#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley In earlier blogs the vital concept of ‘unity of effort’ for effective multinational security campaigns was explored, in addition to the underlying structures of ‘unity of command’ and ‘cooperation, coordination and consensus’ (see blog “#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations” and “#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations”). U.S. General of the Army (GA) Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander over more than one million allied forces in both the
#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” & Multinational Commanders – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations
#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” & Multinational Commanders – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley Unity of Effort: Vital for Success in MNOs Regardless of the means employed to achieve unity of effort within any Multinational Operation (MNO), the actual attainment of unity of effort is crucial for the effective and successful prosecution of multinational campaigns (see blog “#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations”). It is the prerequisite for success in all forms of multinational military operations without which ‘any organization’s work can negate the advances made by others’.[1]
#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations
#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley No-matter which command arrangement a Multinational Operation (MNO) assumes or what Command and Control (C²) system is imposed (see blog “#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command & Control (C²)“), the true effectiveness of the multinational enterprise will ultimately hinge on one factor: the unity of the actors in the effort towards achieving the common purpose of the operation. In military terminology this is known as unity of effort. Unity of Effort According to the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms,
#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command & Control (C²)
#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command & Control (C²) – Dr Regeena Kingsley As stated previously, the conduct of multinational warfare is a very complex business. This complexity is inherent in every multinational security operation, being as it is, the activity of war (whether small- or full-scale), conducted by a temporarily-unified body, for a temporary purpose, that comprises a variety of different national actors via disparate military forces. Command and Control ‘Command and Control’ (C²) systems are crucial to successful management of this inherent complexity within MNOs. Indeed, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Lou Marich from the
#5 Why Multinational War? The Benefits & Costs of Waging War Multilaterally
#5 Why Multinational War? The Benefits & Costs of Waging War Multilaterally – Dr Regeena Kingsley Upon perusing the list of MNO features previously outlined (see blog “#4 What is a Multinational Operation?“), a list involving several drawbacks to multinational command, one may well ask why multinational military campaigns are sought by nations on the world stage at all. Winston Churchill perhaps best expressed the answer to this question during the Second World War when he stated: ‘There is only one thing worse than having allies – that is not having allies’.[1] Indeed, there are a number of
#4 What is a Multinational Operation?
#4 What is a Multinational Operation? – Dr Regeena Kingsley Multinational Operations (MNOs) Multinational operations (MNOs) have become an overriding feature of combat during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Operations conducted by an allied force drawn from several nations have taken place in multiple theatres around the world during this period. During the twentieth century, for instance, MNOs took place in France during World War I; in Northern Russia at the close of the war in 1918; in both the European and the Asia-Pacific theatres of war during World War II; in Palestine, Korea, the Dominican Republic and
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations
The desirability of fighting wars in concert with allies, and yet the difficulty of doing so unitedly, effectively and successfully, is not a new idea. Indeed, the leading champion of the Second World War against the expansionist Axis powers from 1939-45, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, once commented that there was only one thing worse than fighting with allies – and that was to fight alone without them.
In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new, unprecedented and alarming proportions. This is especially the case given the confusing maze of constraining politico-military “red-tape,” which is increasingly imposed by national governments on the armed forces they have contributed to multinational security campaigns, and which national forces are now frequently obliged to interpret and negotiate daily in the course of executing operational missions in the midst of an already friction-fraught war-zone. This red tape is comprised of restrictive politico-military Rules of Engagement, or more specifically, “national caveats” or “national exemptions”.
This blog will introduce this modern problem of allied national caveats, occurring within Multinational Operations (MNOs) that have been prosecuted either: (1) in the interest of defending national, regional or global security; or (2) as an international “humanitarian intervention” peace-enforcement or peace-keeping operation, conducted in the interest of protecting the civilian population of an ethnic or multi-ethnic nation from severe government abuse including the commission of globally illegal acts of genocide, crimes against civilian humanity, and/or ethnic cleansing.
The blog will: first, outline what national caveats are; second, discuss the growing “norm” for government to impose caveat constraints on their armed forces since the end of the Cold War in 1991; third, explain the problem of secrecy as an obstacle to rigorous academic examination and analysis of the problematic caveat issue in multinational security operations; fourth, describe the caveat turning-point that occurred during the course of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation in Afghanistan against terrorist forces between 2001-2021; and finally, introduce my own doctoral research and analysis on this crucial issue, and outline the overall aim of the research published on this website – Military Caveats.