– Dr Regeena Kingsley

In a previous blog ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’, I briefly outlined the central theoretical doctrine and most important principles of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) warfare. 

This appendix consists of a more in-depth examination of insurgencies and is offered in the hope of supplying important additional information to political and military practitioners, with regard to insurgent armed rebellions and the politico-military counter-insurgency warfare required by governing authorities and their civilian and military forces to quell them. 

In particular, this appendix will address:

• insurgency as a common form of warfare in human history;  
• several definitions of insurgency;
• the central characteristics of insurgencies;
• the psychological nature of insurgency warfare, and the 4 psychological effects insurgents seek to inflict on established governing authorities;
• the 3 main forms of warfare used by insurgents, namely terrorism, guerrilla tactics and conventional war;
• the life cycle of an insurgency, from beginning to end; and lastly
• the inherent uniqueness of each particular insurgency.

Insurgency Warfare: A Custom of Humankind in History

The concepts of insurgency and counter-insurgency have taken on unprecedented significance since the 9/11 Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 2001 and the subsequent punitive and pre-emptive U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. More was written on counter-insurgency by political and military scholars and practitioners over the following decade of the 2000s than in the previous four decades combined, the term often used interchangeably with ‘irregular warfare’, ‘internal warfare’, ‘subconventional warfare’, ‘unrestricted warfare’, ‘low-intensity warfare’, and ‘asymmetric warfare’.[1]

Indeed, so abundant has the new counter-insurgency literature become that insurgencies seem often to be viewed as a new or modern phenomenon in world affairs.  However these ‘small wars’, or ‘wars among the peoples’ as they were once called, are in truth ‘an old, old story’ in the history of the world. [2] 

Certainly the historical record is rife with examples of insurgency warfare:

• the revolt of the Israelite nation against Imperial Roman rule in 66-77 A.D.;
• the countless uprisings of the Irish against the English Crown over nearly a millennium;
• the American War of Independence against British rule and their loyalist allies from 1775-1783;
• the Spanish guerrilla insurrection against Napoleon’s occupying French forces in the Iberian peninsula of Spain between 1808-1814; 
• the Libyan Bedouins against Italian occupation in 1910-1912;
• the Mexican guerrillas against the United States in 1916-1917;
• the many guerrilla resistance movements against invasion or occupation by Nazi Germany during the Second World War from 1939-1945;
• the subsequent movements for self-determination in former European colonies in Africa, Asia and South America over the next three decades;
• the Communist Maoist ‘wars of national liberation’ first in China from 1934-49, then in Cuba, South America, Malaya, the Philippines and most infamously Vietnam from 1959-75;
• the insurgency against Israel in and from the disputed Palestinian territories since the mid-20^th century; and lastly
• the multiple insurgencies against the newly-established, representative and democratically-elected governments of Iraq and Afghanistan throughout the 2000s and 2010s, and the military and civilian forces of supporting allied nations.[3]

In short, throughout history insurgency warfare has been the custom of humankind.

Indeed it is asymmetrical warfare, involving irregular warring methods between belligerents of disparate fighting capabilities, rather than symmetrical warfare, that has been the historical norm in world history.  As Gray states, the ‘internecine [mutually-destructive] slugging matches indulged in by great states during the 20^th century has been more the exception than the rule.’[4] 

According to Metz & Millen, insurgency warfare generally increases and thrives during periods when great world powers refrain from waging conventional war (some insurgencies constituting ‘proxy wars’ fuelled by these Great Powers), but decreases to ‘background noise’ once inter-State warfare comes to the fore.[5]  The strategic significance of insurgent activity for the balance-of-power in the world and the global security landscape also varies when compared to that of inter-State warfare.  As Kilcullen states, while historically insurgents rarely succeed in overthrowing the governing apparatus of a State, on the occasions when they do, these events are likely to have strategic importance with subsequent global ramifications.[6]

Today in the early decades of the twenty-first century, and with the ‘democratic peace’ prevailing among most of the Great Powers on the international stage, insurgency warfare has once again come to the fore.  However, while these so-called ‘small’ insurgency movements may seem to present a lesser challenge to world stability in comparison with the great State conflicts that characterised the twentieth century, it is important to note that insurgency warfare presents an equally serious threat and challenge, displaying many of the same features that have characterised war throughout history.  As the 2006 United States (U.S.) Counter-insurgency Manual states:

‘Warfare in the 21^st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent clash of interests between organized groups characterized by the use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a group’s ability to mobilize support for its political interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to generate enough violence to achieve political consequences.  Means to achieve these goals are not limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states.’[7]

The following blog will provide a general overview of academic theory relating to insurgency warfare.  

Defining Insurgency

Insurgency is most commonly defined as: ‘an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.’[8]  This is a definition shared by all NATO members, including the United States, in addition to Australia and New Zealand.[9]

Insurgency has also been defined elsewhere as an ‘armed resistance to the established government or foreign domination’, or as Kilcullen states, ‘a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism’.[10] 

The 2006 U.S. Counter-insurgency Manual goes further describing an insurgency as:

‘An organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.’[11]

The term ‘insurgency’ is often used interchangeably with an ‘insurrection’, ‘rebellion’, ‘revolt’, ‘uprising’ or – as the French say – a ‘sedition’ (sédition), meaning an action that threatens the authority of a State. 

Characteristics of Insurgencies

(1) Politics – A Political Movement Seeking Political Power

Like all warring activity, an insurgency can not be separated from politics. It is first and foremost a political movement, birthed to attain a specific political goal that rivals and rejects the status quo. Indeed, all insurgencies constitute ‘a political legitimacy crisis of some kind’.[12] 

Insurgents seek to achieve their political goal by contesting the legitimacy of those currently wielding political power, while simultaneously presenting an alternate political structure. 

