This table displays the oscillating and variating numbers and nations of caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO & Partner Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, over the passing years between December 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 4 – Table of National Caveat Imposition among ISAF TCNs in Totality, 2003-2012
This table displays the dismal “full picture” in totality of national caveat imposition within the NATO-led ISAF coalition force by NATO and Partner ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on their deployed national contingent forces, between August 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.
#33 The Problem of “National Caveats” in NATO Operations around the World, 1996-2016
This blog will examine more closely NATO’s history of national caveat imposition in NATO military operations. It will begin by providing 5 reasons for caveat imposition within NATO missions. It will subsequently outline the recurring habit of NATO nations to contribute caveat-constrained military forces to NATO missions around the world over two decades, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Libya and most notoriously in Afghanistan. It will next describe the crux of NATO’s “caveat problem”, and then describe the three, largest, negative, caveat effects that have continuously resulted from NATO caveat imposition, namely (1) divided and inflexible NATO forces; (2) a disunified Multinational Force incapable of performing fundamental tasks; and (3) inequality and uneven burden-sharing within each NATO Multinational Force. Lastly, I will offer some final thoughts on this important issue of national caveats within NATO missions, with reference to the purpose and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.
#32 BACKGROUND – The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces
#32 BACKGROUND The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during
#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population
#31 BACKGROUND COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission led by the militarily capable – but politically constrained – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and prosecuted in Afghanistan from 2001-2014, has been one of
#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014
#30 BACKGROUND NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance
#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success
#29 BACKGROUND The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” In the last blog I provided a brief introduction to the ancient land and peoples of Afghanistan, and outlined the central roles that Pakistan, the Pashtun Taliban
#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012
#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” My research comprises an in-depth study of the problem of restrictive national caveats within the multinational NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, and
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” “There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.” « Il y a
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In a series of previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives