#29 BACKGROUND

The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan:

Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership &

NATO Responsibility for Mission Success

– Dr Regeena Kingsley

* This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”

In the last blog I provided a brief introduction to the ancient land and peoples of Afghanistan, and outlined the central roles that Pakistan, the Pashtun Taliban and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network have played in destabilising that country and terrorising its civilian peoples, its police and military armed forces, and its foreign American and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) defenders, over a long period of no less than 25 years from 1994 until the present day in 2019. [See blog ‘#28 BACKGROUND – Afghanistan: The Land, its Diverse Ethnic Peoples & the Pashtun Taliban’]

The following four blogs (#29-#32) seek to provide an introduction to the contextual setting within which my national caveat research takes place – the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) multinational security mission in Afghanistan, which operated in Afghanistan from 2001-2014, and its orientation as a counter-insurgency (COIN) campaign. Together these four blogs aim to provide a political and operational overview of the international ISAF operation, in order to provide essential background information for the ISAF national caveat analysis which is to follow.

In this blog I aim to provide an introduction to the multinational ISAF operation in Afghanistan, by describing the ISAF, the purpose for which it was created, and its core mission in Afghanistan. Fifteen of the distinguishing characteristics of the mission will next be highlighted, each of which has added to the operation’s complexity as one of the world’s largest and most challenging Multinational Operation (MNO) in modern military history to date.

An historical overview of the political, legal and military arrangements that created the ISAF mission in Afghanistan will subsequently be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of the mission’s early problems with leadership, including the way in which this difficult issue was resolved when NATO accepted a request, by both the United Nations (UN) and the new democratically-elected government of Afghanistan, to take command of the mission.

Finally, the blog will present the fact of NATO’s “ownership” of and primary responsibility for the ISAF mission, in the years following its assumption of leadership command in 2003, by outlining the way in which NATO member nations were not only the principal contributors of military forces to the mission, but also formed a consistent majority group of TCNs among all the nations contributing to the ISAF mission, for the duration of the military operation in Afghanistan.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

The ISAF was a multinational military force working on behalf of the international community to assist the legitimate, democratically-elected government of Afghanistan in maintaining its physical, political, and economic security and sovereignty in the face of armed opposition, in the form of Islamic Extremist insurgent and terrorist entities operating both within Afghan sovereign territory and without it from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran.

The ISAF was the physical, tangible embodiment of collective international will in regard to Afghanistan, in the wake of the “9/11” Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States (U.S.), and the subsequent U.S.-led multinational Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) campaign which ousted the totalitarian Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan.

Within the ‘Terror State’ that the Taliban had established in Afghanistan between 1994-2001 with Pakistan’s central and critical support and assistance, the governing Taliban regime had been active and willing hosts and defenders of the central Al-Qaeda terrorist cell, led by Osama bin Laden, which had planned the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the American homeland among other targets in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen. In addition, the Taliban regime had also caused Afghanistan to become a massive training camp and a critical sanctuary for the entire Al-Qaeda terrorist network and other terrorist groups with global terrorist agendas from the Central Asian region and around the world.

The Purpose of the ISAF

The central purpose of the ISAF was, as its name suggests, to ‘assist security’ in the country, primarily by conducting a campaign to restore security and stability to Afghanistan. This security assistance was conducted with the permission of, and on behalf of, the newly-created and democratically-elected Afghan government, and in the broader global interest of international stability and security in an era of global Islamist terrorism.

It was hoped that a secure and stable Afghanistan would, furthermore, by extension, also promote greater security and stability within the surrounding region of Central Asia and thereby deter the creation or protection of any new terrorist sanctuaries in the region.

A map showing the location of Afghanistan within the Central Asian region may be seen below.

Afghanistan – A topographical view of Afghanistan showing Kabul City to the east of the Hindu Kush mountains and the Khyber Pass along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[1]

The Aim & Mission of the ISAF

The mission of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan may be found in the ISAF’s own mission statement, as published in successive ISAF official publications. They state that the mission of the ISAF was to:

‘Conduct military operations in the assigned AO to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and enabling the GoA to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country.’[2]

From this statement it is clear that the ISAF’s overarching aim in Afghanistan was ‘to extend government authority and influence’ within Afghan sovereign territory, a product of which would be better administration of central governance and the completion of reconstruction work throughout the country.

Towards this aim, ISAF’s primary mission was to ‘conduct military operations’ within the boundaries of Afghan territory and in partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), for the specific purpose of establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment within Afghanistan.

As the NATO’s factsheet on the ISAF operation neatly summarised:

‘ISAF’s primary role is to support and assist the GoA in providing and maintaining a secure environment in order to facilitate the rebuilding of Afghanistan, the establishment of democratic structures and deepen the influence of the central government’ [emphasis added].[3]

A Complex Mission: 15 Characteristics

While the purpose of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is clear, in military terms the ISAF coalition was in fact a complex and multi-faceted creation, and one that could rightly be argued to have been conducting one of the most difficult and controversial campaigns in modern history.

