#30 BACKGROUND

 

NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN)

for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan,

2003-2014

 

– Dr Regeena Kingsley

 

* This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”

 

In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation that was authorised and prosecuted by the international community to bring security and stability to Afghanistan.

The ISAF operation took place in the wake of the Al-Qaeda “9/11” terrorist attacks against multiple targets in the American homeland in 2001, and the subsequent United States-led multinational Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) campaign that removed from power the totalitarian, Islamist, Pashtun fascist, terrorist-supporting and tyrannical Taliban rulers of Afghanistan.

The Pakistan-backed Taliban regime of Afghanistan had not only brutalised and terrorised the native Afghan population for 5 despotic years from 1996-2001 (operating in Afghanistan much as a ‘puppet State’ under neighbouring Pakistan’s direction and control), but had also become an ally and host nation to Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, its chief strategist Ayman Al-Zawahri, and the critical central cell of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network that was directing, coordinating and funding terrorist attacks against innocent civilians in nations all around the world (see ‘#28 BACKGROUND – Afghanistan: The Land, its Diverse Ethnic Peoples & the Pashtun Taliban’).

Afghanistan – A topographical view of Afghanistan showing Kabul City to the east of the Hindu Kush mountains and the Khyber Pass along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[1]

Created in December 2001 as a ‘Coalition of the Willing’ with a United Nations (UN) ‘Chapter VII Peace Enforcement’ mandate, the ISAF was originally comprised of 17 voluntary nations that had collectively contributed 4,000 military forces to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.  The purpose of the mission was to support the new interim Afghan government by creating and ensuring a secure and stable environment in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul, and its immediate environs, thereby creating enough safety for:

(1) democratic national elections to take place, that would place in power an authentically-native, representative, and moderate Afghan government that would work to meet the most urgent needs and serve the most vital interests of the population and the nation; and

(2) political and economic transition to proceed, in addition to reconstruction of basic infrastructure, in order to support the lives and most critical needs of the Afghan people, both in the Capital of Kabul itself and the whole of its surrounding environs in Kabul Province.  

Owing to a lack of willingness among ISAF coalition nations to temporarily execute leadership command of the Afghan mission on the basis of 6-month rotations, however, and following specific requests made by the newly-elected Afghan government and the UN, in August 2003 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) collective security alliance took leadership command over the ISAF coalition and the 35 Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) operating in Afghanistan.

Upon assuming leadership command of the mission, NATO immediately established a multinational command headquarters in Kabul, and over the next three years, during geographic expansion of the ISAF mission from December 2003 – December 2006, placed eight principal NATO Member-States with large defence budgets and powerful military forces as Lead Nations with lead command responsibility for securing and stabilising each of the ISAF’s five Regional Command sectors.

The NATO nations who were given this leadership command role over the five Regional Commands included the following countries (see map below):

• France, Turkey and Italy in Regional Command-Capital (RC-Capital), each to hold Lead Nation status on the basis of periodic rotations;
• Germany in Regional Command-North (RC-North);
• Italy in Regional Command-West (RC-West), also simultaneously a rotating Lead Nation in RC-Capital;
• Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in Regional Command-South (RC-South), each nation also to assume leadership periodically on the basis of rotation; and
• the United States in Regional Command-East (RC-East).

The ISAF Operation: ISAF map showing the five ISAF Regional Commands (2004-2010) and the Lead Nations in command of these sectors, as well as subordinate Supporting Nations contributing forces to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[2]

In the following years the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan became one of the most complex and challenging military undertakings by the international community to date.  Nevertheless, although the mission slowly evolved over time, from an initial security assistance and reconstruction operation limited to Kabul Province to a fully-fledged Counter-Insurgency (COIN) war nationwide across the entire sovereign territory of Afghanistan, the principal goal or mission objective of the operation remained the same – to bring security and stability to Afghanistan in support of the successive, democratically-elected governments of Afghanistan, and in partnership with indigenous Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 

As the ISAF’s own mission statement clearly set forth in successive NATO/ISAF documentation, reports and troop placemats, the mission of the ISAF was principally to:

‘Conduct military operations in the assigned AO to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and enabling the GoA to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country.’[3]

Bringing security and stability to Afghanistan, and by extension the region of Central Asia, was in the collective security interests of the wider international community in an age of Al-Qaeda-generated global terrorism, in order to prevent Afghanistan and its border regions from being used to launch terror attacks against freedom-loving, democratic nations in locations all around the world.  The ISAF mission was consequently the tangible, physical expression of collective international will and the world’s best answer to the modern scourge of Islamist international terrorism. 

It is with this knowledge of the overall historical and political context of the ISAF mission, and its vital importance to global security, that my research on national caveats within the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is to be understood. 

