ISAF – COIN APPENDIX 3
9 COIN Characteristics:
Conventional vs. COIN War
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
‘The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking.’[1]
– Karl von Clausewitz
This appendix will outline nine of the most important characteristics of COIN war and contrast them with traditional war, in order to better demonstrate the differences and complexity of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) warfare in comparison with conventional warfare, as referred to in the previous blog ‘ISAF APPENDIX 2 – Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Warfare: Definitions, Political Nature & 5 False Expectations’.
The nine characteristics that will be discussed in the following include:
(1) the basic nature of the war;
(2) aim of the war;
(3) focus of the war;
(4) traditional or non-traditional objectives and operations;
(5) the role of armed forces in the war;
(6) the role of military technology in the war;
(7) defining and measuring “success” in the war;
(8) the final “end point” in the war; and lastly,
(9) the duration of the war campaign.
(1) Nature: A Security Problem or a Political Crisis?
Conventional warfare consists of an armed conflict between two or more nations and is essentially viewed as ‘a security problem with a security solution’.[2]
Counter-insurgency campaigns, by contrast, are far more complex and must be fought in a vastly different fashion. Rather than being solely a security problem, COIN warfare is first and foremost a political war – representing a political crisis – therefore requiring firstly political, then military solutions.
(2) Aim of Campaign: ‘Defeat the Enemy’ or ‘Win the People’?
The aim of conventional war is to destroy the enemy’s capacity to fight. As the renowned Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz states on the matter: ‘The bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy’s forces, is the first-born son of war’.[3]
Unlike in conventional warfare, however, the aim of COIN is not to crush the Enemy through overwhelming military force, but rather towin over the approval and support of the population and thereby to steadfastly wear away the insurgents’ civilian bases of support and supply among the local population.
(3) Focus: ‘Enemy-Centric’ or ‘People-Centric’ Warfare?
In conventional warfare Enemy forces form the battle frontline. In addition, the local Enemy population, as supporters of these Enemy forces, are often viewed with suspicion – sometimes even hatred – to be conquered and forced into compliance with the victorious powers.[4] Indeed, conventional war is an ‘enemy-centric campaign’, the motto being that once the Enemy’s ability or will to fight has been destroyed, all else will inevitably follow.[5] For this reason, conventional warfare is sometimes referred to as ‘manoeuvre warfare’, since the focus of the campaign is the manoeuvre of military forces to win the war.[6]
By contrast, the centrality of winning popular support in counter-insurgency warfare renders COIN a ‘people-centric’ or ‘population-centric’ campaign. In COIN warfare the maxim for the insurgent and the counter-insurgent is to ‘win the people’ and‘control the population’, since all else will follow.[7] Insurgents seek to seize this control over the population primarily through coercive means. Counter-insurgents, however, lack this coercive power and therefore must seek to win control over the population by winning popular consent. [8]
Hence, rather than military destruction of the Enemy, the onus for counter-insurgents is on winning the war of perceptions by earning the respect and support of the local populace (in particular the key ‘opinion leaders’ within the population, who are central figures and leaders of particular social groupings within the populace).[9] As General Sir Gerald Templer stated in 1952 in regard to the Malayan COIN campaign: ‘The answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people’.[10]
In other words, in COIN warfare, campaigns are waged not so much to “defeat the Enemy” as to “win the people”, and thereby take away from the Enemy force their civilian support base supplying them with shelter, food, weapons and new recruits. Unlike in conventional wars then, military troops involved in COIN must, as a basic standard, adopt an attitude of tolerance, sympathy and kindness – goodwill rather than hostility – towards the local population.
Kilcullendescribes this unconventional focus on ‘winning hearts and minds’ as not an exercise in niceties, but rather ‘a hard-headed recognition of certain basic facts’. [11] Namely that:
(a) the Enemy needs the people to act in certain ways, without which the insurgency will wither;
(b) the Enemy is fluid while the population is fixed, making control of the population attainable whereas destroying the Enemy is not;
(c) due to this Enemy fluidity, an insurgency can never be eradicated through solely enemy-centric means, the Vietnam War being a case in point (also refer to the image in section 9); and
(d) the local population is easily identifiable whereas the Enemy, often comprising multiple threat groups, frequently is not.[12]
Indeed, it is the civilian population, rather than insurgent areas of operation, that forms the true frontline in any COIN campaign. This is because in a people-centric war, the local population isthe counter-insurgent’s greatest asset. Indeed, a population won over from an insurgent movement is the counter-insurgency’s greatest strength politically and militarily – its political and military ‘Centre of Gravity’ around which the war will revolve. The primary objectives for any COIN campaign are consequently, as they are for insurgents, to win and control the population.
While this is so, it is worthwhile to also keep in mind however, as Kilcullen argues, that ‘the enemy and the terrain still matter’ within a COIN campaign with terrain-centric (positional warfare) and enemy-centric (manoeuvre warfare) actions still ‘vital and crucial to success’.[13] As he concisely concludes: ‘Enemy and Terrain still matter, but Population is the key’.[14]
Kilcullen: 3 Possible Approaches to War. [15]
(4) Traditional vs. Non-Traditional Objectives & Operations
In conventional wars, the chief objective is to destroy Enemy forces, and thereby weaken and demoralise the Enemy enough to force their leaders either to surrender or to agree to negotiate a cease-fire, armistice agreement or peace treaty that will bring an end to the war.
This destruction of Enemy forces is achieved through the use of relentless and overwhelming military force, by disempowering their capabilities, eliminating their equipment and personnel, interdicting their resources and lines of communication, fending off recruits, breaking cohesion through creating confusion and mayhem, and ultimately wearing down the Enemy’s will and means to make war.
COIN Warfare: The difference between force manoeuvers in an enemy-centric, conventional war campaign and that of a population-centric, counter-insurgency campaign.[16]
In COIN warfare, by contrast, the chief objective is to ‘win the people’, or more precisely, to win the majority population over from supporting the Enemy insurgents to supporting the government’s counter-insurgent forces.
