#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill:
National Caveats in UN Operations
in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
The last blog discussed the key choice facing all Multinational Operations (MNOs) operators of having either standardised or disparate Rules of Engagement (ROE) between national contingents operating within the mission (see blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”). It outlined, firstly, the various difficulties posed to attempts by security organisations to standardise ROE among the States contributing armed forces to an MNO, and secondly, the impact of diverse sets of national ROE on the Operational Commander, the combat capability of the Multinational Force (MNF), and the crucial operational principles of unity of effort and unity of purpose within the mission.
Lastly, it discussed the reality that while, in the short term, national caveat restrictions do work to keep national forces out of harm’s way and thereby keep casualties low, in the long term, caveats can eventually result in higher national casualties overall and greater investments of effort and treasure as a result of delayed progress, prolonged missions, repeated and longer deployments and – in the case of failure – repeated multinational missions in the very same theatre of conflict. From this point of view, the belief so firmly held by nations in the world today, that government imposition of national caveat restraints on deployed forces to MNOs serves to ‘protect’ their national forces, is an unfounded myth and a short-sighted perspective. Moreover, when self-focused national interests of ‘force protection’ are prioritised above the national and international security interests of effective and successful security missions in any given theatre of conflict, extremely negative situations and events can and do occur within that conflict as a result – especially during times of crisis.
Indeed, the historical record shows that diverse ROE, particularly the imposition of national caveat limitations and bans by multiple parties to a coalition, have time and time again proved detrimental – even disastrous – to the effective conduct and successful completion of the multinational security mission, for which purpose the international coalition was originally formed and national forces deployed abroad. The past two-and-a-half decades alone have seen plentiful examples of this grim reality – in MNOs operated by the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and even ad hoc ‘Coalitions of the Willing’.
In the following, I will present three striking examples of the very negative impact created by national caveat constraints within UN operations conducted in Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Example 1: Caveats & the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola
First of all, restrictive and inappropriate national caveats imposed on UN national force contingents in Angola were responsible for worsening an emergency situation and hindering the safe evacuation of UN military and civilian personnel during a security crisis there in 1992-1993.
Background
During the long civil war that followed Angola’s independence from Portugal from 1975-2002, the Communist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the pro-Capitalist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fought over many decades to take control of the country. The longest civil war in Africa, the war was also a proxy war of the Cold War era, with the MPLA receiving support from the Soviet Union and Cuba and UNITA likewise supported by the United States and South Africa. At the close of the first phase of the conflict from 1975-1991, the UN intervened in the conflict to facilitate peace and security in the country. In 1989 it established the United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) to oversee the complete withdrawal from Angola of some 25,000 Cuban troops deployed by Fidel Castro to assist the MPLA in 1975.[1]
The UNAVEM II Mission
Once Cuba’s withdrawal was at last complete in May 1991, the UN further sanctioned the creation of a second UN mission, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) with the mandate of: (1) monitoring the ceasefire agreement; (2) monitoring the demobilisation of the MPLA troops, now the government of the country, as well as their rivals, the UNITA guerrillas; (3) monitoring the neutrality of the Angolan police; and (4) observing and verifying democratic elections, as outlined in the Bicesse Peace Accords. [2]
A limited MNF of 350 unarmed military observers were deployed to Angola under the UN banner, under the command of Chief Military Observers Brigadier (BRIG) Péricles Ferreira Gomes (Brazil) and subsequently Major General (MAJGEN) Edward Ushie Unimna (Nigeria), along with 126 additional police observers and 242 civilian staff.[3] The ‘neutral’ observers were stationed in 65 separate UN locations around the country.[4]
Map of Angola in Western Africa.[5]
The Security Crisis
Between October 1992 – January 1993, the security situation suddenly and dramatically deteriorated in that conflict theatre as a result of a contested national election.[6] Government MPLA forces clashed violently with UNITA forces on the streets of the Capital, Luanda.[7] The violence soon spread to other regions of the country and Angola effectively descended back into civil war. [8] Due to the intensity of the violence around the country, including increasing dangers posed to the lives of UN personnel as UN compounds were targeted and attacked, the UN was compelled to evacuate 45 of its 67 UNAVEM II locations.[9] It was in this perilous and complex environment that national caveats appeared within the MNO to further exacerbate the security crisis in Angola and endanger the lives of UNAVEM II personnel.
