#5 Why Multinational War?
The Benefits & Costs of Waging War Multilaterally
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
Upon perusing the list of MNO features previously outlined (see blog “#4 What is a Multinational Operation?“), a list involving several drawbacks to multinational command, one may well ask why multinational military campaigns are sought by nations on the world stage at all. Winston Churchill perhaps best expressed the answer to this question during the Second World War when he stated: ‘There is only one thing worse than having allies – that is not having allies’.[1] Indeed, there are a number of important advantages to waging multinational war that make the venture worthwhile in the eyes of many – especially those of nations within the international community at large.
Multinational Operations: Key Advantages
Firstly, a MNO – especially one undertaken under the banner of the United Nations (UN) or North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – is considered more legitimate and politically acceptable within the international community, than the politically risky enterprise of conducting a military operation unilaterally. This is especially true with regard to the greater powers on the world stage, particularly the United States, but also the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China, where smaller nations are uncomfortable with such unilateral expressions of national power and distrustful of national motives and intentions.
Secondly, the multinational character of the military operation is often more palatable and acceptable to the entities at war either within, or indeed between, the target State or States.[2] This is particularly the case among countries of the developing world, many of which have had unhappy historical experience of single-State colonialism.
Thirdly, from a military perspective, MNOs importantly prevent overburdening and overstretch of a single military force, since the operational burden is shared among the military contingents of many contributing nations.[3] In fact, regardless of the orientation of any MNO along the war spectrum (towards non-kinetic peace-keeping operations, on the one hand, or overtly kinetic warfare on the other) the chief purpose and advantage of waging multinational campaigns is this: that common objectives may be achieved as rapidly as possible and, by means of operational burden-sharing between its members, at a minimum cost to national blood and treasure.
Fourthly, combined operations can not only minimise the cost, but ‘decisively increase combat power’, thereby further promoting ‘a more rapid and favourable outcome to the conflict’ than otherwise would be the case.[4]
From a socio-political perspective, fifthly, such operations – involving close cooperation and interoperability among the militaries of various States in times of conflict – forge or strengthen bonds between nations through the development of trust and understanding. In fact, operating in concert provides insights not only into other national cultures and approaches to war, but also into their professional capabilities and operational methods.[5] One need only think of the ANZAC legacy created between the Australian and New Zealand armed forces to illustrate this point, a rapport established and reinforced through multiple combined military operations conducted together extending from Gallipoli during the Great War, to East Timor and the Solomon Islands today.
Sixth, besides close ties, these periods of inter-State learning can reap invaluable rewards later on in the building of other military alliances in future years. Experience operating with other national militaries can help to guide allies in future negotiations, enabling them to take into account, or avoid altogether, many of the hazardous politico-military pitfalls present where areas of national sensitivity lie. [6] As COL de B. Taillon states on the matter: ‘There is a spectrum of intangible benefits of operating closely with multinational partners…one learns how to best approach, manage and persuade other nationalities’.[7]
Finally, through the on-the-ground execution of such MNOs involving many partners, wisdom is gleaned for future alliance or coalition-based multinational campaigns in the way they are built, structured and managed.[8]
Multinational Operations: Key Disadvantages
Nevertheless, there are also simultaneously a number of disadvantages to conducting multilateral military endeavours that military operations conducted by a single State entity are unlikely to encounter.
Firstly, because MNOs typically encompass a broad spectrum of operational methodologies between participating nations, command and control systems as well as coordination are typically rendered much more thorny and complex in multilateral campaigns than in unilateral operations.[9]
Secondly, nations participating to MNOs may donate more political weight, clout or influence to the operation than ‘a truly effective military capability’.[10] This is especially the case in multinational campaigns involving high numbers of nations. In these cases, perceived international ‘legitimacy’ is greatly enhanced but comes at the expense of diminished military efficacy, which actually impedes the timely and successfully completion of the mission.
Thirdly, as a result of the latter, the Operational Commanders of MNOs are frequently under enormous international pressure to perform well and are expected to attain important strategic objectives – sometimes even to gain political victories, rather than purely military ones. This is despite having, in Colonel (COL) Jean Paul de B. Taillon’s words, ‘less than optimal tactical organizations’ and ones often further restricted by separate rules of engagement and force employment caveats by the various nations involved.[11] As Lieutenant General (LTGEN) David Richards, a former COMISAF in Afghanistan during 2006, once asserted: ‘Few Multinational Commanders will have all the resources they need to perform their missions, and yet the mission cannot be seen to fail’.[12]
Lastly within the MNF itself, the goodwill and cooperation needed for effective military coordination between national contingents is frequently eroded by tensions and disputes between the contributing nations themselves. These disputes range in gravity from petty squabbles to perilous disagreements. To illustrate, these disputes may concern (but are not restricted to): historical or cultural prejudices between former rivals; bickering regarding tour lengths, conditions of service, the frequency and duration of leave passes, or financial compensation in case of injury or death; fall-outs between commanders and their staffs (sometimes involving personality clashes); quarrels over operational restrictions and capability; and arguments over intelligence sharing.[13]
From this overview it is clear that the conduct of multinational warfare is a very complex business. This complexity is inherent in every multinational security operation, being as it is, the activity of war (whether small- or full-scale), conducted by a temporarily-unified body, that comprises a variety of different national actors via disparate military forces. The more complex MNOs are, the more difficult they are to manage, and the less likely they are to be successful. However, managing highly complex MNOs has become an unfortunate yet inevitable reality within the international community today.
*This blog is an excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1]‘Winston Churchill on Politics’, Winston Churchill Leadership, http://www.winston-churchill-leadership.com/churchill-quote-politics.html. (accessed 17 April 2013).
[2] J. P. de B. Taillon (COL), ‘Some of the Challenges of Multinational Force Command’, New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies, vol. 1, March 2007, p. 2.
[3] Ibid., p. 2.
[4] J. Rice, ‘Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare’, Parameters,Spring 1997, p. 2, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/…/rice.htm, (accessed 20 January 2009).
[5] J. P. de B. Taillon (COL), ‘Some of the Challenges of Multinational Force Command’, op. cit., p. 2-4.
[6] Ibid., pp. 2-4.
[7] Ibid., p. 2.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] R. Lane (MAJGEN), ‘The Command, Leadership and Management Challenges of Contemporary Multinational Command’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, vol.151, issue 6, 2006, p. 32.
[13] J. P. de B. Taillon (COL), ‘Some of the Challenges of Multinational Force Command’. op. cit., p. 3-7; Lane, ibid., p. 32.