#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In my recent blog, “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”, the severely negative effects of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement – otherwise known as “national caveats” – were examined with reference to failed United Nations (UN) operations in Angola (UNAVEM II), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). With the return to civil war in Angola in 1992-1993, an unwise and unrealistic UN mandate, combined with
#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats within the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola & the Need for Appropriate Mandates & ‘Iron Resolve’
#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats within the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola & the Need for Appropriate Mandates & ‘Iron Resolve’ – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I demonstrated how national caveats have led to several extremely negative and serious calamities within multinational security operations, by conducting three case-studies of United Nations (UN) operations executed in the early 1990s (see blog “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”). In this analysis it was shown, firstly, that national caveats complicated evacuation and endangered the lives
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed the key choice facing all Multinational Operations (MNOs) operators of having either standardised or disparate Rules of Engagement (ROE) between national contingents operating within the mission (see blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”). It outlined, firstly, the various difficulties posed to attempts by security organisations to standardise ROE among the States contributing armed forces to an MNO, and secondly, the impact of diverse sets of national ROE on
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy (Official & Unofficial Caveat ROE)
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed how an alarming, new, global norm has developed within contemporary multinational security operations. Since the early 1990s, nations have been increasingly imposing heavy and wide-ranging constraints on the forces they contribute to multinational security operations (see blog “#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations”). The trend has become so strong in fact that today national caveats are considered to be ‘normal’ and the ‘common lot to varying degrees of all military operations conducted by NATO, the European Union
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley Routine imposition of national caveat constraints on national military contingents has developed as an increasingly common habit of nations today, whenever countries contribute forces to Multinational Operations (MNOs) authorised by the international community. This practice has continued regardless of whether the international security missions concerned have been conducted under the banner and command of an international organisation, such as the United Nations (UN), or a treaty-based military Alliance structure, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Caveat constraints have also been habitually
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley The difficulty of fighting wars in concert with allies is not a new idea. Indeed, Winston Churchill once commented that: ‘There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies –and that is to fight without them’.[1] In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new and unprecedented proportions. This is especially the case given the maze of bureaucratic red-tape which is increasingly imposed by national governments on armed forces contributed to a military coalition, and which national