#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort”
in Multinational Operations
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
No-matter which command arrangement a Multinational Operation (MNO) assumes or what Command and Control (C²) system is imposed (see blog “#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command & Control (C²)“), the true effectiveness of the multinational enterprise will ultimately hinge on one factor: the unity of the actors in the effort towards achieving the common purpose of the operation. In military terminology this is known as unity of effort.
Unity of Effort
According to the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms, unity of effort is ‘the product of successful unified action’ and consists of ‘coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization’.[1]
Following the designation of a clear mission and a set of mission objectives for an operation, thereby establishing unity of purpose, unity of effort is the single most important priority for all MNOs and essential to mission accomplishment.[2] It is the glue that, through holding together the disparate actors of the operation, enables progress towards the collective goal. It is this important function within a multinational military operation which causes unity of effort to play such a crucial role in determining a successful or unsuccessful outcome to a MNO overall.
This concept of unity of effort is not at all a modern one. It has historically long been regarded as one of a series of fundamental tenets or principles considered to be not only intricately involved in the business of warfare, but also critical to the effective conduct of military campaigns.[3] While unity of effort is currently not an established ‘principle of war’ per se (although it is traditionally encompassed within the principle of ‘unity of command’), it is nevertheless a fundamental principle with regard to all military operations, and critical for attaining mission success (see endnote).[4] In fact unity of effort is considered the fundamental ‘first principle’ of effectiveness within military operations because it is the key manifestation of effective C².[5]
Consequently, unity of effort may universally be regarded as a conceptual ‘plumb-line’ in the full spectrum of military operations, adherence to which will weigh the balance towards a successful outcome of any military operation.
The function of unity of effort is vital then for any multinational military operation, including the current ISAF operation in Afghanistan. However, how is it to be attained?
Unity of Effort via ‘Unity of Command’
Historically, and also within contemporary unilateral operations that involve a single Joint Task Force, unity of effort has conventionally been attained through unity of command – the existence of a sole overarching source of authority to direct, control and coordinate all military forces participating in an operation. As the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff publication on Joint Operations states:
The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.[6]
Unity of command is far and wide the preferred means of achieving unity of effort. Glenn argues, in fact, that it is ‘the preferred form of coordination and control’ and the form through which one should seek to attain unity of effort in military operations.[7] It is thought, moreover, that unity of command promotes a more efficient, timely and low-casualty operation.[8]
Within the context of MNOs, however, such unity of command is far more difficult – arguably even impossible – to achieve. It equates to one person of one nationality being vested with command authority over all international forces ‘to whom coalition partners owe unswerving obedience, but within the constraints established for their employment’.[9] Some argue, in fact, that this kind of unity of command has historically never truly been accomplished in a multilateral endeavour, either in the early years of World War II, in Vietnam or even the First Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), causing the concept to be more honoured in theory than actually observed in practice.[10]
Indeed, establishing unity of command within a MNO is a contentious issue and one that leads, more often than not, to a power struggle between operational high command and the individual governments of nations contributing forces to the Peace Support Operation (PSO). This is largely because countries participating in a multinational security operation are typically extremely unwilling to cede command authority over their own national forces to another country. Their concerns at both the political and military level regarding who will command their forces, what authority he or she will have, and how much day-to-day control they themselves will retain over force employment, are real and ever-present.[11] As Riscassi states: ‘Because of the severity and consequences of war, relinquishing national command and control of forces is an act of trust and confidence that is unequalled in relations between nations. It is a passing of human and material resources to another nation’s citizens’.[12]
Not surprisingly, most nations are hesitant to make that leap. This hesitancy is heightened further if the participant nations involved in a PSO do not in fact consider themselves or their vital interests to be directly threatened by the conflict, making the ‘perceived surrender of sovereignty associated with unity of command…an unpalatable option for some political leaders’.[13] Furthermore, unity of command is additionally frustrated within MNOs by the range of competing national agendas among the parties involved, and subsequently, the lack of common and ‘clearly-articulated’ national and international objectives.[14]
This being the case, how then can unity of effort – and therefore true operational effectiveness – be attained within a MNO, especially when it is so critical to mission failure or success? The answer lies in the following maxim: ‘Unity of Command is “desired”; Unity of Effort is “required”’.[15] The effect – unity of effort – is more important than the means employed to create it.
Consequently, where unity of effort can not be achieved through unity of command, it can alternatively be created by cooperation and coordination between force contributors to a PSO – what Nuzum refers to as ‘the soft tools of combined warfare’.[16]
Unity of Effort via ‘Cooperation, Coordination & Consensus’
‘Unity of command’ and ‘cooperation and coordination’ are both considered to be supporting constructs to the overall effect of unity of effort in international military operations.[17] This is demonstrated, perhaps, by the way in which both appear as alternate means of achieving unity of effort in the military doctrine of several powerful nations (see Figure 1.1). Consequently, as stated above, the answer to fostering unity of effort within MNOs, where no true unity of command can be achieved, lies in the latter option: cooperation and coordination. As Pudas has stated:
Unity of effort is necessary to achieve success in combined and coalition operations. If unity of command is not possible, then cooperation and coordination are the keys to unity of effort. Coordinated planning staffs and assignment of liaison officers significantly enhance the process.[18]
Figure 1.1 – Unity of Effort and Principles of War: A chart entitled ‘Principles of War, US and others, compared’ showing the divergent Principles of War embraced by five powerful States on the world stage, as presented by the Australian Air University’s Command & Staff College. It demonstrates the alternation of ‘unity of command’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘coordination’ among nations in the row that represents ‘unity of effort’ in military campaigns.[19]
In point of fact, while unity of command is desirable and should be sought to the greatest extent possible, it is in fact through coordination and consensus-building among the contributing nations that unity of effort is most often achieved within a MNO. According to Nuzum, ‘these mechanisms are the strongest available to manage an unwieldy coalition of sovereign State entities’.[20] Indeed, Pudas describes this approach to unity of effort within multinational campaigns the following way:
When unity of command is not achievable, then unity of effort and an agreed upon strategy must be achieved through the coordination and cooperative efforts of allied commanders. Operational commanders can prepare for this eventuality by understanding the various factors which influence a coalition’s ability to coordinate forces and achieve unity of effort…Dealing with allies must be accomplished with patience and respect. Commanders must establish and maintain trust among coalition forces. Both coordination and cooperation are key ingredients to successful coalition command. Harnessing the personalities of allied military leaders and coping with problems associated with interpersonal relations can be among the greatest challenges. [21]
In other words, it is through on-going cooperation and coordination in pursuit of a shared and clear view of the mission and a corresponding set of mission objectives between the multiple parties to a MNO (i.e. ‘unity of purpose’), that unity of effort can alternatively be achieved (see Figure 1.2).
This is because the process of cooperation and consensus between PSO contributors can help to mitigate the negative effects of competing national agendas and disparate national and international objectives that often hinder unity of command within MNOs. In fact multinational command has even been described elsewhere as command by consensus – so-called ‘consensus-based command’ – in which relationships between contributing nations and the attainment of a common political consensus is thought to take precedence over the system of command itself.[22] To illustrate, according to Rice, the renowned success of Allied unity of effort during the campaigns of the Second World War owes more to the ‘mutual confidence’ built up over time between the Allies, than to any other single factor.[23]
Figure 1.2 – Attaining Unity of Effort in Multinational Operations (MNOs): ‘Unity of Command’ and/or ‘Cooperation, Coordination & Consensus’ as two separate means of attaining ‘Unity of Purpose’ and ‘Unity of Effort’ within a multinational security campaign.
Without a doubt, collective cooperation and consensus is of critical import in MNOs since, being coalitions of choice whereby nations participate on a voluntary basis, all member nations contributing to a MNO have the sovereign authority to disagree with the MNF commander, to refuse undesirable missions, and indeed, to leave the coalition entirely.[24] Consensus-based unity of effort is thus a crucial aspect in the smooth, effective and efficient running of any MNO. As a working paper on the subject, produced by the Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute at the University of Edinburgh, states on the matter, ‘an atmosphere of teamwork and partnership must permeate all aspects’ of the MNF and ‘must be consciously sustained’. [25]
Collective cooperation, coordination and consensus within military operations is characterised by: cooperation and consensus within the political sphere; and interoperable, coordinated and flexible multinational forces in the military sphere, the latter working together in a unified, concerted fashion towards the same political goal.
