#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE
within Multinational Security Operations
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
In earlier blogs the vital concept of ‘unity of effort’ for effective multinational security campaigns was explored, in addition to the underlying structures of ‘unity of command’ and ‘cooperation, coordination and consensus’ (see blog “#7 The Fundamental Principle of “Unity of Effort” in Multinational Operations” and “#8 The “Unity of Effort Model” – Vital for Success in Multinational Operations”).
U.S. General of the Army (GA) Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander over more than one million allied forces in both the European and North African theatre of operations during World War II, once concluded that true unity of effort within an allied operation ultimately depended on the cooperation between individual senior officers and soldiers involved in the military enterprise. As he wrote in his memoirs:
‘Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field…It will therefore never be possible to say the problem of establishing unity in any allied command is ever completely solved. This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential.’[1]
Nevertheless, in Multinational Operations (MNOs) today individual servicemen in the field – deployed to act on behalf and in the interest of their own particular nation – can in fact only cooperate with allies within the boundaries or limitations prescribed for them by their political masters. That is to say, the degree of cooperation exhibited by national military officers depends almost entirely upon their own nation’s commitment to the cause and to the national goal for which the deployment of military forces was authorised. In short, the degree of cooperation exhibited by a nation’s armed forces with other international armed forces within a MNO depends entirely on that nation’s political will.
This is a commitment most clearly indicated by the nation’s mandate governing its deployed armed forces and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) instructions for the use of force contained therein. Specifically, the extent of a nation’s political will and commitment to a MNO is best measured and expressed by the number and scope of the caveat limitation and prohibition rules contained within the force contingent’s ROE. This is because caveat imposition is indicative of a national government’s position on force protection in contrast to attaining the security objectives of the mission in hand, and in particular, which of the two is the higher priority in national terms.
A Key Choice: Standardised or Disparate ROE?
Indeed, national ROE within national contingents deployed to a MNO play a very important role in the multinational Command Control (C²) process (refer to blog “#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command and Control (C²)”). They are capable of both helping or hindering unity of effort within international, combined, security operations.
When ROE are standardised amongst the contributing nations to a MNO, thereby reducing the operational and procedural differences and obstacles between partners to a multinational campaign, unity of effort is ‘greatly enhanced’.[2] As the American Department of Defense Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations publication outlines, such standardisation measures are important for achieving the closest practical cooperation possible between allies and enable the most efficient and effective multinational warfighting capability. [3]
Due to the manifold negative effects resulting from disparate ROE between national contingents deployed to a MNO, some leading security bodies in the international system habitually seek to establish a ‘standard’ set of ROE among force contributing nations in the pre-deployment stage, in the belief that uniform ROE will improve efficient cooperation within a Multinational Force (MNF). As NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme states: ‘Reaching agreement on ROE among the states involved in a multinational force operation is critical to success’.[4] For instance, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed ROE guidelines, approved by the Under-Secretary General, as an often obligatory basis for national ROE formulation for any nation participating in a UN-led Peace Support Operation (PSO).[5]
In reality, however, the usual practice among troop contributing nations to a MNO is for ROE to be unstandardised, and therefore, to differ widely. Up until the mid-2000s, for instance, NATO had no approved universal ROE guidelines among its members for use in its operations, and indeed, a push for standardisation of ROE among members, prior to its assumption of command of the Afghan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, was not at all welcomed by its members.[6] As the Department of Defense Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations states: ‘Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought, but may not be achievable’.[7] This occurs for the following reasons.
1 Each State will have different national policy objectives, depending on each government’s political ideology, priorities, threat perception, goals within the international community, domestic support, and even years in government (affecting the government’s level of experience and impacting on the importance of upcoming elections). The nation’s historical experiences of conflict and conflict-resolution will also have a bearing, as will the political climate within the country, including not only the extent of the government’s own interest in that contribution, but also wider public perception toward the particular PSO.