(2) Violence to Exaggerate Strength, Amplify their Political Message & Coerce Civilians

Violence is employed by insurgents as a force-multiplier to exaggerate the insurgency’s strength,  to amplify their message to the target audience – incorporating the civilian ruling powers as well as popular civilian society at large, and to coerce them against their will into submission to the insurgency’s aims.

When the legitimate civilian government of the State reacts to reject the insurgents claims, goals and methods, thereby becoming the counter-insurgent opposing force, the result is an armed struggle using lethal force to control a contested political space between the insurgents (i.e. one or more popularly-based, non-State challengers)and the counter-insurgents (one or more States or occupying powers).[13]  As O’Neill states:

‘Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.’[14] 

(3) Origins: Grassroots Rebellions in Unsafe & Deprived Locations

Insurgencies usually begin as grassroots rebellions in areas where the governing power-holders have failed to address social or regional polarization, sectarianism, corruption, crime, radicalism, or failed to meet rising expectations of living or security from civilians.[15] They are usually comprised of a melange of different kinds of individuals, united despite these differences in their rebellion and shared aim of overthrowing the existing, established government or social order.[16] 

Armed force is deliberately and skilfully employed by these rebels as a means to terrorise or coerce opponents to do the very things they do not want to do, and certainly would never do under normal circumstances.[17] 

The coercion and duress brought to bear on governments by insurgents is difficult to prevent once begun since – as insurgencies are born in secret and develop clandestinely behind closed doors – they are usually reasonably capable and operational long before legitimate power-holders can detect or respond to their presence.[18]

Asymmetric Insurgency Warfare: A Weapon of the Weak

By their very nature, however, insurgencies are inherently weak.  In fact, insurgency warfare is itself a weapon of the weak against the strong, the resort of an inferior and irregular force when challenging a more powerful and conventional foe. 

Innovative, unusual and highly irregular methods must be employed by the ‘intrinsically incompatible’ weaker foe in order to exploit or negate the strengths of the more capable opponent.[19]

Asymmetrical tactics, rather than conventional symmetrical tactics, are consequently the preferred modus operandi in the form of guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism, which both have a strong psychological impact against a stronger adversary and can wear down an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, political will to fight (resolve), and morale.[20]  As Metz & Millen neatly summarise:

‘Insurgency is a strategy adopted by groups which cannot attain their political objectives through conventional means or by a quick seizure of power.  It is used by those too weak to do otherwise…They avoid battlespaces where they are weakest – often the conventional military sphere – and focus on those where they can operate on more equal footing, particularly the psychological and the political.  Insurgents try to postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain themselves, expand their support, and hope that, over time, the power balance changes in their favour.’ [21]

Fundamental Nature of Insurgency: A Psychological Campaign

This means that insurgency warfare is essentially also a psychological campaign, in which the will to fight among the established civilian government and its security forces is continuously targeted, attacked and eroded in various concerted ways.  

This is especially true in regard to the choice of tactics employed by insurgents against their government opponents in order to wage this psychological warfare – an asymmetric repertoire of abrasive ‘psychological shock’ tactics which includes, but is not limited to:

• hit-and-run attacks;
• ambushes;
• raids;
• the laying of mines or Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs);
• suicide-bombings;
• targeted assassinations; and
• grisly executions of captured civilians, government officials, policemen and women, and military personnel. 

Asymmetric Tactics: A Psychological Assault to Produce 4 Specific Psychological Effects

Indeed, Kilcullen considers that the use of such tactics by insurgents essentially amounts to a four-pronged psychological assault, that is intended to produce four specific psychological effects in order to wear down the counter-insurgent authorities’ psychological strength and resolve to fight.

These are: (1) Provocation; (2) Intimidation; (3) Protraction; and (4) Exhaustion – which Kilcullen condenses into the acronym ‘PIPE’.[22]  These will be discussed in more detail below.

(1) Provocation

Firstly, insurgents seek to provoke their counter-insurgent opponents into overreactions that will have a high and extremely negative political cost.  

In order to achieve this, insurgents deliberately aim to commit atrocities that will cause opponents – government forces, foreign counterinsurgent forces, and even rival ethnic or sectarian factions – to have a violent emotional reaction that will impinge upon their decision-making abilities.[23]  The objective is, as Kilcullen argues, to provoke opponents to act ‘in ways counter to their interests.’ [24] 

In particular, insurgents hope to so anger their opponents that counter-insurgent forces will vent their frustration on the local civilian population.   This is a particularly desirable event for insurgents, since any instance of excessive force used by the counter-insurgents against the local population benefits the insurgent cause by:

(a) creating division between the civilians and the counter-insurgents – a particular harmful result for the counter-insurgency campaign since counter-insurgents are heavily reliant on local support and assistance; and/or

(b) diminishing civilian confidence in the counter-insurgents, which may not only curtail civilian support for the counter-insurgency, but may actually cause them to spontaneously overreact and ‘bandwagon’ to the opposite side, thereby inspiring a new wave of non-combatant civilians to become local recruits to the combat of the insurgency. 

Boot aptly underscores this important point, stating that: ‘If an army does not respond swiftly, it can be bled dry. But if it undertakes savage reprisals, it risks driving more supporters into the insurgency’s camp’.[25] 

(2) Intimidation

Secondly, insurgents seek through their ‘shock and terror’ tactics to hamstring opposition through intimidation. 

Many insurgent acts are deliberately committed to terrify and coerce members of the governing civil administration, the counter-insurgent security forces and members of the public into giving up the fight.[26] That is, the attacks are an attempt to forcibly compel opponents into stopping all cooperation or support to counter-insurgent forces. [27] 

The effect is heightened if the attacks are committed at times and in places where opponents believe they are secure, thereby magnifying the terror, fear, and the resultant sense of vulnerability in the face of insurgent forces. 

