This table displaying known ISAF Major Force Units constrained with national caveats by Lead and Supporting ISAF coalition TCNs was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
#39 Farewell Fallen Friend: Democratic Afghan Republic, 2001-2021
The tricolour flag, leaders, military personnel, and civilian citizens of a dead democratic country, the Democratic Afghan Republic, abandoned to die by the American President Joe Biden, and assisted in this political, strategic and national tragedy, with profoundly dire security consequences in the global struggle against Islamist terrorism, by collectively complicit and complacent allies and leading intergovernmental organisations around the world, in their mutually shared if short-sighted preoccupation and desire for a fast and final end to the long but vital Afghan War against terror forces in Central-South Asia.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(b) – List of Known National Caveats by Category Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, December 2001- December 2012
This list of ISAF national caveats by category was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(a) – Table Displaying Known Caveat Categories Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, 2001-2012
This table displaying ISAF national caveats by category was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
#38 ISAF National Caveats in Afghanistan: Summary of Research Findings & Future Implications
There has been an enduring sensitivity and resistance, over the past two decades, to examining and discussing the issue of caveat imposition and its detrimental effects within Multinational Operations (MNOs) on the part of many national governments within the international community. This widespread unwillingness to examine the impact of national caveats on operational effectiveness within MNOs has directly led to the caveat-generated stalemate within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, a situation that has resulted in a range of negative effects for the success of the mission over the past decade from 2002-2012, especially during the years after NATO expanded to take full command over the Afghan AOR in 2006. Effort has been wasted, time has been lost, progress has been delayed, COIN has been compromised, and military and civilian casualties have increased as a result of this network of ISAF national caveats. Both unity of effort within the ISAF force, and the resultant operational effectiveness of the mission, have been seriously undermined by the presence of multiple NATO and Partner national contingents fettered by government-imposed caveat restrictions, leading to the delayed attainment of mission objectives and the poor prosecution of COIN. These findings do not bode well for the success of the ISAF mission to both secure and stabilise Democratic Afghanistan, a new, young, developing and modernising country – formerly a Taliban ‘Terror State’ and terrorist safe-haven – established in the wake of the Afghanistan-based, 9/11, Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on U.S. and international citizens working in the American homeland, by the UN Security Council, Afghan patriots and exiles at the UN-sponsored 2001 Bonn Conference, the Afghan transitional government elected by the 2002 Afghan Loya Jirga, 502 Afghanistan-representative delegates at the 2003 Grand Loya Jirga in Kabul, and the legitimate, permanent, and multi-ethnic Afghan government formed following the nationwide 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections, with political, military and financial support provided over many years from scores of friendly and allied nations of the international community. This extremely negative and obstructive caveat reality within the NATO-led and UN-supported ISAF Coalition force stands even in spite of the fact that mission success, of achieving the objective of a secure, stable, democratic and anti-terror Afghanistan in Central-South Asia, is so critical within the overarching context of our global struggle against international and national Islamo-fascist terrorism and empire-building in the modern post-9/11 era of the 21st century.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 6 – List of 215 Known National Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs in Afghanistan, 2001-2012
This ISAF caveat list was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF security assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
#37 Modern Noble Soldier
When a soldier says he is fighting for his country, we know exactly what he means. But in fact, “country” is an abstraction. What he really means is that he is fighting for his people, the population of his country…
ISAF – COIN APPENDIX 2 – Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Warfare: Definitions, Political Nature, 5 False Expectations, Necessity, & Lessons from Vietnam & Iraq for Afghanistan
In blog ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’, I briefly outlined the central theoretical doctrine and most important principles of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) warfare. This appendix will present a fuller overview of counter-insurgency, by providing various definitions of COIN, the nature of COIN warfare to quell an insurgency, and – most importantly perhaps – addressing five false expectations of COIN war in the modern era, which continue to frustrate national and international efforts to defeat dangerous and destabilising insurgencies in nations around the world today.
#35 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?
This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE) relating to deployed military commanders on operations, and whether or not they have discretionary authority to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre.
#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this hazy and poorly-understood subject. In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first question: Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?