2 Due to the disparate size, strength, training, equipment, funding and development of each nation’s military with respect to others, impacting on what the armed forces of the State can feasibly do, each State will also have different views on the operational situation and varying operational requirements.
3 Each State will have dissimilar legal obligations under domestic and international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), depending on the international agreements the State has ratified. This is particularly true in relation to counter-terrorism operations.[8] Moreover, even where certain States have all signed on to the same international LOAC conventions, their respective legal departments may interpret their obligations under that convention quite differently. This is also the case for obligations under Customary International Law (CIL) as it relates to armed conflict. As NATO’s PfP underscores: ‘There are sometimes disagreements over the interpretation of the obligations involved’.[9]
4 As with legal obligations, States comprising part of a MNF often have disparate understandings of the concept of self-defence as it relates to both the unit and individual soldier, aviator or sailor in the field, and interpret their rights differently.[10] This stands for the concept of mission accomplishment too, in which case States will have a list of limitations and prohibitions (national caveats) that are strikingly diverse.
5 The legal department of the State may have used a different ROE template than other States when beginning the ROE formulation process, causing dissimilar patterns to emerge between nations within a MNF (see blog “#11 How are Rules of Engagement Formed for Military Operations?”). For example, nations that adopt the UN ROE template from the outset will inevitably develop ROE that are different from those of the U.S., developed from the U.S. military’s own list of standardised ROE for all American operations abroad.
6 Finally, ROE may differ widely among troop contributing nations to a PSO simply because of disparate military or legal terminology – the conceptualization of certain terms – which can create confusion and misunderstandings within a MNF. For instance, in the Australian Defence Force OFOF (the order to open fire) is considered a separate concept distinct from ROE, whereas in the armed forces of the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand, as well as at the UN, there is no distinction made between the two at all – OFOF being part of ROE.[11]
All of these factors together can work to form ROE that differ markedly between nations of a MNF. These differences will show themselves in a variety of ways.
In terms of weaponry, national contingents may have disparate rules concerning which weapons are legitimate, resulting in differing attitudes to, and use of, weapons such as anti-personnel mines, napalm, white phosphorus and riot-control agents.[12]
National contingents may also differ with regard to criteria for lawful targeting. For example, some national contingents may be under instructions to target only terrorists or those carrying out armed attacks, while other contingents will also target those supporting the combatants through fundraising, recruitment or incitement, and even protected sites like schools and hospitals if they are being used by the Enemy force. [13]
Furthermore, national components of an international force may diverge in their treatment of noncombatants, adhering to different rules concerning the conditions required for detention and internment, or the criteria for entitlement to Prisoner of War status. [14]
It is in the area of low-level tactical operations that these differences within a MNF are most visible and their impact most keenly experienced – and usually by low-level ranks such as Sergeants, Corporals and Lance Corporals, among the ranks of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and even Privates. This is because it is at the level of tactical operations that ‘the rubber hits the road’, in that armed forces must action ROE to conduct operations involving the minimum use of force, determine who is ‘Enemy’ with all the difficulty of identification that that entails, apply military terminology or ‘war language’ to actual situations, and interact with civilians – all while dealing with the presence of the media and submitting to constant observation and scrutiny by the Red Cross or UN observers.[15]
In essence, this means that it is the lower ranks at the basic and lowest level of operations (and often the least experience) who have to grapple with the realities of divergent ROE in the field when operating in concert with allies – a somewhat inevitable state of affairs that does not bode well for the avoidance of future ROE-related security disasters within multinational campaigns.
The Impact of Diverse ROE
When operational ROE are not standardised, the diversity of national instructions in existence between allied contingents serve to erode operational C². Diverse sets of rules overseen from national capitals within national chains of command can interfere with the command of the Operational Commander of the MNO. For instance, ROE may prevent national contingents from obeying direct orders or responding positively to requests by the Operational Commander. In this way, disparate sets of national ROE can seriously undermine unity of command.
Moreover, diverse rules – especially very restrictive national caveats – can also hamstring large portions of the overall force, limiting or forbidding their combat capability, and thereby the extent to which they can actually be used by the Operational Commander in security operations. This is a serious impediment since, as one University of Edinburgh paper on MNOs explains:
‘In the end, a military’s basic function is to have the ability to use force to impose its will on an adversary. As such, MNF [Multinational Force] forces working within the ranges of MOOTW/SSC [Military Operations Other Than War/Small Scale Contingencies] must be able to rapidly shift to the “use of force or threat of force” to ensure mission accomplishment…The MNF “must be ready to fight” (or transit to fight) at all times. MNF planning and execution actions must acknowledge this.’[16]
Constraining the combat ability of security forces within the Multinational Force (MNF) of a MNO has, at a minimum, three negative effects:
1 It harms the most crucial aspect of control, compatibility and interoperability;
2 It leads to unequal burden-sharing between the contingents, whereby some contingents take part in the fighting, while others do not and thereby hold a so-called ‘stand aside’ role within the MNO (in fact disproportionate burden-sharing, as a result of this ROE division between ‘fighting’ and ‘non-fighting’ groups, is one of the clearest symptoms of the existence of disunity of effort caused by contradictory ROE between national contingents in a MNO); and
3 As a result of these disparate rules and the resulting division of the forces, tangibly negative consequences can result on the ground in terms of the successful prosecution of tactical security operations.
In this way, diverse and contrasting sets of ROE can also severely hinder the degree of cooperation, coordination and consensus within the MNF.
This adverse mixture of a lack of unity of command combined with a lack of cooperation, coordination and consensus – both caused by disparate ROE instructions within various contingents to a MNO – erodes unity of effort across the mission, the most important command element for successful multinational security operations.
Indeed, one could go so far as to argue that diverse sets of national ROE within multinational campaigns – especially with regard to caveat limitations and prohibitions – can act as guarantors of disunity of effort, and thereby, operational ineffectiveness.
Diversity of national ROE within a MNO not only erodes unity of effort, furthermore, but is also indicative of a lack of unity of purpose – one of the central constructs underpinning multinational unity of effort. As Canna states: ‘Without unity of purpose a coalition will necessarily lack unity of effort and unity of action, and individual actions by coalition members may be in competition and conflict with one another’. [17]
Do Caveats Really Protect National Forces? Countering the Caveat Myth
Despite these sobering realities, it has been argued in some quarters that the imposition of national caveats is a ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ practice, given the sovereign status of nations contributing to voluntary military coalitions, in addition to the desire by governments to ensure the protection of their forces deployed on missions overseas and to prevent or reduce casualties among military personnel.[18]
This overriding assumption and practice among nations raises an important question – do national caveats really protect national forces? In the short term, while it may be true that caveats do indeed safeguard national interests by keeping national forces out of harm’s way and thereby securing low casualties amongst national personnel serving as part of the mission, in the long term, the imposition of such caveats may actually serve to endanger both national and international interests by jeopardizing the successful execution of the mission, often with multiple negative consequences.
In some cases, for instance, insufficient mission progress engendered by such inappropriate rules, may cause the conflict to be prolonged as security stalls or deteriorates, thereby necessitating a longer period for the successful completion of the mission, accompanied by more and longer national deployments, and ultimately even higher casualties as military personnel are repeatedly deployed to an active conflict theatre for an extended period of time, amounting to years or even decades. The multinational operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan are good examples of this.
In other cases, inappropriate ROE for the operation at hand may even cause the failure of the entire military mission, resulting in a return to conflict in the theatre of operations. To exemplify, diverse and inappropriate ROE played a role in the failure of multinational peace and security operations in both Rwanda and Bosnia.