Insurgent attempts to psychologically intimidate and cow civilian and military opponents may go one step further, moreover, and be directed into personal attacks.  For instance, the delivery of threatening letters to specific individuals, as has been the case with the Afghan Taliban’s ‘Night Letters’ delivered by night to the homes of unsuspecting and vulnerable Afghan civilians. 

Through these and other forms of intimidation, insurgents hope to demoralise and weaken all resisting forces. 

The use of such shock and terror tactics also hold an additional advantage for insurgents moreover: their use results in the insurgents holding and maintaining the initiative in the war campaign, where counter-insurgent opponents are forced to fight a mostly reactive and defensive – rather than offensive – counter campaign, and will find themselves continually on the back-foot. 

(3) Protraction

Thirdly, insurgents wage psychological war by harnessing the dimension of time and deliberately protracting the conflict across many years, and even decades. 

Indeed, insurgents commit to propagating insecurity, confusion, and ambiguity over very long periods of time. This is done in the hope that a strategy of exacerbating and prolonging the conflict will slowly wear down an opponent’s will and ability to resist, causing counter-insurgent governments and their security forces to weaken to the point that they will eventually give up the struggle and yield to the very forces they were once determined to reject and to defeat in their country.  As Ho Chi Minh’s second-in-command, Dang Xuan Khu, wrote during the Vietnam insurgency:

‘The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? … If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and the enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics…and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory.’[28]

In truth, insurgents nearly always have time on their side since – unlike most opposing governing powers – they need not concern themselves over deadlines, parliamentary terms, democratic elections or exit timelines for military forces. 

Consequently, protracting the conflict over time provides the insurgent force ample time in which to regroup and mount a victorious campaign, while at the same time creating significant stress, impatience and pressure to quickly succeed amongst the ranks of the counter-insurgent force, which, as an instrument of one or more governments, is almost inevitably constrained by temporal deadlines.

Protraction has many other advantages for insurgents moreover. As Kilcullen summarises, a protracted conflict enables the insurgency to ‘avoid strong counterinsurgent forces, control [its] own loss rates, enhance the exhaustion effect and preserve strength after setbacks.’[29]

This kind of time-stretching strategy is distinctive to insurgents since in the normal way of things, as the U.S. Counter-insurgency Manual points out, ‘any combatant prefers a quick, cheap, overwhelming victory over a long, bloody, protracted struggle.’[30]  However, as Galula explains, any insurgent would, as the weaker force, be foolish to attack his opponent in a conventional fashion, attempting to militarily crush the Enemy force and win territory.[31] 

A protracted struggle is consequently far better suited to the insurgents’ abilities and objectives and, as such, it has become a prominent feature of insurgency campaigns. As Galula argues: ‘An insurgency is intentional, but not swift. It is a protracted struggle conducted methodically in order to attain intermediary goals with an eventual aim of overthrowing the existing power structure.’[32] 

In truth, ‘protractedness’ is the name of the insurgents’ game – thus ‘endurance’ must be the opponents.

(4) Exhaustion

Finally, insurgents wage psychological war by seeking to provoke exhaustion among oppositional forces.  

The insurgents’ use of shocking and terrifying asymmetrical tactics against a conventional symmetrical foe play a key role in this effort. 

Firstly, due to the psychological and physical insecurity engendered by such attacks, counter-insurgent forces are compelled to divert missions and resources away from the fight where they are most needed, and towards more menial duties such as garrison and convoy protection, guard duty, and the guarding of key installations and Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  The result is, as Kilcullen states, that counter-insurgent forces and government agencies become tied up and absorbed ‘in actions that require major effort but do not advance their mission’, thereby creating materiel and psychological strain among the full spectrum of counter-insurgent forces at all levels.[33] 

Secondly, in addition to the psychological and materiel strain caused by the diversion of missions and resources described above, the counter-insurgent force can be exhausted by insurgent tactics in a secondary way: the unavoidable reality that the insurgents use of asymmetric ‘shock and terror’ tactics renders all methods of opposition difficult.  This is because the use of such asymmetric tactics provides little time and opportunity for counter-insurgent opponents to react effectively, thereby creating an uneven playing field.  Asymmetric tactics are thus very favourable to insurgents, if ‘unfair’ to opponents.[34]  

Indeed, Metz argues that it is for this precise reason, in addition to concealment, that insurgents use complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas) in the hope that the lack of, or delay in, achieving results will erode the opponents’ will to fight.[35]  Counter-insurgent forces will become embroiled in a painful and seemingly fruitless attritional war (a.k.a. “a war of a thousand flea bites” involving a long and slow wearing down of government forces’ morale, resources and resolve to keep fighting and thereby keep defending and protecting the freedoms and safety of the civilian population of the country) – creating many casualties but few positive developments and results – that will inevitably take a psychological toll on the counter-insurgent force in terms of both frustration and exhaustion.  Psychological exhaustion may even lead to incidents of excessive force by counter-insurgent forces in an attempt to bring a quick end to the struggle, thereby feeding back into the insurgents’ second, intended ‘provocation’ effect. 

Indeed, through provoking materiel and emotional exhaustion among counter-insurgent forces, insurgents may well initiate the collapse of the entire counter-insurgent campaign and thereby win the war.

One can see by this that insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns are in essence a forceful clash of wills and desires – a clash of psychological strength in a psycho-political war.

Ultimate success in each particular conflict will belong only to the most committed and determined warring side – the one which remains, endures and perseveres in the fight for the longest period of time. 

