This is an overview and discussion of the key historical, strategic, and political issues behind the ‘Ukraine Crisis’ of January-February 2022. It was originally published between 28 January-24 February 2022, prior to the eruption of the Ukraine War in the crossroads region of Eurasia, between the Russian Federation with support from allied regional and global States on the one hand, and the 1991 State of Ukraine supported by the United States and the EU/NATO bloc of ‘dual’ or ‘double’ Member-States in Europe on the other. The blog draws parallels between the extremely-alarming Cuban ‘Missile’ Crisis which risked a nuclear WW3 in 1962, and the similarly alarming Ukraine ‘NATO Membership and Nuclear Missile’ Crisis of 2022, which risks an even worse, more global, more sophisticated, and far more lethal and destructive nuclear WW3.

It asks and examines the crucial questions, such as: what were the 2 National Security demands that the Russian government made of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for North America and Europe; why did NATO refuse and reject Russia’s demands; the weight of State Sovereignty within NATO and its role in NATO’s rejection of a Peace Deal with Russia over Ukraine prior to the war, which would have led to the joint or mutual drafting and ratification of new, multilateral and mutually-beneficial Security Treaties to preserve security, stability and peace in Europe and Eurasia; how Russia’s long-term strategic outlook differs from NATO’s long-term strategic outlook on the subject of NATO’s expansion (or ‘runaway over-expansion’) out of Europe and into Eurasia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and around the world; the promises made by leading Free Democracies and NATO officials to the Soviet Communist State that NATO would not expand geographically “further east” beyond a reunified Germany – promises that were not kept or honoured following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War Confrontation between the ideologies of Democracy and Communism and their respective States; what military actions have been taken by the Russian Federation since the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008; and then offers two, starkly different, rivalling, explanations as to WHY the Russian government has taken these actions and assumed this posture – (1) Military Aggression to ‘Make Russia Great Again’ into a resurgent, expansionist, and ‘rule-by-conquest’ Russian Empire in Eastern Europe or (2) Military Self-Defence & Self-Determination to ‘Make Russia Safe Again’ in the context of an ever-expanding, border-encroaching, hostile, increasingly offensive, and world-endangering EU/NATO Continental Empire.

Finally, at the end of the discussion of these crucial strategic and geo-political issues involved in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, I offer a final word of advice on evaluating and deciding for oneself, what is true, and who is in the right.