The desirability of fighting wars in concert with allies, and yet the difficulty of doing so unitedly, effectively and successfully, is not a new idea. Indeed, the leading champion of the Second World War against the expansionist Axis powers from 1939-45, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, once commented that there was only one thing worse than fighting with allies – and that was to fight alone without them.

In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new, unprecedented and alarming proportions. This is especially the case given the confusing maze of constraining politico-military “red-tape,” which is increasingly imposed by national governments on the armed forces they have contributed to multinational security campaigns, and which national forces are now frequently obliged to interpret and negotiate daily in the course of executing operational missions in the midst of an already friction-fraught war-zone. This red tape is comprised of restrictive politico-military Rules of Engagement, or more specifically, “national caveats” or “national exemptions”.

This blog will introduce this modern problem of allied national caveats, occurring within Multinational Operations (MNOs) that have been prosecuted either: (1) in the interest of defending national, regional or global security; or (2) as an international “humanitarian intervention” peace-enforcement or peace-keeping operation, conducted in the interest of protecting the civilian population of an ethnic or multi-ethnic nation from severe government abuse including the commission of globally illegal acts of genocide, crimes against civilian humanity, and/or ethnic cleansing.

The blog will: first, outline what national caveats are; second, discuss the growing “norm” for government to impose caveat constraints on their armed forces since the end of the Cold War in 1991; third, explain the problem of secrecy as an obstacle to rigorous academic examination and analysis of the problematic caveat issue in multinational security operations; fourth, describe the caveat turning-point that occurred during the course of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation in Afghanistan against terrorist forces between 2001-2021; and finally, introduce my own doctoral research and analysis on this crucial issue, and outline the overall aim of the research published on this website – Military Caveats.