#32 BACKGROUND

 

The ISAF COIN Strategy:

4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) &

‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces

 

– Dr Regeena Kingsley

 

* This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”

 

The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during the fateful year of 2006. With the operation completing its final phases of geographic expansion throughout Afghanistan, and facing a resilient and resurgent anti-Government Taliban insurgency supported with weapons, training, transport, funds, sanctuary and battle advice provided by Pakistan, the ISAF was compelled against the wishes of many of principal NATO members and ISAF Lead Nations to fundamentally change the nature of its campaign in Afghanistan.  With these same reluctant NATO nations continuously rejecting a proposed ‘mission merger’ between the ISAF and the parallel Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operation as singularly unpalatable to European sensibilities and anti-American prejudices, the ISAF had one option left: to adopt a historically-controversial, yet nevertheless reasonable and appropriate, strategy of Counter-Insurgency (COIN).

COIN, while vastly different from conventional warfare, is still a form of war.  At its deepest level, COIN is a competition with an insurgency for political power over the local populace and the right to govern.  Insurgents fight to impose disorder, by building up informal structures, local institutions, and armed entities, while at the same time recalling older identities.[1] Counter-insurgents fight to impose order, and does so by establishing formal structures, central institutions, and unarmed entities, while simultaneously affirming newer identities.[2] 

To truly secure the right to govern, however, either the insurgency or the counter-insurgency must achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the people – that is, their cause must be supported and approved of by the majority of the native population residing in the contested area. One side must defeat the other by ‘winning the people’ – securing the ‘hearts and minds’ of the majority population and therefore their support, allegiance and vote of confidence. It must also prove itself to be an effective, reliable and stable means of government. It is for this reason that COIN warfare is often described as a ‘battle for the majority population’ in a conflict theatre. Ultimately, only the people can ever be the king-makers: the victor of the struggle will be determined by the native populace alone (see ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’).

In the last blog I outlined the ISAF’s COIN strategy from 2006-2008, encapsulated by the motto ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ (S-C-H-B) of sequential phases to be enacted within each area contested and violently destabilised by anti-Government insurgents. This blog will now examine the ISAF’s COIN strategy in more detail and present the practical military realities of the ISAF campaign on the ground from 2006-2014.  It will do this by:

(1) describing the various activities conducted by the ISAF between 2001-2006 prior to NATO’s adoption of a COIN strategy at the NATO Riga Summit of November 2006;

(2) presenting the way in which all of these activities were reorganised into 4 streamlined ‘pillars’ or Lines of Operation (LOOs) within the new COIN strategy, keeping in mind Galula’s 80/20 COIN rule with respect to political vs military activity within all COIN campaigns;

(3) analysing the practical ‘division of labour’ between ISAF Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) and the key ‘stability’ and ‘security’ force units within the ISAF Multinational Force (MNF);

(4) explaining the changing emphasis over time with regard to security vis-à-vis development during the four sequential phases of the ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ COIN strategy taking place in each Afghan sector, province and district, as well as the ultimate objective of these four phases for the nation of Afghanistan; and finally,

(5) outlining the key COIN security tasks within the primary areas of activity along the Security LOO of the campaign, conducted by the ISAF’s four main security force units from 2008-2014, which together comprised the smaller – but nevertheless critical – 20% military effort within the ISAF campaign that not only underpinned the entire ISAF COIN strategy, but also rendered possible the 80% political effort of COIN activities, conducted by ISAF stability forces, along the other three LOOs in Afghanistan.

 

Achieving the Mission: ISAF’S Modus Operandi from 2001-2006

The change in the overarching focus of the ISAF mission towards COIN rather than predominantly stabilisation, formerly achieved through Reconstruction and Development (R&D) programmes together with other nation-building activities, resulted in some alteration in the ISAF’s strategy and method of operation too – often referred to as the ‘comprehensive strategy’.  