The last blog (#29) outlined the extremely important and weighty role of NATO in the ISAF mission. It described NATO’s assumption of leadership over the mission in 2003, and the way in which NATO Member-States formed a continuous majority group among the Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) of the ISAF, ad hoc,  ‘Coalition of the Willing’, from August 2003 until the termination of the mission in December 2014, including during the vital intermediate years within the mission – most especially the years 2006-2009 – when the Taliban militants staged their largest comeback and radical campaign to terrorise, destabilise and dominate Afghanistan since the defeat of their Islamist, Pashtun fascist, totalitarian Taliban regime in 2001. 

From this overview it was clearly evident: first of all, that as the entity with command leadership and majority ownership of the ISAF mission, NATO  had the largest stake in, and the greatest responsibility for, both the effective prosecution of the mission and attaining mission success in Afghanistan; and secondly, that the outcome of the ISAF operation would have a significant bearing on NATO itself as a collective security organisation, in terms of both its post-Cold War quest for ‘relevance’ and ‘transformation’ in the modern security environment, and its future aspirations – and collective ability to deliver on these aspirations – as a global Peace Support Operation (PSO) operator of modern, multinational, military missions in global security affairs.

This blog will present the strategic Operational Plan (OPLAN) that NATO designed and implemented within Afghanistan, in pursuit of achieving:

(1) the ISAF’s core aim and mission of securing and stabilising Afghanistan in order to extend the authority and influence of the central, democratically elected, and therefore, legitimate, Afghan government throughout the entire sovereign territory of Afghanistan; and

(2) the desired, final end-state of the ISAF mission – a secure and stable Afghanistan in Central Asia, at peace with itself, its neighbours, and the rest of the world.  

After outlining the OPLAN’s various mission phases, this blog will next provide an overview of the ISAF mission’s actual progression through these planned phases of NATO’s OPLAN between the years 2003-2014.

 

From the Capital to the Country: Expanding the ISAF Mission

As foreseen at the Bonn Conference of December 2001, within a short time of commencing operations that same month, pressure quickly mounted for the ISAF operation to be enlarged and expanded from Kabul Province into other major cities and provinces of the war-torn, impoverished and largely ungoverned country. 

Once NATO assumed command leadership of the Afghan operation in August 2003, it was hoped that the new NATO-led ISAF coalition would take on this responsibility of expansion.  By expanding in this way, the ISAF would be able to fully implement the earlier Bonn Agreement, made in the wake of the successful Operation Enduring Freedom campaign, by:

(1) extending central government authority into other parts of Afghanistan through the enforcement of government laws;

(2) undertaking comprehensive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of all armed guerrilla and anti-Government factions;

(3) assisting in security sector reform through the reconstitution of the new Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP);  

(4) providing safe and secure environments for reconstruction and development to proceed; and

(5) denying anti-Government Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other anti-Government enemy forces territorial space in which to act within Afghanistan.[4] 

However, while Afghan President Hamid Karzai, his ministers, and many security analysts strongly supported the ambition of expanding the ISAF throughout the entire geographical territory of Afghanistan, both the European nations and the United States (U.S.) initially demonstrated reluctance on the issue. These early reactions were due to quite separate fears: the European allies feared becoming too involved in the Afghan operation, while the U.S. was wary of being drawn into an expensive nation-building operation and also feared the operation would be exploited by the Europeans to constrain America’s role and its goals in Afghanistan.[5] 

In early 2003, however, international attitudes began to change as a result of a number of significant factors:

(1) firstly, slow progress in the crucial realms of security, reconstruction and national unity within Afghanistan;

(2) secondly, the prospect and challenge of upcoming presidential elections to take place nationwide throughout Afghanistan in 2004, in order to replace the governing Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) led by President Karzai that, in accordance with the 2001 Bonn Agreement, had earlier been appointed at an Afghan Loya Jirga (‘Grand Asssembly’) of Afghan leaders and had temporarily governed the country since June 2002; and

(3) thirdly, a deteriorating security situation with regard to residual Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces outside of Kabul, in the south and east of the country but most especially along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border opposite Pakistan’s Federally-Assisted Tribal Areas (FATA), that were beginning to stage a comeback as insurgent and terrorist anti-Government forces.[6] 

In addition to these three internal motivators within Afghanistan proper, a fourth external factor also played a role:

(4) the U.S., by then heavily engaged in the Iraq War (2003-2011), now needed help from its European allies to deal with Afghanistan, whereas Germany, France and other major NATO countries wished to commit and invest much more to the Afghan mission in order to completely avoid any military involvement in Iraq, while simultaneously wishing to make a gesture that would nevertheless signal their commitment to the broader Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) post-9/11.[7] 

 

NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the ISAF Mission in Afghanistan

As a result of these changing and pressing realities, on 13 October 2003, only three months after NATO officially assumed command over the ISAF mission, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1510 extending ISAF’s mandate to encompass the entire country of Afghanistan under NATO command. As UNSCR 1510 states, the UN Security Council:

‘…Authorizes expansion of the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs, so that the Afghan Authorities as well as the personnel of the United Nations and other international civilian personnel engaged, in particular, in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secure environment, and to provide security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn Agreement.’ [8] 

The Security Council’s decision was motivated by an official request by the Afghan Foreign Minister, Abdullah Abdullah, for greater ISAF assistance outside Kabul, in addition to an even earlier offer by the NATO Secretary General at that time, British Lord George Robertson, to oversee such an expansion.

