#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: "Self-Defence" & "Mission Accomplishment" Instructions

#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats:

“Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions

– Dr Regeena Kingsley

Rules of Engagement (ROE) contain specific instructions relating to the use of force. Indeed, they are defined by NATO as: ‘Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered’.[1]

ROE contain precise and classified prescriptions on exactly when (use of force) and how (degree of force) military armed forces may employ force against the Enemy while performing tasks towards stated mission objectives (see blog “#9 What are “Rules of Engagement”?”). In particular, they contain specific instructions relating to the means (weaponry) and methods (tactics) by which lethal force may be legitimately and lawfully employed on the battlefield by military armed forces.

According to the NZDF Operational Law Companion, the legal manual of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), ROE are issued in all circumstances where it may be necessary for members of the armed forces to use force and can cover a variety of force-related matters, namely:

(a) the use of all weapons and weapons systems employed by members of the defence force;
(b) the use of methods and means such as electronic warfare, illumination and harassment;
(c) the use of non-lethal weapons;
(d) the use of manoeuvres such as interposition or riding-off;
(e) the exercise of powers in assistance to the civil power; and lastly
(f) the search and detention of vessels, vehicles or persons (the latter including prisoners of war, detainees and those rendered hors de combat through illness, injury or shipwreck).[2]

Usually these rules will also include a list of definitions of key terms used within the instructions, for instance outlining what constitutes a hostile act, hostile intent, deadly force, non-deadly force, and who constitutes the Enemy.

Principally, however, all ROE contain instructions in regard to two issues of critical import to military personnel in the field: self-defence and mission accomplishment.

(I) Self-Defence Instructions

The first major issue concerns self-defence. When individuals, groups of individuals, or an armed force are declared Enemy, it is permissible for force to be used as a matter of course and offensive action to take place. The Enemy force may be attacked, at the discretion and judgment of the military commander, provided all offensive action is carried out with due regard for LOAC, prescribed ROE, and the orders and operational plan from higher command (see endnote).[3]

Special rules govern the use of force in defensive action against an Enemy assault, however, where such action takes place in self-defence. These rules form part of ROE and apply to the use of force in both unit self-defence and individual self-defence in response to a hostile act or hostile intent.[4]

In discussing these concepts, it is first necessary to understand what a hostile act or hostile intent entails. Every State has its own definition of what exactly constitutes a hostile act or hostile intent in the context of operations, and they differ in length and scope (refer to endnote).[5] Generally, however, a hostile act may be regarded as an attack, or other use of force, by any person or foreign force:

(a) directed against national armed forces, or those forces aligned with or under the protection of said national forces, including civilians;
(b) or used directly to prevent or impede the mission or duties of national forces, including against any property or equipment which if lost will significantly impede the safe conduct of operations.[6]

Hostile intent, by contrast, may be regarded as:

(a) the threat or imminent use of force against national forces;
(b) the threat of force to prevent or impede the mission or duties of national forces; or
(c) conduct on the part of any person or foreign force which causes a commander to conclude that a hostile act is imminent.[7]

In determining the latter, the commander must have ‘reasonable grounds’ to arrive at this conclusion, which usually involves consideration of the following factors: (1) the capabilities and physical actions of the person or unit presenting the threat; (2) available intelligence information; (3) the political situation at the time; and (4) specific guidance from higher authority.[8]

Unit Self-Defence

In terms of unit self-defence, firstly, Article 51 of the UN Charter preserves the inherent right of all Member-States to use force in self-defence, either by itself or collectively with other States, if an armed attack occurs against a nation’s sovereign territory, its interests, or another Member-State of the United Nations.[9] By extension, this means that any unit of the armed forces of a sovereign State deployed on operations overseas in the interests of that State, also has the legitimate right to use force in self-defence in the event, or threat of, an armed attack (see endnote).[10]

This right of unit self-defence is written into the ROE for any deployed force. To illustrate, the NZDF legal manual states on the matter:

It is the duty of every New Zealand commander to maintain the combat effectiveness of his or her unit and the safety of those personnel under his or her command. If subject to a hostile act or in response to a hostile intent, Unit Commanders may use such force as is necessary in the circumstances and is proportionate to that hostile act or deter that hostile intent.[11]

