#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
In previous blogs it has been explained that Rules of Engagement (ROE) are instructions for the use of force by military forces, and that these instructions or rules relate to two specific issues – self-defence and mission accomplishment.
With regard to self-defence, when individuals, groups of individuals, or an armed force are declared Enemy, it is permissible for force to be used as a matter of course and offensive action to take place. The Enemy force may be attacked, at the discretion and judgment of the military commander, provided all offensive action is carried out with due regard for the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), prescribed ROE, and the orders and operational plan from higher command.[1] Mission accomplishment, meanwhile, has been described as ‘the driving force behind all ROE’.[2] It relates to the attainment of strategic and operational objectives through the defeat of Enemy centres of gravity, while at the same time providing sufficient force protection to minimise casualties.[3]
The instructions relating to the latter issue of mission accomplishment can be divided into three distinct categories of rules: (1) authorisation rules; (2) limitation rules; and (3) prohibition rules. The vast majority of ROE traditionally belong to the first category and are largely ‘permissive’ rules, permitting the immediate use of weapons and tactics, provided they are used lawfully in compliance with LOAC obligations.[4] The second category usually contains a minority of rules, and concerns limitation rules which allow national forces to use certain weaponry and tactics only after official approval has been sought and given by either the national Secretary or Minister of Defence, or the Combatant Commander of the operation.[5] Very few rules usually belong in the third category of prohibition rules, which contain outright bans that forbid absolutely the use of certain weapons and tactics in the conduct of security missions (for more detailed information see blog “#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: “Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions”).[6]
Limitation and prohibition rules are together collectively known as ‘national caveats’ – elsewhere also referred to as national ‘exceptions’, ‘restrictions’, and ‘limitations’. This is because measures within these categories either significantly limit the means (weaponry) and methods (tactics) armed forces may use to accomplish their missions during operations, or else completely prohibit the use of certain weapons and tactics altogether. In short, these two categories of ROE are restrictive in nature, limiting the way in which armed forces may prosecute their activities and operations in pursuit of their mission objectives.
Caveats & the Important Role of the National Commander
Given the reality of limitation and prohibition ROE on the modern battlefield, and the fact that they have been not only devised and imposed on deployed armed forces by their respective national governments (see blog “#11 How are Rules of Engagement Formed for Military Operations?”), but also strictly enforced by both military and legal devices (as outlined in blog “#12 The Binding Power of Rules of Engagement: Enforcement & Punishment”), it becomes clear that the National Commander in every national contingent has an important role to perform with regard to national caveats.
As the senior national commanding officer, he is essentially the connecting link – ‘the middle man’ – between the national political sphere in the nation’s Capital and national military forces operating on the ground within Multinational Operations (MNOs). For this reason, National Commanders are habitually stationed at the central multinational command headquarters of the MNO to which the national contingent has been contributed, in close proximity to the Operational Commander.
With regard to limitation caveats, firstly, it is the role of the National Commander to show the ‘yellow card’ to the Operational Commander and thereby stall any request which exceeds the contingent’s mandate and ROE. The officer must then apply for consent and authorisation to his or her Minister or Secretary of Defence within the national government in the commander’s home country, on a case-by-case basis.
With regard to prohibition caveats, secondly, it is the National Commander’s duty to show the ‘red card’ to the Operational Commander and thereby deny any request which exceeds the contingent’s mandate and ROE. In short, it is the National Commander’s job to ‘say no’ to the Operational Commander of the MNO when requests over-step the contingent’s political authorisation, in the interests of the national government. In this way the appointed National Commander is the government’s back-stop.