Prior to the adoption of this COIN approach for defeating the Taliban and other insurgent groups within the Afghan theatre by ‘winning the Afghan people’, the ISAF had been engaged in nine different areas of activity, loosely grouped under the somewhat vague heading of ‘security and stability operations’.  No-where in NATO or ISAF documentation are these terms defined or described in more detail (possibly in order to confuse media-savvy insurgent and terrorist enemies).  The United States (U.S.) Department of Defense (DoD), however, provides a definition for ‘stability operations’, which is defined as:

‘An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.’[3]

Before COIN: ISAF Areas of Activity

These nine primary areas of activity within the ISAF mission between the years 2001-2006 were as follows. 

1              Provide Security via Security Operations

The first area of activity for ISAF forces was ‘security operations’, predominantly interpreted to mean defensive patrols by many of the mission’s Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). These were conducted in cooperation with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the latter comprising members of the:

• Afghan National Army (ANA);
• Afghan National Police (ANP); and
• Afghan Special Operations Forces (SOFs).

2              Support & Equip the Afghan National Army (ANA)

The second task, conducted in concert with American forces, was to support the ANA by increasing its operational capability via a military training and equipping programme conducted through the Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A). [ISAF nations were initially given responsibility for key areas of activity during the mission’s early years from 2001-2003, however due to very poor progress by certain nations in their given areas (e.g. Germany with their training of the ANP), this policy was abandoned). 

Training assistance was lent in the form of ISAF Operational Training and Mentor Teams (OMLTs), embedded in ANA battalions, brigades and corps headquarters.[4]  OMLTs spent a minimum of six months with ANA units, where they played an advisory as well as a training and mentoring role, deploying alongside ANSF personnel on operations.[5]  OMLTs played an additional liaison role by assisting communication between ANA units and nearby ISAF forces, and were also involved in the planning of combined ISAF-ANA operations.[6] 

Furthermore, ISAF equipped the ANA through supplying military equipment donated by NATO or Partner nation ISAF participating nations under the NATO Equipment Donation Programme (NEDP), donations which ranged in scope and size from tanks and helicopters to small arms, ammunition and uniform items.[7]  The transportation and installation of this equipment was coordinated by NATO’s Allied Command Operations Headquarters in Mons (Belgium), and financed by the ANA Trust Fund expressly set up for the purpose, which also covered the expense of new equipment purchases, the funding of ANA engineering and construction projects, and in-country or out-of-country training. [8]

3              Improve the Means & Capabilities of the Afghan National Police (ANP)

Similarly, the ISAF’s third area of activity involved supporting the ANP by working to improve its means and capabilities, chiefly through assistance at the tactical level.  As the ANP was created and trained to act as a paramilitary police force – i.e. to perform both civilian and military functions given the Afghan security environment – this also involved military support to ANP security operations, including the sharing of information, advice, indirect mentoring and guidance, joint patrolling and niche training of non-police-specific skills.[9]  Indeed, having been trained to perform dual paramilitary and community policing roles, ANP personnel were regularly involved in combat engagements with Taliban and other insurgents during the early years of the ISAF. 

The task of improving the ANP’s means and capabilities was from 2004 conducted chiefly in coordination with the U.S., but later also by the new creation of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) established in June 2007.[10] 

Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Nick Gillard of the New Zealand Army has described the process by which ANP units were trained in these two roles at the New Zealand-led, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan Province, located in the Regional Command-East (RC-East) sector of Afghanistan under American Lead Command.  First of all, New Zealand ISAF forces trained ANP units in ‘basic paramilitary skills they needed – how to fire their weapon effectively, how to do basic section-level drills, how to fight.’[11]  U.S. Military Police deployed from RC-East Headquarters then took the training a step further and taught the ANP units community policing – in Gillard’s words ‘how to be a copper’ – with training on how to run a police organisation and conduct criminal investigations.[12]  In addition, U.S. forces also provided Afghan police personnel with specialist training, for instance in setting up check-points and conducting building and vehicle searches.[13]  As Gillard explained, the American Military Police ‘could give them extra nuances into the world of the criminal, as opposed to the world of the soldier.’[14]

According to the ‘Afghanistan Compact’ framework established between the international community and the new Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) at the 2006 London Conference, as well as the Afghan government’s later ‘Afghan National Development Strategy’, the objective was for the ANP to comprise a professional police force of 82,000 officers committed to the rule of law by 2011.[15]  