Endangering Escape – Scandinavian Caveats in Huambo
In the midst of heavy fighting that was reportedly worse than the fighting of the previous 16 years, caveats imposed on two Scandinavian national contingents thwarted attempts by the UN Regional Commander in Huambo, New Zealand Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Roger Mortlock, to safely evacuate scores of multinational UN military and civilian personnel from the UN compound there under his command.[10] Already faced with the immediate threat of at least two, separate, oncoming militias that were armed and hostile, together with the reality of few escape routes, these Scandinavian caveats added additional difficulty to an already complex and dangerous situation, further exacerbating the crisis and frustrating the LTCOL Mortlock’s efforts to safely plan and execute the evacuation of the UN personnel.[11]
To his credit, and despite great risk to the life and limb of himself and his team, LTCOL Mortlock was able to successfully lead the UNAVEM II personnel through the deadly warzone to safety, and from there to the Capital Luanda.[12] However, it is clear that national caveats played a role in making a difficult and very dangerous situation even more strenuous that it needed to be. Indeed, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Angola, Margaret Anstee, recalls that when the dirty and bedraggled group at last arrived in Luanda, they were being led by a commander who looked ‘thin and totally exhausted’ from the traumatic ordeal.[13]
A building in Angola riddled with bullets as a result of fighting during the civil war in Angola.[14]
The Aftermath
The UNAVEM II operation ultimately became known as a ‘text book example’ of a failed multinational peace-keeping operation: undermanned in terms of personnel, under-resourced in terms of budget and supplies, and – worst of all – under-muscled in terms of mandate, being completely powerless both to enforce compliance with the military and political process or to intervene ‘when it became evident early on that both sides failed to comply with the demobilization plan’.[15]
After floundering in Angola over the next few years, as hostilities continued to rage throughout Angola well into 1994, UNAVEM II was eventually replaced in February 1995 by a successive multinational mission – UNAVEM III.
Example 2: Caveats & the UNAMIR Operation in Rwanda
Secondly, and more infamously, during the sudden ethnically-motivated return to civil war in Rwanda in 1994, national caveat bans prevented international UN peacekeepers deployed to Rwanda from fulfilling their key military and humanitarian duty to protect Rwandan civilians.
Background
In August 1993, at the close of nearly three years of civil war in Rwanda, the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed between the armed forces of the Hutu-dominated Rwandan Government and the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was a political party and military entity created in 1979 by thousands of stateless Tutsi refugees who had fled to neighbouring Uganda during the Hutu-led genocide of the 1960s and were now seeking to secure their return to Rwanda by force. Upon an official request by both parties to the conflict, the UN established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) operation in October with the mission of overseeing the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Rwanda over a transitional period of two years until October 1995, when national elections and the installation of a new Rwandan government were scheduled to take place.[16]
The UNAMIR Mission
Canadian Major General (MAJGEN) Roméo Dallaire was appointed the Force Commander of the new mission, and by February 1994 he had 2,548 UNAMIR personnel under his command.[17] Belgium, the former colonial power of Rwanda, contributed the bulk of the UNAMIR muscle, its contingent comprising half a battalion of 400 military personnel, while Bangladesh contributed 400 logistical forces, and other personnel were supplied by Ghana, Togo and Tanzania.[18]
The chief tasks of UNAMIR were to: (1) contribute to security and the weapons-secure areas established by the Parties within and around the capital city of Kigali; (2) monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement; (3) monitor the security situation around the country leading up to elections; (4) assist with mine clearance; (5) investigate instances of non-compliance with the Peace Agreement relating to the integration of the two Parties’ armed forces; (6) investigate and report on the activities of the gendarmerie and police; (7) monitor the safe and orderly repatriation of displaced Rwandese refugees; and (8) assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance. [19]
Map of Rwanda in South-East Africa.[20]
The Security Crisis
During November-December of 1993, violent ethnically-motivated incidents increased around Rwanda and the political process stalled.[21] In January 1994, a high-ranking informant disclosed to MAJGEN Dallaire that officials within the Government had devised a shocking and murderous strategy to kill the Tutsi population of Rwanda. [22]
On 7 April this strategy of genocide was put into effect – 40 groups of extremist Hutu militia called the Interahamwe, supported and armed by the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda and assisted by members of the Rwandan Army, began to conduct a campaign of extermination against the Tutsi population of the Capital Kigali.[23] Comprising approximately 1,700 men, this Hutu paramilitary organisation had been trained and tasked to kill Tutsi civilians at the rate of ‘1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes’ by means of rifles, machetes and spiked clubs.[24] Men, women, and children of all ages, were shot, beheaded, dismembered or beaten to death – their bodies left to rot where they fell like rubbish in the streets.
