#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” “There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.” « Il y a
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I detailed the shocking and profoundly disturbing events that took place under Dutch command in the Srebrenica United Nations (UN) “Protected Area” in 1995 within the broader UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see blog #20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”). These tragic real-life events have haunted Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), the Federation of Bosnia
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy (Official & Unofficial Caveat ROE)
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed how an alarming, new, global norm has developed within contemporary multinational security operations. Since the early 1990s, nations have been increasingly imposing heavy and wide-ranging constraints on the forces they contribute to multinational security operations (see blog “#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations”). The trend has become so strong in fact that today national caveats are considered to be ‘normal’ and the ‘common lot to varying degrees of all military operations conducted by NATO, the European Union
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley Routine imposition of national caveat constraints on national military contingents has developed as an increasingly common habit of nations today, whenever countries contribute forces to Multinational Operations (MNOs) authorised by the international community. This practice has continued regardless of whether the international security missions concerned have been conducted under the banner and command of an international organisation, such as the United Nations (UN), or a treaty-based military Alliance structure, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Caveat constraints have also been habitually
#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators
#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators – Dr Regeena Kingsley In previous blogs it has been explained that Rules of Engagement (ROE) are instructions for the use of force by military forces, and that these instructions or rules relate to two specific issues – self-defence and mission accomplishment. With regard to self-defence, when individuals, groups of individuals, or an armed force are declared Enemy, it is permissible for force to be used as a matter of course and offensive action to take place. The Enemy force may be attacked, at the discretion and judgment of the military commander,
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations
The desirability of fighting wars in concert with allies, and yet the difficulty of doing so unitedly, effectively and successfully, is not a new idea. Indeed, the leading champion of the Second World War against the expansionist Axis powers from 1939-45, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, once commented that there was only one thing worse than fighting with allies – and that was to fight alone without them.
In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new, unprecedented and alarming proportions. This is especially the case given the confusing maze of constraining politico-military “red-tape,” which is increasingly imposed by national governments on the armed forces they have contributed to multinational security campaigns, and which national forces are now frequently obliged to interpret and negotiate daily in the course of executing operational missions in the midst of an already friction-fraught war-zone. This red tape is comprised of restrictive politico-military Rules of Engagement, or more specifically, “national caveats” or “national exemptions”.
This blog will introduce this modern problem of allied national caveats, occurring within Multinational Operations (MNOs) that have been prosecuted either: (1) in the interest of defending national, regional or global security; or (2) as an international “humanitarian intervention” peace-enforcement or peace-keeping operation, conducted in the interest of protecting the civilian population of an ethnic or multi-ethnic nation from severe government abuse including the commission of globally illegal acts of genocide, crimes against civilian humanity, and/or ethnic cleansing.
The blog will: first, outline what national caveats are; second, discuss the growing “norm” for government to impose caveat constraints on their armed forces since the end of the Cold War in 1991; third, explain the problem of secrecy as an obstacle to rigorous academic examination and analysis of the problematic caveat issue in multinational security operations; fourth, describe the caveat turning-point that occurred during the course of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation in Afghanistan against terrorist forces between 2001-2021; and finally, introduce my own doctoral research and analysis on this crucial issue, and outline the overall aim of the research published on this website – Military Caveats.