The following two blogs #41 and #42 will now together further elaborate on the ISAF’s Caveat Crisis in Afghanistan, by providing a description of the way in which the mission’s caveat problem developed over the course of the Security Assistance mission, increasing in both scope and severity as the operation progressed through the four fundamental phases of NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the mission. Indeed, limitation and ban rules in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of ISAF national contingents were actively and obstructively present during all five of the OPLAN’s phases, from the very genesis of the ISAF operation in December 2001 until its complete termination in December 2014. These included the phases of: I) Assessment and Preparation; II) Geographic Expansion; III) Stabilisation; IV) Transition; and lastly V) Redeployment. These blogs will provide a concise overview of the diverse difficulties posed by these national caveat restrictions on the ISAF Force during each of these operational phases, in order to illustrate how the issue of heavy caveat imposition spread like a cancer, first politically in the Coalition of the Willing, and then operationally and tangibly across the mission in terms of both geography and time, with the caveat issue growing larger and generating more and more alarm in military and political quarters with the progression of each successive NATO-led phase until the final termination of the mission.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) – List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by the 8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) PDF List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by the 8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012 Dr Regeena Kingsley PDF – ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by 8 NATO Lead Nations of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012 (41 pages)
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(a) – Table Displaying Caveat-Free or Caveat-Fettered Forces of the 8 NATO/ISAF Lead Nations during 6 Crucial COIN Years, 2007-2012
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(a) PDF: Table Displaying Caveat-Free or Caveat-Fettered Forces of the 8 NATO/ISAF Lead Nations during 6 Crucial COIN Years, 2007-2012 Dr Regeena Kingsley PDF – ISAF APPENDIX 10(a) Table Displaying Caveat-Free or Caveat-Fettered Forces of the 8 ISAF Lead Nations during 6 Crucial COIN Years from 2007-2012 (4 pages)
#40 In Videos: An International, Multilateral, Political & Strategic Failure – The Fall of Kabul & the Lamentable Loss of the Anti-Terror & Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 2001-2021
In Videos: The calamitous political and military decisions taken by short-sighted governments in multiple Capitals, to rapidly end the Afghan theatre of war in the overall and ongoing Global War on Terror, and the resulting and hugely consequential developments and events that followed on the ground for the country and the people of Afghanistan, that has shocked, changed, and threatened the entire world. Important videos.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 8(b) – List of Known National Caveats Imposed on ISAF Major Force Units by TCNs in Afghanistan, 2001-2012
This list of ISAF Major Force Units constrained with national caveats by Lead and Supporting ISAF coalition TCNs was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 8(a) – Table Displaying Known ISAF Major Force Units Constrained by TCNs with National Caveats, 2001-2012
This table displaying known ISAF Major Force Units constrained with national caveats by Lead and Supporting ISAF coalition TCNs was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(b) – List of Known National Caveats by Category Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, December 2001- December 2012
This list of ISAF national caveats by category was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(a) – Table Displaying Known Caveat Categories Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, 2001-2012
This table displaying ISAF national caveats by category was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
#38 ISAF National Caveats in Afghanistan: Summary of Research Findings & Future Implications
There has been an enduring sensitivity and resistance, over the past two decades, to examining and discussing the issue of caveat imposition and its detrimental effects within Multinational Operations (MNOs) on the part of many national governments within the international community. This widespread unwillingness to examine the impact of national caveats on operational effectiveness within MNOs has directly led to the caveat-generated stalemate within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, a situation that has resulted in a range of negative effects for the success of the mission over the past decade from 2002-2012, especially during the years after NATO expanded to take full command over the Afghan AOR in 2006. Effort has been wasted, time has been lost, progress has been delayed, COIN has been compromised, and military and civilian casualties have increased as a result of this network of ISAF national caveats. Both unity of effort within the ISAF force, and the resultant operational effectiveness of the mission, have been seriously undermined by the presence of multiple NATO and Partner national contingents fettered by government-imposed caveat restrictions, leading to the delayed attainment of mission objectives and the poor prosecution of COIN. These findings do not bode well for the success of the ISAF mission to both secure and stabilise Democratic Afghanistan, a new, young, developing and modernising country – formerly a Taliban ‘Terror State’ and terrorist safe-haven – established in the wake of the Afghanistan-based, 9/11, Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on U.S. and international citizens working in the American homeland, by the UN Security Council, Afghan patriots and exiles at the UN-sponsored 2001 Bonn Conference, the Afghan transitional government elected by the 2002 Afghan Loya Jirga, 502 Afghanistan-representative delegates at the 2003 Grand Loya Jirga in Kabul, and the legitimate, permanent, and multi-ethnic Afghan government formed following the nationwide 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections, with political, military and financial support provided over many years from scores of friendly and allied nations of the international community. This extremely negative and obstructive caveat reality within the NATO-led and UN-supported ISAF Coalition force stands even in spite of the fact that mission success, of achieving the objective of a secure, stable, democratic and anti-terror Afghanistan in Central-South Asia, is so critical within the overarching context of our global struggle against international and national Islamo-fascist terrorism and empire-building in the modern post-9/11 era of the 21st century.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 6 – List of 215 Known National Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs in Afghanistan, 2001-2012
This ISAF caveat list was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF security assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.