The government’s killing rampage quickly spread from the Capital to other regions around the nation. This unrestrained bloodlust among the Hutu civilian population against their fellow citizens and neighbours of Tutsi ethnicity, spurred on by government propaganda and ‘Hate Radio’, led to slaughter of such horrific proportions that Rwandan rivers literally ran red with the blood of the innocent slain.[25]
Belgian Caveats & Genocide at a UN-Protected School
At the time of the conflict, a Belgian military unit was stationed at a school, the École Technique Officielle (ETO or Dom Bosco School), at Kicukiro, a suburb of Kigali.[26] As the massacres began across the capital city, at least 2,000 civilians fled to the ETO school compound and the protection provided by the presence of the Belgian UN peacekeepers.[27] According to an Independent Inquiry report into the Rwandan disaster, these ‘2,000 people had sought refuge at ETO, believing that the UNAMIR troops would be able to protect them’.[28] However, the Belgian soldiers at the school compound were constrained by a national prohibition caveat that instructed them not to use lethal force during the mission except in cases of self-defence, explicitly and verbatem, ‘not to fire unless fired upon’.[29]
Belgian UNAMIR Forces in Rwanda, 1994.[30]
This was a caveat ban that was being heavily promoted and endorsed to UN Member-States during the genocide at the highest levels of the UN Secretariat, in clear and direct contravention of both the UNAMIR mandate and the mission’s own set of UN ROE written by the UNAMIR Operational Commander, MAJGEN Dallaire, and formally submitted to the UN in November 1993 at the start of the mission.[31] According to Dallaire, as well as an Independent Inquiry report, these UNAMIR ROE allowed the use of unilateral lethal force: (1) in individual self-defence; (2) in defence of UNAMIR units and the UN force overall; and (3) in order to intervene to prevent crimes against humanity and other abuses by using an escalation of force up to and including the use of deadly force.[32]
However, because of UN disasters and failures in Somalia, Croatia and Bosnia during the previous two years, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt), together with his staff at the Secretariat including Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Kofi Annan (Ghana) and his Assistant Secretary-General Iqbal Riza (Pakistan) at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), were all determined to ‘avoid conflict’ in Rwanda at all costs, in an effort to preserve the UN’s reputation as a trustworthy and reliable operator of peace and security operations.[33] In so doing, they were willing and prepared to leave the Tutsi civilians of Rwanda to their fate, however gruesome and unpalatable their deaths might be.
This contradiction in ROE instructions led to frequent written and verbal confrontations between MAJGEN Dallaire in Kigali, desperately seeking to protect the Rwandan Tutsi population, and Annan and Riza in New York, stubbornly working to protect the UN’s reputation, both immediately before and during the course of the genocide from January to July 1994 (see Dallaire’s gripping memoire on the failed UN mission in Rwanda, ‘Shaking Hands with the Devil: The failure of Humanity in Rwanda’, 2004).[34]
The people working at the UN Secretariat do not seem to have realised that by actually doing their job – that is, ordering UN troops to take the right, appropriate and necessary action so that their military actions in theatre matched their rhetorical resolutions adopted in the Security Council – they would safeguard the integrity and reputation of the UN. In adopting a risk-averse pose and trying to keep their jobs, rather than do their jobs, these men at the UN Secretariat were risking and endangering the lives of civilians and UN military personnel, damaging the credibility and trustworthiness of the UN as a reliable operator of peace and security operations, and imperilling their own careers and long-term reputations as diplomats and as men.
Indeed, as events in Rwanda would quickly show, this UN stance of self-preservation and reputation-protection would only result in disaster and death on the ground for thousands of men and women, a legacy of catastrophic UN betrayal and failure, enduringly smeared careers of both political diplomats and military commanders, and long-term harm to the credibility of the UN organisation as a security operation operator.
UNAMIR Operational Commander, MAJGEN Roméo Dallaire[35]
On 11 April, after many bloody days of the Hutu militia carrying out gruesome atrocities against the Tutsi population in the suburbs of the Capital Kigali, Interahamwe fighters and Rwandan Army soldiers, armed mostly with machetes, arrived at the ETO school compound and surrounded it.[36] Only the armed Belgian UNAMIR peacekeeping forces stood between the Tutsi civilians sheltering there and certain death at the hands of the Hutu killers.
However, although during the previous days the Belgian government had loosened their soldiers national caveats to allow them to use lethal force to shoot and kill wild dogs outside the school compound, that were feeding on the bodies of the slain, the same government refused to loosen their ROE and lift their lethal force caveat bans to authorise their soldiers to use the same lethal force against the armed Hutu militia who were seeking entrance to the compound – with the clear intent of committing genocide and slaughtering the Tutsi civilians there (this shocking contradiction gave rise to the 2005 film ‘Shooting Dogs’, which retells the story of events at the ETO compound during the Rwandan genocide).
These starkly inappropriate government-imposed caveats thereby prohibited the Belgian UN soldiers from being able to afford any real security or protection whatsoever during this critical security crisis to the Tutsi civilians they were deployed and duty-bound to protect.