As the old wartime maxim states: ‘Victory belongs to those who believe in it the most and believe in it the longest.’[36] 

Insurgent Forms of Warfare

Disparate insurgencies have more than psychological warfare in common, however.  O’Neill argues that most insurgency campaigns are waged using forms of warfare that are universal to all, where a form of warfare equates to ‘one variety of organized violence emphasizing particular armed forces, weapons, tactics, and targets.’ [37]  That is to say, insurgents rely on similar force arrangements and a shared inventory of violent methods.[38]

Three forms of warfare in particular feature prominently within insurgencies: terrorism, guerrilla warfare and – during the final stages at least – conventional warfare.[39]

(1) Terrorism

Terrorism has been defined as ‘politically motivated violence against non-combatants with the intention to coerce through fear’.[40]  While terrorism has received a great deal of attention since 2001 as a result of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing global War on Terror, terrorism is in fact a common tactic of insurgents, reputedly ‘in the tactical repertoire of virtually every insurgency’.[41] 

This is because terrorism is well-suited for the psychological warfare involved in insurgency warfare, being first and foremost a psychological weapon – the invocation of paralyzing terror. It is hence widely and deliberately adopted and executed by insurgents for the express purpose of weakening the will, commitment and fortitude of opponents, and thereby erode the opposing force’s ability to fight. 

Terrorism within an insurgency is usually carried out by small groups of insurgents organised into cells, each of which conduct a litany of terrorist acts within its assigned area including bombings, assassinations, arson, grenade-throwing, hijacking, kidnapping, torture and mutilation.[42]  

The targets of these terror-inducing acts are largely the “soft targets” of non-combatants, i.e. predominantly unarmed civilians who are not participating in the violence of the conflict at all, rather than the harder and more reasonable targets of participating combatants in the conflict such as armed government security forces or assets.[43]  Though seemingly haphazard, the civilian victims of such terror attacks have more often than not been deliberately selected as targets by the insurgents in order to dramatically increase the psychological shock and political fallout from the attacks within that society.[44] 

While terrorist attacks can occur at any time and in any place, in both urban and rural localities, they tend to occur at locations where there is a high concentration of unarmed civilians – and therefore a good supply of feasible and “easy” victims on which to prey.

Insurgents employ terror tactics to meet a number of different objectives, often simultaneously.  As O’Neill states: ‘Insurgent terrorism is purposeful, rather than mindless, violence because terrorists seek to achieve specific long-term, intermediate, and short-term goals’. [45]

For instance, while insurgents may use terrorism towards the long-term goal of entirely transforming or revolutionising a political entity, system, community, or subset of government policies, such acts may at the same time serve intermediate goals such as destabilising the government, draining away its resources, diminishing its popular support and, ‘by instilling fear into officials and their domestic and international supporters’, eroding the government’s psychological support structures.[46] Concurrent short-term goals, meanwhile, may range from acquiring publicity, invoking chaos, and dispiriting the populace, to securing from government forces the release of prisoners or the payment of ransoms.[47]  Terrorist acts may even serve lesser goals too such as enhancing the reputation of a particular cell or faction within an insurgency, exacting revenge for recent government actions, or inciting aggressive reactions from opposing forces against the population.[48] 

Consequently, since acts of terrorism can serve ‘multitudinous’ objectives, terrorism forms an important force-multiplying weapon for any insurgent force.

(2) Guerrilla Warfare

It is the tactic of guerrilla warfare rather than terrorism, however, that is most often associated with insurgent groups.  The term ‘guerrilla’ is a derivation of the Spanish ‘guerra’ (meaning ‘little war’), the latter coined in the early 1800s to describe the age-old tactic, then used by locals, in resisting French occupation of Spain under Napoleon Bonaparte.[49] 

Today ‘guerrillas’ are widely regarded as a group of individuals, often indigenous, that is organised along military lines to comprise an irregular armed force, and that is engaged in combat against a regular armed force.[50]  ‘Guerrilla warfare’, meanwhile, is regarded as the conduct of military and paramilitary operations by such irregular armed forces, in territory that is ‘held’ or ‘denied’ by regular armed forces.[51]

Guerrilla warfare is often referred to as ‘asymmetrical’ or ‘unconventional’ warfare in that it involves the pitting of a numerically inferior irregular force against a numerically superior regular force, leading the guerrillas to not only organise itself into small, highly mobile and flexible combat cells, but also to resort to unusual military tactics such as subversion, sabotage, ambush, and hit-and-run raids.[52]  These tactics, in addition to the absence of a traditional and tangible frontline, mean that conflicts involving unconventional warfare usually last a great deal longer than conventional wars and are also much more difficult to resolve.[53]

It is perhaps no surprise then that guerrilla warfare is the most popular tactic adopted by insurgents to confront established power-holders and their regular armed forces.[54]  Of course this overriding preference for guerrilla tactics arises principally from necessity, due to the basic power inequalities usually existing between large, entrenched government forces and smaller, less-established forces plotting insurrection.  Because insurgents lack the capability to overthrow the existing political order through an outright military victory, they instead seek to wear down their political opponent’s will by subjecting him to a long, slow, tedious, expensive and psychologically-painful campaign of attrition. Guerrilla warfare is consequently, like terrorism, a weapon of the weak. 

Once again too, it is primarily a psychological rather than a physical form of warfare, and will be successful only if the existing government lacks courage and resilience, most demonstrably seen in a failure to commit adequate and sustained human and material forces to the fight over successive years and even decades.[55] However, sustained patience, resolve, and commitment over long periods of time are in rather short supply among political regimes as a general rule, especially within modern liberal democracies where governments are changed and held accountable to the opinions of their population in frequent national elections.  As a consequence, this long-term insurgent strategy of attrition and ‘wearing down your opponent’s will to fight’ over long periods is a gamble many insurgents are willing to take – and one which, as shown throughout history, has often eventually reaped great rewards for the attacking insurgents.