In order to do this, the military must instead work to actively win over the perceptions – the emotive ‘hearts’ and cognitive ‘minds’ – of both the local population and Enemy fighters (usually through financial aid, development projects, and general goodwill), while at the same time continuing to suppress hostile activity and eliminate hard-line fanatics.[17]
Counter-insurgents must not only ‘win the people’, furthermore, but must also ‘control the population’ in the territory of the conflict, by attaining the approval and consent of the majority population. Winning back governmental control over the population, from any insurgent force, is a difficult task however and requires the military to play a dual role in all COIN campaigns: the primary and largest function being political, and the secondary minor function security. Indeed, in most COIN campaigns at least seventy-five percent of all activity comprises non-military tasks.[18]
This division of labour in a COIN campaign is sometimes referred to as Galula’s 80/20 rule, being ‘20 percent military action and 80 per cent political’. [19] As Galula states:
‘Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population. The armed forces are but one of many instruments of the counterinsurgent, and what is better than the political power to harness the non-military instruments, to see that appropriations come at the right time to consolidate the military work, that political and social reforms follow through?’ [20]
The 80/20 COIN Rule: The political and security dimensions of a COIN war campaign, involving a majority of non-kinetic political operations (comprising 80 per cent of all activity) in combination with a minority of kinetic security operations (comprising only 20 per cent of all activity), the latter nevertheless comprising an essential component of COIN work to ‘protect the population’ through the elimination of hard-line insurgents.
In terms of the 80% political COIN role, the military’s task is to engage in the psycho-political battle with the insurgent enemy and win control over the population, by competing for the hearts and minds of the local population. That is, counter-insurgents must work to win over the emotive hearts and cognitive minds of the local people by convincing them, respectively, that:
(1) the success of the counter-insurgency is in their long-term interests; and
(2) the counter-insurgency will ultimately succeed against the insurgency and will permanently protect their interests.[21]
It is evident by this that close cooperation with indigenous counter-insurgent forces is critical to any COIN campaign in any nation. Only the local indigenous force can help external, non-native counter-insurgents to deliver on these promises and only they can ultimately guarantee these promises continue to be kept once international forces withdraw from the campaign. Indeed, it is only native indigenous forces that can match the Enemy insurgents, in not only possessing a true and practical understanding of the local culture and its core values and imperatives in the contested territory, but also in their on-going presence and long-term commitment in the area of operations, which is after all their own homeland. [22]
The conditions for winning the hearts and minds of the population will of course vary among COIN campaigns, depending on both the counter-insurgent forces and the respective territory in which the COIN campaign is taking place. As Kilcullen argues: ‘There is a fundamental difference between conducting COIN in: (a) your own country; (b) a territory you seek to control permanently (e.g. a colony or separatist province); (c) a friendly foreign country; or (d) a hostile or occupied foreign country’.[23]
Usually, however, winning the hearts and minds involves a wide range of ‘influence operations’, by which the counter-insurgent force delivers verbal and written messages or ‘cultural narratives’, while at the same time performing practical deeds among the population. According to Kilcullen, ‘cultural narratives’ are important and powerful political weapons in the counter-insurgents’ struggle since, as he states:
‘People are not mobilized individually by cold consideration of rational facts. Rather, they are mobilized in groups, by influences and opinion leaders, through cultural narratives’.[24]
Indeed, Kilcullen argues that influence operations are ‘the key tool for generating consent’ within a population, working as they do to counter the insurgent narrative and change local perceptions.[25]
In COIN campaigns, counter-insurgent messages are often formulated with the help of indigenous counter-insurgent forces and conveyed through local media, whereas practical deeds can be performed unilaterally or multilaterally in concert with other counter-insurgent forces and entails an array of restorative governance, law and order, and socio-economic development programmes. Within a counter-insurgency theatre, these programmes are often conducted region-by-region over a long period of time. They are usually undertaken by small teams deployed to specific localities of concern, often referred to as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which comprise a mix of both military and civilian personnel to conduct non-traditional military tasks.
The Fight for Control: Kilcullen’s 4 Stages of ‘Competitive Control’ over the majority population between insurgents and counter-insurgents, from the beginning to the end of the war.[26]
The object of these efforts is not however, contrary to popular belief, to make the population grateful or affectionate towards the counter-insurgent force. Emotive and temporary gratefulness will not secure the loyalty of the population to the counter-insurgency effort when subjected to insurgent pressure or intimidation.[27] Consequently any counter-insurgency effort in which success is calibrated on winning popular ‘gratefulness’ or ‘affection’ is unfortunately destined to fail. Instead the true objective is through these political measures to prompt, invite or persuade the population into making an irrevocable choice to support the counter-insurgency instead of the insurgency.[28] As Kilcullen states:
‘This is about perceived self-interest, not about whether the population likes us. The principal emotive content is respect, not affection. Support based on liking does not survive when the enemy applies fear: intimidation trumps affection. Disappointment, unreliability, failure and defeat are deadly – preserving prestige and popular respect through proven reliability, honouring promises and following through [on those promises], is key.’ [29]
If the ‘empty’ passive majority within the population will stop remaining neutral and make such an irreversible choice to support the counter-insurgency, then the counter-insurgency is well on its way to success. Popular support will lead to popular consent and approval of the governing authorities, thereby creating legitimacy for the government while at the same time eroding the political foundations and claims of the insurgency. If the practical development programmes are effective, moreover, a sense of order and stability will be created that will discourage support and recruits to the insurgency.
In sum the military’s political role in COIN is essentially, to paraphrase Mao, through good works and goodwill to slowly drain away the ‘sea’ of people in which the insurgent ‘fish’ swim, hide and thrive.