Thirdly, whenever a military contingent’s national caveats are reduced or increased by government, the National Commander will be inevitably and intricately involved in this process. For instance, standing rules can be lifted in exceptional circumstances upon specific request by the multinational mission’s Operational Commander. That is, governments may agree upon request to lift a limitation rule temporarily, permanently, or with respect to certain units of national troops, and render it a permissive authorisation rule. Alternatively, they may upon request agree to a prohibition ban being loosened or relaxed to a limitation rule that requires government consent on a case-by-case basis. In all of these situations, it will fall to the senior national officer to liaise between the national government at home and the Operational Command Headquarters in theatre.[7]
Being ‘The Middle Man’: The Permission Process
Every time an Operational Commander of a multinational security operation requests the lifting or loosening of a national contingent’s limitation or prohibition caveats, in order for those national troops to perform a specific task or function within the mission, it is this National Commander’s unenviable task to ‘call home for permission’. This is because all decisions regarding the temporary lifting or loosening of a caveat rule from a participating contingent must come from the highest political authority, that is to say, the relevant national government in the country’s capital.
In addition to communicating the message from the Operational Commander to the highest political authority in the Capital of the home country, for each request the National Commander must also wait for unknown periods of time for the government to make a decision and send a reply via the appropriate military chain of command. This can entail a lengthy waiting process, and has been known to last between a few hours, to anywhere between 6-24 hours, to a number of days.
Once a reply has finally been received, moreover, the National Commander is the person who must communicate this response back to the Operational Commander at Operational Command Headquarters as to whether his or her request has been approved or denied by the national government, and consequently, whether that national contingent can or can not participate in the Operational Commander’s planned operations within the campaign.
Slow, Frustrating and Sometimes Embarrassing
As may perhaps be surmised by the above description, this permission process can be slow, frustrating and sometimes embarrassing.
Canada provides a good illustration of this. Canadian national contingents deployed to both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan during the 1990s and early 2000s were heavily constrained by limitation caveats with regard to their geographical movement and the ways in which they could be used by Operational Commanders. As a result Canadian National Commanders were compelled to frequently ‘call home to ask permission’ whenever the Operational Commanders wanted to use the Canadian contingents within the mission.[8]
During the early years of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan in particular, during the years 2002-2005 when the Canadian contingent was based in Kabul, Canadian National Commanders had to call home for permission whenever the contingent was asked to conduct any mission in or around the Capital ‘that might risk collateral damage’, or had ‘the potential for lethal force’, or wherever significant casualties or strategic failure might be a possibility in the mission.[9] As Auerswald & Saideman state: ‘This essentially meant a phone call home anytime the battle group was to leave the base since collateral damage is always a possibility when hundreds of soldiers move out’.[10] MAJGEN Andrew Leslie, the Canadian National Commander and deputy Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) in 2003, reported that he was also required to call home ‘whenever Canadian special operations forces engaged in any significant activities, even when operating outside of ISAF as part of OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom]’.[11]
From 2002-2004, moreover, Canadian forces in Kabul were compelled to stand-down for a period of approximately 24 hours each time the COMISAF made a request to use Canadian forces and permission was being sought via the National Commander.[12] This was the longest stand-down period of all the nations contributing to the ISAF at that time.[13] This meant not only that a lot of valuable time was repeatedly wasted as a result of this permission process, but also that the reaction times of the Canadian forces were significantly slowed in their ability to respond to security events and crises as they developed.[14]
With many Canadian activities yellow-flagged with limitation caveats during this period, this time-consuming political reality greatly hindered the COMISAF’s ability to deploy or employ the Canadian contingents in a wide range of tasks, resulting in great frustration from successive COMISAFs at ISAF Headquarters during the early years of the mission. Indeed, when Canada’s own Lieutenant General (LTGEN) Rick Hillier became the COMISAF in early 2004, Canadian limitation caveats reportedly placed him in ‘a very frustrating situation’, whereby while on the one hand he was the designated commander of the NATO mission, on the other hand he found that in reality he held ‘little influence’ over Canadian forces deployed to the mission, with many of his requests turned down by the contingent’s National Commander due to strict caveats.[15] Hillier reportedly soon began to refer to the ISAF Canadian Battalions (CANBATs) as ‘CAN’T BATs’, since ‘he frequently had to rely on other contingents that were far more flexible’.[16]
