#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
The last blog discussed how an alarming, new, global norm has developed within contemporary multinational security operations. Since the early 1990s, nations have been increasingly imposing heavy and wide-ranging constraints on the forces they contribute to multinational security operations (see blog “#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations”). The trend has become so strong in fact that today national caveats are considered to be ‘normal’ and the ‘common lot to varying degrees of all military operations conducted by NATO, the European Union and the United Nations, as well as within ‘Coalitions of the Willing’.[1] As French Captain (CAPT) Romuald Bomont states:
‘Caveats no longer represent only an embarrassment at the tactical or operational level, but are well and truly a problem at the politico-strategic level. They have therefore not failed to generate numerous debates, questions and controversies.’[2]
Another factor which further complicates the prevailing situation of caveat-fettered forces within contemporary Multinational Operations (MNOs) around the world is the overriding secrecy surrounding the entire issue. Quite apart from the difficulty presented to security organisations and Operational Commanders of working around national caveat restrictions imposed on deployed national contingents in the course of planning and executing operations in any given theatre, an additional complexity is the fact that – like all Rules of Engagement (ROE) – national caveats are considered by contributing nations to be top secret and are kept highly classified.
‘Caveat’
In fact, even the very term ‘caveat’ is itself a loaded word, with strong connotations of secrecy. This is because the term is often used by itself as an additional designating marker on classified government material, to signal either that:
(1) There is an additional restriction on the secret information, for instance, that it is not under any circumstances to be released or disseminated in any manner to citizens of foreign nations (e.g. the use of the classification marking ‘NOFORN’ meaning ‘No Foreign Nationals’ on classified documents in the U.S.); or
(2) There is a binding condition on the classified material, for instance, that the information must be kept secret and confidential, but is nevertheless ‘releasable’ and may be shared with certain other allied or partner nations (for example, it may be shared with members of NATO or the members of the AUSCANNZUKUS ‘Five Eyes’ alliance).
It is for this reason that the term ‘caveat’ (as opposed to ‘national caveat’) is defined in the U.S. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms as: ‘A designator used with a classification to further limit the dissemination of restricted information’.[3] Likewise, the Australian Defence Force defines a single ‘caveat’ as: ‘An appendage to the security classification of a document warning that special handling is required for security purposes’.[4]
‘National Caveats’
With regard to government-imposed, politico-military national caveats, imposed on deployed national armed forces participating to a MNO, there are two principal reasons for the high classification denoted to these restrictive rules.
Firstly, as a subset of restrictive rules contained within the body of a nation’s operational ROE, national caveats are kept classified along with all other ROE for reasons of national security. Namely, the restrictions are kept secret by governments in the interest of operational security, especially the protection of deployed national armed forces, in order to keep critical information about procedural seams, limitations or other disadvantages within the national contingent or wider MNF from Enemy forces. In this sense, governments keep their caveat restrictions secret in order to deny the Enemy actionable information which, if known, could give the Enemy an advantage to exploit, by alerting them to potential ‘attack openings’ or ‘exploitable gaps’ within the national contingent, or between the national contingent and other participating allied forces.
Secondly, national caveat rules are often kept classified to provide ‘political cover’ for national governments, especially in cases where the caveat restrictions imposed on deployed forces are particularly severe, numerous or controversial. In these situations, governments have an additional incentive to keep their national caveats secret, quite apart from the main reason of force protection – that being to avoid their force limitations being exposed to the security organisation in charge of the MNO or to other participating allies, and thereby to evade criticism, censure or ridicule from either party. In this sense, the classified status of caveats can be a convenient cover or protective screen for nations seeking to hide from their allies the restrictions they have placed on their forces operating within an MNO. This political cover afforded by caveat secrecy seems to be particularly sought by contributing nations to a MNO that are not generally seen to be carrying their ‘fair share’ of the security burden in relation to conducting the more difficult security tasks within the campaign, as this research will later reveal in relation to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan.