In the case of mission failures, the effort, treasure and lifeblood already invested and expended in securing peace and security within the conflict theatre has sadly been for nought. As the return to conflict usually signals the creation of a new multinational security campaign to succeed the failed first endeavour in restoring peace, security and stability to the region, nations must once again invest into a second international campaign. As a result even more effort, treasure and lifeblood is expended in the same theatre of conflict.
However, because the caveat seeds of disunity of effort are once again present within the new replacement operation, the results of the new multinational campaign can still be uncertain. Combat caveats on combat forces, together with a range of limitations and bans on other multinational security forces, can together lead to low levels of security in the MNO Area of Responsibility. In addition, the potential remains for security emergencies and disasters to easily spiral out of control as a result of the continuing diverse limitations and bans among Force Contributing Nations, leading to humanitarian disasters. The latter has occurred frequently within past MNOs, most notably in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Bosnia (UNPROFOR), Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF).
Indeed, this negative cycle of diverse ROE, disunity of effort, operational ineffectiveness and mission failure can repeat itself within the second MNO, leading to successive third and even fourth multinational missions in the very same conflict theatre as the decades roll by.
The following blogs will present several real-life examples of the negative effects of diverse ROE within MNOs. It will do this by examining a number of extremely serious caveat-related incidents that have occurred within past multinational security missions prosecuted around the world since the early 1990s, led and operated by either the UN or NATO, in the conflict theatres of Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo.
*This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] Five-Star General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower, ‘The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III’, pp. 1420-1424, cited in L. Marich (LTCOL), ‘Enhancing Command and Control in Multinational Operations’, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2002, pp. 11-12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404313, (accessed May 14, 2010).
[2] U.S. Department of Defence, (U.S. DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013, p. I-10, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf, (accessed 6 June 2009).
[3] Ibid.
[4] NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, Generated from a PfPLMS 0.2 learning object, NATO Partnership for Peace Forum (PfP ADL-WG, 2006), p. 1, http://pfpdev.ethz.ch/SCORMcontent/112363/scos/5/index.pdf, (accessed 8 October 2009).
[5] A. Strekalov (LTCOL), ‘Drafting ROE for Multinational Operations: EAPC/PfP Workshop: Towards Legal Interoperability Between Multinational Forces’, (Lucerne, Switzerland, 23-25 September 2002), NATO Partnership for Peace Forum, http: pforum.isn.ethz.ch/docs/Strekalov.doc, (accessed 8 October 2009).
[6] J. Garamone. ‘U.S. Wants More Robust Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan’, American Forces Press (AFP) Service, 7 October 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18122, (accessed 26 January 2009).
[7] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, op. cit., III-19.
[8] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 2.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., p. 3.
[11] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Directorate of Legal Services, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, in NZDF Operational Law Companion, May 1999, p. 11-2.
[12] NATO PfP, ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations against Terrorism’, op. cit., p. 2.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] NZDF, ‘11.0 Rules of Engagement’, paragraph 11.18, p. 11-2.
[16] ‘Chapter A-1: ‘Introduction – Asia-Pacific Shared Interests, MNF SOP Objectives, Applicability, and MNF Considerations’, in Multinational Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), 6th working draft, Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute (AIAI) of the University of Edinburgh, 10 April 2002, pp. A1 B-1, A1 B-2., www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/coax/demo/2002/mpat/SOP/A1.DOC (accessed 20 January 2009).
[17] M. A. Canna (LTCOL), ‘Key Characteristics Effecting Command and Control for Multinational Operations Involving United States Military Forces’, A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2004, pp. 50-51.
[18] A perspective argued by Sir Paul Lever , Chairman of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and General Jack Deverell, a former Commander-in-Chief in NATO’s Allied Forces North (AFNORTH) command, to a House of Commons Panel assessing British participation within the ISAF and the issue of national caveats within the mission (United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), Defence Committee, The Future of NATO and European Defence, Ninth Report of Session 2007-2008, 20 March 2008, pp. 37-38, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/111/111.pdf, (accessed 31 January 2013).