‘CAN’T BATS’: Canadian COMISAF, Lieutenant General (LTGEN) Rick Hillier (nicknamed ‘The Soldier’s Soldier’), who commanded ISAF V over a period of 6 months from February 2004 – August 2004 and was continually frustrated by government caveats imposed on the Canadian national contingent.[17]
Another Canadian senior commander below the COMISAF, Brigadier (BRIG) Jocelyn Lacroix in command of the 5,500-strong Kabul Multinational Brigade during the first six months of 2004, reportedly also frequently found himself in ‘the galling situation of needing to find an alternative to the Canadian contingent while waiting for deliberations in Ottawa to conclude’.[18]
In addition to the frustration caused to operational planning, and the time lost and energy expended by ISAF commanders in seeking the Canadian governments’ approval to use their forces, this permission process was – embarrassingly – often also carried out for nought, with the effort being expended in vain for little or no tangibly beneficial outcome. Lacroix’s predecessor, fellow Canadian Major General (MAJGEN) Peter Devlin, for instance, later reported that ‘the home office said yes to about half of the requests to use the special ops units’ – thereby suggesting only a fifty percent success rate during this period for the use of Canada’s most elite fighting unit.[19]
The Cost & Controversy of Delay
The long delays engendered by the limitation-caveat permission process can not only be frustrating or embarrassing, moreover, but it can additionally ‘create controversy both in theatre and at home’, especially in an emergency situation which requires prompt action to save the lives of military personnel, civilian aid workers, or local indigenous civilians in the mission’s Area of Responsibility.[20]
Example 1: The UNTAET Operation in East Timor
The practical on-the-ground impact of such delay on an Operational Commander’s choices within a MNO is exemplified by an incident within the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) operation, a multinational peace-keeping mission led by the ANZAC nations, Australia and New Zealand.
Background
The eastern half of Timor Island, known as East Timor or Timor Leste, had since the 1500s been a Portuguese colony in Southeast Asia. In 1975, however, following unrest within Portugal, the former colonising power withdrew from Portuguese Timor. Seizing its opportunity, the territory was quickly invaded and occupied by neighbouring Indonesia, which claimed East Timor as its 27th province. Nearly two decades later, on 30 August 1999, East Timor voted overwhelmingly in a referendum to break away completely from Indonesia and begin a transition to full independence as a self-governing, sovereign nation.
The vote led to an outbreak of violence in East Timor which included murder, arson, looting and the forced displacement of 500,000 people.[21] A bloody conflict also ensued between pro-Independence East Timorese militia and anti-independence Indonesian militia, the latter supported in part by Indonesian police and military forces.[22] Acts of violence were also committed by Indonesian authorities and anti-independence civilian militias against East Timorese people in neighbouring Indonesian West Timor.
Map of East Timor, occupying the eastern half of Timor Island.[23]
In response the UN Security Council authorised a temporary peace-enforcement mission, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) led by Lead Nation Australia, to quickly restore peace and security to East Timor.[24] Simultaneously intense UN and diplomatic negotiations took place, which resulted in Indonesia agreeing to withdraw all of its security forces from East Timor by the end of September.[25] The UNTAET was subsequently established on 25 October 1999 to fill the power vacuum in East Timor and was mandated to govern and administer the province during the period of its transition to full independence.[26] One of the UNTAET’s key mission objectives was to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor, until its official date of independence on 20 May 2002.[27]
Crisis: UNHCR Staff Needing Rescue in West Timor
In 2000 an incident occurred whereby a number of civilians working for the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Indonesian West Timor became stranded near the border with East Timor and required urgent evacuation. It was a dangerous situation. In early September four other UN refugee workers had been murdered, and several badly injured, when their office was attacked by a pro-Indonesia militia comprised of thousands of male fighters, armed with guns and axes.[28] The building was destroyed, UNHCR vehicles set alight, and the bodies of three of the murdered victims had been dragged outside by the mob and set on fire.[29] Despite the fact that the Indonesian authorities in West Timor had promised to protect the UNHCR staff, moreover, neither the Indonesian military nor the Indonesian police intervened on their behalf during the attacks, and no arrests were made.[30]
At that time two companies of UNTAET soldiers – one Australian and the other New Zealand – were stationed on the East Timor side of the border with West Timor, where they had been deployed to secure the northern and southern halves of the border, respectively.[31] Needing rescue, the plight of the stranded UNHCR workers was brought to the attention of the Operational Commander of UNTAET, who contacted both the Australian and New Zealand contingents for help since they were not only the Leading Nations of the mission, but also the two contingents deployed closest to the border, and consequently also the civilians needing assistance.
