#32 BACKGROUND The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during
#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014
#30 BACKGROUND NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC
#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In a series of previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives
#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law?
#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law? – Dr Regeena Kingsley ‘How the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous.’[1] – Winston S. Churchill In previous blogs I have presented case-studies of Multinational Operations (MNOs) in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo, in which participating national forces – bound by government-imposed national caveat constraints – failed to use lethal force at the critical and necessary moments in order to fully uphold or pursue the primary security objectives of their security mission mandates. In
#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots”
#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”, I examined the reasons for, and impact of, diverse sets of Rules of Engagement (ROE) between force contributing nations to a Multinational Operation (MNO), especially with regard to national caveat constraints. I also presented the fallacy of the “caveat myth” – still believed and asserted by many power-holders and policy-makers today – that national caveat prohibition and limitation rules are “positive” ROE
#22 Recommended Viewing: The UN, National Caveats & Human Carnage in Rwanda
#22 Recommended Viewing: The UN, National Caveats & Human Carnage in Rwanda Movie #1: “Shake Hands with the Devil” (2007) The challenges and obstacles faced by the UNAMIR Commander in Rwanda, Canadian Major General (MAJGEN) Roméo Dallaire, before, during and after the Rwandan genocide. Trailer: “As genocide rages in Rwanda, Major General Roméo Dallaire (Roy Dupuis) is assigned to lead the United Nations peacekeeping force. Fighting for his own survival as well as the millions of innocents threatened by the war, General Dallaire finds himself torn between duty and conscience in his efforts to prevent the country’s descent into
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia
#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia – Dr Regeena Kingsley In the last blog I detailed the shocking and profoundly disturbing events that took place under Dutch command in the Srebrenica United Nations (UN) “Protected Area” in 1995 within the broader UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see blog #20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”). These tragic real-life events have haunted Serbia, the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), the Federation of Bosnia
#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”
#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area” – Dr Regeena Kingsley In my recent blog, “#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina”, the severely negative effects of limitation and prohibition rules of engagement – otherwise known as “national caveats” – were examined with reference to failed United Nations (UN) operations in Angola (UNAVEM II), Rwanda (UNAMIR) and Bosnia (UNPROFOR). With the return to civil war in Angola in 1992-1993, an unwise and unrealistic UN mandate, combined with
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina
#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina – Dr Regeena Kingsley The last blog discussed the key choice facing all Multinational Operations (MNOs) operators of having either standardised or disparate Rules of Engagement (ROE) between national contingents operating within the mission (see blog “#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations”). It outlined, firstly, the various difficulties posed to attempts by security organisations to standardise ROE among the States contributing armed forces to an MNO, and secondly, the impact of diverse sets of national ROE on
#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations
#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley In earlier blogs the vital concept of ‘unity of effort’ for effective multinational security campaigns was explored, in addition to the underlying structures of ‘unity of command’ and ‘cooperation, coordination and consensus’ (see blog “#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations” and “#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations”). U.S. General of the Army (GA) Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander over more than one million allied forces in both the