Nevertheless, how is such consensus to be developed within a MNF? According to the University of Edinburgh study, consensus is thought to develop within an MNF through adherence to several principles or ‘tenets’ of multinational cooperation:
- (1) genuine mutual respect and common courtesy;
- (2) the founding of a personal and direct rapport between contingent counterparts within a MNO, through which mutual trust and confidence may be forged and maintained;
- (3) knowledge and a common understanding of the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, interests, culture and values of the armed forces of each partner, to be incorporated into mission planning and execution;
- (4) patience that MNOs take more time and effort than unilateral military operations, involving as they do forces with a range of diverse languages, cultures and sovereignty issues that make disagreements inevitable; and finally
- (5) flexibility of National Commanders at all levels in their planning and decision-making processes. [26]
In relation to the now ever-present reality of diverse rules of engagement and national caveats within multinational security operations, one could also add to this list a sixth tenet of:
- (6) flexibility of national forces deployed to the MNO, most demonstrably shown by minimal imposition of national caveats.
Adherence to these tenets, together with a clear overall aim, a method for achieving it, simplicity of plan and organisation, and plain and objective communication, is considered essential for creating consensus within a multinational campaign.[27]
The Central Role of ‘Unity of Purpose’ for Attaining Unity of Effort
From these descriptions it is evident that ‘unity of purpose’ is central to both the unity of command and cooperation/coordination approaches to achieving unity of effort within MNOs.
Unity of purpose is said to exist when the actors contributing to a military operation are politically united in the operational goal. It is best symbolised in the development of a clear mission statement, objectives, campaign plan and well-defined rules of engagement that have been ‘commonly developed’ to provide guidance on the use of force and ‘judged against the overriding principle of simplicity’.[28]
Figure 1.3 – Attaining Unity of Purpose in Multinational Operations (MNOs): Unity of Command and Cooperation, Coordination & Consensus produce Unity of Purpose, while at the same time Unity of Purpose conversely enhances both unity of command and the cooperation and coordination process.
Unity of purpose is not only important in enhancing unity of command within any multinational security endeavour, but it is also a necessary prerequisite for on-going cooperation and consensus, while also contributing to the overall unity and cohesiveness between multinational partners. In fact, all three factors – unity of command, cooperation and coordination, and unity of purpose – are present when unity of effort has been achieved (see Figure 1.3 above). Glenn also emphasizes this point, stating that unity of command, coordination and consensus, and ‘common purpose and direction’ are all beneficial symptoms of unity of effort.[29]
This being the case, it becomes clear that unity of purpose also has an important role to play in fostering unity of effort within MNOs. As Pudas has expressed: ‘Unity of effort cannot be realized unless commanders understand allied political and military objectives and reach agreement on their common interests and objectives’.[30] Or as LTCOL Michael Canna has argued:
‘Without unity of purpose a coalition will necessarily lack unity of effort and unity of action, and individual actions by coalition members may be in competition and conflict with one another’. [31]
Figure 1.4 – Attaining Operational Effectiveness in Multinational Operations (MNOs): Unity of Purpose, leading to Unity of Effort, results in Operational Effectiveness within multinational campaigns.
In brief, unity of purpose – expressed operationally by unity of effort – is in fact key to operational effectiveness and coherence. Consequently, the existence of unity of purpose within multinational military operations generally points to the parallel presence of unity of effort within the campaign, and is thereby a good indicator of overall mission effectiveness (see Figure 1.4 above).
The complete ‘Unity of Effort Model’ for attaining effective and successful MNOs, and an overview of the desired characteristics of Multinational Operational Commanders, will be presented in the next blog (see blog “#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” & Multinational Commanders – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations“).
*This blog is an excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2009, p. 576.
[2] ‘Chapter A-1: Introduction – Asia-Pacific Shared Interests, MNF SOP Objectives, Applicability, and MNF Considerations’, in Multinational Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), 6th working draft, Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute (AIAI) of the University of Edinburgh, 10 April 2002, pp. A1 B-1 – A1 B-2., www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/coax/demo/2002/mpat/SOP/A1.DOC (accessed 20 January 2009).
[3] John I. Alger, cited in R.W. Glenn, ‘No More Principles of War?’, Parameters, (Spring) 1998, pp.1-17, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/98spring/glenn.htm, (accessed 24 June 2010).