Indeed, there were fourteen different characteristics of the ISAF multinational mission, each of which added its own layer of complexity to the ISAF’s historic endeavour in Afghanistan. These traits were as follows:

1. The ISAF was a multinational force drawn from scores of contributing nations, each with its own set of political interests and peculiarities in language, military culture, force structure, skills, training, and equipment.

2. The ISAF was essentially an ad hoc coalition, rather than a structured, more permanent, formally-organised alliance grouping. It was consequently comprised of forces drawn from volunteer nations to the international effort, which were organised along temporary command lines for a specific, finite purpose.

3. This so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ was, nevertheless, administered, commanded and controlled for over a decade (2003-2014) by the NATO organisation – a powerful, permanent military alliance created following the Second World War as a means of providing collective security for all of its members, in accordance with the founding principle of ‘all for one and one for all’. This operational arrangement created two tiers of force contributing nations within the ISAF mission – those in the voluntary coalition which were also members of NATO, and those within the coalition which were not members of NATO – a distinction which created additional divisions and frictions within the international force.

4. This complex multinational ISAF force was primarily conducting a land campaign, with small contingents of air forces providing transport, close-air support and medical evacuation functions. As explained in blog ‘#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command and Control (C²)’, ground warfare is the most difficult of operational environments and a drain on both men and treasure. This difficulty was amplified, moreover, by the fact that this land campaign involved very large numbers of international army infantry. To illustrate, the ISAF force augmented from 35,460 personnel in January 2007 to 130,386 personnel in January 2012, the largest proportion of these figures comprising infantry ground forces of diverse nationalities.[4]

5. This vast ISAF force was operating within the construct of the most complex, multi-parallel Lead Nation Command and Control (C²) command arrangement in existence for MNOs.

6. Furthermore, there was never one single set of agreed-upon, ‘standardised’ Rules of Engagement (ROE) to govern the activities of the 51 international contingents which participated in the mission – under separate, mission-contradictory and often counterproductive and conflicting sets of national instructions for the use of lethal force in both mission accomplishment and self-defence ROE categories – between 2001-2012 (refer to blogs ‘#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: “Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions’ and ‘#33 The Problem of “National Caveats” in NATO Operations around the World, 1996-2016’.

7. The ISAF was operating within the context of a population-centric, non-conventional, asymmetric, COIN war campaign. COIN campaigns, conducted to counter an insurgency, are one of the most difficult forms of warfare. COIN warfare is primarily psycho-political in nature rather than purely military, as would be the case in a conventional Enemy-centric campaign. This has meant that, as in all COIN campaigns, the ISAF mission was required to be conducted over very long and protracted periods of time (COIN warfare is discussed in greater depth in a series of COIN appendices, entitled ‘COIN APPENDIX 1 – Insurgency: History, Definitions, Characteristics, Psychological Nature, Warfare & Life Cycle’, ‘COIN APPENDIX 2 – Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Warfare: Definitions, Political Nature, 5 False Expectations, Necessity & Lessons from Vietnam & Iraq for Afghanistan’ and ‘COIN APPENDIX 3 – 9 COIN Characteristics: Conventional vs. COIN War’).

8. The ISAF’s COIN campaign consequently involved the parallel and simultaneous tasks of militarily eliminating hostile insurgent elements, on the one hand, while simultaneously performing the reconstruction, development and governance work of nation-building, on the other. These are both tasks that require a great deal of extra effort expenditure from military armed forces, including heavy dependence on the use of non-traditional military skills, such as local relationship-building and the amassing of local consent and support.

9. This local relationship-building was in addition to the effort that had to be invested in building and maintaining good working relationships between the numerous and diverse international contingents within the ISAF multinational force, a difficult undertaking in itself within any MNO.

10. This COIN work performed by the ISAF was conducted in full view of an undefeated, resilient, resurgent, active and violent, anti-Government insurgency.

11. This insurgent Enemy force was comprised of multiple, fractured, insurgent and terrorist groupings around Afghanistan, including chiefly the Taliban insurgent and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups among several others. As is typical in most cases, many of these fragmented groups lacked any formal structure, hierarchy or organisation, and operated more like independent, sporadically-cooperating cells in a fluid geographical environment. This fragmentation made the work of countering-the-insurgency even more difficult for ISAF forces in Afghanistan, than might otherwise be expected in standard COIN campaigns in other conflict theatres.

12. Adding to the difficulty of a fragmented insurgency, the mission’s insurgent and terrorist adversaries did not abide by international Laws of War – neither the Law of Armed Conflict nor Customary International Law – and consequently not only employed asymmetric methods of warfare, but also unlawful methods of war. Indeed, these insurgents and terrorists comprised an elusive, non-uniformed Enemy, whose Islamist combatant fighters frequently hid themselves within the non-combatant civilian population, and forcibly exploited population centres as key sites from which to mount attacks against ISAF and Afghan forces. In doing so they thereby rendered the local population unwilling ‘human shields’ to their terrorist forces and tactics, and exposed whole towns and cities to devastating death and destruction as a result of both their own actions and the legitimate responses of defending ISAF and native ANSF forces in support of the Afghan Government.

