This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE) relating to deployed military commanders on operations, and whether or not they have discretionary authority to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre.
#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this hazy and poorly-understood subject. In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first question: Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
#33 The Problem of “National Caveats” in NATO Operations around the World, 1996-2016
This blog will examine more closely NATO’s history of national caveat imposition in NATO military operations. It will begin by providing 5 reasons for caveat imposition within NATO missions. It will subsequently outline the recurring habit of NATO nations to contribute caveat-constrained military forces to NATO missions around the world over two decades, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Libya and most notoriously in Afghanistan. It will next describe the crux of NATO’s “caveat problem”, and then describe the three, largest, negative, caveat effects that have continuously resulted from NATO caveat imposition, namely (1) divided and inflexible NATO forces; (2) a disunified Multinational Force incapable of performing fundamental tasks; and (3) inequality and uneven burden-sharing within each NATO Multinational Force. Lastly, I will offer some final thoughts on this important issue of national caveats within NATO missions, with reference to the purpose and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.
#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012
#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” My research comprises an in-depth study of the problem of restrictive national caveats within the multinational NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, and
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” “There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.” « Il y a
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In a series of previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives
#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law?
#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law? – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives of their security mission mandates. In
#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots”
#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”, I examined the reasons for, and impact of, diverse sets of Rules of Engagement (ROE) between force contributing nations to a Multinational Operation (MNO), especially with regard to national caveat constraints. I also presented the fallacy of the “caveat myth” – still believed and asserted by many power-holders and policy-makers today – that national caveat prohibition and limitation rules are “positive” ROE
#22 Recommended Viewing: The UN, National Caveats & Human Carnage in Rwanda
#22 Recommended Viewing: The UN, National Caveats & Human Carnage in Rwanda Movie #1: “Shake Hands with the Devil” (2007) The challenges and obstacles faced by the UNAMIR Commander in Rwanda, Canadian Major General (MAJGEN) Roméo Dallaire, before, during and after the Rwandan genocide. Trailer: “As genocide rages in Rwanda, Major General Roméo Dallaire (Roy Dupuis) is assigned to lead the United Nations peacekeeping force. Fighting for his own survival as well as the millions of innocents threatened by the war, General Dallaire finds himself torn between duty and conscience in his efforts to prevent the country’s descent into
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I detailed the shocking and profoundly disturbing events that took place under Dutch command in the Srebrenica United Nations (UN) “Protected Area” in 1995 within the broader UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see blog #20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”). These tragic real-life events have haunted Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), the Federation of Bosnia