#16 The Practical Value of National Rules of Engagement:
An Assessment
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
In previous blogs, I have discussed what Rules of Engagement (ROE) are, what kinds of instructions they contain, how ROE are formed for military operations, and how they are enforced and breaches punished (see blogs “#9 What are “Rules of Engagement”? Military Mandates & Instructions for the Use of Force”, “#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: “Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions”, “#11 How are Rules of Engagement Formed for Military Operations?”, and “#12 The Binding Power of Rules of Engagement: Enforcement & Punishment”).
This blog will assess the practical value of national ROE within military operations, with reference to both the political and military spheres, and will conclude with a discussion of the ‘great divide’ between politicians and their military commanders.
The Purpose of ROE in Military Operations
ROE have been defined by NATO as: ‘Directives issued by a competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.’[1] The NZDF goes somewhat further with its definition, stating in the NZDF Operational Law Companion issued to Legal Officers that:
‘ROE are directives to military authorities that delineate the circumstances and limitations within which the armed forces may use force. ROE are issued by higher command after consultation with the Government and they are used to ensure that so far as is possible, military activity aligns with political aims…The essence of ROE is that they are orders of Government which tell our Forces when they may, or may not, use force, kill persons, or destroy property. This is a matter of no small importance, it is not a peripheral “legal matter” to be decided by disinterested experts. The question of when force is to be used, and how much, should be the subject of unambiguous, concise and precise directive.’[2]
This definition expresses a dual purpose for ROE. Firstly, drafted as they are to ensure ‘military activity aligns with political aims’, it may be seen that ROE are quintessentially devices used by political masters to control the amount and type of violence inflicted in their name on the battlefield. Indeed, they are the most tangible form of political control within military operations. They may consequently be said to comprise the crucial lynchpin between the political and security domains during security operations.[3]
The second more subordinate, yet equally important, purpose for ROE is a military one – providing commanders with the political limitations within which they may legitimately operate, and thereby providing a framework whereby ROE may guide and inform orders given to lower levels with respect to operations at the operational or tactical level of conflict. As the NZDF legal manual itself states:
‘The purpose of ROE is twofold: a. To impose necessary limitations and restrictions on the use of force in furtherance of New Zealand Governmental Policy; b. To give Service members the confidence to use force appropriately, lawfully and without hesitation when force is required.’[4]
Advantages: The Positive Impact of ROE on Military Operations
In light of this dual purpose then, it may be said that ROE serve as an advantageous tool for governments to effectively exercise both political and military command and control (C²) over their national security forces (see endnote).[5]
Political C²
With regard to the political sphere, ROE can serve as a device for imposing and enforcing political C², thereby serving multiple functions on the part of civilian governments.
Firstly, ROE may be used by a government to delegate authority, specifying exactly who in the chain of command may decide what force is to be used and when.[6]
Secondly, political leaders may use ROE as instructions to their military contingent on how to proceed with the mission, clearly defining ‘when, where, in what amount, and against whom force may be used by those units to achieve the national policy goals underlying that mission’.[7] It should be noted however, that these instructions may in reality be more oriented towards lowering casualties to protect the political survival of the government, rather than operational effectiveness, force protection, or adherence to the traditional principle of preventing escalations of violence. This is especially the case within democracies where the government’s hold on power is of limited duration and dependent on elections and the vote of the people, and even more so within those democracies of the West still living under the shadow of the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, in which war casualties carry an expensive political price-tag.