Unlike insurgent terrorists, the main targets of insurgent guerrillas are not unarmed civilians but rather government security forces – the army, navy, air force and the police – in addition to their military and economic support structures.[56]  Within an insurgency, such guerrilla warfare is usually conducted by medium-sized, lightly-armed but highly mobile units or cells.[57]  Much larger than terrorist cells, these units necessitate a more complex logistical structure including base camps.[58]  For this reason guerrillas will often establish a chain of camps within a rural environment to maintain a steady supply of resources.[59]

Indeed, guerrillas consistently operate in arduous rural environments such as forests, jungles or mountains as a matter of course.[60]  These environments not only provide protection and sanctuary by warding off conventional attacks by government or coalition regular armed forces, but can afford quick concealment should such attacks occur. Furthermore, it is in these rural environments, far from city centres, that guerrillas gather the most popular support – a form of support critical to any guerrilla campaign – in the form of local rural peoples who can supply the guerrillas with a steady stream of food, weapons, ammunition, information and, most importantly of all, new recruits. 

Basing an insurgent movement in these rural areas does have two major disadvantages however:

(1) firstly, the insurgency becomes heavy reliant and dependent on external aid in terms of support and supply in the rural vicinity; and

(2) secondly, the insurgency requires a well-organised and functioning logistical system to share out the influx of externally-supplied and locally-supplied resources in order to survive.[61]

Insurgents engaging in guerrilla warfare place a premium on speed, secrecy, mobility, flexibility surprise and cunning.  Their tactics consist of sabotage, ambushes, lightning raids and hit-and-run attacks, followed by hasty retreats and dispersals.[62]  Historically these tactics can be traced back to Sun Tzu, a famous military general and theorist of ancient China, who in his martial treatise ‘The Art of War’ expounded an indirect style of warfare to secure victory, namely through exploiting enemy weaknesses while avoiding enemy strengths. In essence Sun Tzu advocated waging war first and foremost in the psychological domain before the physical, through crafty targeting and cunning plans that utilised surprise, deception, secrecy, disinformation, and military guile, combined with lightning speed, agility and flexibility.

Twenty-five centuries later, Sun Tzu’s ideas would be incorporated into the writings of another Chinese theorist, Mao Tse-tung (also known as Mao Zedong), whose 1937 pamphlet ‘Yu Chi Chin’ (‘Guerrilla Warfare’) would make him the foremost authority on guerrilla warfare in the 20^th century.  Written to educate peasants on the guerrilla mode of warfare, in order that they might join the Communist movement and fight against the rule of the modernising, reunifying and nationalist Kuomintang government of the Chinese Republic (successor to the final imperial Qing Dynasty), the tactics outlined in this pamphlet would become the modus operandi for many subsequent insurgencies around the world, including those most famously led by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam as well as Che Guevara in Cuba and the South American continent. Indeed, they continue to be relevant to the present day.  Mao Tse-Tung sums up the guerrilla mode of warfare in an illuminating passage. ‘Guerrilla strategy must be based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack,’ he writes:  

‘In guerrilla warfare select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west, avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.  In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated. Only in this way can guerrillas carry out their mission of independent guerrilla action and coordination with the effort of the regular armies.’[63]

As one may see by this, the overarching purpose or goal for such guerrilla tactics is, like terrorism, through constant harassment to and wear down the enemy’s psychological will and physical capability to resist.[64]  In short, in the few cases where guerrillas do secure victory over government forces, they do so by ruthlessly evoking and then capitalizing on the government’s fear and exhaustion.

It is important to note, however, that guerrilla campaigns can only be successful if they are widely supported by the native peoples of the locality in which they take place.  ‘Guerrillas are fish swimming in the sea of the people,’ Mao famously stated. ‘If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will thrive and multiply’.[65]  This means that insurgent guerrillas require a popular conduit, not only as a vehicle to legitimise and assist their violence, but in which they may also hide and seek protection from government forces.  Without this broad popular support it is impossible for guerrilla campaigns to survive or make any progress at all, since they lack a friendly medium in which to operate. As Mao concluded, such guerrilla movements ‘are easy to destroy because they lack a broad foundation in the people’.[66]

This basic fact holds important significance for anti-guerrilla Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategies opposing guerrilla insurgents, since it becomes clear that by draining away that popular support and medium in which guerrillas ‘swim’ and flourish, insurgents can not succeed using guerrilla warfare.

In fact, Samuel Griffith considered that this process by which guerrillas are separated from their popular support structures – essential to any anti-guerrilla campaign – could be summed up in three words: ‘location, isolation, and eradication’. 

Once the location of the guerrilla base area was identified and carefully studied and the links between the movement and its popular foundation addressed (sometimes through the movement or resettlement of entire communities), guerrillas could be entirely isolated from their sources of information and food.  Extremely capable, flexible and highly-mobile government forces, acting in concert with reliable intelligence, could then attack the surviving guerrillas thereby eradicating the movement in one fell swoop.[67] 

In sum, as Griffith concluded:

‘The tactics of guerrillas must be used against the guerrillas themselves. They must be constantly harried and constantly attacked.  Every effort must be made to induce defections and take prisoners. The best source of information of the enemy is men who know the enemy situation.  Imaginative, intelligent and bold leadership is absolutely essential.’[68]

(3) Conventional Warfare

The third and final form of warfare ubiquitously used by insurgents is conventional warfare.  While symmetrical, conventional warfare is usually avoided at all costs at the outset, and often in the early development stages of the insurgency, it is nevertheless frequently adopted by insurgents once the insurgency has grown in maturity and gained strength in numbers.