As a consequence, NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) based in the Belgian city of Mons (one of two strategic command headquarters responsible for all Allied NATO operations), together with Joint Forces Command (JFC) in Brunssum in the Netherlands (NATO’s Operational Headquarters for the Afghan mission), designed an Operational Plan (OPLAN) to implement this expansion – and indeed to oversee the various planned stages of the entire ISAF mission within the Afghan Area of Operations (AO) (see endnote for more details on this NATO command structure in relation to the ISAF operation).[9] 

According to this OPLAN, the mission would be prosecuted in five distinct transitional phases.[10] 

Phase I – Assessment and Preparation involved providing support to the Afghan interim administration, establishing and maintaining security in Kabul Province, and preparing for ISAF expansion beyond its initial AOR of Kabul Province including through the design of a command structure and reconstruction model for subsequent operations.

Phase II – Geographic Expansion concerned the expansion of the ISAF AO in four stages – corresponding to geographic thrusts to the north, west, south and east respectively – to encompass all of Afghanistan’s sovereign territory (see map below). 

NATO’s OPLAN for the Geographic Expansion of the ISAF mission throughout Afghanistan.[11]

ISAF expansion would involve assuming command of the Regional Commands in each of these geographical regions, areas formerly commanded by the U.S.-led OEF mission, to be henceforward led by one or a trio of NATO’s Lead Nations. The latter, who had volunteered for the leadership role, were not only to take responsibility for establishing and maintaining security within their own designated Regional Command sector, but were also responsible for overseeing the civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) undertaking reconstruction and development work within each of the Regional Commands. 

All of these steps within the expansion process would be overseen by the then NATO Supreme Allied Commander– Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones.[12]

Phase III – Stabilisation related to the stabilisation of the whole Afghan Area of Operations (AO), through not only the continued establishment and maintenance of a secure environment throughout the five Regional Commands, under the command of the eight NATO Lead Nations, but also through building the capacity – that is, the quantity and quality – of Afghanistan’s own native security forces under the direct control of the Afghan central government.

 These forces, collectively referred to as Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), included:

• the Afghan National Army (ANA);
• the Afghan National Police (ANP);
• Afghan Special Operations Forces (SOFs); and
• Afghan Border Police (ABP) to patrol the Afghan borders.

ISAF forces were to build ANSF capacity by means of various ISAF Operational Training and Mentor Teams (OMLTs) in each of the Regional Commands.[13]

Phase IV – Transition involved the transition of lead security responsibility from ISAF security forces to the newly-trained body of the Afghan armed forces – the ANSF.  Following transition, these Afghan security forces would take leadership command over all ISAF activities across the security, reconstruction and governance spheres.  This meant that the ANSF would take responsibility for the decision-making, planning and execution of all operations, while ISAF forces took on a more subordinate, supportive and advisory role in the country.[14] 

Lastly, Phase V – Redeployment, the final phase of the NATO OPLAN, concerned the withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan.  As the ANSF took full and independent control over all security matters within Afghan sovereign territory, ISAF forces would begin to redeploy out of the Afghan theatre of operations.  This redeployment of international military forces would mark the end of the international community’s ISAF security assistance mission to Afghanistan. 

From this point onwards Afghanistan’s own civilian government would assume sole responsibility for its own domestic, security and foreign affairs, with additional support provided by the international community only as requested by the Afghan government.

 

The Aim of the OPLAN: Mission Success

The ultimate goal of these five NATO OPLAN phases, as discussed above, was of course mission success.  Nevertheless, for many years after NATO’s assumption of command over the coalition in 2003, the ISAF neglected to define from the outset just what this ‘success’ would entail. 

Indeed, the matter of clear mission success criteria, and metrics by which to measure progress towards that end, was to become a political and military conundrum between 2003-2006, especially given the way in which the original security assistance and nation-building mission had increasingly morphed into a fully-fledged COIN campaign as the years passed and the Pakistan-supported, – funded, -trained and -armed Taliban and Neo-Taliban insurgency amplified its violence, intimidation and control throughout the country (see blog ‘#28 BACKGROUND – Afghanistan: The Land, its Diverse Ethnic Peoples & the Pashtun Taliban’).

As a consequence, it was only five years after NATO took command of the ISAF, at the NATO summit of April 2008 in Bucharest (Romania), that the Heads of State and Heads of Government of all the nations contributing to the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan agreed upon a collective definition of ‘mission success’ and announced it to the world.  As the official NATO post-summit communiqué of 2008 set forth:

‘Our vision of success is clear: extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability; Afghan National Security Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient; and the Afghan Government will be able to extend the reach of good governance, reconstruction, and development throughout the country to the benefit of all its citizens.’[15]

 

Following the OPLAN

Beginning in August 2003, when NATO officially took command leadership of the ISAF mission, NATO began to prosecute each phase of the OPLAN towards this overall aim and the central mission objectives.

