WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 8(a) – Table Displaying Known ISAF Major Force Units Constrained by TCNs with National Caveats, 2001-2012

This table, displaying the ISAF Major Force Units – contributed by Lead and Supporting ISAF coalition TCNs – that were known to have been constrained by national caveats during their operations in the Afghan theatre of war, was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

#39 Farewell Fallen Friend: Democratic Afghan Republic, 2001-2021

The tricolour flag, leaders, military personnel, and civilian citizens of a dead democratic country, the Democratic Afghan Republic, a young country abandoned to die by the American President Joe Biden. This was a needless abandonment and death, and a political, strategic and national tragedy, with profoundly dire security consequences in the global struggle against Islamic Extremist terrorism (the ungodly and cowardly mass-murder and terrorisation of innocent civilians for politico-religious aims). The Democrat Biden-Harris Administration was assisted in this singularly unwise withdrawal from Democratic Afghanistan by collectively complicit and complacent European allies and leading intergovernmental organisations around the world including NATO and the UN, in their mutually shared – if short-sighted – preoccupation and desire for ‘a fast and final end’ to the long but vital Afghan War against terror forces in Central-South Asia.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(b) – List of Known National Caveats by Category Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, December 2001- December 2012

A list of known national caveats within the ISAF Allied Force, arranged according to the 21 caveat categories found to be in existence and active during the ISAF mission from 2001-2014. Namely: Mission caveats; Theatre of Operations caveats; Geographic caveats; Regional caveats; Area of Operations (AO) caveats; Force Numbers-in-Theatre caveats; Command caveats; Weaponry & Lethal Force caveats; General Operations caveats; Ground Combat Operations caveats; Ground Security Operations caveats; Air Combat Operations caveats; Other Air Operations caveats; Time caveats; Weather caveats; Counter-Terrorism caveats; Counter-Narcotics caveats; ISAF Cooperation caveats; ANSF Cooperation caveats; PRT Security Operations caveats; and PRT Stability Operations caveats. The list was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(a) – Table Displaying Known Caveat Categories Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, 2001-2012

A table, displaying the 21 categories of caveats found to be in existence and active in the ISAF mission from 2001-2014, and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) found to be imposing caveats within these categories, between the years 2001-2012.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

#38 ISAF National Caveats in Afghanistan: Summary of Research Findings & Future Implications

“Be sure your sins will find you out.” These are the full findings and conclusions of my doctoral research that assessed the effort by the world’s Free Democracies to protect and build the new Democratic State of Afghanistan, and simultaneously counter and neutralise Islamist Terror Forces, in the ground-zero GWOT battleground of Afghanistan. The PhD research in the domain of Defence & Strategic Studies was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the classified and sensitive issue of politico-military ‘national caveats’ (ROE constraints or government ‘reins’ on military forces) and their effects on allied multinational security operations. It focused on: (1) the extent of the “caveat problem” in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan; and (2) the tangible impact of these ISAF national caveats on the ISAF’s prosecution of security operations and the overall operational effectiveness of the entire counter-insurgency mission to secure and stabilise Afghanistan.

As this blog will show, this ground-breaking research, drawing from multiple primary and secondary sources including the once-classified U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, has exposed the critical politico-military problem of ‘national caveats’ in modern multinational warfare. In short, national caveats have undermined, eroded, countered, crippled, sabotaged and needlessly elongated the international effort made by many of the world’s leading Free Democracies to effectively and successfully wage war against Islamic Extremists in Afghanistan, in defence of their own national security as well as in protection and support of their own fundamental, cherished, and collective beliefs and values. In this way, these government national constraints – that have been deliberately and repeatedly imposed on national military forces by NATO and Partner nations contributing forces to the ISAF mission from 2001-2014 – have actually acted as guarantors of ‘disunity of effort’ and ‘operational ineffectiveness’. These caveat ‘flies’ in the ISAF ointment have led to widespread and repeated failures at the PRT, Regional Command sector, Operational, and Strategic level – delaying, eroding and even halting progress across every pillar of the COIN strategy, and frustrating both the key objectives and the overall aim of the entire mission.