(5) The Role of Armed Forces in Conventional vs. COIN Campaigns
The objectives of conventional war campaigns are achieved traditionally through the use of large land forces, with aerial and naval contingents chiefly performing supporting roles. Land forces are essential in conventional war because war usually involves a struggle over territory, and only land forces can occupy territory, ensure engagement of the Enemy, and enforce compliance or security on the ground.[30] Indeed, armies are requisite in defusing crises and compelling aggressors to back down, and are also crucial to facilitate an opponent’s surrender since ‘nobody ever surrendered to an airplane’.[31] Nevertheless, the deployment of land forces, though often necessary, is a ‘messy option’, because the very fact that the army is comprised of large numbers of personnel, on the ground, with limited mobility, in direct contact with the Enemy, means that it is more vulnerable than the other services to attack and more liable to incur high casualties.
Kilcullen: 3 Pillars of Counter-Insurgency.[32]
In terms of COIN campaigns, no amount of political progress in the psycho-political sphere can be assured without hard-line military protection in the security sphere. The overall political structure and the political action taking place for and within the population, as part of the counter-insurgency campaign, must also be both defended and enforced.
The counter-insurgent’s fundamental security role is therefore to safeguard this political activity and progress by:
(1) protecting the local population, especially those who are already persuaded and those in areas of high political importance;
(2) protecting all those military and civilian personnel involved in the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign, who are performing the political non-military functions; and
(3) eliminating all hostile insurgent elements. [33]
While all of these functions take the form of physical security action, the former two comprise non-kinetic activities while the latter comprises kinetic physical activity (see diagram below).
It is important to underscore here again, however, that unlike in conventional war, physical security operations are secondary to the political influence operations occurring within the political dimension of any COIN campaign. As Kilcullen argues, while in conventional war operations ‘influence operations’ are used to support and enact the physical campaign in order to help explain what is being done, within a COIN campaign ‘physical operations’ are used to support and enact the influence campaign. The emphasis is thus entirely reversed between the two conventional and COIN campaigns.
The 3 Main Tasks of COIN Security Forces in a COIN Campaign.[34]
The three tasks involved in this security dimension of a counter-insurgency campaign are usually performed by a range of security forces acting in cooperation and coordination with each other – an ‘inter-agency’ approach. These security forces comprise:
- military forces (including local territorial forces, regional ‘framework’ forces, strike forces, border protection forces, and theatre reserve forces);
- police forces (including community police, paramilitary constabulary police, and the police intelligence special branch);
- human security forces (including all personnel working in the fields of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security);
- public safety forces (including emergency services and public prosecutors within the justice system); and finally
- resource and population control forces (including access controls, reporting systems, and collective responsibility units such as neighbourhood watch organisations). [35]
All of these forces together work in conjunction to provide protection for the local population and counter-insurgency personnel, thereby performing the first two security functions within the security dimension of a COIN campaign. Most of this protection work, performed by these various security agencies towards attaining the first two security tasks, actually falls into the category of non-traditional military activity, meaning that it is these activities – when combined with other political activities involved in the political dimension of a COIN campaign – which comprise the 80% component of non-military tasks involved in a counter-insurgency.
Meanwhile, military forces (sometimes aided by paramilitary police forces) undertake the ‘Seek & Destroy’ targeted kinetic activity to eliminate insurgents, comprising the third and last security function within the COIN security dimension. In accomplishing this crucial task, these military forces differ from the other security forces mentioned above in one essential respect: they are the only ones performing the hard-line, traditional, military tasks within the COIN campaign, spoken of by Galula as comprising 20% of the activity within any counter-insurgency campaign.
These kinetic traditional military tasks performed by the military security forces are not just ‘part’ of a counter-insurgency moreover, but actually critical to its success. As Kilcullen states: ‘In a counter-insurgency environment, effective military security operations are fundamental: they underpin all other forms of security.’ [36]
The various security components involved in the U.S.-led Coalition’s COIN campaign in Iraq, 2007, with each strata of the pyramid being led respectively by Intelligence (Counter-Terrorism), the Military (Counter-Insurgency), the Police (Communal Peace-keeping/Peace-enforcement), and the Civilian Government (Development & Nation-Building).[37]
So what exactly do these traditional military tasks entail? Namely, ‘eliminating as many causes of the insurgency as feasible’, in particular by ‘eliminating extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government’.[38] Indeed, the U.S. COIN Manual asserts that the killing of insurgents unwilling to cooperate with the government is a vital condition to long-term success, since it enables and encourages the local population to consent to government rule and take charge of their own affairs. [39]
Indeed, according to Kilcullen, the elimination of hard-line, fanatical insurgents is an essential part of winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population threatened by an insurgency, and therefore by extension, an essential part of securing the crucial objective of a counter-insurgency campaign – winning control over the population. As he states, ‘smacking the enemy hard, publicly, when feasible (and no innocents are targeted) is also key’.[40]
In short, offensive ‘peace-making’ in the security sphere through the elimination of the most hostile Enemy insurgents is just as critical to the success of the COIN campaign as the defensive ‘protection’ and ‘peace-keeping’ elements of the 80% political effort.
(6) The Role of Military Technology in Conventional vs COIN War
The vulnerability of ground forces in conventional warfare, as described above, has led warring belligerents to become increasingly dependent on acquiring, developing and using new military technology. This is because military technological inventions can lower risk, lessen casualties, and even allow smaller deployments of field forces, while simultaneously ‘taking the battle to the Enemy’ and meeting objectives.[41] In the decades since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, with ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ widespread in the United States and a casualty-adverse attitude likewise prevalent in a large number of Western governments, military technology has held an ever-more dominant role in conventional warfare, as both the First and Second Gulf Wars can well attest.
In COIN campaigns, however, while military technology can be helpful to an extent, a dependence on military technology can actually become a handicap or weakness in the fight to ‘win the people’. It has already been shown above that, unlike in conventional warfare, military forces in a COIN campaign are heavily involved in both the political and security dimensions of a counter-insurgency, performing a non-kinetic, defensive protection, ‘peacekeeping’ and development role, together with a kinetic, offensive ‘peace-making’ insurgent-elimination role. Of these two roles it is the former which forms the bulk of military activity, meaning that military forces in a COIN campaign must be used overwhelmingly in a rather non-traditional fashion, to perform non-traditional functions.