Australian Defence Force (ADF) Personnel at Dili Airport in East Timor.[32]
Both of the two national contingents were prohibited by caveats within their operational ROE from crossing into West Timor and exiting the mission’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) of East Timor. As is always the case with regard to the temporary lifting of caveats, the two National Commanders of both contingents were also not empowered to make their own judgment calls regarding contingent participation, and had to obtain permission from their respective Ministers of Defence to undertake the rescue mission.[33] As is also usual in these instances, the necessity of obtaining official permission from their own national governments in their own respective capital cities significantly delayed the rescue operation’s reaction time.
However, the New Zealand chain of command for this official approval process was shorter (Senior National Officer – HQJF Trentham – Chief of the Defence Force – Minister of Defence – Prime Minister), involving fewer people than the Australian chain of command for granting such a request (Senior National Officer – Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) – Chief of Defence Force – Minister of Defence – Government Ministers of Cabinet – Prime Minister – Authorising Documentation), thereby taking less time.[34] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Military Advisor Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Nick Gillard, who was stationed in East Timor at this time and witnessed the event personally, has emphasised exactly this point. As he states:
‘I was there then and I know exactly what happened. We moved so much faster than the Australians. They probably had a whole bunch of fish-hooks along the way. We didn’t have as many. We had a slicker chain of command, a shorter one, which is always a good thing – the less links in the chain the better.’[35]
As a result, the Commander of UNTAET took the New Zealand option over the Australian one, in which approval could be secured with the least delay. A request was made to the New Zealand contingent and, after thirty minutes of phone calls, NZDF helicopters were in the air to rescue the stranded UN personnel.[36] This was an end-result that, according to Gillard, ‘gave the NZDF huge amounts of kudos because the NZDF moved quickly and efficiently and safely’.[37] Indeed, the reputation of New Zealand as a reliable ally during multinational missions was significantly enhanced as a result of this incident, vis-à-vis its partnering ANZAC Lead Nation Australia, as well as other UNTAET Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs).
NZDF Soldiers in East Timor during the UNTAET operation.[38]
Although this emergency had a happy outcome, one can see by this example that in dire circumstances when caveat prohibitions need to be lifted temporarily, long approval processes have the potential to have a tangible and unfavourable impact on real events in the security realm, with a consequent impact on the saving or loss of human lives.
Example 2: The ISAF Operation in Afghanistan
Another illustration clearly exemplifies the tangible, on-the-ground consequences of such caveat-generated, long permission processes on security operations, as well as the way in which these delays risk the lives of military personnel on the battlefield.
Background
The incident took place in the midst of the first major offensive under ISAF command in the Afghan south, an operation known as Operation Medusa. This was a major Canadian-led combat operation which took place between 2-17 September 2006, with the aim of ejecting Taliban forces from Regional Command-South (RC-South), namely from Helmand and Kandahar Provinces (a previous U.S.-led OEF offensive in May-July, Operation Mountain Thrust, had failed to oust the Taliban from their southern strongholds despite heavy casualties on both sides).[39]
Crisis: Besieged British-Afghan Combat Troops Urgently Needing Reinforcement
During the offensive a combined British-Afghan combat force, including Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) personnel, was tasked to take back from the Taliban the town of Garmsir, a critical insurgent transport hub in Helmand Province.[40] During the ensuing battle, the unit became heavily outnumbered by Taliban fighters. After suffering many casualties, the unit became trapped with low supplies of both ammunition and food.[41] A distress call was made for emergency reinforcement. However, as Britain’s main combat manoeuvre unit was similarly engaged in heavy battle with the Taliban further north, in defence of three British platoon garrisons, the unit was reliant on reinforcements from other ISAF allies in the area.[42]
In response to the emergency, the COMISAF quickly made official requests for help to a number of the other allied nations stationed in the same sector of RC-South, namely the Netherlands, Australia and Denmark, asking that they deploy forces from their national contingents to reinforce the besieged British-Afghan combat unit in Garmsir. However, all three of the allied contingents were bound by a combination of geographical, regional and combat caveats – including both prohibition and limitation rules. These caveats prevented both the Dutch and the Australians from deploying to assist the trapped unit.