4              Collect & Destroy Illegal Weapons

The fourth task for ISAF forces involved the collection of illegal weapons, ordnance and ammunitions from armed groups and individuals.[16]  Once collected, these munitions were catalogued then destroyed safely so that they would no longer present a threat to either Afghan or ISAF security forces, not to mention the native civilian population of Afghanistan. [17]

5              Provide Immediate Humanitarian Assistance

A fifth ISAF area of activity, established in 2006, involved providing rapid short-term humanitarian assistance to Afghan civilians in the immediate aftermath of significant military operations, such as supplying food, shelter, medicine and repair to buildings and core infrastructure.[18] 

This activity was supported by the Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF), under the authority and discretion of the COMISAF, which was totally comprised of voluntary donations by ISAF TCNs.  Updates on the use of the fund were regularly made to NATO’s highest body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), by NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan.[19]

6              Provide Stability via Provincial Reconstruction & Development

The sixth ISAF task – and the most visible and predominant area of activity within the mission – was crucial for both securing and stabilising Afghanistan, and involved PRTs.  Indeed, according to NATO, PRTs were at the cutting or ‘leading edge’ of ISAF efforts in Afghanistan and were a practical expression of ISAF’s commitment to Afghanistan.[20]  By 2009 there were 26 PRTs across Afghanistan, each led by one or more of the ISAF’s TCN countries. 

The dual role of the PRTs was:

(1) to provide local security together with ANSF units; and

(2) to support all local R&D activities (whether Afghan, national, international or non-governmental in nature), in order to meet the ultimate objective of extending Afghan government authority throughout the country.[21] 

Each PRT was thus comprised of both military and civilian personnel, either supplied by one TCN or composed of personnel from a variety of different TCN countries. The efficacy of each PRT team depended heavily on good civil-military communication and cooperation both within each team and between PRT personnel and the Afghans – and in the cases of combined PRTs, also on cooperation internationally amongst multinational military and civilian personnel within the team.

The role of military personnel at the PRTs was threefold:

(1) to provide and ensure area security and stability;

(2) to support security sector reform including the augmentation of ANSF capabilities; and

(3) to direct assistance to civilians in the form of transport, medical assistance or engineering aid.[22] 

By comparison, the role of the non-military civilian members of the PRTs was to use their political, economic, humanitarian and societal knowledge and skills:

(1) to strengthen political institutions;

(2) to encourage good governance;

(3) to support the growth of governance structures;

(4) to promote the rule of law and human rights; and

(5) to further reconstruction projects in support of the Afghan Government’s national development priorities.[23] 

Such reconstruction projects included: the repair of infrastructure; the building of schools and implementation of education programmes; the digging of irrigation ditches, wells and reservoirs to the benefit of farmers and the local population; the laying of pipelines; and measures to improve local mobility, communication, and medical access.[24]

7              Give Humanitarian Relief 

In addition to the above, the seventh task was – upon request – for PRTs to assist the Government of Afghanistan and other international actors with particular humanitarian relief missions within their area, such as disseminating medication, food or winter supplies during severe weather conditions.[25]

8              Reduce Drug Production

The eighth major area of activity within the mission was to support the Government of Afghanistan in its efforts to substantially reduce the production of illicit drugs within Afghanistan, the profits of which were fuelling the anti-Government insurgency in certain parts of the country. 

In May 2003 the Afghan Government declared its National Drug Control Strategy with the aim of eliminating all drug production by 2012. The effort was to be led by the Minister of the Counter-Narcotics Directorate within the Interior Ministry of the Afghan government.  However, it was largely reliant on international assistance.