What is worse, instead of loosening or altering the ROE of its personnel and thereby offering real protection to the 2,000 people depending on the Belgian unit to protect them and safeguard their lives, the Belgian government struck a deal with the government of France, which, like Belgium, Italy and the United States, had on April 8 deployed large numbers of elite forces to rescue expatriates living in Rwanda from the genocidal violence.[37] As part of the deal, an elite French military contingent of commandoes was deployed to the ETO school compound to evacuate all the French expatriates sheltering there. Once the French civilians had been collected, the elite French commando unit left the compound, followed by the Belgian UNAMIR military contingent, and drove away – leaving all the Tutsi men, women and children there at the mercy of their bloodthirsty enemies.[38]
Abandoned, helpless, and left completely unprotected by UN military forces, as well as the French Special Forces contingent, these human beings were left ‘as lambs to the slaughter’ to be butchered by their enemies. The Hutu immediately entered the school compound and slaughtered the 2,000 Tutsi civilians sheltering there.[39] As MAJGEN Dallaire later wrote of this tragic event in his memoire:
‘Two thousand Rwandans had lost their lives that day as a direct result of the Belgian withdrawal’.[40]
After the Genocide.[41]
The Aftermath
Nationwide, over the period of 100 days between April and July 1994, a total of 800,000 people were killed during the 1994 genocide under UNAMIR’s watch – equating to almost 10% of the entire Rwandan population at that time.[42] Instead of protecting the Rwandan civilian population, the 3,000 UNAMIR personnel there were, as one journalist at The Guardian reported, ‘no more than spectators to the savagery’.[43]
Indeed, the Independent Inquiry into the 1994 Rwandan genocide reported that the genocide – substantially worsened by national caveats imposed by governments on their UNAMIR national force contingents – ‘will forever be remembered as one of the most abhorrent events of the 20th century’.[44] As it concluded:
‘The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun. This failure has left deep wounds within Rwandan society, and in the relationship between Rwanda and the international community, in particular the United Nations…The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations system as a whole. The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness.’[45]
The UNAMIR mission in Rwanda was a UN failure of catastrophic proportions, which continues to haunt the UN organisation and some of its Member-States to this day. The mission terminated in ignominy and was replaced in July 1994 by UNAMIR II.
Example 3: Caveats & the UNPROFOR Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Thirdly, caveat bans and limitations on UN national contingents have also played a critical role in another genocidal slaughter of civilians, this time in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Background
In June 1991, at the end of the Cold War, the Communist state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolved as two of its six Socialist republics, Croatia and Slovenia, declared their independence and seceded to become independent and democratic nation states.[46] In opposition to independence, war broke out across Croatia as Croatian Serbs allied with soldiers of the federal Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), who had been previously stationed in Croatia and answered to the Serb government in the federal capital of Belgrade under the leadership of President Slobodan Milošević.[47] Together they employed military violence against civilians in an effort to occupy Croatia and forcibly stop the republic’s independence from Yugoslavia. Combat between pro-independence Croatians and anti-independence Croatian Serbs and their Serb allies continued from 1991 to 1995, with the exception of a temporary cease-fire in January 1992, ending with a Croat victory against the Serb alliance.
On 29 February-1 March 1992 Yugoslavia’s third formerly Socialist republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina likewise voted in a democratic referendum to declare its independence from the remaining Yugoslavian Federation and Serbian rule from Belgrade.[48] However, as in Croatia, this bid for independence divided Bosnia’s ethnically- and religiously-diverse population. While the majority Muslim Bosniak population supported independence, Serbian Orthodox Bosnian Serbs wanted to remain under Serbian rule from Belgrade, while the minority Catholic Bosnian Croats wanted Bosnian independence but also wished to annex Croat-dominated Bosnian areas to join the neighbouring and newly-independent State of Croatia.[49]
As a result of the affirmative vote, and despite the dissent of Bosnian Serbs, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on 3 March 1992 and received international recognition of their independence and national sovereignty.[50] Immediately war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina as severely disgruntled Bosnian Serbs, supported by Milošević’s Serb government in Belgrade and other elements of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, sought to regain control of the new nation by force.
Declaring themselves the Army of the Serb Republic (“Republika Srpska”) fighting for a ‘Greater Serbia’, this Bosnian Serb militia used their military arsenal to attack and take control of all ethnically Serb areas around Bosnia-Herzegovina, ultimately occupying over half of its total territory.[51] Simultaneously, Republika Srpska forces also sought to decisively swing the balance towards Serbian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina by carrying out a deliberate, targeted eradication of pro-Independence Bosniaks and Croatians by means of ethnic cleansing, involving: forced expulsion of unwanted ethnic groups; the forced seizure or expropriation of property; the destruction of homes, cultural buildings, places of worship and cemeteries; the mass execution of Muslim Bosniak males; the systematic mass rape of approximately 50,000 Muslim Bosniak and Catholic Bosnian females – including in deliberately established ‘rape camps’; and the additional use of torture, murder, physical injury and sexual assault carried out in the most brutal and savage manner in order to instil terror on the civilian population. [52]
Map of Yugoslavia prior to and following its Fragmentation.[53]
The UNPROFOR Mission
From 1992-1995, during the course of these two Croatian and Bosnian Wars, the UN established and operated a peace and security mission in both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina called UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).[54] UNPROFOR’s initial mandate was to ensure that three United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia were demilitarised, that ‘all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack’, and to control the entry of civilians to these Protected Areas.[55] In September 1992 this mandate was then expanded to Bosnia-Herzegovina, with UNPROFOR forces tasked with delivering humanitarian aid, protecting convoys of civilian detainees, and monitoring a “no-fly” zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.[56]
As the war raged on ferociously in Bosnia during 1993 and the fighting parties became increasingly fractured and complex, the UN created six further UNPA safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina around five Bosnian towns – Tuzla, Bihac, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica – as well as the Bosnian capital city of Sarajevo.[57] These ‘safe havens’ were intended to be areas in which Bosnian civilians fleeing the fighting could find sanctuary and refuge in the midst of the war.
