#38 ISAF National Caveats in Afghanistan: Summary of Research Findings & Future Implications

“Be sure your sins will find you out.” These are the full findings and conclusions of my doctoral research that assessed the effort by the world’s Free Democracies to protect and build the new Democratic State of Afghanistan, and simultaneously counter and neutralise Islamist Terror Forces, in the ground-zero GWOT battleground of Afghanistan. The PhD research in the domain of Defence & Strategic Studies was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the classified and sensitive issue of politico-military ‘national caveats’ (ROE constraints or government ‘reins’ on military forces) and their effects on allied multinational security operations. It focused on: (1) the extent of the “caveat problem” in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan; and (2) the tangible impact of these ISAF national caveats on the ISAF’s prosecution of security operations and the overall operational effectiveness of the entire counter-insurgency mission to secure and stabilise Afghanistan.

As this blog will show, this ground-breaking research, drawing from multiple primary and secondary sources including the once-classified U.S. diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, has exposed the critical politico-military problem of ‘national caveats’ in modern multinational warfare. In short, national caveats have undermined, eroded, countered, crippled, sabotaged and needlessly elongated the international effort made by many of the world’s leading Free Democracies to effectively and successfully wage war against Islamic Extremists in Afghanistan, in defence of their own national security as well as in protection and support of their own fundamental, cherished, and collective beliefs and values. In this way, these government national constraints – that have been deliberately and repeatedly imposed on national military forces by NATO and Partner nations contributing forces to the ISAF mission from 2001-2014 – have actually acted as guarantors of ‘disunity of effort’ and ‘operational ineffectiveness’. These caveat ‘flies’ in the ISAF ointment have led to widespread and repeated failures at the PRT, Regional Command sector, Operational, and Strategic level – delaying, eroding and even halting progress across every pillar of the COIN strategy, and frustrating both the key objectives and the overall aim of the entire mission.

An unending ‘Cycle of Caveat Ineffectiveness’ has existed for the duration of the mission. Lack of political will and resolute commitment at the highest political levels in European and global Capitals – as plainly evidenced by the pervasive, continuous and widespread imposition of risk-averse and self-protecting national caveats on military forces – leads to disunity of purpose and effort, handicapped or anaemic security and combat forces and operations, security disasters, unwilling rescuers or reinforcement among allies, increased military and civilian casualties, slowed progress, loss of native support, loss of time, and unwise desperate measures – which all work together to decrease political will and commitment in international Capitals even further. In other words, national caveat constraints are both a symptom of disunity among allies and a recipe for failure in every multinational or allied security campaign in which they are present.

The research findings also hold grave implications for: Multinational Operations (MNOs) generally; the Democratic State of Afghanistan and the Global War on Terror (GWOT); the NATO Collective-Security Organisation in North America and Europe; and for the large and critical ‘Caveat Gap’ that exists in academic research and scholarship in the domains of both Defence & Strategic Studies and Political Science & International Relations on the serious and extremely negative role, impact, and effects of national caveat ‘ROE red-tape’ within important security operations conducted in the interest of securing national, regional and/or global security.

However, overall, two conclusions are very clear – as the long NATO-led mission in Afghanistan has plainly shown, in the most painful way, and in the midst of the most critical of wars waged to protect and safeguard national, regional and global security worldwide. NATO today is in fact an obese, heavy, unwilling, and clumsy, fraud of a fighting machine for the wars of the 21st century. And most of the Free Democracies of the world have lost their faith, will, heart and stomach to fight and die for the causes they say they most believe in, stand for, and prize.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 6 – List of 215 Known National Caveats Imposed by ISAF TCNs in Afghanistan, 2001-2012

A list of 215 national caveats, ranging across 21 categories of politico-military caveat constraints amongst allied forces, known to have been imposed by the governments of NATO and Non-NATO Nation-States contributing military forces to operate as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, over a period of more than a decade of war between the years 2001-2012. The list was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

#35 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?

This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE), relating to deployed military commanders on operations: Are deployed military commanders given discretionary authority, by their civilian masters in government, to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre?

ROE will first be outlined as two classes of military orders or instructions issued to national armed forces deployed at home or abroad to act on behalf of the government and the nation of the State: these are (1) ‘offensive’ military orders for Mission Accomplishment (to achieve the military objectives towards attainment of the overall political aim) & (2) ‘defensive’ military orders for Self-Defence when encountering Enemy or Hostile opposition (intent and actions) during the course of their military operations. Next, I will discuss who has the power to change ROE, and describe the three differing degrees of ‘Discretionary Authority’ that governments tend to give to their military commanders in conflict theatres today, in the modern 21st century world of warfare. Subsequently, this real-world analysis will end with a discussion of the negative consequences of overly-constrained commanders in conflict theatres – which so often leads to ludicrous, illogical and tragic security situations and outcomes for fighting military personnel (and also defenceless local civilians) on operations, providing two such examples from warzones concerning New Zealand armed forces in East Timor during 2000 and Danish armed forces in Afghanistan during 2006. Finally, I will discuss this modern phenomenon of ‘Ridiculous ROE’ as the result of the significant and ever-abiding problem of the ‘political-military disconnect’ or ‘grey area’ of incomprehension and misunderstanding, that exists between the political masters in the political sphere and military commanders in the military sphere – once alluded to centuries ago, by the famous, Prussian, realist, military commander, veteran, theorist and philosopher, Karl von Clausewitz.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 5 – Table Displaying the Caveat-Free & Caveat-Imposing NATO & Partner Nation TCNs within the ISAF Coalition, December 2003-2012

This table displays the oscillating and variating numbers and nations of caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO & Partner Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, over the passing years between December 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 4 – Table of National Caveat Imposition among ISAF TCNs in Totality, 2003-2012

This table displays the dismal “full picture” in totality of national caveat imposition within the NATO-led ISAF coalition force by NATO and Partner ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on their deployed national contingent forces, between August 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

#33 The Problem of “National Caveats” in NATO Operations around the World, 1996-2016

This blog will examine more closely NATO’s history of national caveat imposition in NATO military operations. It will begin by providing 5 reasons for caveat imposition within NATO missions. It will subsequently outline the recurring habit of NATO nations to contribute caveat-constrained military forces to NATO missions around the world over two decades, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Libya and most notoriously in Afghanistan. It will next describe the crux of NATO’s “caveat problem”, and then describe the three, largest, negative, caveat effects that have continuously resulted from NATO caveat imposition, namely (1) divided and inflexible NATO forces; (2) a disunified Multinational Force incapable of performing fundamental tasks; and (3) inequality and uneven burden-sharing within each NATO Multinational Force. Lastly, I will offer some final thoughts on this important issue of national caveats within NATO missions, with reference to the purpose and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.

#32 BACKGROUND – The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces

#32 BACKGROUND   The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during

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#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population

#31 BACKGROUND   COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission led by the militarily capable – but politically constrained – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and prosecuted in Afghanistan from 2001-2014, has been one of

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#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014

#30 BACKGROUND   NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance

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#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success

#29 BACKGROUND   The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   In the last blog I provided a brief introduction to the ancient land and peoples of Afghanistan, and outlined the central roles that Pakistan, the Pashtun Taliban

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