The following two blogs #41 and #42 will now together further elaborate on the ISAF’s Caveat Crisis in Afghanistan, by providing a description of the way in which the mission’s caveat problem developed over the course of the Security Assistance mission, increasing in both scope and severity as the operation progressed through the four fundamental phases of NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for the mission. Indeed, limitation and ban rules in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of ISAF national contingents were actively and obstructively present during all five of the OPLAN’s phases, from the very genesis of the ISAF operation in December 2001 until its complete termination in December 2014. These included the phases of: I) Assessment and Preparation; II) Geographic Expansion; III) Stabilisation; IV) Transition; and lastly V) Redeployment. These blogs will provide a concise overview of the diverse difficulties posed by these national caveat restrictions on the ISAF Force during each of these operational phases, in order to illustrate how the issue of heavy caveat imposition spread like a cancer, first politically in the Coalition of the Willing, and then operationally and tangibly across the mission in terms of both geography and time, with the caveat issue growing larger and generating more and more alarm in military and political quarters with the progression of each successive NATO-led phase until the final termination of the mission.
NATO APPENDIX: The ‘Ukraine NATO Membership & Nuclear Missile Crisis’ of 2022
This is an overview and discussion of the key historical, strategic, and political issues behind the ‘Ukraine Crisis’ of January-February 2022. It was originally published between 28 January-24 February 2022, prior to the eruption of the Ukraine War in the crossroads region of Eurasia, between the Russian Federation with support from allied regional and global States on the one hand, and the 1991 State of Ukraine supported by the United States and the EU/NATO bloc of ‘dual’ or ‘double’ Member-States in Europe on the other. The blog draws parallels between the extremely-alarming Cuban ‘Missile’ Crisis which risked a nuclear WW3 in 1962, and the similarly alarming Ukraine ‘NATO Membership and Nuclear Missile’ Crisis of 2022, which risks an even worse, more global, more sophisticated, and far more lethal and destructive nuclear WW3.
It asks and examines the crucial questions, such as: what were the 2 National Security demands that the Russian government made of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for North America and Europe; why did NATO refuse and reject Russia’s demands; the weight of State Sovereignty within NATO and its role in NATO’s rejection of a Peace Deal with Russia over Ukraine prior to the war, which would have led to the joint or mutual drafting and ratification of new, multilateral and mutually-beneficial Security Treaties to preserve security, stability and peace in Europe and Eurasia; how Russia’s long-term strategic outlook differs from NATO’s long-term strategic outlook on the subject of NATO’s expansion (or ‘runaway over-expansion’) out of Europe and into Eurasia, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and around the world; the promises made by leading Free Democracies and NATO officials to the Soviet Communist State that NATO would not expand geographically “further east” beyond a reunified Germany – promises that were not kept or honoured following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War Confrontation between the ideologies of Democracy and Communism and their respective States; what military actions have been taken by the Russian Federation since the NATO Bucharest Summit of 2008; and then offers two, starkly different, rivalling, explanations as to WHY the Russian government has taken these actions and assumed this posture – (1) Military Aggression to ‘Make Russia Great Again’ into a resurgent, expansionist, and ‘rule-by-conquest’ Russian Empire in Eastern Europe or (2) Military Self-Defence & Self-Determination to ‘Make Russia Safe Again’ in the context of an ever-expanding, border-encroaching, hostile, increasingly offensive, and world-endangering EU/NATO Continental Empire.
Finally, at the end of the discussion of these crucial strategic and geo-political issues involved in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, I offer a final word of advice on evaluating and deciding for oneself, what is true, and who is in the right.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) – List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by the 8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012
This list displays the known national caveat ROE constraints (of 21 caveat categories of rules), that were imposed by successive governments of the 8 NATO Lead Nations in the ISAF mission, in order to constrain the movements, activities, operations, and fighting combat capabilities of their own national forces in Afghanistan – and this despite being vested with heavy leadership command responsibilities for security and stability in their respective ISAF Regional Command sectors. These caveats were all in force, at one time or another, or even continuously over long periods of time amounting to many years, on ISAF Lead Nation security and stability forces, over the course of ten years of conventional and counter-insurgency war waged against anti-democracy terrorists and insurgents between 2002-2012. It was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.
This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.