The 2006 Garmsir Crisis: Caveated allies fail to cooperate in order to reinforce a British-ANA-ANP unit, trapped in a heavy gunbattle with Taliban forces. [43]
As for Denmark, Danish forces were already stationed in Helmand Province of RC-South and were importantly also available to be deployed to reinforce the beleaguered unit. However, Area of Operations (AO) limitation caveats – requiring explicit government approval from Copenhagen – halted their immediate deployment (Danish caveats were not eliminated until the NATO Riga Summit of November 2006, but were subsequently reimposed a year later in June 2007).[44]
Indeed, a lengthy permission process between the Danish contingent and the Danish government in Copenhagen ensued. A week passed by as the Danish government discussed and debated the merits of the case. One can only imagine the great stress, frustration, embarrassment and despair felt by the Danish National Commander during this time as the hours and days slowly passed. At last, permission was given for one Danish reconnaissance squadron to deploy to reinforce the British-Afghan unit – eight full days after the COMISAF request for emergency assistance was officially lodged.[45]
When at last Danish forces did arrive on the eighth day to assist the battle-weary British and Afghan soldiers, however, a prohibition combat caveat banning Danish personnel from participating in ‘war-fighting’ offensive combat operations prevented them from ‘actually fighting the Taliban’, meaning they could give little real assistance to the British-Afghan unit in the battle raging around them.[46] The British unit was consequently forced to hold out another six days – with only sporadic U.K. and U.S. air support.[47]
The situation became so critical that the Danish soldiers were eventually compelled to begin ‘interpreting their rules of engagement loosely’, and commenced clearing Enemy-held buildings with grenades and machine guns.[48]
The joint British-Afghan combat unit were finally relieved by British Royal Marines after enduring 14 days of intense combat.[49] Following the incident NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, publicly expressed his frustration at the caveats constraining forces in the Afghan south, stating: ‘It’s not enough to simply provide forces if those forces have restrictions on them that limit them from being effective’.[50]
The Discretion of National Commanders: Power to Decide
Finally, the amount of discretion given to a National Commander with regard to national caveats is another very important factor in relation to a nation’s military caveats during operations.
In some rare cases, National Commanders may be given the freedom, by his government, to alone determine the appropriate ROE for any given operation. In these instances, the government relies on the commander’s own experience, expertise and judgment while deployed on-the-ground in theatre to determine the appropriate ROE for the situation. The commander is given the power to suspend or remove rules he or she deems unsuitable for the mission at hand or for the circumstances faced by national forces within the MNO in the conduct of their duties and operations.
More commonly, however, National Commanders will not have authority to remove or loosen ROE, including caveat restrictions. They may, however, be vested with authority to increase or add to the national contingent’s ROE, by imposing further rules or tightening existing ones at his or her own discretion.