Thirdly, ROE may be used by governments to control or mitigate the violence of operations and thereby better coordinate the use of force with other instruments of government in pursuit of a stated aim. To explain, all military deployments take place to advance national policy in pursuit of a specific political aim. Politics thus not only forms an operation’s genesis, but also governs its execution and signals its termination via political agreements or treaties, thereby proving the veracity of the assertion made by Clausewitz that war is in reality:
‘Not just a political act, but a true political instrument, the continuation of political interaction, and the carrying out of the same by other means…the political object is the goal, war is the means, and this means can never even be thought of without a goal (see endnote).’[8]
As the NZDF legal manual likewise explicitly states in reference to New Zealand’s armed forces: ‘Operations by the NZDF are conducted in furtherance of NZ national policy, and are related to the political aims to be achieved. Within the framework of national objectives, direction is provided by the Government to CDF [Chief of the Defence Force] as to the military objectives to be achieved’.[9]
Nevertheless, force is only one weapon in the arsenal of the powerful. Other instruments are also at a government’s disposal by which a pre-eminent political outcome may be sought, for instance diplomatic or economic measures. ROE may consequently be designed to restrict or alter the use of military force ‘in manner, degree or circumstance’, so that this instrument might more easily be coordinated with the other less coercive instruments of government and thereby ensure a ‘flexible national response is available for any contingency’ [original emphasis]. [10] In short, ROE may be used as political brakes on the use of force that work to assist the machinery of government, and thereby provide presiding power-holders with a wider range of options.
The fourth and final function of ROE as a means of political C² is to act as a safeguard on this instrument of force, or more expressly, to mitigate the risk of dramatic escalations of force that might lead to out-of-control situations, with potential for dramatic national and international ramifications. As one NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) document on ROE for Multinational Operations (MNOs) states: ‘National civilian leaders use ROE to ensure that military forces responding in self-defense do not use disproportionate force and thereby preclude the leadership from preventing the incident from leading to a wider conflict.’[11] ROE are thus a political backstop, whereby having made the decision to go to war and to unleash brute force as a tool towards a political end, governments can still maintain some degree of control over the force used, with the power to intervene should the violence escalate beyond what is deemed acceptable (see endnote).[12] The rules ensure that military activity does not escalate out of control to the point that the government that authorises it can no longer control or govern its use.
Military C²
As with civilian politicians, ROE can also be useful to national military commanders embarking on multinational military operations. Indeed, they have been described as a ‘critical command and control tool’ for commanders, consisting as they do of ‘a set of rules governing the firing of weapons and use of force by soldiers’.[13] ROE offer a number of advantages to commanders in the field.
Firstly, ROE can assist commanders by providing clear instructions regarding who in the chain of command wields actionable authority to issue orders, and direction as to when force is to be used and to what degree.[14] In this way ROE may not only provide clear guidance to commanders, but may also serve to reinforce the hierarchical command structure, which in itself constitutes one of seven important principles for effective military command (see endnote).[15]
Secondly, ROE are useful to military commanders at both the operational and tactical levels of conflict. The operational level concerns the implementation of military strategy in a theatre of war through the planning and conduct of campaigns and the selection of tactical objectives, including the assignment of missions, tasks and resources to tactical missions.[16] By contrast the tactical level involves ‘the application of force in battle’ and refers to the actual planning and conduct of the battles to gain the assigned objectives, involving a combination of firepower and the movement (manoeuvre) of military units, all invariably operating within a climate of chaos and prevailing uncertainty – the hallmark of all war.[17]
At both levels ROE offer critical guidance in the planning, assignment and execution stages to define:
‘When, where, in what amount, and against whom force may be used by those units to achieve the national policy goals underlying that mission.’[18]
As one U.S. General and the former Deputy Commander of CENTCOM, LTGEN DeLong (Ret’d), has summarised in reference to ROE and armed forces:
‘The rules govern when they can fire, when they cannot; what type of force they can use, what type they cannot; what they can do in particular situations, and what they cannot.’[19]