It is for these dual reasons that rules of engagement, including national caveat limitation or prohibition rules, are guarded jealously by both the political and military institutions of government, and all those with knowledge or access to ROE for a set deployment – current or historic – are often legally prohibited to speak of them in the interest of national security.[5]
A Government Choice: To Declare Or Not To Declare…
Regardless of the inherent secrecy surrounding national caveats within a national contingent’s ROE during multinational security operations, it is in fact sovereign national governments themselves which determine the extent to which their caveats will remain secret within an MNO.
National caveats can exist in a two main forms within a multinational security operation, depending on the degree of openness adopted by the national government towards the Lead Nation or leading security organisation of the international campaign, and the appointed Operational Commander in charge of the mission.
(1) Governments may, on the one hand, choose to write down their national caveat constraints. In these cases a caveat document which lists all national restrictions will appear within either the national force contingent’s mandate or the Operations Order (OPORD) given to the National Commander, and can sometimes also be published in short-form on colour-coded cards issued to military personnel of various ranks.[6] Governments that have published their written restrictions generally also opt to ‘declare’ or ‘disclose’ these written caveats to the leading security organisation or the Lead Nation(s) of the MNO, as well as to the overall Operational Commander.[7] These written and declared caveats are referred to as ‘official’ caveats.
(2) Governments may, on the other hand, choose not to write down or record their national caveats in any official documentation. In order to avoid discovery – by friend or foe alike – many nations opt to communicate their restrictions only verbally to their appointed senior national officers, giving rise to ‘unwritten’ or ‘ad hoc’ national caveats.[8] Though a nation may, in rare and extraordinary circumstances, choose to reveal ad hoc caveats to multinational command headquarters or to specific allies, usually these caveats are not officially communicated or shared with anyone – either the commanding security organisation or Lead Nation(s) of a multinational operation, the Operational Commander at multinational headquarters, nor indeed with any other allied nation contributing forces to the MNO.[9] They are kept top secret, and known only to the government, the National Commander, and national military personnel in the execution of their tasks. These unwritten and undeclared caveats are generally regarded as ‘unofficial’ caveats.
Official Caveats
According to Auerswald & Saideman, ever since the 1992 MNO in Bosnia, it has become ‘standard procedure’ for nations contributing to a MNO to inform the lead security organisation of written, operational caveats.[10] If an international operation is commanded by a Lead Nation rather than an organisation, for example the United States, it is also usual practice for force contributing nations to declare their official caveats to this commanding nation.[11]
This disclosure of official caveats allows a ‘caveat spreadsheet’ to be created by the leading organisation or nation and given to the Operation Commander tasked with coordinating the MNO.[12] The spreadsheet assists the Operational Commander in the positioning of caveated forces within the operation, in terms of both location and tasking.[13]
Official Caveats & the Abiding Practice of Non-Disclosure to Allies
Due to the sensitivity of participating governments with regard to their caveat constraints together with their emphasis on secrecy, however, the multinational command headquarters does not usually communicate these official caveat restrictions to other allied nations participating within the MNO – even when allied national force contingents are operating alongside these caveated forces – except on rare occasions when necessity requires it.