For instance, when operational and tactical commanders of the United States armed forces deploy overseas on military operations, their issued ROE routinely contain a menu list of numbered ‘supplemental measures’, from which commanders may select additional ROE they deem suitable for the accomplishment of each mission on which they embark.[51] U.S. commanders at all levels are authorised to add their own supplemental measures to the list of ROE – whether a further limitation or prohibition rule – on the proviso that:
- (1) they are more restrictive than those approved by the Secretary of Defense;
- (2) they are consistent with the directions of higher authority and relevant law; and
- (3) that due notification is given to the Secretary of Defense as soon as possible.[52]
Sometimes, governments will give little or no power of discretion to their senior national officers at the beginning of an MNO, but gradually relax their ‘grip’ and control over that National Commander and the contingent’s ROE as the mission progresses. This occurred in regard to the Canadian national contingent and its successive National Commanders and rotations during the early years of the ISAF, as investigated by Auerswald & Saideman in their 2009 Political Science paper ‘Caveat Emptor! National Oversight and Military Operations in Afghanistan’.[53]
Auerswald & Saideman found that while Canadian National Commanders had limited discretionary powers in 2002 and were, due to heavy caveat restrictions, required to regularly call home to Ottawa to obtain permission for each COMISAF request (as discussed earlier in this blog), by 2006 they were given ‘wide arcs of fire’ despite the fact that Canada was now deployed to Afghanistan’s volatile RC-South sector and Canadian forces were engaged in the heaviest combat fighting since the Korean War.[54]
Interestingly, this increasing freedom and power of discretion given to Canadian National Commanders by their government over the passing years seems to coincide with its parallel elimination of caveat restraints on their ISAF contingent. Indeed, as my research demonstrates, the Canadian contingent becoming completely caveat-free by January 2006, when it deployed from Kabul to Kandahar Province in southern Afghanistan and assumed shared leadership by rotation of RC-South, in cooperation with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
Canadian National Commander Colonel (COL) Steve Noonan (August 2005 – March 2006), was ‘allowed to act first if necessary and then explain his actions’.[55] His successor, Brigadier General (BRIG) David Fraser (March 2006 – November 2006), was informed in the Letter of Intent within his Operations Order (OPORD) that, within the bounds of the Strategic Targeting Directive, he had ‘full freedom to authorize and conduct operations as you see fit’, but was to inform the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (CEFCO) wherever possible in advance of the concept of operations for any planned operations in the interest of national situational awareness, particularly those likely to involve significant contact with the enemy.[56] This meant, as Fraser states, that:
‘Everything I did over there was notification, not approval…. If I had to go outside the boundaries of the CDS [Chief of the Defence Staff] intent, then I would have to get approval. I never got to a boundary.’[57]
By late 2006, furthermore, Fraser’s successor, Brigadier General (BRIG) Tim Grant (November 2006 – August 2007), found that he ‘was empowered to make 99% of the ops-related decisions in theatre’ (and the other one percent never came up).[58] This meant not only that Grant was able, as the Canadian National Commander, to send Canadian forces out of their assigned AO of Kandahar Province into other parts of RC-South (for instance, to assist the British in Helmand Province) without having to go through the slow and laborious process of seeking approval from the government in Ottawa for each deployment.[59] Even more importantly, moreover, this high power of discretion meant that he never had to reject a NATO or COMISAF request – although he did ‘engage in some discussions with his NATO commanders to “achieve the desired effect”’.[60]
Indeed, beginning in January 2006 and continuing until the end of their combat mission in July 2011, the Canadian contingent in Afghanistan became one of the most valiant, war-fighting, combat forces operating within the whole ISAF mission: the Canadian government’s removal of its inhibitive caveat fetters had set the Canadian forces free to be flexible in both movement and action, greatly enhancing both their effectiveness and their significance within the Afghan security and stability campaign.
In sum then, as this discussion shows, apart from official government removal or reduction of caveats, the National Commander and the degree of discretion given to this commander by the national government, is the sole mediating factor that can help to modify the impact or severity of national caveats imposed on national armed forces within a security operation.
*This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement, Draft-Rules of Engagement Manual for the New Zealand Defence Force’, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999.
*For written NZDF authorisation permitting the use of these sections within the NZDF Operational Law Companion, refer to p. xxiii-xxxiv of Volume I: Thesis in my doctoral research, accessible here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/6984.
[2] S. M. Womack (LTCOL.), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 80, no. 2, February 1996, p. 22.
[3] Ibid.
[4] NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, Generated from a PfPLMS 0.2 learning object, NATO Partnership for Peace Forum (PfP ADL-WG, 2006), p. 3, http://pfpdev.ethz.ch/SCORMcontent/112363/scos/5/index.pdf, (accessed 8 October 2009).
[5] Ibid., p. 4.
[6] Ibid.
[7] MAJ Steve Challies (NZDF), Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 December 2009, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Palmerston North, New Zealand.
[8] Related by MAJGEN Tim Grant, Commander of the Canadian contingent in Bosnia, in D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, (2-5th September) 2009, p. 17, http://shape.nato.int/resources/1/documents/nato%20at%20war.pdf, (accessed 18 March 2013).