WAR ON TERROR: OEF APPENDIX – List of Known National Caveats Imposed by OEF TCNs on National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2001-2012
This list displays the ‘national caveat’ limitation and prohibition rules known to have been imposed on national security forces, contributed and deployed to Afghanistan to operate as part of the U.S.-led Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission, by the governments of OEF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) Germany, Canada, Spain and Turkey.
This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.
WAR ON TERROR: ‘Triumphs after Trials’ Progress Report, 2001-2021
A chronological table displaying the Free Democracies’ failures, successes and stalemates in the global campaign against Islamic Extremist terrorism (the ungodly and cowardly mass-murder and terrorisation of innocent civilians for politico-religious aims), otherwise known as the Global War on Terror(ists) (GWOT), ever since the world-changing, Afghanistan-based, Al-Qaeda terror attack on the American homeland and its native and foreign-born citizens, more than two decades ago, on 11 September 2001.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(a) – Table Displaying Caveat-Free or Caveat-Fettered Forces of the 8 NATO/ISAF Lead Nations during 6 Crucial COIN Years, 2007-2012
This alarming table, displaying the overall total numbers of caveat-fettered and caveat-free forces contributed by NATO’s 8 Lead Nations in the ISAF security and stability mission, during the Afghan mission’s critical years after the 2006 Taliban Resurgence between January 2007-December 2012, was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.
This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.
#40 In Videos: An International, Multilateral, Political & Strategic Failure – The Fall of Kabul & the Lamentable Loss of the Anti-Terror & Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 2001-2021
In Videos: The calamitous political and military decisions taken by short-sighted governments in multiple Capitals, to rapidly end the Afghan theatre of war in the overall and ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT), and the resulting and hugely consequential developments and events that followed on the ground for the country and the people of Afghanistan, that has shocked, changed, and threatened the entire world. Important videos.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 9 – Table Displaying Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs on Major and Minor Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs), 2006-2012
This dire, combat-capability table displays the Major (700+) and Minor (550-699) ISAF Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs), contributed by NATO-nation and Partner-nation States to the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan, that were operating under national caveat constraints in their combat and security operations between June 2006 – December 2012. Among these caveats were: reconnaissance & surveillance caveats; intelligence-sharing caveats; combat caveats; combat-support caveats; counter-terror caveats; counter-insurgent caveats; counter-narcotics caveats; ISAF Allies caveats; ANSF caveats; and even MEDEVAC caveats (refer to ISAF Appendices 7(a), 7(b), 8(a) and 8(b) below or on the ‘APPENDICES’ page). The table was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.
This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.
#36 The Art of Government: Military Servants, Political Masters, ‘The People’ & the Purpose of the Military
What is the main purpose of the military? To deter, fight and win wars both at home and abroad. As I have already outlined in the previous two blogs, Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the critical lynchpin, or key interconnecting devices, between the two separate and different political and military spheres of a nation during any armed conflict. ROE are binding political-military-legal orders given to national military forces by civilian national government officials, which clearly limit or restrict what the military can do on behalf of the nation, and in the name of the government, while actively deployed in a theatre of armed conflict. National militaries are subordinate to and accountable to obey these instructions or commands of their national civilian government because, in most countries of the world, national armed forces are the military servants of the civilian masters in government, who in turn are also themselves the temporary chosen representatives and servants of their citizen nation of people. As military servants of elected governments, then, and because of the changing nature and short-term tenure of governments comprised of various and often rival political parties and ideologies, especially in liberal democratic countries, national armed forces must officially be strictly apolitical and non-partisan: loyal to the Nation-State, the National Constitution, the national government, and the nation of people they exist to protect.
This blog will discuss these critical issues, and then examine the role of the military in each State today in the modern world. It will subsequently discuss the primary purpose of the military in every Nation-State, as well as the three kinds of wars national militaries usually engage in historically and today – (1) war at home to protect the sovereign State and the population of the nation; (2) war abroad in defence of critical national security interests and concerns; and (3) war abroad to defend foundational and core principles, values and beliefs.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 8(b) – List of Known National Caveats Imposed on ISAF Major Force Units by TCNs in Afghanistan, 2001-2012
This list, of known national caveats constraining 11 Major Force Units to the ISAF Security Assistance mission by Lead and Supporting ISAF coalition TCNs (NATO and Partner nations), was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.
This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.