13. In addition to the above, furthermore, alongside the Al-Qaeda terrorists operating in Afghanistan, the anti-Government Taliban and other insurgent forces in Afghanistan also employed the heavy use of psychological warfare, namely terrorism (refer to the definition provided in the Glossary), by indiscriminately targeting innocents in continuous terror attacks. This endless series of violent ‘terror tactics’ were specifically designed and executed to create massive destruction and death – and thereby the maximum fear, panic, and extreme terror within the civilian population – in order to frighten and intimidate civilians sufficiently to force their submission and compliance to anti-Government forces, that they would not naturally or rationally wish to rule over them in normal circumstances. In correspondence with such a tyrannical, mean-spirited and bloody-minded strategy of intimidation and domination by all means, no-matter how cruel, oppressive or unjust, the anti-Government fighters employed large numbers of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) bombs and terrorist suicide-bomber attacks, that deliberately targeted Afghan civilians and civilian objects, in addition to ISAF and ANSF security and stability forces. By such brutal, unlawful, inhumane and wicked methods, the Taliban and its Islamic extremist and terrorist affiliates, who were overthrown, removed from power and expelled from the country in 2001 by means of the post-9/11 multinational OEF mission, hoped to seize back control – in incremental steps – of the Afghan population, its legitimate and representative, democratically-elected Government, and the whole nation of Afghanistan.

14. This same terror-using insurgent Enemy had also – with continuous assistance and support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and the terrorist Al-Qaeda network – evolved over time to become technologically-savvy and adept at exploiting global mass media communications (giving rise to the term ‘Neo-Taliban’). Internet sources had been used by these insurgents as much for acquiring strategic and targeting intelligence on ISAF and Afghan government counter-insurgency forces and their respective national governments, as for propaganda and recruitment purposes. Internet access and use had also meant that Afghanistan’s anti-Government insurgents were able to globalise their extremist movement in Afghanistan, by communicating, inter-connecting and sharing ideas and plans with political and financial supporters around the world, as well as with other insurgent and global terrorist groups.

15. Finally, as mentioned above, these splintered insurgent and terrorist groups were supported by a powerful and lethal combination of internal and external sources. Internally within Afghanistan, the insurgents were supported by locals hostile to the new Afghan government (especially Pashtuns living in the southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan, i.e. ‘Pashtunistan’), in addition to a constant financial flow of money stemming from profits made in the poppy-flower opium trade within the country. Externally, moreover, the insurgent and terrorist groups were supported by terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, in addition to government support, financing, weapons, training, and sanctuary provided by Afghanistan- and ISAF-hostile countries in the Central Asian region, and even further abroad, most notably Afghanistan’s immediate and notorious neighbours – Pakistan to the east and Iran to the west.

From this overview it is evident that the ISAF operation that took place in Afghanistan from 2001-2014 was one of the most complex multinational security missions that has ever been conducted anywhere in the modern world to date.

Furthermore, it was simultaneously facing one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century – that of bringing security and stability to a country menaced by fierce and well-supported insurgent and terrorist foes, the outcome of which would have important consequences in multiple political and military spheres, and for the international community as a whole.

Ushering In a New Era in Afghanistan: The Genesis of the ISAF

The difficult multinational security enterprise, outlined above, began in 2001 following the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington D.C. and the resultant OEF campaign in Afghanistan which, by ousting the Taliban, had created a power-vacuum within this war-torn, under-developed, impoverished and terrorised country.

The ISAF entity was created on 5 December 2001 at the international conference held in Bonn, Germany. The Bonn Conference was convened to initiate the process of rebuilding Afghanistan into a stable, democratic, pluralist, Islamic state, at peace with both the international community and its own regional neighbours, and of implementing reconstruction and development within the country.

At Bonn, a temporary governmental Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was established to conduct the affairs of State and act as the repository of Afghan sovereignty on 22 December 2001.[5] It was to be replaced within eighteen months by an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) elected at an Emergency Loya Jirga convened by exiled Afghan King Mohammed Zaher.[6] Both the Interim and Transitional Authorities were initially led by Hamid Karzai, a former Afghan warlord and former Pashtun ally of the anti-Taliban ‘Northern Alliance’ earlier led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, which in previous months had helped to capture Kandahar during the OEF campaign of October-December 2001.

