#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” “There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.” « Il y a
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I detailed the shocking and profoundly disturbing events that took place under Dutch command in the Srebrenica United Nations (UN) “Protected Area” in 1995 within the broader UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see blog #20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”). These tragic real-life events have haunted Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), the Federation of Bosnia
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy (Official & Unofficial Caveat ROE)
#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed how an alarming, new, global norm has developed within contemporary multinational security operations. Since the early 1990s, nations have been increasingly imposing heavy and wide-ranging constraints on the forces they contribute to multinational security operations (see blog “#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations”). The trend has become so strong in fact that today national caveats are considered to be ‘normal’ and the ‘common lot to varying degrees of all military operations conducted by NATO, the European Union
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations
#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley Routine imposition of national caveat constraints on national military contingents has developed as an increasingly common habit of nations today, whenever countries contribute forces to Multinational Operations (MNOs) authorised by the international community. This practice has continued regardless of whether the international security missions concerned have been conducted under the banner and command of an international organisation, such as the United Nations (UN), or a treaty-based military Alliance structure, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Caveat constraints have also been habitually
#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators
#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators – Dr Regeena Kingsley In previous blogs it has been explained that Rules of Engagement (ROE) are instructions for the use of force by military forces, and that these instructions or rules relate to two specific issues – self-defence and mission accomplishment. With regard to self-defence, when individuals, groups of individuals, or an armed force are declared Enemy, it is permissible for force to be used as a matter of course and offensive action to take place. The Enemy force may be attacked, at the discretion and judgment of the military commander,
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley The difficulty of fighting wars in concert with allies is not a new idea. Indeed, Winston Churchill once commented that: ‘There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies –and that is to fight without them’.[1] In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new and unprecedented proportions. This is especially the case given the maze of bureaucratic red-tape which is increasingly imposed by national governments on armed forces contributed to a military coalition, and which national