To accommodate this new and important assignment, the UNPROFOR mandate was again altered and UNPROFOR contributing nations tasked with sending ‘heavily armed’ national forces to the six new Bosnian UN Protected Areas with authorisation to ‘repel attacks’ on the safe zones.[58] By March 1995 UNPROFOR comprised a total force strength of some 38,600 military personnel. [59]
The 6 UNPROFOR ‘Protected Areas’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992-1995.[60]
The Security Crisis
A magnet for frightened war refugees in a Muslim-dominated area of Eastern Bosnia, the Srebrenica safe zone soon held approximately 50,000 Bosnian civilians, including a preponderance of families and young people.[61] A Dutch national contingent of some 450 UNPROFOR military forces – Dutch Battalion III (DutchBat III) – was stationed at this UN Protected Area, tasked with guarding the safe haven from military attack, repelling any military assaults, and protecting the civilian refugees sheltering there under the UN flag.[62]
However, despite their mandate and tasking, these Dutch peacekeepers were lightly armed rather than ‘heavily armed’ for combat, as the UNPROFOR mandate required.[63] In addition to these inadequate and ‘completely unrealistic’ light arms for the mission in hand, the Dutch Command of the battalion had itself further weakened the unit by ordering its personnel not to carry many weapons in plain sight, as it did not want to appear ‘too warlike’.[64]
The DutchBat III forces were strictly restrained in their ROE, moreover, by national caveats relating to the use of force, which prohibited the use of lethal force except in individual or unit self-defence.[65] This severely limited the extent to which Dutch peacekeepers could realistically fulfil the UNPROFOR mandate to provide robust military protection to the civilians in their Area of Responsibility (AoR), including through the kinetic, offensive, repulsion of any hostile military attacks. Indeed, a 2002 report later blamed the Dutch government for ‘setting the troops up to fail’ in Srebrenica, a finding that led to the resignation of the Dutch Prime Minister, Wim Kok, and the collapse of his government that had ruled the Netherlands since 1994.[66]
On 8-11 July 1995, Bosnian Serb militia forces under the command of General (GEN) Ratko Mladić, acting on the instructions of appointed Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić, launched a military attack on the UNPROFOR DutchBat III observation posts and invaded the Srebrenica UN Protection Area. [67]
The ‘Safe Area’ guarded by Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica, Eastern Bosnia.[68]
Dutch Caveats & the Massacre at the Srebrenica UN Protected Area
As a direct result of the decisions made and caveats imposed by the Dutch government with regard to its UNPROFOR national contingent in Bosnia, these Dutch UN forces were quickly and easily overwhelmed by Bosnian Serb forces.[69] No serious military attempt to defend the Protection Area was ever mounted by the battalion during the attack. In fact, despite receiving advance warning in the previous days that preparations were being made by Serb forces to assault the UN safe haven, the DutchBat III battalion had remained ‘persistently lethargic’.[70]
Furthermore, when the Serbs attacked the UN observation posts during the assault, these Dutch protection forces not only opted not to use their one legal authority to fire their weapons and use lethal force in self-defence, but also willingly abandoned their posts – with the approval of Dutch Command.[71] Instead, the Dutch battalion gathered and, ‘to avoid provocations’, laid down all their weapons in a massive pile, handing over to Bosnian Serb forces a total of 199 rifles, 25 submachine guns, 28 pistols and 29 machine guns.[72]
The one exception to this dismal record by the Dutch Protection Forces, was when Dutch Command acted on a limitation caveat and sought government approval to bring in air strikes from other UN national contingents based in Sarajevo. [73] However, this request was categorically refused by the Dutch Chief of Staff, General (GEN) Cees Nicolai, after the request was denied over the telephone by the Dutch Defence Minister in The Hague, Joris Voorhoeve.[74]
With Dutch military forces failing to mount any military opposition over four consecutive days, on 11 July Bosnian Serb forces overran the safe haven and were unimpeded in carrying out their ethnic cleansing campaign of ‘liquidation’ within the UN-protected ‘safe area’ – the final stage of the Serb ‘Operation Krivaja’, through which Bosnian Serb forces hoped to forcibly create an ‘ethnically pure’ Serbian state.[75] The Serb Republic forces sent out orders for local police forces and Serb rebel fighters in neighbouring Croatia to join them, and together these Serb forces systematically carried out their genocidal slaughter within the Dutch-controlled UN Protected Area.[76]
Dutch UNPROFOR peacekeepers at the UN Protected Area and ‘safe haven’ in Srebrenica, July 1995.[77]
Male adults, teenagers and children were first separated from their female counterparts, then the Bosniak males were either killed on site or loaded onto buses and summarily executed in obscure locations.[78] Meanwhile, the girls and young women were marched away to designated locations within the UN Protected Area to be gang raped by Serb forces.[79]
Due to the extremely inappropriate set of ROE constraints placed on the DutchBat III forces by their risk-averse government in The Hague, these 450 Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers were compelled to helplessly stand aside and watch inactively as silent witnesses to successive days of violence, violation and horror – or as one Dutch soldier later recounted, ‘torture, executions and slaughter’ – in the midst of the Srebrenica UN Protection Area. [80]