Likewise, within the ‘standing ROE’ of the U.S. armed forces it states that a U.S. unit commander has ‘the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action to defend the unit, including elements and personnel, or other U.S. forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent’, which may also include the defence of Partner and host nation forces, in addition to civilians.[12]

Individual Self-Defence

In terms of individual self-defence, secondly, members of national armed forces are by extension entitled to take all appropriate action, using all necessary means available, for their own individual self-defence or in defence of fellow compatriots-in-arms or allied personnel, and this right is similarly recorded in an armed force’s ROE.[13] As the NZDF legal manual emphasizes:

‘Each individual service member may use such force as is, in the circumstance as he or she believes them to be, it is reasonable to use to defend himself or herself or any person whom it is his or her duty to defend’.[14]

This entitlement comes with the proviso, however, that self-defence is necessary and that the force used is proportional, meaning that the nature, duration and scope of the engagement does not exceed that required to counter the hostile act or hostile intent.[15] Military personnel acting in self-defence may not under any circumstances breach LOAC, nor disobey superior orders, including orders relating to fire discipline such as orders for opening fire.[16]

This international right of personnel to individual self-defence may be limited, however, when such individuals are acting as part of a unit, whereby the degree of force used is decided at the discretion of the ranking military officer in command.[17]

ROE Guidelines for Defensive Action

The main role that ROE plays with respect to these rights of self-defence is to outline guidelines regarding whether and in what way military commanders may carry out defensive action to preserve combat effectiveness and the safety of personnel.[18]

In situations in which national forces become subject to a hostile attack or hostile intent, for instance, ROE may lay out specific guidelines for action oriented around disparate courses of defensive action, usually a range of options involving low-, medium- and high-level force.

To illustrate, the NZDF Operational Law Companion outlines three means of self-defence:

(1) attempt to control without the use of force, if time and circumstances permit, by providing the opposing person or force with warnings and an opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening action (low-level force);
(2) use force to control the situation if necessary, providing the force used is proportionate with the nature, duration and scope of the engagement not exceeding that required to decisively counter the hostile act or threat (medium-level force);
(3) attack to disable or destroy the hostile force, authorised only when such action is the only prudent means by which a hostile act or hostile intent can be prevented or terminated, and only until the opposing force no-longer poses an imminent threat (high-level force).[19]

Guidelines involving a graduating scale of responses, such as these outlined above, are standard in most ROE (see endnote).[20]

Guiding Principles of Self-Defence: ‘Military Necessity’ & ‘Proportionality’

As can be seen by these examples, intrinsically all ROE guidelines issued to armed forces on operations in regard to the use of force in self-defence relate to the firm principles of military necessity and proportionality. These two principles, along with that of humanity, form the basis of all LOAC. Wherever conduct is not absolutely prohibited under LOAC, military action always proceeds according to the judgment of the ranking military officer. In reaching decisions, however, it is that officer’s duty to consider the military necessity and proportionality of any action before giving the order to proceed.

Military Necessity

A situation of military necessity is said to exist when either a hostile act occurs, or when a force or person exhibits hostile intent.[21] LOAC recognises and accepts the realities of war and does not require a State to allow itself to be destroyed (refer to endnote for more information on this point).[22] Consequently, armed forces of a State involved in an armed conflict are lawfully justified in using whatever force is necessary, within the boundaries of LOAC, to bring about the complete submission of the Enemy force at the earliest possible moment and with the least possible cost to itself in lives and resources.[23]

However, in acting against legitimate targets, whether in offensive or defensive actions, States must not violate LOAC by using unlawful force, or commit acts of destruction that are not necessary to achieve the military objective. Unnecessary acts of violence, motivated by spite, revenge or personal profit, are similarly not justified and do not enjoy protection under LOAC.[24]

As is often the case in the legal sphere, however, there is room for interpretation between various States on these points. To illustrate, some nations like the U.S. and New Zealand contend that military necessity exists when either a hostile attack or hostile intent situation takes place, while others hold the position that necessity exists in times of hostile attack only.[25] Nevertheless, the principle of military necessity remains firmly at the core of all LOAC governing hostilities.