The ISAF was initially created to be a multinational peace and stabilisation force in Kabul, and was sanctioned under a United Nations (UN) Security Council peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC Resolution 1386).[7] From the outset it was a coalition of the willing, acting with a UN mandate, rather than a UN deployment per se. It was consequently also dependent on the contributions of personnel, equipment and other resources by UN Member-States, as well as other necessary assistance as requested, such as overflight and transit clearances.[8]

Its mandate was to support the AIA by providing a secure and stable environment in Kabul and its immediate environs, thereby allowing political and economic transition as well as reconstruction to proceed in the Capital (an area to which all other Afghan forces had by mutual agreement been withdrawn).[9] During this period other Member-States were called upon to assist in establishing a new Afghan security infrastructure involving, among other things, the training of indigenous Afghan security forces.[10]

A detailed Military Technical Agreement (MTA) was subsequently signed between the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) and the AIA, which formalised the earlier Bonn Agreement and established the ISAF’s role, mission, size and a number of required ROE.[11]

Though permitted to move around at will and to defend themselves, as well as to ‘take all necessary measures to fulfil the mandate’, ISAF forces were initially to be seen as a distinctly separate force from the OEF Coalition Forces under U.S. command, that were continuing to engage in combat with the remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[12]

The ISAF Military Force

The ISAF force itself became a real entity on 20 December 2001 when Britain’s offer to contribute 1,500 armed forces and to assume overall command for the first three months of the mission was accepted by the UN Security Council and enshrined in law under UNSC Resolution 1386.[13] Sixteen other countries also contributed a further 2,500 armed forces at the same time making the first ISAF force deployment 4,000-strong.[14]

Outside of the ISAF mission, nine Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established throughout the country by OEF, all led by various participant nations of the multinational OEF campaign.[15]

Lead Nation Command of the Mission

During these early years of the UN-mandated ISAF mission, when its Area of Operations (AO) was confined to Kabul Province, encompassing only the Afghan capital city of Kabul and its environs, the ISAF coalition was comprised of an ad hoc assortment of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), foremost among them the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

Immediately following the Bonn Conference in December 2001, command of the mission was assumed from the outset by the United Kingdom, referred to as the ‘Lead Nation’ of the mission.[16] As decided at Bonn, Lead Nation command was originally intended to rotate periodically, every six months, between all of the ISAF troop contributors to the mission. [17] Consequently in July 2002 Lead Nation command was taken up by Turkey, the latter commanding the mission over a period of a further seven months until January 2003, and subsequently by Germany for the first half of 2003.[18]

Lack of Leadership within the ISAF Mission

It was during Turkey’s tenure as Lead Nation of the mission in 2002, in only the first full year of the ISAF mission, that problems first began to arise amongst the TCNs of the ISAF mission.

With regard to mission command, firstly, the coalition was suffering from a lack of leadership with most of the ISAF’s TCNs unwilling to assume Lead Nation command responsibility in their turn. This was in spite of the fact that the ISAF’s mandate at that time was limited only to reconstruction and stabilisation activities, and also the reality that the mission’s AO was actually very small, being confined to only one of Afghanistan’s 32 total provinces.[19] This unwillingness to assume command responsibility for the mission was so great amongst the ISAF TCNs, that Germany was compelled to serve a second consecutive term as ISAF Lead Nation, though this time sharing the role jointly with the Netherlands.[20]

Secondly, the ISAF had become burdened with the difficulty of having to establish new mission command headquarters each time ISAF command responsibility changed hands and nationalities between Lead Nations, an endeavour that was time-consuming and problematic given Kabul’s already challenging security environment.[21]

The UN & the Afghan Government Request NATO’s Assistance

It was at this unpromising juncture in the course of the ISAF mission that the UN, supported by temporary Lead Nations Germany and the Netherlands, together with the newly-elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), were compelled in April 2003 to ask the NATO collective security organisation to take command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.[22]

For the UN, on the one hand, NATO represented the ideal military institution for a challenging and yet critically important military mission and, with its broad membership and vast resources, seemed a competent and credible vehicle for successfully implementing the ISAF security and stabilisation mission, which included UN plans for expansion across the whole of Afghanistan. After all, NATO alliance members’ collective military spending at that time equated to 70 percent of all defence expenditure in the world.[23]

Having invoked Article V of the NATO Charter for the first time in its history after the September 11 terrorist attacks, moreover, a collective-defence clause in which an attack against one member is considered an attack against all, the NATO organisation was committed to fighting international terrorism and was already active in anti-terrorism aerial patrols in the skies over the United States and anti-terrorism naval patrols on the waters of the Mediterranean Sea.[24]

The prospect of a constant multinational NATO headquarters, furthermore, offered on-going command stability as well as the opportunity for smaller nations to play a larger role in an international NATO headquarters.[25]

For NATO, on the other hand, the ISAF mission presented a unique opportunity for the organisation to transform and recast itself from an ‘outdated’ Cold War collective-security institution into a strong, democratic, flexible, and modern security entity, able to address modern security challenges in the post 9/11 era.[26] In fact, taking responsibility for leading the ISAF was considered by NATO to be ‘a vital step in its struggle for relevance’ in the context of twenty-first century military missions.[27]

As for the ISAF mission itself, with NATO boasting a membership of 19 alliance nations at this time, in addition to 22 formal and 15 informal partners worldwide, it was generally thought that NATO command of the mission to secure and stabilise Afghanistan would encourage NATO stakeholders – member and non-member alike – to commit to the mission through contributions of national forces and financial resources.