Military Footprint in COIN Campaigns
This reality holds a number of implications for the military in terms of the size and nature of the military footprint within a COIN campaign – and one which contrasts sharply to the small, technology-dependent footprint employed within modern conventional war campaigns. While land forces are important in conventional wars, they are absolutely essential in a counter-insurgency campaign since, as indicated above, COIN necessitates a great deal of manpower, on the ground, to carry out a wide range of difficult political and security tasks in the ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. As Black argues, the tasks of COIN are inherently difficult and therefore manpower-intensive.[42]
Not only are land forces essential in COIN campaigns, furthermore, but they are required in very large numbers. Consequently, while in conventional warfare smaller deployments are possible when combined with information technology, counter-insurgencies simply can not be waged ‘on the cheap’. They require large, robust, manpower-intensive land forces capable of countering any unpredictable threats until indigenous security forces assume control.[43] As Gray states:
‘Tactical skill and technology are not very relevant. They are nice to have, but the basis of success is numbers in the right ratio […] Technology will not substitute anywhere near adequately for numbers on the ground’.[44]
In short, when it comes to COIN campaigns, a small, technology-dependent military footprint will not do.
The successful stabilisation of the security environment in Iraq between 2007-2011 following the 2007 ‘COIN surge’ is a perfect example of this point. What mattered was the presence of human beings, not machines – a large army of ‘boots on the ground’ to protect and to patrol. No fleet of machines or devices could have reassured the Iraqi majority population that their security mattered to their allies, and was being continuously and determinedly fought for, like the additional 20,000-strong army of armed allied soldiers deployed for the express purpose of protecting them daily from the hostile insurgents and fanatical terrorists who had become their enemies.
Dependence on Military Technology
Furthermore, in COIN campaigns the military can not rely on modern technology to the same extent as in conventional modern warfare. In regular wars, for instance, a high concentration of infantry in one theatre of war, as outlined above, would normally entail a high dependence on the network-centric warfare technologies available today (devised from the development of information technology and precision weaponry) to both accelerate victory and limit casualties in the field. This hi-tech approach is of central importance and assistance to military forces in regular warfare.
However, in COIN wars, a dependence on military technology is paradoxically not well suited to the nature and requirements of COIN warfare. COIN wars are people-focused, not Enemy-focused, and require a great deal of person-to-person contact and interaction that would neither be required nor desired in conventional warfare. They are ‘wars among the people’ that are won more by winning over the hearts and minds of the majority population than targeting and killing the Enemy, and by slowly gaining the approval, consent and trust of the people over long periods of time leading to government ‘control of the population’.
Hence a dependence and faith in military technology to win or accelerate the war seems to be singularly ill-suited for COIN warfare, which is fundamentally focused on politics and people by its very nature. A dependence on modern information technology is simply incompatible with COIN.[45]
Accelerating & Guaranteeing Success?
In terms of accelerating or guaranteeing prospects of success, furthermore, as is often true in conventional wars, Ryan argues that there is ‘no necessary correlation between military might and military effectiveness’ at all in COIN campaigns. According to Ryan, a technological ‘edge’, while highly advantageous in conventional war, does not automatically guarantee triumph over an unconventional insurgent foe.[46] Whether Vietnam, Nicaragua, Lebanon or Afghanistan, history is replete with examples whereby a technologically-superior foe has been defeated by insurgents with limited weapons and economic resources, little military experience, no organization or permanent bases – and in some cases – ‘not even shoes’.[47]
For example, during the Cold War both the forces of the American Superpower, armed with Huey helicopters in the Vietnam War of 1961-1975, and the Soviet forces of the Russian Superpower, armed with T-55/T-62 tanks and Hind helicopter gunships in the Soviet-Afghan War of 1979-1989, were both ultimately defeated by a technologically-inferior, traditional, insurgent foe.[48] As van Creveld once concluded: ‘The largest, best-organized, most advanced, and most powerful armed forces that ever existed have been humiliated and defeated.’[49]
‘The more powerful and more modern the technology at the disposal of an army (and the more modern, therefore, the organization, training, doctrine, and command system built around that technology), the less useful it was in combating [this insurgent] enemy.’[50]
Or as Boot elaborates on the point:
‘Not only Alexander [the Great] but most great captains, from Julius Ceasar to Napoleon Bonaparte, have found that putting down an insurrection can be more difficult and time-consuming that defeating a regular army. The prevalence of guerrilla warfare increased in the second half of the twentieth century with the spread of nationalist, communist, and, most recently, jihadist ideology. Both [technologically-superior] superpowers were humbled by Third World guerrillas – the Americans in Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia; the Russians in Afghanistan and Chechnya.’[51]
In short, modern military technology does not – indeed can not – accelerate or secure victory in asymmetric wars against a hostile and thriving insurgency.
The COIN Checkmate to Advanced Military Technology
Boot argues in fact that insurgency warfare actually negates many of the technological advantages developed within Western conventional military capabilities over the past decades.[52] This is for a number of reasons.
Firstly, insurgents using traditional methods of warfare are actually not easy to detect, even when using the most sophisticated information technology. As the chief American intelligence officer in Iraq, Brigadier General John DeFreitas III, is quoted as saying during the Iraq COIN campaign of 2004: ‘Insurgents don’t show up in satellite imagery very well’. [53] Likewise, in Afghanistan, once the Taliban retreated into the mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and regrouped into insurgent groups following the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom campaign, they became ‘almost invisible in the native culture and terrain’.[54] ‘Intercontinental ballistic missiles, stealth bombers and cruise missiles are of limited use,’ states Ryan, ‘against a shadowy warrior enemy who chooses not to be brought to battle on a conventional battlefield’.[55]
Secondly, even when insurgents can be detected, new precision weaponry is not precise enough for the demands of COIN. As Ucko argues, ‘the killing required in counterinsurgency requires precision that eludes even today’s high-tech capabilities’ and is ‘best undertaken by disciplined and well-trained infantry’.[56] ‘Smart’ munitions are of limited value against low-tech insurgents who are typically dispersed, indistinguishable from the civilian population, intermingled with Friendly forces and often operating in complex urban environments.[57] In fact it is Human Intelligence (HUMINT) which is critical in COIN and of far greater worth in the success of COIN campaigns than intelligence-gathering technology such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).[58]
Thirdly, it has been argued that electronic circuitry technologies which electronically find, track, aim and fire at targets actually work against the main principles of counter-insurgency, by dehumanising targets, being indiscriminate, causing civilian casualties, and damaging the local environment – four side-effects that are particularly harmful in a people- and values-laden context in which armies are competing for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population.[59] Consequently, instead of being ‘won’, an over-dependence on military technology can inadvertently cause the local population to become alienated from those seeking to protect them. In short, technology may do more to lose popular support than to gain it.