Over a period of nine days from July 11 to July 19, 1995, these Bosnian and Croatian Serb forces methodically selected and killed thousands of Bosniak males of all ages – all of whom had sought UN protection there under Dutch command. Approximately 8,000 men and boys were slaughtered there during the massacre.[81] What is more, in a deliberate attempt to conceal their gross violation of human rights, and avoid any future prosecution for war crimes from the international community, the Serb forces took pains to conceal the corpses of the slain in 32 secret mass graves.[82]
War Crimes investigators excavate one of the 32 mass graves containing the bodies of Srebrenica victims.[83]
The Aftermath
This second genocidal massacre committed under the UN flag and before the eyes of UN military forces is now considered ‘the worst atrocity committed in Europe since World War II’ and – along with Rwanda – remains one of the UN’s greatest shames.[84]
Like the massacre at the ETO school compound in Rwanda, this second massacre highlights the reality that, despite verbal political statements of commitment and tangible military deployments to international security missions, the political will of force contributing national governments is generally extremely weak. In the modern world today, casualty avoidance repeatedly trumps all other concerns – especially during security crises. As one may see clearly by this real-life illustration within the UNPROFOR mission, when an emergency security situation developed and real danger arose, the Dutch government – like many before and after them – placed the protection and safety of their own armed and trained military forces above the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia, above the UN mandate, and – worst of all – above the lives of the 50,000 innocent and completely unarmed Bosnian civilians that had sought UN protection and who trusted the Dutch forces stationed there to protect them. As Zegfeld states:
‘The Dutch government and the Dutch command within UNPROFOR were responsible for the gross negligence shown by Dutch troops, [they] were primarily concerned for the safety of their national contingent and showed scant regard for the safety of the civilian population entrusted to their care.’[85]
Indeed, in June 2008, survivors of the Srebrenica massacre filed a 228-page lawsuit against both the Dutch government and the UN alleging that ‘although the Serbs’ murderous intentions were known, neither the Dutch, as a protective power, nor the UN, as the organization providing the mandate, took steps to save the local population’. [86] In the suit, the Dutch UNPROFOR forces are described as criminally negligent troops who played a ‘disgraceful role’ in the massacre in that they had an obligation to protect the Bosnian civilians under their control and to prevent genocide, but instead they simply ‘handed over the population to the bloodthirsty Bosnian Serbs’.[87]
In short, the Dutch battalion is portrayed as:
‘A force that was incompetent, disinterested and solely concerned about the health and wellbeing of its own soldiers.’[88]
Or as the attorney for the surviving Srebrenica victims, Marco Gerritsen, has also stated: ‘The Dutch had only one goal from the start, namely to get all their soldiers home in one piece’. [89]
Following the Srebrenica massacre, the UNPROFOR operation failed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ceased completely in December 1995. The UN operation was replaced by two successive NATO-led missions – the IFOR and SFOR operations.
*This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] ‘Angola Unravels – the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, X. The United Nations’, Human Rights Watch, 1999, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Angl998-10.htm, (accessed 22 August 2017); Clive Foss, ‘Cuba’s African Adventure’, History Today, Vol. 60, No. 3, March 2010, http://www.historytoday.com/clive-foss/cubas-african-adventure, (accessed 29 August 2017).
[2] ‘Angola Unravels – the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, X. The United Nations’, ibid.; United Nations (UN), Completed Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Angola: United Nations Angola Verification Mission II’, United Nations, 2000, https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm, (accessed 29 August 2017).
[3] United Nations (UN), Completed Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Angola – UNAVEM II: Facts and Figures’, United Nations, 2000, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIF.html, (accessed 29 August 2017); Karl Maier, ‘Angola: Peace at Last?’, Refworld, 1 May 1997, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6be10.html, (accessed 29 August 2017).
[4] United Nations (UN), Completed Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Angola – UNAVEM II: Background’, United Nations, 2000, https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm#UNITA, (accessed 29 August 2017).
[5] ‘Angola Map – Political Map of Angola’, Ezilon Maps,2015, http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/angola-maps.html, (accessed 29 August 2017).
[6] UN, ‘Angola – UNAVEM II: Background’, op. cit.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Brigadier (BRIG) Roger Mortlock (Ret’d), Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, 3 November 2009, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand; UN, ‘Angola – UNAVEM II: Background’; M. Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1996, pp. xvi.