Thirdly, military commanders may use ROE as a means of enhancing operational control, which involves the commander’s direction and deployment of assigned forces to accomplish specific delegated missions or tasks.[20] While ROE issued by high command must always be complied with, commanders from General to Lieutenant level may use ROE to further restrain the actions of their subordinates, since commanders at all command levels are permitted to issue their own ROE – provided of course that they are more, not less, restrictive in the use of force than those issued by higher command and approved by government.[21] Commanders might add additional, extra-restrictive ROE, for instance, if in their judgment these additional rules assist them in commanding and controlling their armed forces and/or in attaining the objective in a way that minimises casualties (whether friendly, civilian or Enemy – depending on the goal of the mission). As the NZDF Operational Law Companion sets forth: ‘A Commander may choose to inhibit the potential for a localised conflict to escalate beyond the resource of his command to deal with’.[22]
Lastly, when issued as directives to armed forces from the brigade (3-5,000) to platoon (30-40) level, ROE can give service personnel ‘the confidence to use force appropriately, lawfully and without hesitation when force is required’.[23] According to the NZDF law manual, ROE perform this function by providing the individual soldier with clear guidelines and procedures for the use of force in combat.[24] As DeLong also concurs on this point:
‘Battles can become very confusing very quickly, and a common soldier needs simple rules to guide him, to know when he is or is not allowed to kill – and who is and is not the enemy.’[25]
Disadvantages: The Negative Impact of ROE on Military Effectiveness
Despite these advantages, however, it is important to recognise that ROE restraints do not necessarily always serve to act in the best interest of national forces deployed on the ground in conflict zones. Indeed, to the contrary, these politically-based instructions can in fact be heavily disadvantageous to effective security operations. This is because with ROE being primarily political devices and ‘not used for purely military purposes’, they can often prove detrimental to military missions, acting as fetters to the robustness and flexibility necessary in the art of conducting war to attain outright victory in military engagements.[26]
In terms of national contingents deployed to MNOs, for instance, acting in accordance to prescribed ROE can result in a number of negative consequences for a national contingent’s ability to achieve assigned tasks towards set objectives, as well as for the contingent itself.
First, in terms of military C², ROE can frustrate the national contingent commander’s planning by limiting the available options and hindering his or her ability to effectively carry out assigned mission tasks towards selected objectives.
Second, at the level of the unit, ROE can retard a unit’s ability to spontaneously seize chances and make use of rare opportunities, while also inhibiting the unit’s ability to attain the element of surprise against the Enemy force.
Third, through a combination of the above, ROE can ultimately cause casualties and even cost the lives of personnel serving the nation’s interests under military command, which is always a very serious matter. The NZDF’s own legal manual attests to these negative ramifications, freely acknowledging that:
‘For national policy reasons ROE may put tight constraints on the conduct of military operations. A commander may also be precluded from conducting military operations purely and simply in terms of what is best from a military perspective. ROE are primarily politically and not military driven. The political situation may require de-escalation at a time when militarily this seems undesirable. National policy considerations drive ROE, with the result that often “ideal military opportunities” are wasted, possibly resulting in the loss of lives of Service members [original emphasis].’[27]
One can see by this just how ROE can become a dire headache for any National Commander operating within a theatre of war. They can interfere with a commander’s ability to make the best out of every tactical opportunity – forbidding actions that are desirable or even necessary militarily to prevent negative escalations in the conflict.
National caveats are especially harmful in this regard, impinging drastically on the flexibility and freedom of action of national armed forces. In setting forth how the National Commander can actually use the force assigned to him or her – that is to say, making clear the methods and weaponry the commander can not utilise – caveats change the way that a commander can both act towards the objectives and react to events in the field. They can therefore be very costly, not in monetary terms, but more importantly in terms of ceding military advantage to the Enemy, delaying the seizure of objectives, and losing rare and priceless opportunities to swing the balance of power towards the allied force (whether at the micro or macro level), thereby causing irreversible harm to the war effort. Inappropriate ROE can also accelerate exhaustion among military commanders, since caveat restrictions force them to become very creative in their problem-solving, wasting time and energy that could best be put to use elsewhere.
Explained in another way, caveats often serve to guarantee a poor outcome for the amount of treasure, effort and lifeblood invested by any particular nation. In handicapping national contingents, they have the potential to diminish – even negate – the military contribution the nation has made to a peace support endeavour. One must conclude, therefore, that ROE are the ‘teeth’ of government control over security operations, and the area in which soldiers in the field will most keenly feel the bite of their political masters.
