#35 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?

This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE), relating to deployed military commanders on operations: Are deployed military commanders given discretionary authority, by their civilian masters in government, to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre?

ROE will first be outlined as two classes of military orders or instructions issued to national armed forces deployed at home or abroad to act on behalf of the government and the nation of the State: these are (1) ‘offensive’ military orders for Mission Accomplishment (to achieve the military objectives towards attainment of the overall political aim) & (2) ‘defensive’ military orders for Self-Defence when encountering Enemy or Hostile opposition (intent and actions) during the course of their military operations. Next, I will discuss who has the power to change ROE, and describe the three differing degrees of ‘Discretionary Authority’ that governments tend to give to their military commanders in conflict theatres today, in the modern 21st century world of warfare. Subsequently, this real-world analysis will end with a discussion of the negative consequences of overly-constrained commanders in conflict theatres – which so often leads to ludicrous, illogical and tragic security situations and outcomes for fighting military personnel (and also defenceless local civilians) on operations, providing two such examples from warzones concerning New Zealand armed forces in East Timor during 2000 and Danish armed forces in Afghanistan during 2006. Finally, I will discuss this modern phenomenon of ‘Ridiculous ROE’ as the result of the significant and ever-abiding problem of the ‘political-military disconnect’ or ‘grey area’ of incomprehension and misunderstanding, that exists between the political masters in the political sphere and military commanders in the military sphere – once alluded to centuries ago, by the famous, Prussian, realist, military commander, veteran, theorist and philosopher, Karl von Clausewitz.

#33 The Problem of “National Caveats” in NATO Operations around the World, 1996-2016

This blog will examine more closely NATO’s history of national caveat imposition in NATO military operations. It will begin by providing 5 reasons for caveat imposition within NATO missions. It will subsequently outline the recurring habit of NATO nations to contribute caveat-constrained military forces to NATO missions around the world over two decades, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Libya and most notoriously in Afghanistan. It will next describe the crux of NATO’s “caveat problem”, and then describe the three, largest, negative, caveat effects that have continuously resulted from NATO caveat imposition, namely (1) divided and inflexible NATO forces; (2) a disunified Multinational Force incapable of performing fundamental tasks; and (3) inequality and uneven burden-sharing within each NATO Multinational Force. Lastly, I will offer some final thoughts on this important issue of national caveats within NATO missions, with reference to the purpose and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.

#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia

#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   In the last blog I detailed the shocking and profoundly disturbing events that took place under Dutch command in the Srebrenica United Nations (UN) “Protected Area” in 1995 within the broader UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see blog #20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”). These tragic real-life events have haunted Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), the Federation of Bosnia

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#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”

#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   In my recent blog, “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”, the severely negative effects of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement – otherwise known as “national caveats” – were examined with reference to failed United Nations (UN) operations in Angola (UNAVEM II), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). With the return to civil war in Angola in 1992-1993, an unwise and unrealistic UN mandate, combined with

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#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina

#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   The last blog discussed the key choice facing all Multinational Operations (MNOs) operators of having either standardised or disparate Rules of Engagement (ROE) between national contingents operating within the mission (see blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”).  It outlined, firstly, the various difficulties posed to attempts by security organisations to standardise ROE among the States contributing armed forces to an MNO, and secondly, the impact of diverse sets of national ROE on

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