[4] While various military concepts or ‘tenets’ for successful warfare were loosely referred to in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they first appeared as a set of brief, cohesive, written principles – ‘simply expressed and essential to the successful conduct of war’ – in the twentieth century, and were referred to as the ‘principles of war’. The principles are a condensation of the military wisdom of great historical commanders including Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Hannibal, Napoleon and Clausewitz, which first appeared as a comprehensive set of guidelines for military success in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in the writings of military theorist John F. C. Fuller following the First World War. Many debates have raged over the guidelines since then, with some of the principles being modified, removed, added to, or qualified. However, in essence the nine principles remain rather inviolate to the present day. Indeed, nine internationally-recognised ‘principles of war’ exist today, that together serve as fundamental guidelines, aides, frames of reference, or points for consideration during the planning phase of any military operation. These are: (1) Objective; (2) Offensive; (3) Mass; (4) Economy of Force; (5) Maneuver; (6) Unity of Command; (7) Security; (8) Surprise; and (9) Freedom of Action – otherwise referred to as ‘Mobility’ or ‘Simplicity’ (Glenn, op. cit., pp. 1-3, 5-6).
Although these principles were once considered only to apply to conventional war, over the past decades scholars and practitioners have begun to apply the principles to non-conventional military campaigns, a broad category known in the U.S. as ‘Operations-Other-Than-War’ (OOTW). Indeed, since the principles of war are generally regarded as ‘common-sense propositions’ and a universally applicable ‘working tool for analysis’, they are now regarded as applicable wherever military force must be applied to obtain strategic objectives. This signifies that the principles are considered to be applicable to a range of military warfare: as important for the success of conventional wars as to irregular, low-intensity wars, or OOTWs such as peacekeeping and counter-insurgency campaigns. As Josiah A. Wallace has argued in reference to the latter, the principles are an: ‘excellent device for the commander to use in analyzing all aspects of his counterinsurgency plans. If his plans conform to the principles of war, he is on firm ground’ (cited in Glenn, op. cit., p. 5).
[5] G.S. Corn, ‘Multi-National Operations, Unity of Effort, and the Law of Armed Conflict’, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) Harvard University, Working Paper Series: International Humanitarian Law and Contemporary Conflicts, p. 2, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/84B588812CF91A754925762E00194C41-Harvard_May2009.pdf, (accessed May 14, 2010).
[6] United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, p. A-2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf, (accessed 6 June 2009).
[7] Glenn, op. cit. p, 10.
[8] J. Rice, ‘Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare’, Parameters, Spring 1997, p. 11, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/…/rice.htm, (accessed 20 January 2009).
[9] Ibid., p. 9.
[10] Ibid.; Glenn, op. cit. p. 9.
[11] Rice, op. cit., p. 1.
[12] Riscassi, R.W., ‘Principles for Coalition Warfare’, Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 1, (Summer) 1993, p. 67, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA528818 (accessed 6 June 2009).
[13] Rice, op. cit., p. 9.
[14] Glenn, op. cit. p. 10.
[15] Figure A1-4 ‘Principles of Multinational Unity of Effort’, in Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute (AIAI) of the University of Edinburgh, Multinational Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), 6th working draft, ‘Chapter A-1: Introduction – Asia-Pacific Shared Interests, MNF SOP Objectives, Applicability, and MNF Considerations’, op. cit., p. A1 C-3.
[16] Glenn, op. cit. pp. 9-10; H. Nuzum, ‘Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of “unity of effort” in American Counterinsurgency’, Strategic Studies Institute (23 April, 2010), p. x, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=981. (accessed 25 June 2013)
[17] Glenn, op. cit. p. 9.
[18] T.J. Pudas, ‘Preparing Future Coalition Commanders’, Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), (Winter) 1993-1994, p. 45, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA528835, (accessed 25 June 2013)
[19] United States Air Force, ‘The Principles of War’, The Air University – The Intellectual and Leadership Centre of the Air Force, 1997, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/prinwar.htm, (accessed 25 June 2013).
[20] Nuzum, op. cit.
[21] Pudas, op. cit., p. 41.
[22] ‘Chapter A-1: Introduction – Asia-Pacific Shared Interests, MNF SOP Objectives, Applicability, and MNF Considerations’, op. cit.
[23] Rice, op. cit., p. 9.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] ‘Chapter A-1: Introduction – Asia-Pacific Shared Interests, MNF SOP Objectives, Applicability, and MNF Considerations’, op. cit.
[27] Ibid.
[28] M. A. Canna (LTCOL), ‘Key Characteristics Effecting Command and Control for Multinational Operations Involving United States Military Forces’, A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2004, pp. 50-51.
[29] Glenn, op. cit.
[30] Pudas, op. cit.
[31] Canna, ‘Key Characteristics Effecting Command and Control for Multinational Operations Involving United States Military Forces’, op cit., pp. 50-51.