Fourthly, while weaponry enabled by information technology has a high kill-rate and can produce massive enemy casualties, in fact heavy insurgent casualties are of little importance in winning a victory against insurgencies. Indeed COIN attempts in Cuba, Ethiopia, and Vietnam along with many others all failed despite the fact that guerrilla casualties exceeded their technologically-superior, counter-insurgent opponents by a ratio of between 10-100:1.[60] As Edgerton states, when it comes to quelling insurgencies, ‘disparities in killing power did not determine victory’, but can conversely actually cause the insurgents to win greater popular support and even new recruits.[61] It is the degree of active support won from the people, rather than the body-count of Enemy dead, that really matters.
Finally, while network-centric information technologies have been developed to give a tactical edge to regular forces and enable them to win quick, decisive victories, counterinsurgency campaigns are won not through speed or agility, but through patience, staying-power, survivability and attrition – what Ucko calls ‘the anathema of the transformation ideal’.[62]
(7) Defining & Measuring Success in Conventional vs. COIN Campaigns
Furthermore, in conventional, traditional wars success may be defined as the military achievement of the war’s original objective – usually the military destruction of the Enemy’s capacity to fight, which forces the Enemy either to surrender or to request peace terms be negotiated. In such regular enemy-centric campaigns as these, success is usually measured by the number of enemy killed, wounded or captured and the extent of the destruction inflicted on enemy military capabilities. In this sense, measuring success in conventional war is a simple, straight-forward task based on facts, figures and real-time photos, footage and satellite-imagery.
By stark contrast, the success of COIN campaigns depends almost entirely on the local population. Only through support for the COIN campaign among the majority population of the conflict theatre, in addition to popular participation with the central government through their taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to government rule, can the people of the area ensure the success of a COIN campaign, and thereby guarantee their own safety and a stable future.[63] The role of military forces in COIN is therefore to support wider political goals and through minimal force, first, to protect the population, and second, to provide the security necessary for political gains to be achieved that will ultimately win the support of the people.[64]
Even with such a careful and steady approach as this, however, it is in fact extremely difficult to define success within COIN, or state precisely what “success” looks like within a counter-insurgency campaign, or what it entails once achieved. This is because, unlike in conventional war, in a campaign fought not so much to defeat the Enemy as to win the people, it is hard to pinpoint exactly when the majority population has been won and thereby success achieved.
What is more, even given a precise definition of success, it is difficult to tangibly “measure” how effective and successful a COIN campaign actually is or has been – at any one point of time – towards reaching its final goal. With COIN success requires much more than just measuring the number of Enemy dead, captured or wounded, or the amount of Enemy equipment or sites destroyed. COIN is ‘war amongst the people’ and it is among the people – not the Enemy – that victory is ultimately won or lost.
Multiple efforts by various academics to determine the appropriate metrics for measuring COIN success during the 2000s resulted in no clear answers. Indeed, the matter instead became a painful subject and point of intense debate among military theorists worldwide at that time. As Gray argues, irregular warfare is protracted, indecisive, difficult to understand and hard to describe, in which progress remains elusive, and the future is impossible to predict.[65]
Kilcullen: Defining Success in COIN War
Nevertheless, Kilcullen – a COIN theorist and practitioner with experience in Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan – has risen to the fore of the debate and offers one approach to the quandary of defining and measuring COIN success. Kilcullen describes success in COIN as:
(1) the achievement of control over the people in a theatre of war, whereby control has been established and then consolidated by the counter-insurgent force; and
(2) the return of this control back to the indigenous local populace by means of a transferral of power from the counter-insurgent force to permanent, effective and legitimate indigenous institutions.[66]
Control is thus fundamental to COIN success, because when control is attained by the counter-insurgent force – an event that can only be secured with the tacit support and approval of the local populace – then the force can also by extension manage the tempo of activity, the level of violence, as well as the degree of stability in the environment. The counter-insurgent force can consequently make headway towards the ultimate end-goal of restoring normality to the theatre in which the COIN force is operating.[67]
By this it is clear that ‘success’ within a COIN campaign is conceived of and defined by Kilcullen as the restoration of normality in the theatre of concern, whatever this normality may mean within the cultural context of the country in question and taking note of social and historical norms (‘“normality” in one society may look different from normality in another’).[68]
As Kilcullen explains, within an insurgency ‘conflict ecosystem’ the ‘relatively healthy competition and creative tension that sustains normal society has spun out of control, and the conflict threatens to destroy the society’.[69] The intent of a counter-insurgency campaign is therefore ‘not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality’, or in other words, ‘to control the system’s destructive, combative elements and return it to its “normal” state’. [70]
How successful a COIN campaign is can thus be equated with the degree to which the state in question is being restored to normality, its actors behaving in a healthily collaborative and competitive – rather than a combative and destructive – way. [71]
Measuring COIN Success: The Migdal & Galula Frameworks
In terms of measuring success, moreover, Kilcullen advances two frameworks for measuring COIN progress towards this objective of ‘restored normality’, both of which can be used to take a snapshot-in-time of the significant trends occurring within the theatre of concern. Indeed, it is the trends that are most insightful in measuring the effectiveness of any COIN campaign. As Maloney, a senior military historian from Canada, likewise propounds on the matter:
‘Counter-insurgency is not about battles – they are almost a by-product. The emphasis in both journalism and histories is on battles and frequently fails to identify the multi-year trends, policies and subtle emphasis that really decide counter-insurgency success.’[72]
In terms of measuring the success of the political dimension of a COIN campaign (the 80% COIN effort), firstly, Kilcullen advocates Migdal’s framework propounded in his 1988 book Strong Societies and Weak States.[73] Usually any attempt to compare and contrast political actors within an insurgency theatre is a difficult task, mainly due to the structural disparities between these rival actors. As Kilcullen states: ‘Comparing insurgents, terrorists, coalition forces and a national government is like comparing apples to oranges – these are competing but unlike political structures’. [74] The Migdal framework, however, measures the effectiveness of various political actors based solely on their ability to perform the four basic political functions of the State:
(1) to penetrate society;
(2) to regulate social relationships;
(3) to extract resources; and
(4) to apply resources to identified group ends.[75]
Kilcullen argues that this framework is particularly useful within the context of a COIN campaign, since it can be used to evaluate effectiveness and legitimacy of any political entity operating within the conflict ecosystem, regardless of how different the actors may be from each other (gang, tribe, insurgents, terrorists, coalition forces, national government or international organisation).[76] Moreover, it can assist the counter-insurgent to determine which actor wields the most influence over the local populace at any one moment in time, and therefore, which ‘sphere of influence’ is predominant over the others within the political milieu. [77]
In terms of measuring COIN success in the security domain (the 20% COIN effort), secondly, Kilcullen advocates the Galula framework emanating from Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare book, written in 1964. According to Galula, attaining success within the security dimension of a COIN campaign entails not just ‘the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization’, but also ‘the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population [emphasis added]’.[78]
Galula’s definition of “Victory” in COIN Wars.[79]
Towards such success on the security front, Galula advocated ‘Eight Steps’ for counter-insurgent military forces, to be followed in any locality under siege by insurgent forces. They are as follows:
(1) Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents (Surge);
(2) Detach for the area sufficient forces to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength (Quarantine);
(3) Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas (Control);
(4) Destroy the local insurgent political organizations (Isolate);
(5) Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities (Build);
(6) Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the soft and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units (Test & Purge);
(7) Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement (Nationalize);
(8) Win over or suppress the last insurgents (Mop-Up).[80]
Or as Kilcullen summarizes: ‘Surge, quarantine, control, isolate, purge, build, test, nationalize, mop up. Test in one area where conditions are favorable, then spread out’ – otherwise known as the ‘oil-spot’ approach. [81]
Galula’s ‘Eight Steps’. [82]
However, according to Kilcullen, Galula’s framework can be used not just as a security roadmap, but rather as a means of measuring how successful the security dimension of a COIN campaign is at any one moment of time. This can be done simply by contrasting the security realities of any one locality within the theatre of operations against the eights steps outlined above, to assess just how effective the security campaign is in that locality.
In this way Galula’s Eight Step framework can be used to give an assessment of how far along the security roadmap the COIN campaign is, and which steps must still be completed in any given insurgent-challenged locality.
(8) “Victory” vs. “End”?
Conventional wars are also straight-forward in that they end with one side gaining victory and the other defeat, turning forces into conquerors and the vanquished. This event, the ultimate victory of one side over the other – whether through the surrender of the conquered party, their agreement to a politically-negotiated armistice, the complete withdrawal of all Enemy military forces from a disputed territory, or the victor’s complete military conquest and control of Enemy territory – marks a clear “end point” to the war and will lead to a broad cessation of hostilities and the beginning of new political arrangements.
Counter-insurgency campaigns differ from conventional ones once again in this important and fundamental respect. Unlike in regular war campaigns, irregular COIN campaigns very rarely end through a clear-cut victory between its belligerent actors (the Sri Lankan government’s stunning defeat of the long-running Tamil Tiger insurgency in 2009 being a remarkable exception to the general rule of COIN warfare). The fact that counter-insurgency wars are won not through military means, but through painstakingly-slow political and physical erosion of the insurgents’ popular and territorial support base, makes the prospect of outright victory almost obsolete in COIN wars.
As Gray argues, since in COIN campaigns all military action is in some respect an act of political theatre, modern insurgencies simply can not be won through a decisive military victory as in regular warfare: ‘Irregular warfare does not, cannot, have a military outcome’.[83] Instead, Gray argues that these campaigns must be won politically through slowly but methodically winning the war of ideas day-by-day – not on a blood-soaked battlefield, but in people’s homes and living-rooms.[84] With COIN, the war is both waged and won in the hearts and minds of the majority population. The people are the true frontline, the true determiners of victory or defeat, and the true victors when the war ends.
For this reason, counter-insurgency war tends to come to an end in an inglorious, almost unremarkable, yet extremely significant way. Quite simply, the campaign dies down over the decades in step with the insurgency it is countering. Once insurgent members begin to realise that they will never actually achieve victory, no-matter how long and hard they fight, and no-matter how many people they have killed or how many comrades they have lost, they lose motivation and abandon the fight, causing the insurgency movement to slowly but surely fizzle out and die.
For this reason, unlike with conventional wars, COIN wars are usually described in terms of having a ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ outcome – rather than one of outright ‘victory’ or ‘defeat’. Progress in COIN is conveyed instead in the more cautious, less dramatic, but nevertheless steady and healthy language of ‘gains’, ‘losses’ and positive or negative ‘trends’ within the population.
One could say that COIN wars are won very slowly: there can ultimately be victories, but they are victories in slow-motion.
(9) The Duration of Conventional & COIN Wars
As to the issue of war duration, because conventional wars involve clearly delineated belligerents and are fought using conventional military means which have finite limits, conventional wars – in the modern era at least – tend to be of reasonably short duration when compared with the wars of history, except in extraordinary circumstances (such as the decade-long Iran-Iraq War from 1979-1989). Evidence of this short-term trend may be seen in the conventional wars of the twentieth century: the First World War, for instance, lasted just over four years (September 1914 – November 1918); the Second World War came to an end just shy of the six-year mark (September 1939 – August 1945); the Korean War extended three years (June 1950 – July 1953); the Gulf War (a.k.a. Gulf War I) lasted only seven months (August 1990 – February 1991); and the U.S.-led coalition’s conventional military overthrow of the Saddam dictatorship (now often referred to as Gulf War II) just two months (March 2003 – May 2003).
