This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE) relating to deployed military commanders on operations, and whether or not they have discretionary authority to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre.
#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this hazy and poorly-understood subject. In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first question: Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In a series of previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives
#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law?
#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law? – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives of their security mission mandates. In
#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots”
#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”, I examined the reasons for, and impact of, diverse sets of Rules of Engagement (ROE) between force contributing nations to a Multinational Operation (MNO), especially with regard to national caveat constraints. I also presented the fallacy of the “caveat myth” – still believed and asserted by many power-holders and policy-makers today – that national caveat prohibition and limitation rules are “positive” ROE
#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”
#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In my recent blog, “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”, the severely negative effects of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement – otherwise known as “national caveats” – were examined with reference to failed United Nations (UN) operations in Angola (UNAVEM II), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). With the return to civil war in Angola in 1992-1993, an unwise and unrealistic UN mandate, combined with
#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats within the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola & the Need for Appropriate Mandates & ‘Iron Resolve’
#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats within the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola & the Need for Appropriate Mandates & ‘Iron Resolve’ – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I demonstrated how national caveats have led to several extremely negative and serious calamities within multinational security operations, by conducting three case-studies of United Nations (UN) operations executed in the early 1990s (see blog “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”). In this analysis it was shown, firstly, that national caveats complicated evacuation and endangered the lives
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed the key choice facing all Multinational Operations (MNOs) operators of having either standardised or disparate Rules of Engagement (ROE) between national contingents operating within the mission (see blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”). It outlined, firstly, the various difficulties posed to attempts by security organisations to standardise ROE among the States contributing armed forces to an MNO, and secondly, the impact of diverse sets of national ROE on
#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations
#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley In earlier blogs the vital concept of ‘unity of effort’ for effective multinational security campaigns was explored, in addition to the underlying structures of ‘unity of command’ and ‘cooperation, coordination and consensus’ (see blog “#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations” and “#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations”). U.S. General of the Army (GA) Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander over more than one million allied forces in both the
#16 The Practical Value of National Rules of Engagement: An Assessment
#16 The Practical Value of National Rules of Engagement: An Assessment – Dr Regeena Kingsley In previous blogs, I have discussed what Rules of Engagement (ROE) are, what kinds of instructions they contain, how ROE are formed for military operations, and how they are enforced and breaches punished (see blogs “#9 What are “Rules of Engagement”? Military Mandates & Instructions for the Use of Force”, “#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: “Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions”, “#11 How are Rules of Engagement Formed for Military Operations?”, and “#12 The Binding Power of Rules of Engagement: Enforcement &