Air Commodore (AIRCDRE) Greg Elliott of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), a former National Commander of the New Zealand-led ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and the senior national representative at U.S. CENTCOM in 2010, has alluded to this reality with reference to both the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and ISAF missions in Afghanistan. As Elliott explains:
‘Under the earlier OEF era of ‘bilateral multilateralism’ whereby partners entered bilateral agreements with the US, the US would have known the terms of such arrangements, but they never shared these with others. Now that AFG has become a NATO (ISAF) endeavour, national ROE and caveats would be known to HQISAF, but still not shared amongst other nations, except on a ‘need to know’ basis.’[14]
There are two exceptions to this general rule within MNOs, however. The first concerns force contributing nations with lead command responsibilities within the framework of an MNO. According to Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Nick Gillard, a former Chief of Staff at the New Zealand-led PRT in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan (CRIB 14, 2009) and the NZDF Military Advisor at the New Zealand High Commission in London in 2010, Lead Nations in command of operational sectors often receive a brief from multinational headquarters of the official caveats in force among the subordinate national contingents under the Lead Nation’s command.[15] More rarely, nations with command responsibilities over smaller areas or compounds within a mission sector, such as PRTs within a MNO, may also be briefed by operational headquarters of the caveats imposed on force contingents under that nation’s command responsibility.[16]
Secondly, the supporting, subordinate nations themselves within a given command sector or PRT may also choose to voluntarily disclose their declared national caveats to the commanding nation of their sector, via either the official operational chain of command within the mission or bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements with the specific commanding nation, in the interest of aiding understanding, inter-operability and Command and Control (C²) in the mission sector.[17] However, they are not duty-bound to do so and these caveat disclosures, if they occur, are made only to the commanding nation – not to other allied contingents operating in the same sector.
According to Gillard, this is because ‘caveats are usually done nationally on a ‘need-to-know’ basis’ and consequently ‘there may be a reticence to share caveats with partners beyond those who command you’. [18] As Gillard further explains:
‘If I’m working for the Americans or the British I’m going to give them a copy of those caveats, because that’s fair enough in RC-East so they understand – if I had them. But am I going to tell the Hungarians what my caveats are as I go into Baghlan? Probably not. Because it’s ‘need-to-know’…I might not tell the Turks…why would I? Am I going to tell the Turks what my caveats are? Probably not, [although] a necessity might lead me to, I might have to.’[19]
In sum, nations not holding command responsibility within a MNO will not usually be informed of the official caveat restrictions in place on the force contingents of their allies operating alongside their own national forces. Elliott has commented on this common practice among supporting nations within MNOs, stating:
‘National caveats are a sensitive issue with the nations involved. They don’t share such information with other Coalition partners. It’s not like we all know the various ROE or other constraints that each nation is operating under…It’s largely a case of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’[20]
Nevertheless, if necessity demands that caveated contingents communicate the content of certain restrictions to neighbouring forces, such as during the planning or execution of specific operations on the ground or in the air within the mission, or else in emergency security situations, the caveated contingent may opt to disclose this information to specific allied national forces on a case-by-case basis.
Knowledge Gaps & a Pervasive Sense of Uncertainty
This entrenched practice of caveat non-disclosure to allied national contingents within MNOs creates not only a caveat ‘knowledge gap’ between coalition forces on the ground within a MNO, but also a pervasive sense of uncertainty among national contingents with respect to their allies, which is difficult to rectify.
Indeed, according to Gillard, even if one national contingent wanted or needed to find out the caveats restrictions of neighbouring contingents: ‘It’s a difficult process to do, to actually seek caveats and also for people to have the willingness to divulge them’.[21] Furthermore, quite aside from caveat disclosure requests, communicating with neighbouring force contingents within a MNO can itself be difficult, as it was within the ISAF operation in Afghanistan due to complex communication procedures within the missions.[22]
For example, during his time as Chief of Staff and a tactical commander at the New Zealand-led PRT in Bamyan Province (RC-East) during 2009, Gillard found that it was ‘bloody hard’ to communicate at all with the neighbouring Hungarian contingent in Baghlan Province (RC-North).[23] As he states, there was: ‘An inability to talk through various command chains and communications channels…We could talk through certain NETs [Networks] and certain secret level IT systems, but it wasn’t an easy thing to do…The procedures were difficult’. [24] This difficulty was greatly increased, moreover, if forces were attempting to communicate with neighbouring contingents while physically deployed out on the ground, rather than from Bamyan headquarters. [25]
In short, it appears that in real practice the issue of national caveat restrictions is a subject that is hardly ever discussed between allied force contingents participating within an MNO. As Major (MAJ) Terrence Brown, a New Zealand Liaison Officer stationed at U.S. CENTCOM in 2010, has remarked on the issue: ‘It is not a matter I have ever discussed with other nations, nor do I need to. It is…a sensitive issue.’[26]
Unofficial Caveats
Caveat secrecy is greater, the knowledge gap wider, and the caveat situation made even more problematic within MNOs with regard to unofficial caveats however. Because these government-imposed caveat constraints are neither written nor declared to the leading security organisation or Lead Nation in command of the MNO, but are nevertheless secretly in force to restrain the actions of participating national contingents, the effects of unofficial caveats are even more severe within a MNO than officially declared caveats.