Phase I – Assessment and Preparation (2003)

The first phase of the OPLAN, Phase I – Assessment and Preparation, which included preparations for the subsequent expansionary phase, commenced immediately and was completed in Kabul Province in November 2003, within only four months of NATO’s assumption of command in August that year. All the prior activities conducted by ISAF forces between December 2001-August 2003 were also subsumed under this heading, being, as they were, activities geared towards providing support for the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) by providing security within Kabul Province. 

Phase II – Geographic Expansion (2003-2006)

The end of Phase I signalled the beginning of NATO’s Phase II – Geographic Expansion in which, at the behest of the Afghan government, the ISAF security mission expanded its AO in four stages to assume command responsibility for security and stability within the entirety of sovereign Afghan territory. 

The first stage of this expansion northwards into RC-North, under the command of Lead Nation Germany, occurred over the period of one year between October 2003 and October 2004. [16]  On 31 December 2003 French and German forces expanded northwards, placing the German-run PRT in Kunduz to the north of Kabul under ISAF command and establishing four additional ISAF PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif, Maimana, Feyzabad and Baghlan.[17] By 1 October 2004 ISAF had assumed responsibility for security in nine northern Afghan provinces. 

The second stage of expansion to the west followed shortly afterwards under the command of Lead Nation Italy, and also took place over a one-year period with the expansion completed by September 2005.[18]  Italian and Spanish forces expanded westwards into RC-West, taking over command from OEF of two other PRTs in western Afghanistan in Herat and Farah, in addition to a logistical Forward Support Base (FSB) in Herat.[19]  Two new PRTs were founded in Chaghcharan and Qala-e-Naw, the capitals of Ghor and Badghis Province respectively, making ISAF responsible for providing security assistance to one-half of the entire country (see image below).[20] 

Phase II – Geographic Expansion: The four expansionary stages of NATO’s OPLAN Phase II.[21]

The pace of ISAF’s expansion accelerated markedly during the following third and fourth stages, of the expansion, with the final two stages completed within a single year. 

ISAF expansion to the south, and the establishment of RC-South under Lead Nations Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (on the basis of rotation), began in January and was completed by 31 July 2006.[22]  During Stage Three, forces drawn from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and the Netherlands relieved U.S. OEF forces of command over six southern provinces – Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul, areas in which four PRTs had already been established.[23] 

At the same time the original ISAF deployment in Kabul, formerly named Kabul Multi-National Brigade, was renamed Regional Command Capital (RC-Capital) bringing the capital area into the new, larger ISAF command structure.[24]  By this time ISAF troop numbers had swelled from 10,000 armed forces prior to the expansion to around 20,000 at the end of stage three.[25]  The operation was now responsible for security in three-quarters of the total area of Afghanistan.  

Following hard on the heels of this southern expansion, the ISAF expanded its AO eastward toward the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, with American ISAF forces (some formerly deployed under OEF) assuming control of all remaining Afghan provinces.  The final sector, RC-East, was to be commanded by Lead Nation the United States.  The eastern expansion was completed in only three months between the 5 October 2006 and December 2006, finalising just as a strong resurgence of Taliban insurgents gripped the country, especially in the heavily Pashtun-populated southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan nearest Pakistan. [26] 

This final expansion thereby marked not only the end of stage four, but the close of Phase II of the NATO OPLAN.

Phase III – Stabilisation (2007-2013)

Phase III – Stabilisation subsequently commenced in January of 2007.[27]  However, unlike the earlier phases of NATO’s OPLAN, achieving stabilisation across all of ISAF’s Regional Commands proved far more difficult than originally anticipated.  In fact, this phase was not officially completed until June 2013, when the final tranche of Afghan provinces and districts was officially transferred to the lead command of native Afghan security forces. 

This means that the ISAF was engaged to a greater or lesser extent in Phase III over a very prolonged period of time – a period that amounts to six-and-a-half years from January 2007 until June of 2013. 

The ISAF mission’s 5 Regional Commands from 2006-2010 along with their Lead Nations, supporting TCN nations & PRT nations.[28]

Indeed, stabilisation was hampered by many internal problems within the mission. The most significant and consequential of these problems, however, was the reality of disparate and mission-adverse Rules of Engagement (ROE) between the ISAF TCNs (especially national limitation and prohibition caveats) – including four of its eight principal NATO Lead Nations with lead command over three ISAF Regional Commands (Germany, Italy, France and Turkey) – which constrained the operations that many ISAF forces could legitimately perform within their respective Regional Commands, especially the most important and most urgently-needed combat operations, combat-support operations, counter-insurgency operations, counter-narcotics operations and counter-terrorist operations.

