#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In my recent blog, “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”, the severely negative effects of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement – otherwise known as “national caveats” – were examined with reference to failed United Nations (UN) operations in Angola (UNAVEM II), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). With the return to civil war in Angola in 1992-1993, an unwise and unrealistic UN mandate, combined with
#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats within the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola & the Need for Appropriate Mandates & ‘Iron Resolve’
#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats within the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola & the Need for Appropriate Mandates & ‘Iron Resolve’ – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I demonstrated how national caveats have led to several extremely negative and serious calamities within multinational security operations, by conducting three case-studies of United Nations (UN) operations executed in the early 1990s (see blog “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”). In this analysis it was shown, firstly, that national caveats complicated evacuation and endangered the lives
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed the key choice facing all Multinational Operations (MNOs) operators of having either standardised or disparate Rules of Engagement (ROE) between national contingents operating within the mission (see blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”). It outlined, firstly, the various difficulties posed to attempts by security organisations to standardise ROE among the States contributing armed forces to an MNO, and secondly, the impact of diverse sets of national ROE on
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy (Official & Unofficial Caveat ROE)
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed how an alarming, new, global norm has developed within contemporary multinational security operations. Since the early 1990s, nations have been increasingly imposing heavy and wide-ranging constraints on the forces they contribute to multinational security operations (see blog “#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations”). The trend has become so strong in fact that today national caveats are considered to be ‘normal’ and the ‘common lot to varying degrees of all military operations conducted by NATO, the European Union
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley Routine imposition of national caveat constraints on national military contingents has developed as an increasingly common habit of nations today, whenever countries contribute forces to Multinational Operations (MNOs) authorised by the international community. This practice has continued regardless of whether the international security missions concerned have been conducted under the banner and command of an international organisation, such as the United Nations (UN), or a treaty-based military Alliance structure, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Caveat constraints have also been habitually
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations
The desirability of fighting wars in concert with allies, and yet the difficulty of doing so unitedly, effectively and successfully, is not a new idea. Indeed, the leading champion of the Second World War against the expansionist Axis powers from 1939-45, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, once commented that there was only one thing worse than fighting with allies – and that was to fight alone without them.
In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new, unprecedented and alarming proportions. This is especially the case given the confusing maze of constraining politico-military “red-tape,” which is increasingly imposed by national governments on the armed forces they have contributed to multinational security campaigns, and which national forces are now frequently obliged to interpret and negotiate daily in the course of executing operational missions in the midst of an already friction-fraught war-zone. This red tape is comprised of restrictive politico-military Rules of Engagement, or more specifically, “national caveats” or “national exemptions”.
This blog will introduce this modern problem of allied national caveats, occurring within Multinational Operations (MNOs) that have been prosecuted either: (1) in the interest of defending national, regional or global security; or (2) as an international “humanitarian intervention” peace-enforcement or peace-keeping operation, conducted in the interest of protecting the civilian population of an ethnic or multi-ethnic nation from severe government abuse including the commission of globally illegal acts of genocide, crimes against civilian humanity, and/or ethnic cleansing.
The blog will: first, outline what national caveats are; second, discuss the growing “norm” for government to impose caveat constraints on their armed forces since the end of the Cold War in 1991; third, explain the problem of secrecy as an obstacle to rigorous academic examination and analysis of the problematic caveat issue in multinational security operations; fourth, describe the caveat turning-point that occurred during the course of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation in Afghanistan against terrorist forces between 2001-2021; and finally, introduce my own doctoral research and analysis on this crucial issue, and outline the overall aim of the research published on this website – Military Caveats.