Consequently, support for the Afghan counter-narcotics programme became another key ISAF task, involving:

(1) counter-narcotics training for the ANA;

(2) distribution of information;

(3) the execution of an efficient public information campaign;

(4) the delivery of alternative livelihood means when requested; and

(5) logistical support – including military support to counter-narcotics operations in extreme situations.[26] 

9              Other Temporary Tasks

Finally, ISAF forces were also occasionally assigned certain ‘other tasks’ at specific times in the years since the force’s inception, as set out by the ISAF mandates of various United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions.  These occasional tasks involved, for instance, ISAF assistance to the conduct of free and fair elections, and participation in the disbandment and reintegration of illegal groups (otherwise known as ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration’ or ‘DDR’).  The ISAF additionally made several contributions towards the reform of the Afghan justice sector, including the reconstruction and reform of the Afghan prison system, in order to improve respect for the rule of law and human rights in Afghanistan.[27] As a general rule these extra functions were conducted by additional national force contingents from TCNs, which had been volunteered and deployed to the ISAF for this express purpose, and the contingents were usually withdrawn to their home countries on either the completion of their specific task(s) or at the end of their assigned rotation.

As one may see by this overview, UNSC Resolution 1510 of 2003, which had re-authorised the authority and mandate of the multinational ISAF entity in Afghanistan, had enlarged ISAF’s functions and objectives to include additional tasks than those initially envisioned in 2001. These tasks were reiterated, and sometimes added to, in subsequent UNSC mandates passed annually in the years afterwards (e.g. in UNSC Resolutions 1563 (2004), 1623 (2005), 1707 (2006), 1776 (2007), and 1833 (2008) among others). 

[Indeed, an additional task or area was later also added to the ISAF’s menu of activities while in the midst of its COIN campaign: the management of ANA ammunitions depots and supporting the development of stockpile management capabilities in order to improve physical security within Afghanistan.  This task, approved by the Afghan Government in 2008 and supported as a NATO Trust Fund project, was led by three contributing ISAF nations – Belgium, Canada and Luxembourg – with the cooperation of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).[28]] 

 

COIN Strategy Changes: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs), 2006-2014

Following the ISAF’s reorientation towards a COIN strategy in late November 2006, and the adoption of the maxim and approach of ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ as outlined in the previous blog (#31), the nine primary areas of activity within the mission at that time were initially regrouped into three main Lines of Operation (LOOs) or COIN ‘pillars’. 

These operational lines or pillars included:

(1) Security;

(2) Governance; and

(3) Reconstruction and Development (R&D). 

Due to unsatisfactory progress in the realm of counter-narcotics during the two following years, the Afghan government subsequently also made a formal request in late 2008 for a greater ISAF role in supporting counter-narcotics operations too, a request granted at the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Budapest (Hungary) on 10 October that year.[29] This increased assistance involved ISAF actively contributing to the demolition of narcotics processing facilities and to operations against drug producers with proven links to the insurgency. However, each of these counter-narcotics operations had to, first, be requested by the Afghan Government on a case-by-case basis, and second, be assented to by the governments of the TCN forces involved, before the specific counter-narcotics operations could commence within the Afghan theatre of operations. 

As a result of this new realm of activity for the ISAF, following the NATO Budapest meeting a fourth LOO – (4) ‘Counter-Narcotics’ – was added as an additional ISAF main pillar or LOO within the COIN mission. [30]  

From late 2006-2014 onwards, these three – then four – LOOs were considered to be key components of the ISAF mission’s ‘comprehensive COIN strategy’ for Afghanistan, and are depicted in the diagram below.

Lines of Operation (LOOs): A flow-chart of the ISAF mission’s main LOOs, entitled ‘Components of the Comprehensive COIN Strategy’, taken from the U.S. Department of Defense Pentagon Report of January 2009.[31] 

LOO Primary Areas of Activity

Following NATO’s adoption of a COIN strategy to the Afghan conflict in late 2006, the ISAF’s nine main areas of activity at that time were reorganised – and in many cases expanded – under these new LOOs or areas of effort. 