Largely as a direct result of these contradictory and counter-productive ROE between the ISAF coalition’s NATO and non-NATO Partner force contributors, and the impact of these ROE on the ISAF’s security forces, there existed within the ISAF mission a profound and worrying lack of real, tangible progress on the ground within Afghanistan’s provinces, in terms of both basic security from insurgent and terrorist attacks, intimidation and influence, and the stability provided by advancements in governance, reconstruction and development which, after all, were completely reliant on the creation and maintenance of ‘safe and secure environments’ in which ISAF stability forces could work.

In short, despite geographic expansion and the presence of between 33,000-98,000 ISAF forces deployed and operating across the entire Afghan AOR between January 2007 and June 2013, the NATO-led ISAF coalition was struggling to fulfil its mission of securing and stabilising the country, extending the authority of the central Afghan government, and safeguarding Afghanistan from Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other extremist forces and influences. 

Consequently, in 2009, three years into Phase III – Stabilisation, most of Afghanistan fell short of the level of security and stability envisioned by NATO in Phase III to achieve the ISAF’s overall mission.

This poor progress in the early years of Phase III led to an important decision within NATO. At the NATO Defence Ministers meeting in Bratislava in October 2009, it was decided that changeover from Phase III – Stabilisation to Phase IV – Transition within Afghanistan could not take place all at once, but instead had to take place incrementally district by district and province by province, only as Afghan areas attained the conditions for transition set by NATO in partnership with the GIRoA. 

What this meant, on the ground, was that in many of the ISAF Regional Commands, Phase III and Phase IV would take place concurrently and in parallel within many Afghan provinces.  It signified too that, unlike the preceding phases of the ISAF mission, there would be no clear-cut divide delineating the cessation of Phase III and the onset of Phase IV across the Afghan theatre. 

Instead, there would be a gradual, piece-meal transition resulting in much overlap and variance across the ISAF AOR as many areas remained in Phase III while others advanced into Phase IV of Transition, in which the ANSF would assume leadership of ISAF security operations.[29]  In many cases the progress of any one district or province between Phase III and Phase IV of NATO’s OPLAN would depend heavily on the abilities of the local ANSF units in the proximity first to execute, then to lead, security operations.[30]  As ANSF capability increased, so would advancement into NATO’s transitional phase, and even then, as one U.S. congressional report concluded, commencement of Phase IV in the locality might not begin from a clear single point in time, but rather in a series of ‘fits and starts’.[31] 

Phase IV – Transition (2011-2013)

Phase IV – Transition (or Inteqal in the Pashto and Dari language) involved the process by which lead responsibility for security was transitioned from ISAF combat forces to ANSF combat forces, a process established by NATO members at the NATO Lisbon Summit of 2010. [32] 

As outlined above, Transition within the ISAF mission took place on the whole in gradual, incremental stages between March 2011 and June 2013.[33] As individual districts and provinces attained specific transition requirements, they would proceed from Phase III into Phase IV, grouped together as a ‘tranche’ of disparate areas (refer to the tranche maps below).

 Transition: The slow changeover between Phase III – Stabilisation and Phase IV – Transition within the Afghan AO.[34]

[Note: Afghan forces did take over lead security responsibility for Kabul City on 28 August 2008.  However, this was a solitary and exceptional case, as shown by the fact that it was not repeated elsewhere within the country with regard to other cities in the years afterwards.  Indeed, the next transition occurred in the form of the first ‘tranche’ of stabilised areas in March 2011.]

Criteria for ‘Transition’

Authorisation to proceed from Stabilisation into Transition was decided by the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) based on the following operational, political and economic factors:

(1) the capability of the ANSF to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;

(2) the level of security in the area and the degree to which the local populace was able to pursue ‘routine daily activities’ as a result;

(3) the development of local governance structures, so that security would not be undermined as ISAF assistance diminished; and

(4) whether the force level and ‘posture’ of ISAF forces could be readjusted as the ANSF expanded its capabilities and as threats to security were reduced. [35]

Once areas met these requirements and was authorised by the JANIB to proceed into Phase IV, transition would begin to occur in a four-stage sequential process in the areas of security, governance, development and rule of law.[36] 

Ultimately, however, the speed by which this process occurred, and the on-the-ground progress that resulted from it, was dependent upon the actual abilities and conduct of the ANSF together with Afghan civil institutions within each area, as they assumed these new leadership responsibilities.[37]  For this reason, full transition between ISAF and ANSF security leadership within each area could take up to 18 months to be complete. [38] 

Five Transition ‘Tranches’ of Afghan Areas

Ultimately transition took place in five separate tranches. 