[11] NZDF BRIG Roger Mortlock (Ret’d), Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, ibid.
[12] NZDF BRIG Roger Mortlock (Ret’d), Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, ibid.; Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War, op cit., p. 370.
[13] Anstee, Orphan of the Cold War, ibid.
A recollection of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Angola from 1992-1993, Dame Margaret Joan Anstee (a British diplomat and the first woman to head a UN peace-keeping mission), recorded in her book ‘Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93’.
[14] Image taken from ‘Angolan Civil War’, Wikiwand, http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Angolan_Civil_War, (accessed 14 September 2017).
[15] ‘Angola Unravels – the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, X. The United Nations’, op. cit.
[16] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 872 (1993), S/RES/972 (1993), 5 October 1993, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/540/63/PDF/N9354063.pdf?OpenElement, (accessed 6 September 2017).
[17] United Nations (UN), Completed Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Rwanda – UNAMIR: Background’, United Nations, 2000, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirS.htm, (accessed 6 September 2017).
[18] UN, ‘Rwanda – UNAMIR: Background’; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, United Nations, 15 December 1999, p. 17, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC%20S19991257.pdf, (accessed 19 June 2008).
[19] UNSC, Resolution 872 (1993), S/RES/972 (1993), op. cit.
[20] Modified image comprised of two online maps – ‘Rwanda Spearheads Fight Against Corruption in the Sub-Region’ [online map], News of Rwanda, 20 May 2012, http://www.newsofrwanda.com/ibikorwa/8539/rwanda-spearheads-fight-corruption-sub-region/, (accessed 14 September 2017) and ‘Rwanda to let U.N. troops remain 3 more months’ [online map], CNN World Briefs, 12 December 1995, http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/Newsbriefs/9512/12-12/, (accessed 14 September 2017).
[21] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., p. 9.
[22] Ibid., p. 10.
[23] R. Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, USA, Da Capo Press, 2004, p. 289.
[24] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., p. 10.
[25] ‘Hate radio’, RwandanStories, 2011, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/hate_radio.html, (accessed 7 October 2017); K. Manson, ‘Rwandan genocide: Lingering Legacy’, Financial Times, 7 April 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/f36e7b5c-bbe8-11e3-84f1-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e5, (7 October 2017).
[26] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., pp. 18-19; Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, op. cit., p. 289.
[27] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, ibid., p. 18; Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, ibid., p. 289.
[28] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, ibid., p. 19.
[29] Ibid., p. 16.
[30] Modified image taken from ‘The role of the west’, Rwandan Stories, 2011, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/role_of_the_west.html, (accessed 13 September 2017).
[31] Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, op. cit., pp. 99, 229; UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., p. 9.
[32] Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, ibid., pp. 114, 229; UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, ibid., p. 9.
[33] Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, ibid., pp. 50, 147, 229.
[34] R. Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, USA, Da Capo Press, 2004, pp. 1-592. This book is available for purchase from Amazon USA at the following link: https://www.amazon.com/Shake-Hands-Devil-Failure-Humanity/dp/0786715103/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1505186324&sr=8-1&keywords=Dallaire+shake+hands+with+the+devil
[35] Modified image taken from ‘The role of the west’, Rwandan Stories, 2011, http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/role_of_the_west.html, (accessed 13 September 2017).
[36] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., p. 19.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Dallaire, Shaking Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, op. cit., p. 290.
[39] Ibid., pp. 289-290.
[40] Ibid., p. 289.
[41] Image taken from P. Gourevitch, ‘After the Genocide’, The New Yorker [Magazine], 18 December 1995, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1995/12/18/after-the-genocide, (accessed 14 September 2017).
[42] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., p. 3; D. Usborne, ‘UN pilloried for failure over Rwanda genocide’, Independent, 17 December 1999, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/un-pilloried-for-failure-over-rwanda-genocide-739072.html, (accessed 6 September 2017).
[43] M. Huband, ‘UN troops stand by and watch carnage’, The Guardian, 12 April 1994, https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/apr/12/rwanda.fromthearchive, (accessed 13 September 2017).
[44] UNSC, S/1999/1257 Report of the Independent Inquiry, op. cit., p. 3.
[45] Ibid.
[46] United Nations (UN), Completed Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force: Background’, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_b.htm, (accessed 26 September 2017).
[47] UN, ‘Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force: Background’, ibid.
[48] ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina Timeline’, BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17212376, (accessed 5 May 2008).
[49] United Nations (UN), International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, United Nations, 31 March 2003, p. 5, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf, (accessed 25 September 2017).
[50] Ibid.
[51] ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina Timeline’, op. cit.; UN, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., p. 5.
[52] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/1994/674 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 27 May 1994, p. 34, paragraphs 133-137, http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf, (accessed 27 September 2017); C. Kennedy-Pipe & P. Stanley, The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions, K. Booth (ed.), UK, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 73.
[53] Modified image taken from ‘Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia’, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm, (accessed 8 March 2010)
[54] United Nations (UN), ‘Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force: Profile’, United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm, (accessed 26 September 2017).