Proportionality

The principle of proportionality is not at all precise, allowing some room for interpretation. It is calculated as the balance struck when the two concepts of humanity and military necessity are mentally weighed on a scale. While military necessity may automatically give armed forces the right to act in self-defence, the subsequent use of force – if not elsewhere prohibited under LOAC – must be proportional to be lawful. That is, it must be carried out with due regard for humanity – a level of basic respect for human life and that which sustains it, including due regard for cultural heritage and the natural environment in which human kind lives and draws its livelihood.[26] The infliction of suffering or destruction not necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military objectives is completely forbidden under LOAC.[27]

Proportionality during self-defence is thus the use of only that amount of force necessary to decisively counter the hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent and to ensure the continued protection of the armed force.[28] When a situation of military necessity arises therefore, whereby an armed force must act in self-defence against a lawful target, it is the commander’s duty when planning an attack to ‘balance the overall benefit of the military action proposed’ against the often inevitable ‘collateral or incidental damage which may occur as a result’ (especially inevitable in scenarios where the Enemy station themselves in close proximity to civilian objects or use civilians as human-shields).[29] Sufficient military benefit must be derived for the amount of harm done to ‘civilian objects’, including both persons and property.

This means that while more force may legitimately be used in self-defence than that applied in the initial inbound hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, and the Enemy force pursued and engaged for as long as it commits hostile acts or hostile intent, the attack can not lawfully proceed if the destruction likely to be inflicted on civilian objects during the attack is disproportionate to the overall military benefit anticipated.[30] The exercise of the judgement required to achieve proportional military action, in the face of hostile action and intent on the battlefield, is palpably no simple matter – even for highly trained military personnel.

(II) Mission Accomplishment Instructions

The second major issue of critical import covered within ROE, and one which is both more important and complicated than self-defence instructions, concerns mission accomplishment. In fact, mission accomplishment has been described as ‘the driving force behind all ROE’.[31]

Mission accomplishment relates to the attainment of strategic and operational objectives through the defeat of Enemy centres of gravity, while at the same time providing sufficient force protection to minimise casualties.[32] According to LTCOL Womack of the U.S. Marines, ‘meaningful ROE must strike a balance’ between the two. [33]

Correspondingly, mission accomplishment ROE typically contain guidance as to the means and methods of force permitted for use by armed forces while attaining these objectives. These means and methods refer to restrictions on weaponry and tactics, respectively, to be used on missions. Mission accomplishment rules may also contain operational criteria too, which commanders must meet to gain approval from higher command when planning new missions.[34]

Generally there are three types or categories of ROE in relation to mission accomplishment:

(a) Permission rules;
(b) Limitation rules; and
(c) Prohibition rules.

Each type governs the use of certain weapons and tactics, either to authorise or to constrain the force used.

(a) Authorisations

The first category comprises authorisations permitting the immediate use of weapons and tactics, provided they are used lawfully in compliance with LOAC obligations. [35] The vast majority of ROE measures belong to this category, and can be described as largely ‘permissive’ rules. [36] Indeed, permissive measures are straight-forward rules for mission accomplishment, which generally lead to greater freedom of action on the part of military commanders on the ground.

Nevertheless, despite the permissive nature of this first category, provided the tactic or weapon is employed lawfully, these ROE have not always proved satisfactory for the needs of counter-terrorist activities in the modern age of international terrorism.