At these times, conventional battles are no longer seen as disadvantageous to the movement.  On the contrary, a transition from indirect guerrilla warfare to direct conventional confrontations is deemed necessary in these final stages to deliver the ‘death blow’ to the opposing government force.[69]

In adopting this final form of warfare, however, insurgents are usually judicious in their battles, seeking out opportunities of time and place where opposing regular forces will be the most vulnerable.[70]  They also pay great attention to retaining maximum mobility throughout the battles, allowing freedom of action for insurgents to make a hasty retreat, should the battle not proceed in their own favour.[71]

The Life Cycle of An Insurgency

In addition to common forms of warfare, Metz describes insurgencies as having a common life cycle too.  This cycle is comprised of three distinct stages. 

Start

In the first stage the insurgency begins to organise itself in secret, primarily through recruiting, training, educating, mobilizing, and gathering resources – though it nevertheless tends to remain weak and undeveloped at this stage.[72]  Since in this initial phase survival of the new movement is all that counts, the insurgency often goes underground and remains concealed for a lengthy period of time as it stealthily organises itself and its recruits.

However, in cases where the new insurgency comprises only one of many already-existing insurgencies in the operational area, the competition between the diverse fighting groups may prompt the embryonic proto-insurgencies to risk a more public mobilization through launching bold – and even rash – attacks in the quest to establish its own ‘brand identity’ and, through the resultant publicity of the attack, to afterwards attract and gather in recruits.[73] 

Whichever strategy is adopted, the beginning phase is the easiest stage of an insurgency movement. However, it is also the phase in which most insurgencies fail, since any government action against the infant movement by regular forces can quash the new insurgency completely before it has had time to develop ‘a critical mass of skill and support’.[74]

Indeed, much depends on the attentiveness and effectiveness of governing authorities during the early phases of anti-government insurgencies.  Insurgencies tend to be more successful if they begin in nations where the governing authorities are corrupt, disorganised, divided, tyrannical, ineffectual and/or slow to respond, and where the authorities fail to identify the infant insurgency as a direct and serious threat to governance in their nation.[75] Insurgencies are less successful, by contrast, when they are pitted against strong, well-organised, and effective governments with majority popular support and a good understanding or experience with countering insurgencies (see endnote).[76]

By this it may be seen that in many cases the eventual success or failure of a young insurgency to develop further depends largely on the government authority it is rebelling against, especially the degree to which it is corrupt and either incapable or unwilling to provide security and basic infrastructure, services and opportunities to its population, and the degree to which it either does not recognise or fails to respond appropriately to the growing new insurgency.  Indeed, Metz argues that: 

‘Although the most benevolent and stable government may face isolated violence, an organized insurgency reveals deep flaws in rule or administration. Today, even an unsuccessful insurrection can weaken or undercut a government, hinder economic development and access to global capital, or at least force national leaders to alter key policies. The tendency then is to deny or underestimate the threat, to believe that killing or capturing only a few of the most obvious rebel leaders will solve the problem when in fact the problem – the heart of the insurgency – lies deeper.  Like cancers, insurgencies are seldom accorded the seriousness they deserve at precisely the time they are most vulnerable, early in their development.’[77]

Byman makes a similar conclusion, stating: ‘Often, the ultimate success of the proto-insurgency in becoming a full-blown insurgency depends on the mistakes of the government it opposes.’[78]

It seems then that the real strength or “food” of an infant insurgency in a country is often the government’s own flaws, its own negligence, and its own mistakes.

Middle Phase

Once an insurgency has organised itself to the extent that it has acquired the requisite critical mass of insurgent skill, recruits and support, the second phase commences – launching direct operations against the governing authorities. 

This is a much more difficult task for the movement as it involves undertaking a three-pronged campaign.  As Metz states:

‘Starting an insurgency is easy. A dozen or so dedicated radicals with access to munitions and explosives can do it.  Building an effective insurgency, though, is difficult.’[79] 

Firstly, the insurgents must open a military campaign – albeit one using asymmetrical tactics such as terrorism, guerrilla warfare, sabotage and assassinations.[80] 

Secondly, the insurgents must continue the mobilization campaign. In this second phase mobilization involves not only the continued acquisition of resources and raw recruits, and ongoing training to more finely hone battle skills, however, but also accumulating funds to financially support this campaign.[81] Since securing financing for a destabilising and violent anti-government insurgency is a thorny problem, insurgents often resort to securing finances criminally through a litany of skulduggery exploits, involving – but not limited to – smuggling, robbery, drug trafficking, kidnapping, black marketing, money laundering, counterfeiting, merchandise pirating, false charities, racketeering, extortion or alliances with other criminal organisations.[82]

Thirdly, and of great importance, insurgents must also wage a publicity campaign to gain acceptance and legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This is most often achieved through what Metz calls ‘information warfare’, namely propaganda.  This propaganda is designed to not only reshape public perceptions towards the inherent ‘justice’ or ‘rightness’ of the insurgent cause, but also to recast the terror-wielding and violent insurgents as ‘freedom fighters’ rather than what they actually are – rebels and murderers. 

However, insurgents will additionally also seek to perform grandiose and brazen exploits against the authorities, in the hope that the very boldness of their acts will inspire allegiance, particularly among the youth and especially ‘young males with the volatile combination of boredom, anger, and lack of purpose’ for which ‘insurgency can provide a sense of adventure, excitement, and meaning that transcends its political objectives’.[83]

End Game

The third and final stage is essentially the ‘end game’.  An insurgency will continue so long as the insurgents believe they will ultimately prevail, regardless of the costs incurred in the meantime.

This means that the duration of an insurgency campaign will differ from insurgency to insurgency. In some cases, quite apart from their belief or unbelief in eventual victory, insurgents may opt for continued warfare simply out of a sense of fear – either fear that the cost of stopping will incur greater costs that that of continuing, or fear of peace which in long conflicts spanning many generations can often become a frightening ‘unknown’.[84]   The local population usually compounds these existential factors since, as Metz states, ‘the normal practice is for large segments of the population to “bandwagon” by throwing their support to the side they believe will win’.[85]

Nevertheless, insurgencies do meet their end eventually, and in a variety of ways. 

