian national forces outside of Kabul City into the surrounding areas of Kabul Province.¹⁴⁷ [2002-2004]

COMMAND:

3. Caveat *limiting* the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent from exiting immediate vicinity of Kabul City, without permission from the national chain of command in the Canadian capital of Ottawa.¹⁴⁸
4. Caveat *limiting* the National Commander of the Canadian force contingent to travel in any vehicle not agreed to by the national chain of command, regardless of the commander's own preference or recommendation (e.g. one commander was compelled to travel in an armoured vehicle rather than his own choice of a more COIN-suitable sports utility vehicle).¹⁴⁹
5. Caveat *limiting* the requisition of Canadian aircraft by ISAF HQ or other ISAF allies, without explicit national government approval.¹⁵⁰
6. Caveat *limiting* the COMISAF from over-riding any decision made by National Commanders of the Canadian national contingents without direct communication with the national

government in the capital.¹⁵¹ [Between 2001-2004 when Canadian Generals held the position of overall COMISAF and deputy COMISAF of the ISAF mission]

GENERAL OPERATIONS/ACTIVITIES CAVEATS:

7. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁵² [2002-2004]
8. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁵³ [2002-2004]
9. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁵⁴ [2002-2004]
10. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁵⁵ [2002-2004]
11. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁵⁶ [2002-2004]
12. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁵⁷ [2004]
13. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. ¹⁵⁸ [2005-2006]
14. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].¹⁵⁹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

15. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶⁰ [2002-2004]
16. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶¹ [2002-2004]
17. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶² [2002-2004]
18. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶³ [2002-2004]
19. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶⁴ [2002-2004]
20. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶⁵ [2004]
21. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.¹⁶⁶ [2005-2006]
22. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].¹⁶⁷

SECURITY OPS GROUND FORCES:

23. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶⁸ [2002-2004]
24. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁶⁹ [2002-2004]

25. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷⁰ [2002-2004]
26. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷¹ [2002-2004]
27. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian Special Forces on any operation in RC-Capital where forces might be involved in ‘significant activities’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷² [2002-2004]
28. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that Canadian force units ‘may be exposed to a higher degree of risk’ than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷³ [2004]
29. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes ‘outside the boundaries’ of the Chief of Defence Staff’s guidelines contained in the ‘Letter of Intent’, without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task. ¹⁷⁴ [2005-2006]
30. Caveat prohibiting the engagement of Canadian national forces in crowd control operations [2002-2004].¹⁷⁵

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

31. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that ‘might risk collateral damage’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷⁶ [2002-2004]
32. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain ‘potential for lethal force’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷⁷ [2002-2004]
33. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘significant casualties’ amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷⁸ [2002-2004]
34. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail ‘strategic failure’, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁷⁹ [2002-2004]

35. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a 'reasonable belief' that Canadian force units 'may be exposed to a higher degree of risk' than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁸⁰ [2004]
36. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes 'outside the boundaries' of the Chief of Defence Staff's guidelines contained in the 'Letter of Intent', without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.¹⁸¹ [2005-2006]

OTHER AIR OPS:

37. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian aircraft and personnel on any operation in RC-Capital that 'might risk collateral damage', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁸² [2002-2004]
38. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might contain 'potential for lethal force', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁸³ [2002-2004]
39. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'significant casualties' amongst national forces, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁸⁴ [2002-2004]
40. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where operations might entail 'strategic failure', without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁸⁵ [2002-2004]
41. Caveat *limiting* the deployment of Canadian national forces on any operation in RC-Capital where there is a 'reasonable belief' that Canadian force units 'may be exposed to a higher degree of risk' than in its other operations, without government approval being sought and granted prior to the operation.¹⁸⁶ [2004]
42. Caveat *limiting* the engagement of Canadian national forces in any activity that goes 'outside the boundaries' of the Chief of Defence Staff's guidelines contained in the 'Letter of Intent', without government approval being sought and granted prior participation of national personnel in the task.¹⁸⁷ [2005-2006]

THE NETHERLANDS

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-South

- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from December 2003 – November 2006 (3 years) and from August 2010 – December 2012 (2 years, 4 months)*
- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation from November 2006 – August 2010 (3 years, 9 months)*
- *Total number of known caveats: 10*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