NATO leadership of the ISAF Afghan campaign would thereby have two positive effects:

(1) it would secure the success of the ground-breaking, NATO-led, Afghan mission;

and simultaneously

(2) it would transform NATO itself into a modern collective security alliance, capable of taking part in the full scale of high- and low-intensity wars of the modern era in conflict theatres around the globe.[28]

NATO Takes Command of the ISAF Mission

On 16 April 2003 the NATO organisation acquiesced to this UN request by a unanimous vote at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the alliance agreeing to assume responsibility for the ISAF mission in August the same year. By consenting to lead the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, NATO had made a landmark decision: the Afghan mission would become the organisation’s first ‘out-of-area’ operation, taking place in a geographical locality far outside NATO’s traditional North Atlantic and European AO.

The ISAF’s leadership dilemma was consequently finally resolved on 11 August 2003 when NATO assumed full leadership command of the ISAF coalition of the willing. NATO immediately abolished six-monthly ISAF leadership rotations between TCNs, established a permanent multinational ISAF Headquarters in Kabul city, and assumed all responsibility for the command, coordination and planning of the ISAF force, including the selection of the COMISAF, thereby resolving once and for all the ISAF’s problem of no true leadership.[29]

The ISAF Headquarters (ISAF HQ) complex in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul.[30]

As expected, when NATO assumed responsibility for the command of the multinational mission in Afghanistan, the ISAF was comprised of forces contributed by the full list of 19 NATO member-nations at that time, specifically:

Belgium;
Canada;
the Czech Republic;
Denmark;
France;
Germany;
Greece;
Hungary;
Iceland;
Italy;
Luxembourg;
the Netherlands;
Norway;
Poland;
Portugal;
Spain;
Turkey;
the United Kingdom; and
the United States. [31]

In addition, seven other nations that were then in the process of gaining NATO membership also contributed forces to the ISAF mission – a process to be completed by March 2004, bringing total NATO membership to 26 nations) – specifically:

Bulgaria;
Estonia;
Latvia;
Lithuania;
Romania;
Slovakia; and
Slovenia.[32]

In subsequent years these 26 ISAF TCNs would be referred to as the ‘Allies’ or ‘NATO nations’ of the ISAF coalition.

NATO’s Expansion 1949-2009: A map showing the expansion of NATO’s Member-States, which has occurred in seven phases over a period of sixty years since its founding in 1949.[33]

International forces were also contributed to the NATO-led ISAF by a range of other non-NATO nations, namely:

Azerbaijan;
Finland;
Ireland;
New Zealand;
Sweden;
Switzerland;
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia)
Albania; and
Croatia.[34]

In subsequent years these 9 non-NATO nations would be referred to as ‘Partners’ of the ISAF Coalition.

Outside of the ISAF mission itself, many of these Partner nations also enjoyed formal or informal political or military ties with the NATO organisation. Albania and Croatia, meanwhile, had an additional reason to contribute military forces to the Afghan mission apart from their basic belief in, and support for, the important ISAF mission taking place in Afghanistan in the interest of global security – both were eager to follow in the footsteps of their Eastern European neighbours and were actively seeking to obtain NATO membership in the near future..[35]

With NATO in command of the organisation, several principal NATO members agreed to become ISAF Lead Nations with lead nation command responsibility over one or more of the five mission sectors as the ISAF expanded, namely:

Regional Command Capital (RC-Capital);
Regional Command North (RC-North);
Regional Command West (RC-West);
Regional Command South (RC-South); and
Regional Command East (RC-East).

The designation of NATO-member Lead Nations in each of the ISAF Regional Command sectors had significance for NATO leadership of the coalition overall. It meant that, following the four planned expansionary stages, NATO would be able to provide leadership not only over the mission as a whole, at a strategic and operational level from Joint Force Command Brunssum (the Netherlands) and ISAF Headquarters in Kabul (Afghanistan) respectively, but also at the operational and tactical level with its own NATO Lead Nations holding lead command within each Regional Command sector in the country.

In designating NATO Lead Nations for each of these Afghan sectors, NATO not only provided leadership at every major command level, moreover, but also simultaneously resolved successfully the Lead Nation ‘unwillingness’ issue which had so often troubled the ISAF mission in its early years.

The NATO nations who were given this leadership command role over the five Regional Commands included the following countries (see image below):

France, Turkey and Italy in RC-Capital, each to hold Lead Nation status on the basis of periodic rotations;
Germany in RC-North;
Italy in RC-West (also simultaneously a rotating Lead Nation in RC-Capital);
Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in RC-South, each nation also to assume leadership periodically on the basis of rotation;
and the United States in RC-East.