In rare cases an insurgency may end after a decisive victory. This occurs when counter-insurgents eradicate the insurgents and block off any further recruitment attempts, thereby effectively killing the insurgency e.g. Sri Lanka’s sudden military defeat of the decades-long Tamil Tiger insurgency in 2009, giving them the final victory in the so-called “unwinnable war”, and Pakistan’s similarly decisive counter-insurgent military victory over the Taliban threatening the Pakistani Capital and State in 2008, even in the notoriously dangerous and insurgent-infested Swat Valley (once visited and described by British journalist and military commander Winston Churchill during the 1890s, and for much the same reasons – refer to an excerpt from Churchill’s fascinating and illuminating book ‘My Early Life’ provided in blog #28).

In other cases, a decisive victory can occur when the insurgents themselves succeed in militarily overthrowing the existing government, e.g. the defeat in China of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang government that had ruled the Republic of China since 1912 by Mao’s Communist insurgency, which resulted in the creation of the Chinese Communist State on the massive and substantial Chinese mainland in 1949 and the withdrawal of the Kuomintang government to the comparatively tiny island of Taiwan and its much tinier surrounding islands).[86] [According to the renowned, respected and internationally-read Chinese military commander, strategist, theorist and philosopher of Ancient China, Sun Tzu (c. 544-496  B.C.), who wrote the famous book ‘The Art of War’ according to the ancient and enduring political and military motto of “Through Theory – Understanding”, the best wars were those that were either ‘never fought’, ‘avoided’, or ‘won without bloodshed’, while the worst wars were those that ‘involved heavy loss of life’ or were ‘repeated time-after-time’ in the exact same place or region, or because of the same historically disastrous quarrels or issues.  Indeed, Sun Tzu’s #1 lesson from his military career and experience of warfare was explicitly ‘to keep violence at a minimum’, and subsequently #2 ‘to know yourself and your Enemy’ (i.e. recognise strengths and weaknesses so as to avoid the trouble and needless human bloodshed of confronting what is strong).]

More frequently, insurgencies end when a negotiated political settlement is reached between the anti-government insurgent rebels and the counter-insurgent governing authorities.[87]

Alternatively, insurgencies may simply lose momentum and fizzle out, with insurgents slowly but surely breaking away from the armed group (disbanding), ceasing their insurgent activity (demobilizing), and either merging back into the civilian population as fellow non-combatant civilians who have chosen to give up the futile fight and live and work under the authority and laws of the legitimate national government, or going into self-imposed exile abroad in a bid to escape legal prosecution and punishment for war crimes or other domestic criminal offenses.[88] 

If the armed rebellion in question reaches any of these points described above, then the insurgency has ended and the life-cycle of the insurgency is complete.

The Uniqueness of Each Insurgency

Despite the many comparisons made and commonalities between various insurgencies identified above, the fact nevertheless remains that each insurgency is always utterly unique to itself. 

This is because every individual insurgency will have its own particular specifications or parameters, depending on its origins, its political goals, its leadership, its recruits, its capabilities, its organisation and the degree of support it receives from local and external sources – not to mention the history, geography, politics and socio-cultural environment of the land in which they operate.[89]  As Melshen, a well-known counter-insurgency expert likewise concludes:  ‘All insurgency wars are different. Each insurgency has unique specific parameters that differentiate it from other insurgencies’.[90]

When examining insurgency theory and practice then, and studying insurgencies past or present in the course of human history, it is important to keep in mind that every insurgency is always unique – sui generis –  and of its own singular kind, therefore also often requiring uniquely-designed counter-insurgency strategies, tactics, weapons and approaches to quell it. [91] 

The following appendix will continue this more in-depth examination by presenting an overview of counter-insurgency, and the various ways in which COIN war differs markedly from conventional war.

* For information on the extent and impact of national caveats on the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here:

http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984

Endnotes

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[1] Colin S. Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, (Winter) 2007, pp. 40, 42; United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), Headquarters Department of the Army (DA), FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, p. 1-1, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12257/, (accessed 29 January 2009).

[2] Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, ibid., p. 36; A. Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21^st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare’, in Evans M., Parkin, R. & Ryan, A. (eds.) Future Armies Future Challenges – Land warfare in the information age, Crows Nest, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2004, p. 300.

[3] Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, ibid., p. 36;  W.R. Polk, Violent Politics: A history of insurgency, terrorism & guerrilla warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq,New York, HarperPerennial, HarperCollins Publishers, 2007, p. xi;  J. Black, ‘Qualifying technology’, Rethinking Military History, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 123;  M. van Creveld, ‘Technology and War II – Postmodern War?’, in Townsend, C. (ed.) The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 311; Parker, G. (ed.), The Times Compact History of the World, London, Times Books, 2002, pp. 98-99, 104-105, 112-113, 118-119, 130-131, 154-155, 158-159, 160-161, 162-163.

*For further reading on insurgencies throughout history, see William R. Polk, Violent Politics: A history of insurgency, terrorism & guerrilla warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq, New York, HarperPerennial, HarperCollins Publishers, 2007.

[4] Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, ibid., p. 36; Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21^st-century armies’, op. cit., p. 300. 

[5] S. Metz & R. Millen (LTCOL), ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response’, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), p.1, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/insurgency21c.pdf, (accessed 21 July 2010).

[6] D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 4, (Winter) 2006, p. 112.

[7] U.S. DoD, Headquarters DA, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 1-1.

[8] ‘Insurgency/ Sédition’ in  NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), AAP-6 (2010), 2010, p. 2-I-5, http://www.scribd.com/doc/39197937/NATO-Glossary-of-Terms-and-Definitions-Aap-6-2010, (accessed 18 October 2010).