A good example of this concerns the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 when the ship was docked in the Yemeni port of Aden, refuelling at a floating platform 2000 feet from shore.[37] When terrorists driving a speedboat rigged with 700 pounds of explosives approached the vessel, the servicemen aboard could only comply within the constraints of the U.S. Navy’s ROE, a permissive rule which instructed a warning shot to be fired across the bow before any other action could be taken.[38] Although this was the correct and lawful course of action under these ROE, the reality was that the crew had barely time to fire one such warning shot before the speedboat impacted the vessel, blowing a hole 32-by-36 feet wide in the hull and killing 17 sailors.[39] As LTGEN Michael DeLong (Ret’d), the Deputy Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) at that time, concluded after the incident: ‘It was the worst attack on an American ship since World War II, and the worst terrorist attack on an American ship in history…They did what they were trained to do, but their rules were not appropriate for terrorism in the Gulf’.[40]

As an immediate result of the attack, all craft entering CENTCOM’s area of responsibility had subsequently to adhere to CENTCOM’s ROE, which was better suited for the demands of counter-terrorism. [41]

(b) Limitations

The second category of rules available for mission accomplishment within military operations – and much more restrictive than the first – concerns ‘limitation’ rules. Usually only a small, minority group of ROE measures belong to this category, which allows national forces to use certain weaponry and tactics only after official approval has been sought and given by either the national Secretary or Minister of Defence, or the Combatant Commander of the operation.[42] Within a Multinational Operation (MNO), the Combatant Commander would consist of the nationally-designated National Commander of the contingent deployed to the international operation.

In military terminology, limitation ROE – otherwise known as ‘limitation caveats’ – are often referred to as ‘yellow cards’. This is because a simplified but accurate version of limitation rules is often printed onto a yellow colour-coded card and issued to the senior national officer deployed to a MNO, who is then responsible for vetoing participation of the national contingent in individual operations. [43] It is this National Commander’s job to deny requests from Operational Command that exceed the national mandate provided by his or her government, by producing the ‘yellow card’ of national prohibitions.[44] Less commonly, yellow colour-coded cards containing the contingent’s limitation ROE are issued to all individual service members to avoid confusion about ROE amongst the ranks. In this case the yellow cards may also be known as ‘ROE cards’, ‘Orders for Opening Fire (OFOF)’, ‘Rules for Opening Fire (ROF)’ and ‘fire cards’.[45]

An example of this second category of measures – a restrictive rule allowing an action only after official authorisation – concerns another speedboat hastening out of a Pakistani port in the wake of the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) coalition campaign in Afghanistan. Intelligence indicated the speedboat contained fleeing Al-Qaeda operatives, however the boat had already crossed the 12-mile mark into international waters where the Law of the Sea held sway.[46] Although a number of Coalition ships were in the vicinity, the French and Canadian Coalition ships had elected not to take any action, leaving the remaining American ship to intercept the speedboat.[47] In this situation, in international waters, American ROE for the region allowed only two actions: (1) a warning by radio (an ‘authorisation’ rule); and then (2) a warning shot over the bow following official approval (a ‘limitation’ rule).[48] The first measure, a radio warning, was issued by U.S. marines from the American ship without response. Higher authorisation was subsequently needed for the U.S. marines to take any other action, for which reason approval was sought from the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, by the ranking senior national naval officer, First Lieutenant (LT) Zinni, through the chain of command.[49] Permission given, the U.S. ship under Zinni’s command fired on the speedboat and shot out its engines.[50] Correct limitation ROE procedures had been followed.

(c) Prohibitions

The third and final category of measures concerns prohibition rules, otherwise referred to as ‘prohibition caveats’. Usually only a very small number of these measures exist within the mission accomplishment ROE of deployed national armed forces, in comparison with the other two categories described above. These rules are outright prohibitions, forbidding absolutely the use of certain weapons and tactics in the conduct of security missions.[51] Very rarely, a prohibition measure of this type may, for clarity’s sake, also overtly authorise the use of a specific associated tactic or weapon (in order to make clear that while one rule is banned, another particular tactic or weapon is lawful and permitted for use by comparison).[52]

While limitations on the use of certain weapons and tactics can be problematic, it is these prohibitions which can often prove to be detrimental to mission achievement, and indeed, severely impede the overall success of a particular security operation.