The first tranche, consisting of three of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces and four solitary districts, began the transition from ISAF to ANSF leadership on 22 March 2011.[39]  These very first areas were:

• 14 districts in Kabul Province within RC-Capital;
• Mazar-e-Sharif District in Balkh Province within RC-North;
• Herat City District in Hirat Province within RC-West;
• Lashkar Gah District in Helmand Province within the new RC-South West sector (created in July 2010 under U.S. Lead Nation command, following NATO’s change in command structure under COMISAF General David H. Petraeus, and consisting of the two western-most provinces formerly encompassed within RC-South, Nimroz and Helmand Provinces);
• and finally in RC-East, all five districts in Bamyan Province, all seven districts in Panjshir Province, and Mehtar Lam District in Laghman Province (near Kabul).[40]

The ISAF mission’s 6 Regional Command sectors following the creation of Regional Command-South West (RC-SW) in July 2010, which, along with RC-East, was led by NATO Lead Nations the United States and the United Kingdom with support provided by Denmark.[41]

The second tranche of areas across the north, west and south of Afghanistan began Transition on 27 November 2011.[42] 

The third tranche followed closely behind it, commencing phase IV on 13 May 2012, at which time every provincial capital had entered transition and ANSF forces held lead security responsibility for over 75 percent of the Afghan population.[43] 

The fourth transitional tranche, involving the transition of 12 full provinces in the northern and central regions of Afghanistan, occurred over six months later on 31 December 2012.[44] 

As a result, by the end of 2012 only 11 provinces still remained in the Stabilisation phase with Afghan forces in a secondary and supportive security role, encompassing among them, however, many of Afghanistan’s most troubled provinces – including Helmand Province.[45] 

Finally, on 18 June 2013, President Karzai announced that the fifth and final transitional tranche of remaining areas, including Helmand Province, would commence the OPLAN’s fourth transitional phase (see map below).  This announcement thereby signalled the complete end of Phase III – Stabilisation within the Afghan AO. 

Final Transition: The final tranche of areas that progressed into the transitional phase in June 2013, an event which marked the end of ‘Phase III – Stabilisation’ of NATO’s OPLAN within the Afghan AO, an OPLAN phase in which the ISAF had remained continuously over a period of six-and-a-half-years since January 2007.[46]

The entrance of this last group of areas into Phase IV marked an important point in the progress of the ISAF mission: ANSF combat forces all became involved in the Transition phase and held lead security responsibility across the entirety of Afghan sovereign territory. 

In this phase not only did ANSF forces take the lead for all the planning, decision-making and execution of combat operations, but the ANSF entities themselves began slowly to be transformed. 

The ANA, for instance, was transformed, by means of additional ISAF training, from ‘infantry-centric forces’ to a ‘fully-fledged army’ comprised of both fighting elements and enabling capabilities (i.e. with its own military police, intelligence, route clearance, combat support, medical, aviation, and logistics capabilities).[47] Simultaneously, the ANP was transitioned from its present role of ‘countering the insurgency’ into a more traditional ‘civilian policing’ role, to conduct the more normal and traditional range of policing activities ranging from criminal investigations to traffic control.[48] The Afghan Air Force too, was developed and expanded in terms of both personnel and aircraft, in command of the full range of gunships, attack and transport helicopters and light aircraft. [49] 

By contrast, the role of ISAF combat forces was comparatively diminished to that of mentoring, advising and supporting ANSF operations within the ISAF Regional Command sectors.[50]  At the same time, ISAF stability forces – that is, its many PRT civil-military teams – shifted their focus from ‘direct delivery’ to providing ‘technical assistance’ only, and conducting intense capacity building of provincial and district governments so that Afghans might themselves meet the needs of their own respective local populations.[51]  This was done with a view to the eventual dissolution of the PRTs, when the responsibility for all the functions provided by PRTs in the past was to be fully handed over to local Afghan government and its services.[52]

While full transition to Afghan leadership within several tranches – especially the last tranche – is still in progress at the time of writing in 2014, it is expected that full Transition in all provinces within Afghanistan will be complete by December 2014, as formerly agreed upon at both the 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit and the 2012 Chicago NATO Conference. [53]  Consequently, by January 2015 the ANSF will be fully responsible for security nationwide in Afghanistan. 

Indeed, the end of Phase IV – Transition by 2014 is the express wish of the Afghan government, which desires to see Afghans taking the lead in all security, governance, development and rule of law spheres throughout the country from 2015 on.[54]  As NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, stated in March 2013:

In less than two years from now, Afghan forces will be fully responsible for Afghanistan’s security. Every province. Every district. Every village. And every valley. This is a great responsibility, but Afghanistan’s forces have shown they can do the job, and they can know they will continue to have our support.[55]

Phase V – Redeployment

Evidently then, the final months of 2014 will also mark the beginning of the NATO OPLAN’s Phase V – Redeployment in which all ISAF combat forces will be withdrawn from the Afghan theatre of war.  During this final stage of the OPLAN, ISAF forces will take part in ‘the long withdrawal’ from Afghanistan, as the country these international security forces have assisted returns to self-sufficiency and takes its place on the world stage.[56]