The ISAF Operation: ISAF map showing the five ISAF Regional Commands (2004-2010) and the Lead Nations in command of these sectors, as well as subordinate Supporting Nations contributing forces to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[36]

NATO: Command, Ownership, the Largest Stake & the Greatest Responsibility for the ISAF Mission & its Success in Afghanistan

From this historical account it is evident that from the moment NATO assumed command responsibility for the ISAF, the Afghan operation became a NATO-oriented mission with NATO member-nations – and many countries with interests or strong ties with the NATO organisation – representing the vast majority of force contributing nations. In fact, among all of the TCNs that contributed forces to the mission over the decade between 2003-2012, NATO nations continually outnumbered non-NATO Partner nations.

In August 2003, for instance, when the NATO organisation officially took lead command responsibility for the mission in Afghanistan, the ISAF was comprised of 35 TCNs, 19 of which were NATO nations and the remaining 16 non-NATO Partner nations. In percentages this meant that NATO nations comprised over half – 54 percent – of the ISAF coalition’s TCNs, with Partner nations comprising the remaining 46 percent. NATO nations thus comprised the largest share of TCNs from the outset of the NATO-led mission (depicted in Graph 6.4 below).

Graph 6.4 – The ISAF’s NATO & Partner Nation TCNs (2003): Pie graph showing the composition of the ISAF Coalition of the Willing in Afghanistan, as of August 2003, in terms of the percentage of TCNs that were NATO nations, as well as the corresponding percentage of TCNs that were non-NATO Partner nations.

This NATO ‘ownership’ of the ISAF mission only increased over time as other former Partner nations to the ISAF gained membership at the NATO organisation to officially become NATO nations within the coalition. This preponderance of NATO nations has occurred in spite of the fact that various other non-NATO nations also became force contributing nations to the mission over the same period.

To illustrate, on 29 March 2004, a group of seven nations – already Partner TCNs to the mission – officially gained membership within the NATO alliance, thereby changing their designation within the ISAF from Partner nation to NATO nation. This group was comprised of the following nations – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, bringing total NATO membership from 19 to 26 nations.[37] This meant that NATO nations within the ISAF coalition also increased from 19 to 26, so that NATO then supplied nearly three-quarters – or 74 percent – of all the TCNs participating in the Afghan mission. By contrast non-NATO nations decreased from 16 to a figure of only 9, Partner nations thereby comprising around a quarter – 26 percent – of all the TCNs contributing forces to the ISAF (see Graph 6.5 below).

Graph 6.5 – The ISAF’s NATO & Partner Nation TCNs (2004): Pie graph showing the composition of the ISAF Coalition in Afghanistan, as of March 2004.

These percentages would continue to fluctuate slightly over the next decade, as other non-NATO countries contributed forces to the ISAF or indeed as further Partner nations obtained membership within the NATO alliance (refer to NATO’s expansion map provided previously). Nevertheless, NATO nations would continue to represent the largest share of all the nations contributing forces to the ISAF.

By July 2006, as the ISAF expanded southwards, for instance, Austria and Australia had joined the ISAF raising the total number of ISAF TCNs to 37.[38] However, the addition of these two countries to the coalition did not significantly alter NATO ownership of the mission, with NATO nations continuing to represent 70 percent (just over two-thirds) of ISAF TCNs, and Partner nations comprising the remaining 30 percent (just under one-third). In fact, with NATO nations numbering 26, and Partner nations only 11, in mid-2006 NATO nations amounted to more than double the number of non-NATO nations.

Two years later, in July 2008, these numbers had altered again, owing firstly to the complete withdrawal of Switzerland and its national contingent from the ISAF coalition by March 2008, and secondly to the addition of national forces from five other Partner nations to the ISAF – namely, Jordan, Singapore, the Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and lastly Georgia (previously a member of the ISAF as of 7 September 2004, but not a TCN contributing military forces to the mission until February 2008).[39]

Yet still, standing at 26 NATO nations compared with 15 Partners out of a total of 41 TCNs, NATO nations continued to comprise the largest share of TCNs to the mission. Indeed, NATO nations then comprised 63 percent of all coalition TCNs, while Partner nations comprised 37 percent (depicted in Graph 6.7 below).

Graph 6.7 – The ISAF’s NATO & Partner Nation TCNs (2008): Pie graph showing the composition of the ISAF Coalition in Afghanistan, as of July 2008.

One year on, in July 2009, these numbers had changed again, first due to the accession of Albania and Croatia into NATO as new members of the collective security organisation on 1 April 2009, and second, due to the addition of Bosnia Herzegovina as a TCN to the ISAF.[40] Consequently, out of a total of 42 TCNs contributing forces to the mission at this point of time, NATO nations had risen from 26 to 28, while Partner nations stood at only 14 – the latter comprising exactly one half of the total number of NATO TCNs.