REGIONAL:

1. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside RC-South boundary lines, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹⁸⁸ [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

AREA OF OPERATIONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces outside Uruzgan Province of RC-South, even when required by the COMISAF, or requested by other allies to mount a response to emergency security situations.¹⁸⁹

FORCE CEILING:

3. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1,000 troops.¹⁹⁰
4. Caveat prohibiting the deployment of Dutch national forces to the Uruzgan PRT in Afghanistan above the Parliamentary-approved cap of 1200 troops.¹⁹¹

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

5. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch ground combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South.¹⁹² [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

6. Caveat prohibiting the participation or involvement of Dutch air combat forces in offensive kinetic operations in RC-South.¹⁹³ [2006, prior to the Riga Summit]

COUNTER-TERRORISM:

7. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch ground forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁴ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]
8. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch air forces in ISAF counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁵ [2001-2006, prior to the 2006 Riga Summit]

COUNTER-NARCOTICS:

9. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch national forces in counter-narcotics interdiction anywhere within the Afghan AOR.¹⁹⁶ [2003-2006, prior to the Riga Summit]
10. Caveat prohibiting the participation or engagement of Dutch personnel in narcotics eradication operations in Uruzgan Province.¹⁹⁷ [2006]

UNITED KINGDOM

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-South & RC-Southwest

- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation from December 2003- December 2012 (9 years)*
- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation: Never - No caveats have ever been imposed on British forces deployed to the ISAF mission (0 years)*
- *Total number of known caveats: 0*

UNITED STATES

ISAF Lead Nation, RC-East & RC-Southwest

- *Caveat-Free Lead Nation from December 2003- January 2010 (6 years)*
- *Caveat-Imposing Lead Nation from January 2010 – December 2012, relating **only** to U.S. forces operating in Helmand Province, RC-Southwest (3 years)*
- *Total number of known caveats: 6*

Caveats Imposed According to Caveat Category:

COMMAND:

1. Caveat prohibiting the transfer of American national forces to British Lead Nation operational control within RC-Southwest.¹⁹⁸ [2010-2012, both the U.S. and the U.K. are designated Lead Nations of RC-Southwest]

LETHAL FORCE/WEAPONS:

2. Caveat prohibiting inclusive or joint/combined applications of force (only ‘exclusive’ applications of force permitted by U.S. personnel).¹⁹⁹ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT GROUND FORCES:

3. Caveat prohibiting joint combat ground operations with ground forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).²⁰⁰ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

COMBAT/SUPPORT AIR FORCES:

4. Caveat prohibiting joint combat air operations with air forces of other nationalities (only ‘independent’ combat operations permitted).²⁰¹ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

ISAF COOPERATION:

5. Caveat prohibiting the communication of information by American national forces through combined, inclusive communication systems (only ‘segregated communication systems’ may be used by U.S. forces).²⁰² [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]
6. Caveat prohibiting shared, inclusive reporting of information by American national forces (only ‘exclusive reporting’ permitted by U.S. personnel).²⁰³ [2010-2012, with regard to British personnel in Helmand Province in RC-Southwest]

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- ³ 'FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan', *Reuters AlterNet*, 26 November, 2006. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165>, (accessed 18 November 2009); J. Phillips & L. Curtis, 'Backgrounder No. 2124 - The War in Afghanistan: More Help Needed', *The Heritage Foundation*, 17 April 2008, p. 6, *The Heritage Foundation*, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/04/The-War-in-Afghanistan-More-Help-Needed>, (accessed 26 January, 2009); J. de Hoop Scheffer. 'Press Briefing on NATO's Riga Summit by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer', *op. cit.*; U.S. State Department (released by Wikileaks), *Cable 09STATE31102, Requesting Specific Contributions to Afghanistan*, 1 April 2009, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09STATE31102.html>, (accessed 12 July 2012); U.S. State Department, *Cable 09STATE31102, op. cit.*; Auerswald & Saideman, 'NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan', *op. cit.*, p. 28.
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