An unending ‘Cycle of Caveat Ineffectiveness’ has existed for the duration of the mission. Lack of political will and resolute commitment at the highest political levels in European and global Capitals – as plainly evidenced by the pervasive, continuous and widespread imposition of risk-averse and self-protecting national caveats on military forces – leads to disunity of purpose and effort, handicapped or anaemic security and combat forces and operations, security disasters, unwilling rescuers or reinforcement among allies, increased military and civilian casualties, slowed progress, loss of native support, loss of time, and unwise desperate measures – which all work together to decrease political will and commitment in international Capitals even further. In other words, national caveat constraints are both a symptom of disunity among allies and a recipe for failure in every multinational or allied security campaign in which they are present.

The research findings also hold grave implications for: Multinational Operations (MNOs) generally; the Democratic State of Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror (GWOT); the NATO Collective-Security Organisation in North America and Europe; and for the large and critical ‘Caveat Gap’ that exists in academic research and scholarship in the domains of both Defence & Strategic Studies and Political Science & International Relations on the serious and extremely negative role, impact, and effects of national caveat ‘ROE red-tape’ within important security operations conducted in the interest of securing national, regional and/or global security.

However, overall, two conclusions are very clear – as the long NATO-led mission in Afghanistan has plainly shown, in the most painful way, and in the midst of the most critical of wars waged to protect and safeguard national, regional and global security worldwide. NATO today is in fact an obese, heavy, unwilling, and clumsy, fraud of a fighting machine for the wars of the 21st century. And most of the Free Democracies of the world have lost their faith, will, heart and stomach to fight and die for the causes they say they most believe in, stand for, and prize.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 6 – List of 215 Known National Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

A list of 215 national caveats, ranging across 21 categories of politico-military caveat constraints amongst allied forces, known to have been imposed by the governments of NATO and Non-NATO Nation-States contributing military forces to operate as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, over a period of more than a decade of war between the years 2001-2012. The list was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

#37 Modern Noble Soldier

Good and strong men live by good and strong deeds. God bless the soldier at arms – the precious, brave, few.

ISAF – COIN APPENDIX 2 – Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Warfare: Definitions, Political Nature, 5 False Expectations, Necessity, & Lessons from Vietnam & Iraq for Afghanistan

In blog ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’, I briefly outlined the central theoretical doctrine and most important principles of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) warfare. This appendix will present a fuller overview of counter-insurgency, by providing various definitions of COIN, the nature of COIN warfare to quell an insurgency, and – most importantly perhaps – addressing five false expectations of COIN war in the modern era, which continue to frustrate national and international efforts to defeat dangerous and destabilising insurgencies in nations around the world today.

#35 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?

This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE), relating to deployed military commanders on operations: Are deployed military commanders given discretionary authority, by their civilian masters in government, to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre?

ROE will first be outlined as two classes of military orders or instructions issued to national armed forces deployed at home or abroad to act on behalf of the government and the nation of the State: these are (1) ‘offensive’ military orders for Mission Accomplishment (to achieve the military objectives towards attainment of the overall political aim) & (2) ‘defensive’ military orders for Self-Defence when encountering Enemy or Hostile opposition (intent and actions) during the course of their military operations. Next, I will discuss who has the power to change ROE, and describe the three differing degrees of ‘Discretionary Authority’ that governments tend to give to their military commanders in conflict theatres today, in the modern 21st century world of warfare. Subsequently, this real-world analysis will end with a discussion of the negative consequences of overly-constrained commanders in conflict theatres – which so often leads to ludicrous, illogical and tragic security situations and outcomes for fighting military personnel (and also defenceless local civilians) on operations, providing two such examples from warzones concerning New Zealand armed forces in East Timor during 2000 and Danish armed forces in Afghanistan during 2006. Finally, I will discuss this modern phenomenon of ‘Ridiculous ROE’ as the result of the significant and ever-abiding problem of the ‘political-military disconnect’ or ‘grey area’ of incomprehension and misunderstanding, that exists between the political masters in the political sphere and military commanders in the military sphere – once alluded to centuries ago, by the famous, Prussian, realist, military commander, veteran, theorist and philosopher, Karl von Clausewitz.

#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?

After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this classified, sensitive, hazy, poorly-understood but critically important subject.

In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first crucial question: Are ROE legally-binding ‘military orders’ or are they merely ‘guidelines’ to military personnel?