However, comprising 67 percent of all TCNs, NATO nations continued to form the majority among ISAF force contributing nations, with Partner nations, comprising 33 percent of coalition TCNs, continuing to form the minority (see Graph 6.8 below).

Graph 6.8 – the ISAF’s NATO & Partner Nation TCNs (2009): Pie graph showing the composition of the ISAF Coalition in Afghanistan, as of July 2009.

In July 2010, the Partner nation share of the coalition TCN increased slightly, and conversely NATO’s share moderately decreased, with the addition of four new non-NATO TCNs to the coalition: Armenia, Mongolia, Montenegro and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).[41] This meant that of the 46 TCNs contributing forces at this time, 28 TCNs were members of NATO, while the remaining 18 were non-NATO nations. Yet, as in previous years, NATO nations continued to hold sway over Partner TCNs, comprising 61 percent of all TCNs (see Graph 6.9 below).

Graph 6.9 – The ISAF’s NATO & Partner Nation TCNs (2010): Pie graph showing the composition of the ISAF Coalition in Afghanistan, as of July 2010.

Finally in July 2012, after the passage of a further two years during which time two NATO nations had publicly terminated their combat roles in the ISAF mission (the Netherlands in February 2010 and Canada in December 2011, after multiple years of resilience and sacrifice in hard, costly and bloody combat against the Taliban and other anti-Government insurgents in RC-South since 2006, by their preciously rare, caveat-free, national contingents within the NATO-led ISAF coalition), and subsequently withdrawn the majority of their combat forces from the Afghan theatre of war, the total number of ISAF TCNs had risen to a total of 50 nations.

At this point of time in the ISAF’s mission’s trajectory, the ISAF coalition represented one-quarter of the total membership of the United Nations organisation, which NATO argued was indicative of the broad international support on the world stage for the ISAF mission to secure and stabilise Afghanistan.[42]

Still, however, the 28 NATO nations within the ISAF continued to comprise the largest share of all ISAF TCNs, comprising a majority share of 56 percent. This was in spite of the addition of forces from three new Partner TCNs to the ISAF – Tonga, El Salvador and Bahrain, as well as from Malaysia (a country which despite having been a member of the ISAF since July 2003, did not contribute military forces to the Afghan mission until February 2011), which increased Partner TCNs from 18 to 22, comprising 44 percent of coalition TCNs (see Graph 6.10 below). [43]

Graph 6.10 – The ISAF’s NATO & Partner Nation TCNs (2012): Pie graph showing the composition of the ISAF Coalition in Afghanistan, as of July 2012.

As may be seen by this short numerical history, it is exceedingly clear that since the very beginning of NATO’s leadership over the mission in August 2003 until at least July 2012, NATO nations had represented the majority of the ISAF TCNs contributing forces to the mission, comprising between 54-74 percent of all ISAF TCNs over this period of time, representing nearly a decade of military operations and warfare in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, during the period under review, NATO’s share of and dominance over the ISAF mission’s TCNs was smallest at the very beginning and at the end of this period, but largest during the vital intermediate years within the mission – most especially the years 2006-2009 – when the Taliban militants staged their largest comeback and radical campaign to terrorise, destabilise and dominate Afghanistan since the defeat of their Islamist, Pashtun fascist and totalitarian Taliban regime in 2001.

Conversely, Partner nations within the ISAF represented the smallest share of ISAF TCNs during these same intermediate years, about one-quarter of all TCNs, but had strong representation – comprising nearly half of all TCNs – at the very beginning (46% in 2003) and end of the period (44% in 2012). Indeed, one year later in June 2013, and six months before the termination of the ISAF mission in December 2014, Partner nations still comprised 21 of the 49 TCNs (43%) operating as part of the NATO-led ISAF coalition.[44]

In sum, with NATO holding lead command position and ‘ownership’ over the entire ISAF coalition of the willing in Afghanistan, and NATO members forming the constant majority of all ISAF TCNs contributing military forces to the mission – especially during the critical intermediate years of the mission between 2004-2010, one may easily conclude that NATO has continuously held the largest stake in, and the greatest responsibility for, the successful execution of the ISAF mission to secure and stabilise Afghanistan from all forms of anti-Government Islamic extremism and terrorism.

The following blog will outline NATO’s strategic Operational Plan (OPLAN) for achieving the ISAF mission, and attaining its core aim and desired end-state in Afghanistan, during this important period of time of over a decade between 2003-2014, followed by an overview of the mission’s actual progression in practice through these planned phases. [See blog ‘#30 NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan, 2003-2014’]

* For information on the impact of national caveats within the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here:

http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984

Endnotes

[1] Modification of a topographical map of Afghanistan, ‘Geography of Afghanistan’, Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopaedia [online map] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Afghanistan#mediaviewer/File:Afghan_topo_en.jpg, (accessed 11 November 2008).

[2] International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 29 January 2007, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 February 2013).

[3] ‘ISAF Afghanistan’, Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum (JFC HQ Brunssum), April 2007, http://www.nato.int/isaf. (accessed 20 October 2011).