Indeed, it is difficult for the leading security organisation or Lead Nation in command of an operation, as well as other allied force contributing nations, even to ascertain what unofficial ad hoc caveats are in force on certain national contingents, except by observation and experience as other national contingents inter-operate with the contingent in question.
It is for this reason that ad hoc, undeclared caveats are considered the most pernicious and harmful category of caveats within MNOs, far more so than written and declared caveats. Secret restrictions constraining any one national force contingent are only discovered haphazardly during the course of operations, often only become evident to allied operational, planning and tactical field commanders in the planning – or worse – the actual execution stages of security operations within a campaign.
Unhappily, the latter has been the experience of national contingent commanders and personnel in both of the NATO-led operations in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, whereby unofficial caveats in force on allied neighbouring forces within a command sector have only been discovered under the worst possible circumstances – in the midst of volatile security crises and emergencies. In fact, during NATO’s operation in Kosovo unofficial caveats rendered the C² situation so difficult, that one senior Canadian commander serving with the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) described the underhand deception involved in allies’ use of unstated caveats as ‘insidious’.[27]
As a result, unofficial ad hoc caveats have gained a notorious reputation within international security operations.
Rising Criticism of Caveats
Secrecy has not prevented nations from coming under criticism for their caveats, however, as security operations on the ground have revealed the existence of caveats in practice.
In Kosovo, for instance, where unofficial caveats are believed to have greatly contributed to the NATO peacekeepers’ failure to repress violence during the Kosovo Riots in early 2004, many nations participating as members of the KFOR coalition were subsequently the recipients of much criticism and embarrassment.[28] Internationally, like the French and Belgians after the Rwandan war or the Dutch after the Srebrenica safe-haven massacre in Bosnia, many nations could not shrug off the stigma of their security failures in such a volatile area, now the focus of so much international attention. In many of the KFOR Lead Nation countries this international criticism led to political scandals, as international criticism of poor performance by national troops infiltrated into national media outlets to become publicised nationwide, resulting in controversy within national parliaments.[29] Such negative reviews also led to a general decline in public support and political will for continued national participation in the KFOR operation at all.
International criticism on the part of some coalition partners against others, with regard to official or unofficial classified caveats, have oftentimes also created a good deal of tension, distrust and acrimony amongst allies participating in multinational Peace Support Operations (PSOs). So much so, in fact, that during the past decades national caveats have been regarded as highly politically sensitive. In truth, the issue of national caveat imposition within MNOs is so very sensitive that even long after the cessation of operations, military personnel are hesitant to speak of them or to provide specifics about their content, many refusing also to name the countries that have imposed caveats in the past.[30] Until recently, this government sensitivity had caused the very subject of national caveats to be ‘shrouded in mystery’, to the point that their very existence within MNOs was deliberately kept from becoming public knowledge.[31]
Nevertheless, as in former times following the Bosnian and Kosovo operations, national caveats imposed on forces deployed to operate as part of the ISAF in Afghanistan has caused the subject to be repeatedly and publicly revisited over the past several years. As during earlier MNOs, national caveats have once again risen to prominence as a major sore point and source of bitterness within the ISAF multinational campaign, especially amongst members of the NATO alliance in command of the operation in Afghanistan. As a result – and quite against the volition of the caveats’ political creators in many nations – the subject of national caveats has once again been thrown into the international spotlight and exposed to intense public scrutiny and debate. In this way the layers of secrecy over this issue have been stripped away, allowing in-depth analysis to occur for the first time on the role national caveats play within a MNO.