The ‘Great Divide’ Between Politicians & Military Commanders
From this overview it is clear that there exists a significant gap in thinking between military leaders and their political masters, exposed most starkly by this device known as ROE. Civilian leaders do not always understand the nature of war or the business of conducting warfare, thereby imposing constraints that, militarily-speaking, do not allow for the best course of action. Indeed, the constraints embodied within ROE can cede opportunities, surprise and the overall advantage to Enemy forces, much to the chagrin of military commanders on the ground who have been asked to do what may often seem impossible: to achieve specific military objectives with a very limited range of means and methods. Through ROE, politicians might quite plausibly be sending military personnel into harm’s way with their hands tied behind their backs.
Nevertheless, since war is an expression of politics – and merely an instrument of the political realm – it is evident that political factors must always prevail over the security domain. As Clausewitz argued on the matter, if in reality war is innately an extension or tool of policy, military leaders must be subordinate to political leaders, and military strategy to political policy.[28] Indeed, according to Clausewitz: ‘He who maintains, as is so often the case, that politics should not interfere with the conduct of a war has not grasped the ABCs of grand strategy.’[29]
For Clausewitz, who spent much time reflecting on the conflicting realities in war, the only solution to this struggle of opposing forces – politicians advocating restraint in view of policy aims, on the one hand, and military commanders requiring freedom of action to achieve these aims through military means, on the other hand – lies in ‘dualism’. As he concluded on the matter:
‘The military instrument must be subordinated to the political leadership, but political leaders must understand its nature and limitations. Politicians must not attempt to use the instrument of war to achieve purposes for which it is unsuited. It is the responsibility of military leaders to ensure that the political leadership understands the character and limitations of the military instrument. There is thus a gray area between soldiers’ subordination to political leaders and their professional responsibility to educate those leaders in military realities.’[30]
This ‘grey area’ remains a challenge of our time, especially in the context of modern warfare, and even more so, modern counter-insurgency campaigns in which the political and military spheres are inextricably intertwined. When this political-military gap is considered in relation to multinational command within international security operations involving scores of national contingents under international command, moreover, this area can look very grey indeed.
It is this grey area and the dynamics of these interactions between the political and military spheres that will be explored in greater depth and detail in following blogs, as applied to the study of the national caveats imposed on national contingents within the multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, and their impact on the effective prosecution of security operations in that theatre of conflict over the period of a decade of warfare.
Before commencing this study, however, one must consider not only the positive and negative impact of national ROE on national governments and their contingents, but also the impact of diverse – and sometimes clashing – sets of national ROE between the various national contingents deployed to operate within international security operations. The effect that multiple sets of competing instructions with regard to the use of force have on the successful and effective prosecution of multinational security campaigns will be explored in the next blog.
*This blog is an excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), AAP-6(2008), 2008, p. 2-R-10, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf, (accessed 6 January 2011); NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, Generated from a PfPLMS 0.2 learning object, NATO Partnership for Peace Forum (PfP ADL-WG, 2006), p. 1, http://pfpdev.ethz.ch/SCORMcontent/112363/scos/5/index.pdf, (accessed 8 October 2009).
[2] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999, paragraph 11.10, 11.21-22, pp. 11-1, 11-3.
*For written NZDF authorisation permitting the use of these sections within the NZDF Operational Law Companion, refer to p. xxiii-xxxiv of Volume I: Thesis in my doctoral research, accessible here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/handle/10179/6984.
[3] Ibid., paragraphs 11.10, p . 11-1.
[4] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement, Draft-Rules of Engagement Manual for the New Zealand Defence Force’, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999.
[5] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 1, http://pfpdev.ethz.ch/SCORMcontent/112363/scos/5/index.pdf, (accessed 8 October 2009)
Where command may be regarded as legal authority, by virtue of rank, assignment or appointment, to direct, coordinate and control armed forces; and control as the authority exercised by a commander, or person of authority, over part of the activities of subordinate organisations or other organisations not normally under his command, involving the oversight, direction and coordination of forces towards the implementation of orders and directives issued from a higher authority. It is important to note that though used together, the two terms are not synonymous (New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), ‘Chapter One: Introducing Command in the New Zealand Defence Force’, Command and Control in the New Zealand Defence Force – NZDDP – 00.1, New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, Wellington, 2008, pp.1-1,1-4; New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine – NZDDP-D 2004, New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, Wellington, 2004, pp. G-3, G-4).