[4] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, 6 January 2012, op. cit.

[5] United Nations (UN), ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions [“Bonn Agreement”]’, 22 December 2001, Bonn, http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm, (accessed 12 March 2009).

[6] Ibid.

[7] A. Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s stabilization role?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, 2006, pp. 525-526; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1386 (2001) – Adopted by the Security Council on its 443^rd meeting, on 20 December 2001, 20 December 2001, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf, (accessed 12 March 2009).

[8] UNSC, Resolution 1386 (2001), ibid.

[9] Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s stabilization role?’, op. cit., pp. 525-526; UN, ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, op. cit.; UNSC, Resolution 1386 (2001), op. cit.; UN, ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, op. cit; UNSC, Resolution 1386 (2001), op. cit.

[10] UN, ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’, op. cit.; UNSC, Resolution 1386 (2001), op. cit.

[11] Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s stabilization role?’, op. cit., p. 527.

[12] UNSC, Resolution 1386 (2001), op. cit.; Saikal, ibid.

[13] Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s stabilization role?’, ibid., p. 527; UNSC, Resolution 1386 (2001), op. cit.

[14] Saikal, ibid., p. 527.

[15] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, NATO in Afghanistan: NATO Bucharest Summit Guide (2-4 April 2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0804-bucharest/presskit.pdf, (accessed 6 February 2013).

[16] International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), About ISAF – History, 2011, http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html, (accessed 27 October 2011).

[17] S. Sloan, ‘NATO in Afghanistan’, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Redalyc, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espana, enero-sin mes, Vol. Jan-March, no.22, 2010, pp. 35.

[18] ISAF, About ISAF – History, op. cit.

[19] NATO, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Progress in Afghanistan, Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008, p.10, http://www.isaf.nato.int/pdf/progress_afghanistan_2008.pdf (accessed 12 April 2011).; ISAF, About ISAF – History, op. cit.; P. H. Gordon, Back Up NATO’s Afghanistan Force, Brookings Institute, January 8, 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/0108afghanistan_gordon.aspx?p=1,(accessed 25 November 2010)

[20] ISAF, About ISAF – History, op. cit.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.; NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[23] ‘NATO’, NATO Review Magazine, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/Topics/EN/NATO.htm, (accessed 24 January 2013).

[24] D. de Mora-Figueroa, ‘Combating Terrorism – NATO’s response to terrorism’. NATO Review Magazine, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/Combating-Terrorism/NATO-Response-Terrorism/EN/index.htm. (accessed 24 January 2013)

[25] ISAF, About ISAF – History, op. cit.

[26] U.S. Embassy Helsinki (released by Wikileaks), Cable 04HELSINKI1571, NATO Ambassador Burns’ visit to Helsinki, 16 December 2004, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04HELSINKI1571.html, (11 July 2011).

[27] M. Gordon, ‘Dispatches – Flirting with Failure: NATO’s Afghan Mission’, World Security Network, 21 May 2004, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Broader-Middle-East/Gordon-Michael/Dispatches-Flirting-with-failure-NATOs-Afghan-mission, (accessed 25 March 2013)

[28] ‘NATO’, NATO Review Magazine, op. cit.

[29] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[30] Modified photographs taken from ‘Afghanistan- Kabul’, GlobalSecurity.Org, 2011 [online photographs] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/kabul-images.htm, (accessed 29 June 2011).

[31] ISAF, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 2013, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php, (accessed 24 January 2013).

[32] Ibid.

[33] Modified image of a map entitled ‘Enlargement of NATO’ [online map] Wikipedia – the Free Encyclopaedia, 20 April 2013, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enlargement_of_NATO, (accessed 10 May 2013).

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid

[36] Modification of a map provided in ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 1 December 2008, op. cit.

[37] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO Update – Seven new members join NATO’, NATO Newsroom, 29 March 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/03-march/e0329a.htm., (accessed 10 May 2013).

[38] ISAF, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, op. cit.

[39] United Nations (UN), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Afghanistan: Swiss aid to continue despite military withdrawal’, IRIN Asia: Humanitarian News and Analysis (a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), 28 November 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=75554, (accessed 9 April 2013); ‘Swiss Army Withdraws From Afghanistan’, Current Concerns, No 16, 2007, http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=489, (accessed 9 April 2013); ISAF, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, op. cit.; ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 6 February 2008, op. cit.

[40] NATO, NATO Enlargement, 20 December 2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, (accessed 10 May 2013); ISAF, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, op. cit.

[41] ISAF, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, ibid.

[42] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO’, NATO Topic: NATO and Afghanistan, 12 March 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/69772.htm, (accessed 5 May 2013).

[43] ISAF, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, op. cit.; ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 3 February 2011, op. cit.; NATO, ‘NATO’, NATO Topic: NATO and Afghanistan, op. cit.

[44] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 24 June 2013, op. cit., (accessed 5 February 2015).