However, it is clear from this discussion that the winding-down of an insurgency, and its corresponding COIN counter-measures, usually takes place over very long, extended periods of time, rendering a COIN war a campaign of very long duration. Indeed, in comparison with the relatively short lengths of modern conventional wars, especially over the recent decades in which wars have begun and ended in the space of a few months (e.g. Gulf War I and the initial military overthrow of the Saddam regime in Gulf War II and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001), COIN is a long-term commitment. History shows that successful COIN campaigns require an investment of between 10-12 years on average. [85]
This fundamentally-long time frame is in some ways counterproductive to a COIN campaign: firstly, it impinges on the commitment and determination of both military personnel within the armed forces, as well as their political masters who are pressured by a vacillating and often critical electorate; and secondly, it serves to encourage and embolden insurgency fighters when they see COIN forces ‘dribble in and out’ of the campaign and sense ever-weakening political commitment on the part of the counter-insurgents.[86] Indeed, so demoralising are protracted campaigns to COIN forces that Callwell emphatically argues that COIN forces must do all they can to avoid protracted wars, ‘especially by democracies where the electorate periodically weighs the costs and benefits of waging a counterinsurgency campaign.’[87]
Komer: An overview of the human mistakes or errors made in the U.S.-led campaign in Vietnam, which aided the Communist Viet Cong insurgency, led America to retreat and withdraw its forces, and resulted in both the war and Democratic South Vietnam being irrevocably lost there in 1975.[88]
Nevertheless, with counter-insurgency there is simply no ‘quick fix’. Instead, each counter-insurgency campaign will have its own rhythm, duration, and end point in response to the waning insurgent life cycle – and a ‘final end’ can not be predicted, determined or procured merely by desiring it. [For more information on the ‘life cycle’ of insurgencies, see ‘ISAF APPENDIX 1 – Insurgency: History, Definitions, Characteristics, Psychological Nature, Warfare & Life Cycle’.]
Indeed, the only way to curtail the length of a COIN campaign is by either recognising the insurgency in its earliest stages and overpowering it while it is still in its infancy, or alternatively and more frequently, through developing a well-defined strategy to keep the COIN war from becoming aimless, haphazard and unmethodical.[89] According to Metz & Millen, sustaining the political commitment of COIN forces is additionally a very important part of ‘force packaging’ in a COIN campaign during this long time period, since ‘successful counterinsurgency takes many years, often a decade or more.’[90]
Nevertheless, despite the long-term commitment, continuous effort, and often great cost in blood and treasure that is required to sustain a COIN campaign against a violent destabilising insurgency in a theatre of conflict, this price-tag is ultimately necessary and required if the insurgency or insurgencies in question must be quelled or defeated in the interests of national security or international security – and even more so if the campaign in question is important for both simultaneously.
Conclusion
From this overview it is readily apparent that non-traditional, counter-insurgency war is of quite another character altogether than that of traditional conventional war. Because each type of war involves a different kind of Enemy, they each necessitate a disparate kind of response, causing the two types of war to contrast markedly from each other.
When it comes to designing a well-defined and comprehensive strategy for a war campaign, it is therefore essential first of all to recognise exactly what kind of war it is that one is fighting. As Clausewitz states: ‘The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking’.[91] Conventional wars and counter-insurgency wars will necessitate very different kinds of strategy.
If embarking on the latter, COIN warfare will hold heavy implications and responsibilities for counter-insurgents.
Firstly, planners must understand exactly what kind of warfare COIN comprises – a long, protracted psycho-political struggle, fought mainly on the psychological plain of battle, for the hearts and minds of the local populace, especially the ‘empty middle’ of the majority population.
Planners must hence, secondly, also understand what kind of campaign must be waged to secure this objective, namely, a largely psycho-political campaign with a small security edge. Or in other words, a people-centric rather than an enemy-centric campaign.
Thirdly, planners must also recognise that COIN war is supremely complex, sometimes referred to as the ‘thinking man’s war’ and even ‘the graduate level of war’.[92] As the U.S. COIN Manual states: ‘Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.’[93]
Finally, planners need to always stay focused on the one golden rule of counter-insurgency: the local populace are the prize and the king-makers. Only through winning the support of the people will a COIN war have a successful outcome. Indeed, Boot argues that in a counter-insurgency campaign the goal is far more difficult than winning territory – one must win the allegiance of the people who live there [emphasis added].[94]
The COIN ‘way of war’ – the drumbeat of COIN warfare – is perhaps best summarised by one military officer who served in the NATO-led COIN campaign in Afghanistan in 2010: ‘COIN is a mindset, not a tactic, technique or procedure’.[95]
* For information on the extent and impact of national caveats on the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here:
http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] ‘Karl Von Clausewitz – Clausewitz Quotes/Quotations’, Military Quotes, http://www.military-quotes.com/Clausewitz.htm, (accessed 7 February 2011).
[2] J. Kiszely (LTGEN), ‘Learning about Counter-Insurgency’, RUSI Journal, (December) 2006, p. 16, www.rusi.org/publication/journal/ref:A4587F6831E1A6, (accessed 11 March 2009).
[3] ‘Karl Von Clausewitz – Clausewitz Quotes/Quotations’, Military Quotes, op. cit.
[4] Kiszely, ‘Learning about Counter-Insurgency’, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
[5] D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, Presented at Small Wars Center of Excellence Counterinsurgency Seminar 07, Quantico, VA, 26 September 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/COINSeminarSummaryReport.doc, (accessed 5 January 2011).
[6] ibid.
[7] ibid.
[8] ibid.
[9] ibid.
[10] Cited in Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[11] ibid.
[12] ibid.