In military terminology prohibitive caveats are often referred to as ‘red cards’. This refers to the red colour-coded card, containing a simplified but accurate version of the contingent’s prohibitive ROE, issued to the deployed senior national officer made responsible for vetoing participation of national armed forces in individual operations.[53] It is this senior commander’s job to categorically deny requests from Operational Command that exceed the national mandate, by producing the ‘red card’ of national prohibitions.[54]

To illustrate, during the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation in Kosovo (1999-present), the German contingent was prohibited by its national government from: (1) being deployed to high-risk areas; (2) from participating in high-risk tasks; (3) from using force in defence of civilian property; or (4) from participating in riot-control operations.[55] German KFOR soldiers could therefore only perform a ‘stand-aside’ role within the operation, and were incapable of mounting an adequate or robust response in the advent of any security crisis. [56] As a result of these government-imposed ROE prohibitions, during the subsequent Kosovo Riots crisis of 2004 German combat forces were legally unable to respond adequately to protect the minority Serb population in its Area of Operations (AO) against Albanian militia. Their caveats constrained what they could lawfully do.

In this scenario, the ultimate consequence of the caveat prohibitions was that the peace-keeping contingent could not feasibly achieve either of its mission objectives during the crisis, of either protecting the area around Prizren or guarding civilian property in the interests of ‘keeping the peace’.

The Link between ROE & National Caveats: Limitation & Prohibition Rules

It is these last two categories of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement, described above, which both come under the politically-loaded rubric of ‘national caveats’ – elsewhere known as national ‘exceptions’, ‘restrictions’, and ‘limitations’ (see Figure 3.1 below).

This is because measures within these categories either significantly constrain the means (weaponry) and methods (tactics) armed forces may use to accomplish their missions during operations, or else completely ban the use of certain weapons and tactics altogether.

Figure 3.1 – Mandates, Rules of Engagement (ROE) & National Caveats: The relationship between the national mandate, ROE and national caveats.

In short, these two categories of ROE are restrictive in nature, limiting the way in which armed forces may prosecute their activities and operations in pursuit of their mission objectives.

These caveat rules will be discussed in greater detail in later blogs with reference to their impact on the operational effectiveness of several multinational security operations conducted by the United Nations and NATO in Eastern Europe and on the African continent since the early 1990s, in addition to, most recently, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan conducted from 2001 to the present day in 2014.

This blog is an excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in* Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.

Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984

Endnotes

[1] NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), AAP-6(2008), 2008, p. 2-R-10, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf, (accessed 6 January 2011); NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, Generated from a PfPLMS 0.2 learning object, NATO Partnership for Peace Forum (PfP ADL-WG, 2006), p. 1, http://pfpdev.ethz.ch/SCORMcontent/112363/scos/5/index.pdf, (accessed 8 October 2009).

[2] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement, Draft-Rules of Engagement Manual for the New Zealand Defence Force’, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999.

*For written NZDF authorisation permitting the use of these sections within the NZDF Operational Law Companion, refer to p. xxiii-xxxiv of Volume I: Thesis in my doctoral research, accessible here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/6984.

[3] Ibid.

The NZDF Operational Law Companion indicates that where force must be used against persons not declared Enemy in the course of operations, minimum force only is to be used. These persons include: other belligerent parties; bandits; criminals; terrorists; saboteurs; protestors; persons seeking to obstruct operations; mobs, rioters and groups of people rushing the armed force to obtain food or political asylum; and lastly, foreign forces acting contrary to the sovereign interests of the armed force (Ibid.).

[4] NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, Generated from a PfPLMS 0.2 learning object, NATO Partnership for Peace Forum (PfP ADL-WG, 2006), p. 1, http://pfpdev.ethz.ch/SCORMcontent/112363/scos/5/index.pdf, (accessed 8 October 2009).

[5] To illustrate, consider the definition provided by the U.S. in comparison with that issued by the NZDF. In the United States a hostile act is regarded as ‘an attack or other use of force against US forces’ in addition to ‘force used directly to preclude or impede the mission or duties of US forces’, whereas hostile intent is defined as ‘the threat of imminent use of force against US forces’ and ‘also the threat of force to prevent or impede the mission or duties of US forces’. In New Zealand, by contrast, a hostile act is defined as: ‘an attack or any other use of force direct by any person or foreign force against: (a) New Zealand and any area for the defence of which New Zealand is responsible; (b) New Zealand’s interests, whether in New Zealand or elsewhere; (c) any State, or the armed forces of any state with whom New Zealand is in a collective security arrangement; (d) any member of the New Zealand Armed Forces; (e) any person whom it is the duty of the New Zealand Armed Forces to defend; and (f) any property or equipment, the loss of which will significantly impede the safe conduct of operations (NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit.,p. 3; NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.).