[9] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, Reuters AlterNet, 26 November, 2006. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26451165, (accessed 18 November 2009).
[13] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., pp. 15-16 .
[14] ‘FACTBOX – Restrictions on NATO troops in Afghanistan’, op. cit.
[15] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 16.
[16] Cited in Auerswald & Saideman, ibid.
[17] Photograph taken from ‘Top Canadian General Rich Hillier Submits Resignation As Defence Chief’, Digital Journal [online photograph], 15 April 2008, http://digitaljournal.com/article/253253, (accessed12 June 2014).
[18] Government of Canada, Canadian Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, Backgrounder – Operation ATHENA: The Canadian Forces Participation in ISAF, 3 March 2005, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=operation-athena-the-canadian-forces-participation-in-isaf/hnocfoce, (accessed 17 January 2014); Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 16.
[19] Footnote 31, in Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, ibid., p. 15.
[20] D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, United States, (15-18th February) 2009, p. 5-6, http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf., (accessed November 18, 2009).
[21] ‘East Timor – UNTAET Background’, Official Website of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm, (accessed June 5, 2017).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Map taken from ‘File: East Timor map mhn.jpg’, Wikipedia (Wikimedia Commons) [online map],12 December 2006, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:East_Timor_map_mhn.jpg, (accessed June 5, 2017).
[24] ‘East Timor – UNTAET Background’, United Nations, op. cit.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] ‘East Timor – UNTAET Mandate’, Official Website of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/UntaetM.htm, (accessed June 5, 2017).
[28] John Aglionby, ‘UN refugee staff killed in west Timor’, The Guardian, 7 September 2000, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/sep/07/indonesia.johnaglionby, (accessed June 2, 2017).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[32] Photograph taken from ‘Hurray for Australian Soldiers’, Mooiness.com [online photograph], 26 May 2006, http://mooiness.com/2006/05/26/hurray-for-australian-soldiers/, (accessed June 5, 2017).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] LTCOL Nick Gillard (NZDF), Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 September 2010, New Zealand High Commission, London, United Kingdom.
[36] MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[37] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[38] Photograph taken from ‘Timor Leste: 1999 – 2012’, NZ Army [online photograph], 18 March 2015, http://www.army.mil.nz/about-us/what-we-do/deployments/previous-deployments/timor+leste/default.htm, (accessed June 5, 2017).
[39] United States Library of Congress, V. Morelli & P. Belkin, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 3 December, 2009, p. 11, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf, (accessed February 20, 2013).
[40] J. Brophy & M. Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’. Univerzita Obrany, 29 July 2007, http://www.vabo.cz/stranky/fisera/files/National_Caveats_Short_Version_version_V_29%20JULY.pdf, (accessed November 18, 2009); ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, This Is London, 26 November 2006, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23376029-makeshift-rorkes-drift-unit-of-medics-and-engineers-holds-out-taliban.do, ( accessed 4 August 2010).
[41] ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Map created from a close-crop of an unclassified ISAF Map of Afghanistan, Afghanistan ISAF RC and PRT Locations, NATO HQ, SITCEN Geo Section [online map], 22 October 2009, http://www.isaf.nato.int, (accessed 1 December 2009), combined with elements of a map provided in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions [online map], 23 July 2009, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 22 February, 2010).
[44] Brophy & Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, op. cit.; ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, op. cit.
[45] ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Brophy & Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, op. cit.; ‘Makeshift ‘Rorke’s Drift’ unit of medics and engineers holds out Taliban’, op. cit.
[50] United States Library of Congress, Morelli & Belkin, op. cit., p. 10.
[51] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 4.
[52] Ibid.
[53] D.P. Auerswald, S.M. Saideman & M.J. Tierney, ‘Caveat Emptor! National Oversight and Military Operations in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at a conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, United States, (September) 2007, pp. 1-25.
[54] Ibid., pp. 8-9, 22, 23.
[55] Ibid., p. 22.
[56] Ibid., p. 22-23.
[57] Ibid., p. 22.
[58] Ibid., p. 23.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid., p. 24.