WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) – List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by the 8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012

This list displays the known national caveat ROE constraints (of 21 caveat categories of rules), that were imposed by successive governments of the 8 NATO Lead Nations in the ISAF mission, in order to constrain the movements, activities, operations, and fighting combat capabilities of their own national forces in Afghanistan – and this despite being vested with heavy leadership command responsibilities for security and stability in their respective ISAF Regional Command sectors. These caveats were all in force, at one time or another, or even continuously over long periods of time amounting to many years, on ISAF Lead Nation security and stability forces, over the course of ten years of conventional and counter-insurgency war waged against anti-democracy terrorists and insurgents between 2002-2012. It was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

WAR ON TERROR: OEF APPENDIX – List of Known National Caveats Imposed by OEF TCNs on National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2001-2012

This list displays the ‘national caveat’ limitation and prohibition rules known to have been imposed on national security forces, contributed and deployed to Afghanistan to operate as part of the U.S.-led Operational Enduring Freedom (OEF) mission, by the governments of OEF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) Germany, Canada, Spain and Turkey.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(b) – List of Known National Caveats by Category Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, December 2001- December 2012

A list of known national caveats within the ISAF Allied Force, arranged according to the 21 caveat categories found to be in existence and active during the ISAF mission from 2001-2014. Namely: Mission caveats; Theatre of Operations caveats; Geographic caveats; Regional caveats; Area of Operations (AO) caveats; Force Numbers-in-Theatre caveats; Command caveats; Weaponry & Lethal Force caveats; General Operations caveats; Ground Combat Operations caveats; Ground Security Operations caveats; Air Combat Operations caveats; Other Air Operations caveats; Time caveats; Weather caveats; Counter-Terrorism caveats; Counter-Narcotics caveats; ISAF Cooperation caveats; ANSF Cooperation caveats; PRT Security Operations caveats; and PRT Stability Operations caveats. The list was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research.

This PhD research in the academic domain of Defence & Strategic Studies, and undertaken over a period of 7 years from 2008-2014, was the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of ‘national caveats’ and their effects within multinational security operations. The research focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan, and examined and analysed the extent and tangible impact of ISAF national caveats on ‘unity of effort’ and ‘operational effectiveness’ within the ISAF COIN mission, over the period of ten years from 2002-2012.

#35 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?

This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE), relating to deployed military commanders on operations: Are deployed military commanders given discretionary authority, by their civilian masters in government, to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre?

ROE will first be outlined as two classes of military orders or instructions issued to national armed forces deployed at home or abroad to act on behalf of the government and the nation of the State: these are (1) ‘offensive’ military orders for Mission Accomplishment (to achieve the military objectives towards attainment of the overall political aim) & (2) ‘defensive’ military orders for Self-Defence when encountering Enemy or Hostile opposition (intent and actions) during the course of their military operations. Next, I will discuss who has the power to change ROE, and describe the three differing degrees of ‘Discretionary Authority’ that governments tend to give to their military commanders in conflict theatres today, in the modern 21st century world of warfare. Subsequently, this real-world analysis will end with a discussion of the negative consequences of overly-constrained commanders in conflict theatres – which so often leads to ludicrous, illogical and tragic security situations and outcomes for fighting military personnel (and also defenceless local civilians) on operations, providing two such examples from warzones concerning New Zealand armed forces in East Timor during 2000 and Danish armed forces in Afghanistan during 2006. Finally, I will discuss this modern phenomenon of ‘Ridiculous ROE’ as the result of the significant and ever-abiding problem of the ‘political-military disconnect’ or ‘grey area’ of incomprehension and misunderstanding, that exists between the political masters in the political sphere and military commanders in the military sphere – once alluded to centuries ago, by the famous, Prussian, realist, military commander, veteran, theorist and philosopher, Karl von Clausewitz.

#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?

After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this classified, sensitive, hazy, poorly-understood but critically important subject.

In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first crucial question: Are ROE legally-binding ‘military orders’ or are they merely ‘guidelines’ to military personnel?

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 5 – Table Displaying the Caveat-Free & Caveat-Imposing NATO & Partner Nation TCNs within the ISAF Coalition, December 2003-2012

This table displays the oscillating and variating numbers and nations of caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO & Partner Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, over the passing years between December 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 4 – Table of National Caveat Imposition among ISAF TCNs in Totality, 2003-2012

This table displays the dismal “full picture” in totality of national caveat imposition within the NATO-led ISAF coalition force by NATO and Partner ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on their deployed national contingent forces, between August 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

#32 BACKGROUND – The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces

#32 BACKGROUND   The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during

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#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014

#30 BACKGROUND   NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance

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#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success

#29 BACKGROUND   The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   In the last blog I provided a brief introduction to the ancient land and peoples of Afghanistan, and outlined the central roles that Pakistan, the Pashtun Taliban

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