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] UN, ‘Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force: Profile’, ibid.; ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina Timeline’, BBC, op. cit.; M. Tanner, ‘Bosnia’s ‘Safe Areas’: West sets the stage for a human tragedy – The creation of UN ‘safe’ refugee zones proceeds apace. In these disease-ridden camps thousands of orphaned Muslim children, with no hope for the future, will turn to crime or terrorism’, 7 June 1993, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/bosnias-safe-areas-west-sets-the-stage-for-a-human-tragedy-the-creation-of-un-safe-refugee-zones-1490291.html, (accessed 26 September 2017).
[58] Tanner, ‘Bosnia’s ‘Safe Areas’: West sets the stage for a human tragedy’, ibid.
[59] UN, ‘Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force: Profile’, op. cit.
[60] Modified image taken from ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, World Atlas, 2017, http://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/europe/ba.htm, (accessed 26 September 2017).
[61] Tanner, ‘Bosnia’s ‘Safe Areas’: West sets the stage for a human tragedy’, op. cit.
[62] D. Robinson, ‘Dutch still grapple with the shame of Srebrenica’, Financial Times , 11 July 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/93a5c67a-26d2-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca, (accessed 26 September 2017); ‘U.N., Dutch Complicity in Srebrenica Genocide’, 5 June 2007, Srebrenica Massacre, https://srebrenicamassacre1995.wordpress.com/tag/dutch-state/ (accessed 14 September 2017).
[63] U. Ludwig & A. Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, Srebrenica Massacre, 6 June 2008, a republication of ‘Criminal Negligence? Srebrenica Survivors Sue Netherlands, United Nations’ from Der Spiegel (5 June 2007) and translated from German by C. Sultan, https://srebrenicamassacre1995.wordpress.com/tag/dutch-state/, (14 September 2017); ‘U.N., Dutch Complicity in Srebrenica Genocide’, op. cit.
[64] Ludwig & Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, op. cit.
[65] ‘U.N., Dutch Complicity in Srebrenica Genocide’, op. cit.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ludwig & Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, op. cit.
[68] Modified image taken from U. Ludwig & A. Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’ [online map], Srebrenica Massacre, 6 June 2008, https://srebrenicamassacre1995.wordpress.com/tag/dutch-state/, (14 September 2017).
[69] Ludwig & Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.; D. Robinson, ‘Dutch still grapple with the shame of Srebrenica’, Financial Times , 11 July 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/93a5c67a-26d2-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca, (accessed 26 September 2017).
[74] Ludwig & Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, ibid.; Robinson, ‘Dutch still grapple with the shame of Srebrenica’, ibid.
[75] N. Wood, ‘Bosnian Serbs Admit Responsibility for the Massacre of 7,000’, New York Times, 12 June 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/12/world/bosnian-serbs-admit-responsibility-for-the-massacre-of-7000.html?mcubz=3, (accessed 13 March 2010).
[76] Ibid.
[77] Modified image taken from ‘Niederlande haften für Srebrenica-Opfer’ [‘The Netherlands liable for Srebrenica Victims’], SRF [Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen], 16 July 2014, https://www.srf.ch/news/international/niederlande-haften-fuer-srebrenica-opfer, (accessed 10 October 2017).
[78] Wood, ‘Bosnian Serbs Admit Responsibility for the Massacre of 7,000’, op. cit.; ‘U.N., Dutch Complicity in Srebrenica Genocide’, op. cit.
[79] Ludwig & Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, op. cit.
[80] Ibid.
[81] ‘Srebrenica Genocide Trial: Mladic & Karadzic Evade Justice – Genocide Trial Without Rako Mladic & Radovan Karadzic’, ibid.; Robinson, ‘Dutch still grapple with the shame of Srebrenica’, op. cit.; ‘U.N., Dutch Complicity in Srebrenica Genocide’, op. cit.
[82] Wood, ‘Bosnian Serbs Admit Responsibility for the Massacre of 7,000’, op. cit.; ‘Srebrenica Genocide Trial: Mladic & Karadzic Evade Justice – Genocide Trial Without Rako Mladic & Radovan Karadzic’, ibid.
[83] Modified image taken from ‘Serbia Arrests 8 Linked to Srebrenica Massacre’, VOA News, 18 March 2015, https://www.voanews.com/a/serbia-arrests-7-linked-to-srebrenica-massacre/2685000.html, (accessed 10 October 2017).
[84] Wood, ‘Bosnian Serbs Admit Responsibility for the Massacre of 7,000’, op. cit.
[85] L. Zegveld, ‘The Dutch State Failed in Its Duty to Protect Civilian Victims of Genocide at Srebrenica’, Srebrenica Massacre, 3 June 2008, https://srebrenicamassacre1995.wordpress.com/tag/dutch-state/, (accessed 14 September 2017).
[86] Ludwig & Mertin, ‘U.N. & Dutch Cowards on Trial (Analysis)’, op. cit.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.