WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) – List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by the 8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 10(b)   PDF List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by the 8 NATO “Lead Nations” of ISAF Regional Commands  in Afghanistan, 2002-2012   Dr Regeena Kingsley PDF – ISAF APPENDIX 10(b) List of National Caveats Imposed on Armed Forces by 8 NATO Lead Nations of ISAF Regional Commands in Afghanistan, 2002-2012 (41 pages)

WAR ON TERROR: OEF APPENDIX – List of Known National Caveats Imposed by OEF TCNs on National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2001-2012

WAR ON TERROR:   OEF APPENDIX – List of Known National Caveats Imposed by OEF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2001-2012     Dr Regeena Kingsley PDF – OEF APPENDIX – List of National Caveats Imposed by OEF TCNs on National Armed Forces Deployed to Afghanistan, 2001-2012   (2 pages)

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 7(b) – List of Known National Caveats by Category Imposed by ISAF TCNs on National Forces, December 2001- December 2012

This list of ISAF national caveats by category was created based on the caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral research on the ISAF security assistance mission between 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

#35 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?

This blog will address the second crucial question on Rules of Engagement (ROE) relating to deployed military commanders on operations, and whether or not they have discretionary authority to change or alter their lethal force instructions in any way, as they see fit, based on the conditions on the ground in theatre. 

#34 Crucial Questions on Rules Of Engagement (ROE): (Q1/3) Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?

After more than 13 years of research on ROE instructions issued by governments to national military contingents deployed to operate as part of multinational security endeavours around the world, and especially the continuing existence and consistently negative effects of national caveat limitations and bans within these ROE, I will now attempt in the following to shine more light on this hazy and poorly-understood subject. In particular, I will try to assist general understanding on this vital issue in military operations by answering, to the best of my knowledge, three basic and crucial questions as to the normative status and practices of nations with regard to ROE. This blog addresses the first question: Are ROE Legally-Binding “Military Orders” or Merely Guidelines?

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 5 – Table Displaying the Caveat-Free & Caveat-Imposing NATO & Partner Nation TCNs within the ISAF Coalition, December 2003-2012

This table displays the oscillating and variating numbers and nations of caveat-free and caveat-imposing NATO & Partner Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan, over the passing years between December 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

WAR ON TERROR: ISAF APPENDIX 4 – Table of National Caveat Imposition among ISAF TCNs in Totality, 2003-2012

This table displays the dismal “full picture” in totality of national caveat imposition within the NATO-led ISAF coalition force by NATO and Partner ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) on their deployed national contingent forces, between August 2003 – December 2012. The table was created based on the national caveat information I gathered and compiled during the course of my doctoral caveat research on the ISAF Security Assistance mission in Afghanistan from 2008-2014, especially the data relating to the specific and various constraints imposed by caveat-imposing TCNs within the ISAF coalition on their deployed national armed forces, over the period of more than a decade of warfare in Afghanistan between December 2001 – December 2012.

#32 BACKGROUND – The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces

#32 BACKGROUND   The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during

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#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014

#30 BACKGROUND   NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance

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#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success

#29 BACKGROUND   The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success   – Dr Regeena Kingsley   * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”   In the last blog I provided a brief introduction to the ancient land and peoples of Afghanistan, and outlined the central roles that Pakistan, the Pashtun Taliban

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