Several years ago, there was a very real fear among many NATO officials that the commencement of Phase IV would cause a stampede for troop withdrawals and an exit deadline, as ISAF nations eagerly anticipated Phase V and prematurely envisioned the end of the NATO-led ISAF campaign.  However, following NATO appeals in 2010, there seems to now exist a consensus that NATO nations, having deployed into Afghanistan together, must also deploy out of Afghanistan together – an approach encapsulated by the catch-phrase of ‘in together, out together’.[57] 

In fact, aware of certain countries’ eagerness to prematurely begin drafting exit strategies and deadlines for their deployed troops in Afghanistan, Rasmussen issued a warning to ISAF countries in 2011 on this very point, as the first tranche began Phase IV:

‘I understand that as this transition gets underway, political leaders are facing pressure to bring their troops home for good.  No one wants our forces to be in combat a day longer than necessary.  But it is vital that we maintain solidarity and continuity in order to ensure that transition is irreversible…Within the ISAF mission our approach remains “in together, our together”. We are committed not to leave any security vacuum that could breed extremism.’[58] 

As a result of such warnings, most ISAF NATO and Partner nations – with the exception of the combat-exhausted NATO nations of the Netherlands and Canada (which both withdrew their ISAF combat forces from RC-South in 2010 and 2011 respectively), in addition to France (which was resolute in withdrawing all French forces one year earlier than the other remaining NATO nations in 2013) – have committed to keeping their national forces in Afghanistan until the end of 2014.[59]

ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs): ISAF Placemat showing the number of forces deployed to the mission by each of the TCNs as of December 2012.[60]

Nevertheless, a slow withdrawal did begin to occur as early as March 2012, with Hungary, Albania, New Zealand, Norway, and Slovakia redeploying some of their national force units from the Afghan theatre (an ISAF table displaying the force strength of each ISAF TCN in Afghanistan, as of December 2012, may be seen above).[61]  The redeployment of other units has also taken place during 2013, for example the withdrawal by Bulgaria of its force protection company from Kabul International Airport in January.[62]  However, as planned, the bulk of the remaining ISAF force is not expected to be ‘significantly downsized’ until the early months of 2015.[63]

Consequently, the year 2014 will be an important milestone for the ISAF mission, as it will signify that the NATO-led International Security Assistance mission will be drawing to a close and, post-2014, will ultimately cease to exist. 

At this significant juncture of time when the ISAF ‘combat mission’ is terminated, a supportive ‘training and advisory’ assistance mission will succeed the ISAF mission in 2015.[64]  As NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan expressed in December 2012:

‘ISAF will continue to support the Afghan National Security Forces until the end of 2014 and after that NATO and its partners remain committed to Afghanistan’s future stability through a new mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces.’[65] 

On 4 March 2014, Rasmussen announced that the name of the new NATO mission in Afghanistan post-2014 would be called ‘Operation Resolute Support’. [66]

In order to further aid understanding of the contextual setting of this research on the extent and impact of national caveats on the operational effectiveness of the ISAF Operation from 2002-2012, the following blog (#31) will next describe the security realities and concerns of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan between 2003-2006, and the subsequent and necessary evolution of the Afghan mission in early 2007 into a comprehensive COIN campaign, in order to respond to and counter the resurgent and ever-strengthening Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan backed by neighbouring Pakistan. [See blog ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’.]

The subsequent blog (#32) will then go one step further by outlining the practical military realities of the ISAF’s COIN operation, namely the 4 principal ‘pillars’ of activity  or Lines of Operation (LOOs) within the ISAF’s COIN strategy, and the division of labour between the ISAF’s diverse, multinational, security forces conducting the tasks of the security LOO on the ground in Afghanistan. [See blog ‘#32 BACKGROUND – The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces’.]

 

* For more information on the impact of national caveats within the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here:

http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984

 

Endnotes

[1] Modified image of a topographical map of Afghanistan, ‘Geography of Afghanistan’, Wikipedia – The Free Encyclopedia [online map] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Afghanistan#mediaviewer/File:Afghan_topo_en.jpg, (accessed 11 November 2008).

[2] Modified image of a map provided by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 1 December 2008, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 February 2013).

[3] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, ibid.

[4] A. Saikal, ‘Afghanistan’s Transition: ISAF’s stabilization role?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3, 2006, p. 528; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1510 (2003) – Adopted by the Security Council on its 4840^th meeting, on 13 October 2003, 13 October 2003, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1510.pdf, (accessed 12 March 2009).

[5] Saikal, ibid., p. 528.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 529.

[8] UNSC, Resolution 1510 (2003), op. cit.

[9] NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides political direction for the ISAF operation; the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) provides strategic command and control; the Joint Force Command Headquarters  exercises overall operational control (and reports to SHAPE); and the ISAF exercises in-theatre operational command (also reporting to NATO’s SHAPE) (United States Government Library of Congress, V. Morelli & P. Belkin. ‘NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance’, Congressional Research  Service (CRS), 3 December 2009, p. 10, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf, (accessed 20 February 2013).

[10] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, op. cit.

[11] Modified image taken from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)’, 1 September, 2009, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 1 December 2009).

[12] ‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 15 April 2009, http://www.understandingwar.org, (accessed 30 June 2009).

[13] D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, (2-5^th September) 2009, p. 22, www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20%at%20War.pdf, (accessed 18 March 2013).

[14] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), NATO Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) Press and Media Section, ‘Backgrounder – Phase 4: Transition to Afghan ownership and leadership in security’, Media Operations Centre (MOC) NATO HQ Brussels, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 October 2011).

[15] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘ISAF’s Strategic Vision’, NATO Newsroom, 3 April 2008, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-052e.html, (accessed 11 November 2011).

[16] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, op. cit.

[17] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, NATO in Afghanistan: NATO Bucharest Summit Guide (2-4 April 2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0804-bucharest/presskit.pdf, (accessed  6 February 2013); ‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.

[18] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, op. cit.

[19] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 2 January 2007, op. cit.

[22] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, ibid.

[23] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.; ‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, Institute for the Study of War, op. cit.; ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 2 January 2007, ibid.

[24] ‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, Institute for the Study of War, ibid.

[25] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[26] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, op. cit.; NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, ibid.

[27] United States Army Lieutenant General (LTGEN) David W. Barno (Ret’d), former Operational Commander of Operation Enduring Freedom’s Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (2003-2005) and Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington D.C., Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 26 August 2010, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Washington D.C., United States.

[28] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 16 April 2010, op. cit.

[29]  NATO, Backgrounder – Phase 4, op. cit.

[30] United States Library of Congress, Morelli & Belkin, ‘NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance’, op. cit., p. 10.

[31] Ibid.

[32] ‘Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review’. International Herald Tribune, 16 December 2010, www.iht.com, (accessed 17 December 2010); North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead,18 June 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_87183.htm, (accessed 9 July 2013).

[33] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, NATO Newsroom, 18 June 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_87183.htm, (accessed 9 July 2013).

[34] Modified image taken from NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, ibid.

[35] NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, ibid.

[36] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘President Karzai announces first phase of transition’, NATO Newsroom, 22 March, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71685.htm, (accessed 8 November 2011).

[37] NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, op. cit.

[38] Ibid.

[39] NATO, ‘President Karzai announces first phase of transition’, op. cit.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 6 July 2010, op. cit.

[42]  NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, op. cit.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.; ‘Afghanistan enters fourth stage in transition of power’, 31 December 2012, The Express Tribune, http://tribune.com.pk/story/487026/afghanistan-enters-fourth-stage-in-transition-of-power-from-us-forces/, (accessed 7 July 2013)

[45] NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, op. cit.

[46] Modified image taken from NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, ibid.

[47] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO’, NATO Topic: NATO and Afghanistan, 12 March 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/69772.htm, (accessed 5 May 2013).

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid

[51] NATO, ‘Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead’, op. cit.

[52] Ibid.

[53] United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Pentagon, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan’, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), April 2012, p. 28. http://www.defense.gov/news/1230_Report_final.pdf, (accessed 14 January 2013); Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Annual Review’, op. cit.

[54] NATO, ‘President Karzai announces first phase of transition’, op. cit.

[55] ‘NATO Secretary General reviews transition progress in Helmand’, NATO Newsroom, 5 March 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-35081A66-83B8112D/natolive/news_98937.htm, (accessed 9 July 2013)

[56] Afghanistan enters fourth stage in transition of power, op. cit.

[57] B. Stewart, ‘Time for a hard look at our exit plans’, CBC News (Canada), 2 April 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2010/03/31/f-vp-stewart.html, (accessed 18 February 2013)

[58] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO Secretary General welcomes Afghan transition announcement’, NATO Newsroom, 22 March 2011, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71681.htm, (accessed 1 November 2011).

[59] U.S. DoD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012, op. cit., p. 11.

[60] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 3 December 2012, op. cit.

[61] Ibid., p.12; A. Young, ‘Minister Says SAS Won’t Return to Afghanistan’, The New Zealand Herald, 12 April 2012, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10798239, (accessed 20 March 2013)

[62] U.S. DoD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012, op. cit.

[63] Young, Minister Says SAS Won’t Return to Afghanistan, op. cit.

[64] NATO, ‘NATO’, NATO Topic: NATO and Afghanistan, op. cit.

[65] Cited in ‘Afghanistan enters fourth stage in transition of power’, 31 December 2012, The Express Tribune, http://tribune.com.pk/story/487026/afghanistan-enters-fourth-stage-in-transition-of-power-from-us-forces, (accessed 7 July 2013).

[66] NATO Newsroom, ‘NATO Secretary General reviews transition progress in Helmand’, op. cit.