[9] United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Dictionary of Military Terms, (Joint Pub 1-02), New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2009, p. 267; Australian Department of Defence, ADFP 101 Glossary, Australian Defence Force Publication- Staff Duties Series, Canberra, 2009, p. I-6; New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine – NZDDP-D 2004, New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, Wellington, 2004, p. G6.

[10] R. Bowyer, Dictionary of Military Terms (3^rd ed.), London, A & C Black Publishers Ltd, 2008, p. 128; D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, (August) 2005, p. 603.

[11] U.S. DoD, Headquarters DA, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 1-1.

[12] B.E. O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare, Dulles, Virginia, Brassey’s, Inc, 1990, p. 17.

[13] Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, op. cit., p. 112.

[14] O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 13.

[15] Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 603; S. Metz, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 1, (Winter) 2003-2004, p. 26.

[16] Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, ibid., p. 603.

[17] Modification of General Sir Frank Kitson’s definition, in P. Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol.18, no. 4, (December) 2007, p. 676.

[18] Metz, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’,  op. cit., p. 25

[19] J. Kiszely (LTGEN), ‘Learning about Counter-Insurgency’, RUSI Journal, (December) 2006, p. 16, www.rusi.org/publication/journal/ref:A4587F6831E1A6, (accessed 11 March 2009); Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21^st-century armies’, op. cit., p. 300; P. Abigail (MAJGEN), ‘Preparing the Australian Army for 21^st-Century Conflict: Problems and Perspectives’, in Evans, M., Parkin, R & Ryan, A. (eds.), Future Armies Future Challenges – Land warfare in the information age, Crows Nest, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2004, p. 239; T.J. Williams, ‘Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare’, Parameters, (Summer) 2003, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03summer/williams.htm, (accessed 22 October 2008). 

[20] Abigail, ‘Preparing the Australian Army for 21^st-Century Conflict’, ibid., p. 239; Williams, ‘Strategic Leader Readiness and Competencies for Asymmetric Warfare’, ibid.

[21] Metz & Millen, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century’, op. cit., p. 2.

[22] D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, Presented at Small Wars Center of Excellence Counterinsurgency Seminar 07, Quantico, VA, 26 September 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/COINSeminarSummaryReport.doc, (accessed 5 January 2011).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Boot, ‘Humvees and IEDs: Iraq, March 20, 2003 – May 1, 2005’, War Made New – Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World, New York, Gotham Books, Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2006, p. 405.

[26] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Dang Xuan Khu, cited in M. van Creveld, The Changing Face of War: Combat from the Marne to Iraq, New York, Ballantine, 2008, pp. 229-230.

[29] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.

[30] U.S. DoD, Headquarters DA, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 1-2.

[31] D. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 2006. p. 4.

[32] B. Reeder, ‘Book Summary of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula’, Conflict Research Consortium, www.crinfo.org/booksummary/10672/, (accessed 6 January 2011).

[33] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.

[34] U.S. DoD, Headquarters DA, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 1-2.

[35] Metz & Millen, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century’, op. cit., p. 2.

[36] ‘Military Quotations from Around the World’, Digger History, http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-asstd/quote.htm, (accessed 26 July 2010).

[37] O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 24.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 603.

[41] Ibid.

[42] O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 24.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p. 24-25.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid., p. 25.

[48] Ibid.

[49] ‘Guerrilla’, Indopedia.org, 2010,http://www.indopedia.org/index.php?title=Guerilla, (accessed 28 July 2010).

[50] UK Dictionary of military terms, p. 112; DoD, p. 234.

[51] U.S. DoD, The Dictionary of Military Terms (Joint Pub 1-02), op. cit., p. 234.

[52] ‘Guerrilla’, Indopedia.org, op. cit.

[53] U.S. DoD, The Dictionary of Military Terms (Joint Pub 1-02), op. cit, p. 572; ‘Guerrilla’, Indopedia.org, ibid.

[54] O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 25.

[55] Ibid., p. 26.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., p. 25-26.

[58] Ibid., p. 26.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Ibid., p. 25-26.

[63] T. Mao (translation by S.B. Griffith), On Guerrilla Warfare, Champaign, IL, University of Illinois Press, 2000, p. 46.

[64] O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 25.

[65] Cited in China in Crisis, Volume II – China’s Policies in Asia and America’s Alternatives (ed. Tang Tsou), Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1968, p. 271. 

[66] Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, op. cit., p. 47.

[67] S. Griffith, ‘Foreword’, in Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 31-32.

[68] Griffith, ibid., p. 33.

[69] O’Neill, ‘The Nature of Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 26.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Metz & Millen, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century’, op. cit., p. 3.

[73] Ibid., p. 3.

[74] Ibid., p. 5.

[75] Ibid., p. 4-5.

[76] Ibid., p. 5.

*For more information on insurgencies in this early phase and the reasons why they either succeed or fail to become full-blown insurgencies, see D. Byman, ‘Understanding Proto-Insurgencies’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 31, no. 2, (April) 2008, pp. 165-200.

[77] Metz, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, op. cit., p. 25.

[78] D. Byman, ‘Understanding Proto-Insurgencies’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 31, no. 2, (April) 2008, p. 165.

[79] Metz & Millen, ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21^st Century’, op. cit., p. 5.

[80] Ibid., p. 4.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid., p. 5.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

*For more information on how the Sri Lankan government brought an end to the 25-year civil war in Sri Lanka and achieved ultimate victory over the Tamil Tiger insurgency in 2009, see S. Desilva-Ranasinghe, ‘How Sri Lanka Won the Unwinnable War’, Asia Pacific Defence Reporter – Australian Defence in a Global Context, vol. 35 (September) 2009, pp.23-24.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan’, op.cit., p. 689.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Kiszely, ‘Learning about Counter-Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 17.