This is an important event in defence scholarship, because it allows defence practitioners and academics to better understand ‘the limits and effects of international cooperation at the pointy end of the spear’.[32] As Auerswald & Saideman have rightly asserted, understanding national caveats – their variations, causes and effects – is key to understanding just how multilateralism works (or does not work) in wartime.[33]
*This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, United States, (15-18th February) 2009, p. 6, http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf, (accessed November 18, 2009); R. Bomont, ‘Les « caveats »: Un concept d’engagement à géométrie variable au sein des coalitions est-il viable?’, École de Guerre, June 2010, pp. 1-8, http://www.ecoledeguerre.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/CF-Bomont_Caveats.pdf, (accessed 7 February 2013).
Bomont [Original French]: « Véritables freins à l’efficacité opérationnelle, ces caveats sont donc le lot commun, à un degré divers, de toutes les opérations militaires, qu’elles soient placées sous l’égide de l’OTAN, de l’UE, de l’ONU ou d’une autre coalition de circonstance » (Bomont, ibid.).
[2] Bomont, ‘Les « caveats »: Un concept d’engagement à géométrie variable au sein des coalitions est-il viable?’, ibid.
« Cependant, les caveats ne représentent plus uniquement un embarras au niveau tactique ou opératif, mais bel et bien un problème de niveau politico-stratégique. Ils ne manquent donc pas de susciter nombre de débats, d’interrogations voire de polémiques » (Bomont, ibid.).
[3] U.S. Department of Defense, The Dictionary of Military Terms, Washington D.C., Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2009, p. 80.
[4] Australian Department of Defence, ADFP 101 Glossary, Australian Defence Force Publication- Staff Duties Series, Canberra, 2009, p. AL1.
[5] NZDF AIRCDRE Greg Elliott, Official communication to Regeena Kingsley via the New Zealand Embassy in Washington D.C., [Email], 26 August 2010, Washington D.C., United States; NZDF LTCOL Justin S. Emerson, Personal correspondence with Regeena Kingsley, [Letter], 3 September 2009, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington.
[6] NZDF LTCOL Andrew Shaw, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 23 November 2009, NZDF Command & Staff College, Trentham Military Camp, Wellington, New Zealand; NZDF MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 December 2009, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Palmerston North, New Zealand; New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, , ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999, paragraph 11.2, p. 11-1; New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement, Draft-Rules of Engagement Manual for the New Zealand Defence Force’, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999; D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War, op. cit., p. 5.
*For written NZDF authorisation permitting the use of these sections within the NZDF Operational Law Companion, refer to p. xxiii-xxxiv of Volume I: Thesis in my doctoral research, accessible here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/6984.
[7] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, ibid., p. 6; NZDF LTCOL Andrew Shaw, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, ibid.
[8] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, ibid., p. 6.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] AIRCDRE Greg Elliott, Official communication to Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[12] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 6.
[13] AIRCDRE Greg Elliott, Official communication to Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.; LTCOL Justin S. Emerson, Personal correspondence with Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[14] Ibid.
[15] NZDF LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 September 2010, New Zealand High Commission, London, United Kingdom.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] AIRCDRE Greg Elliott, Official communication to Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[21] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] MAJ Terrence M. Brown, Official communication to Regeena Kingsley via the New Zealand Embassy in Washington D.C., [Email], 26 August 2010, Washington D.C., United States.
[27] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 6.
[28] Cited in Auerswald & Saideman, ibid., p. 6; MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
[29] MAJ Steve Challies, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, ibid.
[30] Footnote 15, in D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, (2-5th September) 2009, p. 9, www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20%at%20War.pdf, (accessed 18 March 2013).
[31] J. Brophy & M. Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’, Univerzita Obrany, 29 July 2007, http://www.vabo.cz/stranky/fisera/files/National_Caveats_Short_Version_version_V_29%20JULY.pdf. (accessed November 18, 2009).
[32] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 2.
[33] Ibid.