There has been an enduring sensitivity and resistance, over the past two decades, to examining and discussing the issue of caveat imposition and its detrimental effects within Multinational Operations (MNOs) on the part of many national governments within the international community. This widespread unwillingness to examine the impact of national caveats on operational effectiveness within MNOs has directly led to the caveat-generated stalemate within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, a situation that has resulted in a range of negative effects for the success of the mission over the past decade from 2002-2012, especially during the years after NATO expanded to take full command over the Afghan AOR in 2006. Effort has been wasted, time has been lost, progress has been delayed, COIN has been compromised, and military and civilian casualties have increased as a result of this network of ISAF national caveats. Both unity of effort within the ISAF force, and the resultant operational effectiveness of the mission, have been seriously undermined by the presence of multiple NATO and Partner national contingents fettered by government-imposed caveat restrictions, leading to the delayed attainment of mission objectives and the poor prosecution of COIN. These findings do not bode well for the success of the ISAF mission to both secure and stabilise Democratic Afghanistan, a new, young, developing and modernising country – formerly a Taliban ‘Terror State’ and terrorist safe-haven – established in the wake of the Afghanistan-based, 9/11, Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on U.S. and international citizens working in the American homeland, by the UN Security Council, Afghan patriots and exiles at the UN-sponsored 2001 Bonn Conference, the Afghan transitional government elected by the 2002 Afghan Loya Jirga, 502 Afghanistan-representative delegates at the 2003 Grand Loya Jirga in Kabul, and the legitimate, permanent, and multi-ethnic Afghan government formed following the nationwide 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections, with political, military and financial support provided over many years from scores of friendly and allied nations of the international community. This extremely negative and obstructive caveat reality within the NATO-led and UN-supported ISAF Coalition force stands even in spite of the fact that mission success, of achieving the objective of a secure, stable, democratic and anti-terror Afghanistan in Central-South Asia, is so critical within the overarching context of our global struggle against international and national Islamo-fascist terrorism and empire-building in the modern post-9/11 era of the 21st century.
#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this hazy and poorly-understood subject. In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first question: Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?
#33 The Problem of “National Caveats” in NATO Operations around the World, 1996-2016
This blog will examine more closely NATO’s history of national caveat imposition in NATO military operations. It will begin by providing 5 reasons for caveat imposition within NATO missions. It will subsequently outline the recurring habit of NATO nations to contribute caveat-constrained military forces to NATO missions around the world over two decades, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Libya and most notoriously in Afghanistan. It will next describe the crux of NATO’s “caveat problem”, and then describe the three, largest, negative, caveat effects that have continuously resulted from NATO caveat imposition, namely (1) divided and inflexible NATO forces; (2) a disunified Multinational Force incapable of performing fundamental tasks; and (3) inequality and uneven burden-sharing within each NATO Multinational Force. Lastly, I will offer some final thoughts on this important issue of national caveats within NATO missions, with reference to the purpose and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.
#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014
#30 BACKGROUND NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” “There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.” « Il y a
#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations
#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley In earlier blogs the vital concept of ‘unity of effort’ for effective multinational security campaigns was explored, in addition to the underlying structures of ‘unity of command’ and ‘cooperation, coordination and consensus’ (see blog “#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations” and “#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations”). U.S. General of the Army (GA) Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander over more than one million allied forces in both the