[13] ibid.
[14] ibid.
[15] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[16] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[17] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[18] Kiszely, ‘Learning about Counter-Insurgency’, op. cit., p. 16.
[19] D. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice [1964], cited in Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[20] Galula, ibid.
[21] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[22] ibid.
[23] ibid.
[24] ibid.
[25] ibid.
[26] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[27] ibid.
[28] ibid.
[29] ibid.
[30] A. Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare’, in Evans M., Parkin, R. & Ryan, A. (eds.) Future Armies Future Challenges – Land warfare in the information age, Crows Nest, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2004, pp. 293, 306.
[31] A. Ryan, ‘Land forces in 21st-century coalition operations: implications for the Asia-Pacific’, in Evans, M., Parkin, R & Ryan, A. (eds.), Future Armies Future Challenges – Land warfare in the information age, Crows Nest, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2004, ibid., p. 111; J.S. Goldstein & J.C. Pevehouse, ‘Conventional Military Forces’, International Relations (4th ed.), New York, Pearson Education International, 2008, p. 147.
[32] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[33] ibid.
[34] Created based on information provided in a slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[35] ibid.
[36] ibid.
[37] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[38] U.S. DoD, Headquarters DA, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 1-1.
[39] ibid.
[40] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[41] Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare’, op. cit., p. 306; P. Abigail (MAJGEN), ‘Preparing the Australian Army for 21st-Century Conflict: Problems and Perspectives’, in Evans, M., Parkin, R & Ryan, A. (eds.), Future Armies Future Challenges – Land warfare in the information age, Crows Nest, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2004, p. 241; J.A. Gentry, ‘Doomed to Fail: America’s Blind Faith in Military Technology’, Parameters (Winter 2002-03), http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/gentry.htm, (accessed 22 October 2008).
[42] J. Black, ‘Qualifying Technology’, Rethinking Military History, USA, Routledge, 2004, p. 123.
[43] P. Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical Considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol.18, no. 4, (December) 2007, p. 670; D. Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 17, issue 12, (December 2005), p. 8; Black, ‘Qualifying technology’, ibid., p. 122.
[44] C.S. Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, (Winter) 2007, pp. 49,55.
[45] Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, op. cit., p. 8.
[46] Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare’, op. cit., p. 294.
[47] M. van Creveld, ‘Technology and War II – Postmodern War?’, in Townsend, C. (ed.) The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 311; M. van Creveld, ‘The Future of Low-Intensity War’, in L. Freeman (ed.), War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 357.
[48] Creveld, ‘Technology and War II – Postmodern War?’, ibid., p. 313.
[49] ibid.
[50] ibid., p. 311.
[51] M. Boot, ‘Humvees and IEDs: Iraq, March 20, 2003 – May 1, 2005’, War Made New – Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World, New York, Gotham Books, Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 2006, p. 405.
[52] ibid.
[53] Cited in Boot, ‘Humvees and IEDs: Iraq, March 20, 2003 – May 1, 2005’, ibid., p. 405.
[54] Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, op. cit., p. 8; M.C. Meigs (GEN), ‘Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare’, Parameters (Winter 2002-03), volume 33, pp. 4-19. http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/02winter/gentry.htm, (accessed 22 October 2008).
[55] Ryan, ‘Conclusion: Early 21st-century armies and the challenge of unrestricted warfare’, op. cit., p. 306.
[56] Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, op. cit., 8.
[57] ibid., p. 8; M. van Creveld, ‘The Future of Low-Intensity War’, in L. Freeman (ed.), War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 357.
[58] Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, ibid., p. 8; Meigs, ‘Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric Warfare’, op. cit.
[59] Creveld, ‘Technology and War II – Postmodern War?’, op. cit., p. 313; Creveld, ‘The Future of Low-Intensity War’, op. cit., p. 357.
[60] Creveld, ‘Technology and War II – Postmodern War?’, ibid., p. 311.
[61] D. Edgerton, ‘War’, The Shock of the Old: Technology & Global History since 1900, U.K., Profile Books, 2006, p. 152.
[62] Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, op. cit., p. 8.
[63] U.S. DoD, Headquarters DA, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, op. cit., p. 1-1.
[64] Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, op. cit., pp. 48-49, 50; Ucko, ‘US counterinsurgency in the information age’, op. cit., p. 10; Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan’, op. cit., p. 669.
[65] Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, ibid., p. 51.
[66] D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006. p.6, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf, (accessed 5 January 2011).
[67] ibid.
[68] ibid.
[69] ibid.
[70] ibid.; Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[71] Kilcullen, ‘Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency’, ibid.
[72] S. Maloney, ‘Contemporary History Panel Discussion’, The Society for Military History Annual Conference, hosted by Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, U.S.A., 2-5 April 2009.
[73] Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[74] ibid.
[75] ibid.
[76] ibid.
[77] ibid.
[78] Cited in Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[79] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[80] Cited in Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid.
[81] ibid.
[82] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, ibid..
[83] Gray, ‘Irregular Warfare: One Nature, Many Characters’, op. cit., pp. 44, 48.
[84] ibid., p. 45.
[85] ibid., p. 49; Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan’, op. cit., p. 672.
[86] Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan’, ibid., pp. 671-672.
[87] Cited in Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan’, ibid., p. 672.
[88] A modified slide taken from Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, op. cit.
[89] Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan’, op. cit., pp. 670-671.
[90] S. Metz & R. Millen (LTCOL), ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response’, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), p. vii, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/insurgency21c.pdf, (accessed 21 July 2010).
[91] ‘Karl Von Clausewitz – Clausewitz Quotes/Quotations’, Military Quotes, op. cit.
[92] United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), Headquarters Department of the Army (DA), FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, p. 1-1, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12257/, (accessed 29 January 2009).
[93] ibid.
[94] Boot, ‘Humvees and IEDs: Iraq, March 20, 2003 – May 1, 2005’, op. cit., p. 415.
[95] M.T. Hall, ‘How to win in Afghanistan and how to lose’, International Security Assistance Force, http://www.isaf.nato.int, (accessed 1 December 2010).