[6] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3; NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.

[7] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, ibid., p. 3; NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, ibid.

[8] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, ibid., p. 3.

[9] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.

[10] Further still, a national armed force is permitted to additionally use force in aid of armed forces of any other UN Member-State being attacked or under threat of an armed attack, with whom the nation has a collective security arrangement (NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, ibid.). Quite plausibly then, self-defence on the part of another state’s armed force may occur on the sovereign national territory of either country, or in foreign territory where both armed forces are operating, for instance where both contingents are deployed to a theatre of war as part of a multinational operation.

[11] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, ibid.

[12] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3.

[18] Ibid.

[19] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.

[20] For example, U.S. ROE make the same provision for the first option of self-defence employing low-level force, indicating to commanders that: ‘If time and circumstances permit, a threatening unit or person should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions’ [original emphasis] (NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3).

[21] Ibid.

[22] J. Derbyshire (MAJ), ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, 149.335 Law of Armed Conflict, Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Palmerston North, New Zealand, 2008, p. 3; J. Derbyshire (MAJ), ‘149.335: Basic Principles of LOAC’, in ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, 149.335 Law of Armed Conflict, Centre for Defence Studies, Massey University College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Palmerston North, New Zealand, 2008, p. 7.

While the body of LOAC governing the conduct of armed conflict has been developed to reduce as much as possible the suffering, loss and damage caused by armed conflict, it has also been drafted with the intent of enhancing military efficiency. For instance, by safeguarding the rights of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked (those hors de combat), Prisoners of War (PWs), detainees, and civilians, it is believed that a smoother and easier return to peace will be made possible in the theatre of conflict at the cessation of hostilities (Derbyshire, ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, p. 5).

[23] Derbyshire, ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, op. cit., p. 3; Derbyshire, ‘149.335: Basic Principles of LOAC’, op. cit., p. 7.

[24] Derbyshire, ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, op. cit., p. 2; Derbyshire, ‘149.335: Basic Principles of LOAC’, op. cit., p. 7.

[25] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3.

[26] Derbyshire, ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, op. cit., p. 3.

[27] Derbyshire, ‘149.335: Basic Principles of LOAC’, op. cit., p. 7.

[28] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3.

[29] Derbyshire, ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, op. cit., p.4; Derbyshire, ‘149.335: Basic Principles of LOAC’, op. cit., p. 9.

[30] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3; Derbyshire, ‘Section Two: Basic Principles of LOAC, NZDF Code of Conduct and Command Responsibility’, ibid., p. 4.

[31] S. M. Womack (LTCOL.), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 80, no. 2, February 1996, p. 22.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 3.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] M. DeLong (LTGEN) & N. Lukeman, ‘Welcome to CentCom’, A General Speaks Out: The Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’, St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company LLC, 2007, p. 11.

[38] Ibid.

[39] DeLong & Lukeman, ‘Welcome to CentCom’, op. cit., p.10-11; ‘Homeland Security: USS Cole bombing’, GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/uss_cole_bombing.htm, (accessed 4 March 2010).

[40] DeLong & Lukeman, ‘Welcome to CentCom’, op. cit., p.10-11

[41] Ibid.

[42] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 4.

[43] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.; D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, United States, (15-18^th February) 2009, p. 5, http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf. (accessed November 18, 2009).

[44] Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 December 2009, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Palmerston North, New Zealand.

[45] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, , ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999, paragraph 11.2, p. 11-1; NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.

[46] DeLong & Lukeman, ‘Prologue’, A General Speaks Out: The Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’, St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company LLC, 2007, pp. xxi-xxii.

[47] Ibid., p. xxi, xxiii.

[48] Ibid., p. xxii.

[49] Ibid., pp. xxi-xxiii.

[50] Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv.

[51] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 4.

[52] Ibid.

[53] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.; Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War, op. cit., p. 5.

[54] MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.