[6] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 2.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Own translation from the German: ‘…dass der Krieg nicht bloß ein politischer Akt, sondern ein wahres politisches Instrument ist, eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs, ein Durchführen desselben mit anderen Mitteln…die politische Absicht ist der Zweck, der Krieg ist das Mittel, und niemals kann das Mittel ohne Zweck gedacht werden’ (C. von Clausewitz, ‘Erster Teil. Erstes Buch’, Vom Kriege – Hinterlassenes Werk, Ungekürzter Text’, Berlin, Ullstein Buchverlage GmbH & Co. KG., 1999, p. 45.)
Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian military commander who took part in seven campaigns against Napoleonic French forces in Europe during the late 18th and early 19th century. As an intellectual and philosopher, educated at the prestigious Prussian Military Academy, he later became a military instructor, strategist and philosopher of great renown whose ideas were recorded in a number of German works including his most famous three-volume work entitled Von Krieg (‘On War’). Following his death, Clausewitz’s treatises on war were published and quickly became the most influential texts on military thinking. Von Krieg is still considered today to be the single most important work ever written on military strategy and the theory of warfare.
[9] NZDF, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, op. cit., paragraph 11.11, p. 11-2.
[10] Original italics. Ibid., paragraph 11.12, p. 11-2.
[11] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 2.
[12] This is especially apt considering Clausewitz’s argument that all wars in their natural state tend towards escalation. As he states on this one dimension weighing-in on the process of war: ‘War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore compels the other to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes’ (Clausewitz, Carl von. ‘Book One: On the Nature of War’, On War. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984. p. 77).
[13] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 1; R. Bowyer. Dictionary of Military Terms (3rd ed.), London, A & C Black Publishers Ltd, 2008, p. 210.
[14] Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism, ibid., p. 2.
[15] The seven principles of command include: (1) unity of command; (2) chain of command; (3) continuity of command; (4) delegation of authority; (5) span of control; (6) freedom of action; and (7) control of scarce resources.
[16] HQNZDF, ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, op. cit., p. G-9; T. T. Lupfer, ‘Tactics’, in Margiotta, F.D. (Col.)(ed.), Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, Washington, Brassey’s, Inc., 1996, p. 1023.
[17] HQNZDF, ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, op. cit.,p. G-11; Bowyer, Dictionary of Military Terms, op. cit., p. 239; ‘Tactics’, op. cit., pp. 1023-1024.
[18] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 2.
[19] M. DeLong (LTGEN) & N. Lukeman. ‘Prologue’, A General Speaks Out: The Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq’, St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company LLC, 2007, p. xxii
[20] HQNZDF, ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, op. cit.,p. G-9.
[21] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 2.
[22] NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.
[23] NZDF, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, op. cit., p. 11-2; NZDF, ‘Annex A to Rules of Engagement’, op. cit.
[24] Ibid.
[25] ‘Prologue’, op. cit., p. xxii.
[26] NZDF, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, op. cit., paragraph 11.2, p. 11-1.
[27] Ibid., 11.13-11.14, p. 11-2.
[28] C. Bassford, ‘Clausewitz and His Works’, Paper for the U.S. Army War College, 2008, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm#Politik, (accessed 9 November 2009).
[29] Clausewitz, (‘Betrachtungen über einen künftigen Kriegsplan gegen Frankreich’ (c.1830), in Moltkes Militärische Werke, Teil I: Militärische Korrespondenz, Teil 4 (Berlin, 1902), p. 181-197), cited in Bassford, ‘Clausewitz and His Works’, ibid.
[30] Bassford, ‘Clausewitz and His Works’, ibid.