#2 What are “National Caveats”?
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
A Definition
National caveats can be defined as national restrictions or constraints imposed by political decision-makers on national armed forces to constrict the actions of armed forces deployed to multinational security operations. In other words, they are binding instructions enjoined on military forces by civilian government officials which clearly limit or restrict what the military can do on behalf of the nation during a conflict.
One further definition, collectively agreed upon by NATO in June 2006 and published in NATO’s official glossary of terms, defines a “caveat” as:
In NATO operations, any limitation, restriction or constraint by a nation on its military forces or civilian elements under NATO command and control or otherwise available to NATO, that does not permit NATO commanders to deploy and employ these assets fully in line with the approved operation plan (Note: A caveat may apply inter alia to freedom of movement within the joint operations area and/or to compliance with the approved rules of engagement).[1]
Caveats are primarily political, rather than military, constructs. They mark the cut-off point of political will and sanction in the highest places, beyond which no service member has the legitimate authority to go. As such, caveats form a kind of insurance policy to aid the survival of political masters, particularly those in electoral democracies where survival and the retention of political power is dictated by the shifting opinions of the civilian populace in response to government actions.
In short, caveats are the political bottom-line in military terms.
National Caveats: Limitation & Prohibition Rules
Specifically, national caveats relate to two of three categories of rules contained within the Rules of Engagement (ROE) issued by national governments to military personnel, which govern the conduct of national armed force contingents when deployed on military operations.
The first category of rules of engagement concerns authorisation rules, which authorise military personnel to employ specific weaponry and tactics, on the proviso that this employment is conducted in full compliance with the body of international law on the conduct of war known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
By contrast the second and third categories of rules of engagement concern limitation and prohibition rules respectively. These two classes of rules – collectively referred to as “national caveats” – specifically constrain where and in what manner military personnel may deploy, what tasks national military forces may do, which tactics are permitted, how lethal force may be utilised and with which weapons, and therefore also how the national contingents may be utilised by Operational Commanders within multinational military missions.
A limitation caveat allows certain actions or movements by deployed national forces only after official permission has been applied for and granted by the appropriate government minister at the national capital. It requires the senior national commander to apply for and obtain explicit approval and authorisation from the government in the home capital before national personnel can participate in a task, operation or geographical movement required of it from Operational Command in the theatre to which it has been deployed. In most cases, this government permission must be sought and obtained from the relevant Minister or Secretary of Defence, or in the case of civilian personnel the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Secretary of State. However, in some cases the caveat may also involve seeking and acquiring permission from the Head of Government as well, the Prime Minister or President of the nation.
By contrast a prohibition caveat is a complete ban which forbids outright specific movements and actions by deployed national forces. Participation of personnel in certain tasks, operations, deployments, communications and intelligence-sharing, and the use of certain tactics, weaponry and even lethal force within the multinational operation, are absolutely prohibited by the national government.
Limitation rules are sometimes referred to as ‘yellow-card’ restrictions, while prohibition rules are commonly known as ‘red-card’ constraints. This is because a simplified but accurate version of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement are frequently printed onto a yellow and/or red colour-coded card respectively and issued to a national contingent’s senior national officer prior to deployment. It is this officer’s job to deny requests from multinational operational command that are considered to exceed the national mandate provided by his or her government, by producing the appropriate colour-coded caveat card and displaying it to the Operational Commander of the military mission.
The following blog will discuss how governments may impose these national caveats to constrict the activities and functions of all types of national stability and security forces deployed to a multinational operation – including both civilian government officials and military personnel from the Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Operations or Intelligence services – as well as the full range of humanitarian and security operations, regardless of their diverse geographic and operational environments or their mission aims (see blog “#3 National Caveats: Potential to Constrain the Full Spectrum of Military Personnel & Operations”).
*This blog is an excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), AAP-6(2008), 2008, p. 2-C-2, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/other/nato2008.pdf, (accessed 6 January 2011).