The Security LOO involved the security activities of:

• degrading insurgent capacity;
• developing the ANSF;
• border management; and
• counter-terrorism operations.[32]

The Governance LOO involved activities to improve:

• the rule of law;
• policy development;
• policy implementation and public service delivery;
• government accountability; and
• democracy and human rights.[33]

The Reconstruction and Development LOO, by comparison, incorporated the following ISAF activities:

• infrastructure;
• social sector development;
• agriculture and rural development; and
• private sector development.[34]

Finally, the new Counter-Narcotics LOO as of October 2008 (formerly of unknown classification as a ‘security’ or ‘stability’ operation), involved:

• public information;
• alternative development;
• elimination/eradication operations;
• interdiction operations; and
• law enforcement tasks.[35]

This new organisation of the ISAF’s various tasks and activities under the four key COIN LOOs is depicted in the diagram below.

LOO Priority Areas: The 4 Lines of Operation within the ISAF’s ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ COIN strategy, and their associated tasks for ISAF forces in each of the mission’s Regional Command sectors.[36]

New Strategy – Same Goal

Nevertheless, despite this reorganisation of the ISAF’s main areas of activity into four primary LOOs, it must be emphasised that all of the ISAF’s tasks continued to work towards the same mission objective since the outset – to secure and stabilise Afghanistan.  As ISAF’s own official publications set forth in successive mission statements between 2007-2011, the ISAF mission was continuously to:

‘Conduct military operations in the assigned AO to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and enabling the GoA to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country.’[37]

Regardless of its new COIN ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ approach then, it is evident that the ISAF mission continuously remained the same: to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, with the mission objective of attaining ‘the establishment of a secure and stable environment’, in order to both facilitate Afghanistan’s reconstruction and enable the GIRoA to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country, with the end-goal of promoting ‘effective governance’ in Afghanistan while simultaneously ‘contributing to regional stability.’[38]  Indeed, achieving this goal was considered to be the very role of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 

Consequently, even when equipped with its new COIN strategy, the ISAF’s role in Afghanistan was always overall, as one ISAF document stated:

‘In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment [emphasis added].’[39]

 

COIN in Practice: Division of Labour Between ISAF Nations

Yet the question begs, how exactly did the multinational ISAF military force work to achieve these challenging mission goals, on behalf of the international community, in practical terms on the ground in Afghanistan? 

The answer lies in the ISAF’s own mission statement.  The ISAF sought the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment through the ‘conduct of military operations in the assigned AO… with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces.’  Or as ISAF documentation further states, ‘to this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the ANA through mentoring, training and equipping (emphasis added)’, this being the prerequisite for ‘paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance’.[40]  In 2010-2011, this mission statement was expanded to also include ISAF’s new focus on significantly increasing ‘the capacity of Afghan security forces in order to hand over gradually lead responsibility for security to Afghans themselves.’[41] 

[Only in February 2011, under the leadership of COMISAF General (GEN) David H. Petraeus, was the ISAF mission statement changed to explicitly state that one of its four key priorities was COIN-oriented – to ‘protect the Afghan people’ and to ‘counter the insurgency’, an alteration which remained ever afterwards under the leadership of COMISAF’s Allen and Dunford (see endnote).[42] In fact, according to one former OEF Commander, U.S. Lieutenant General (LTGEN) David W. Barno, from 2001 to at least mid-2009 the word ‘counter-insurgency’ was a forbidden word in the NATO lexicon, with NATO not allowing the term to be used in any of its official documentation with regard to its Afghan campaign or its ISAF mission statement – even somewhat absurdly, during several years following its adoption of a COIN campaign for the NATO-led mission in late 2006.[43]] 

What these ISAF mission statements meant in practice was this:

The ISAF was pursuing its mission objective by conducting the activities of the four LOOs, in sequential phases in accordance with the COIN strategy (‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’), within an Afghan AO that was divided into five administrative Regional Command sectors (six from 2010). 

It was doing this in concert with ANSF forces, while simultaneously participating in ANSF training and ANSF capacity-building. 

The ISAF was further prosecuting these operations by means of security and stability forces deployed to each Regional Command, which were respectively conducting security and stability operations in cooperation with local ANSF units, and under the lead regional command of one NATO Lead Nation.

Generally-speaking, security operations referred to kinetic, often lethal military operations conducted by security forces, whereas stability operations referred to non-kinetic, non-lethal and even non-traditional military operations conducted by stability forces.

The Role of ISAF ‘Lead Nations’

Within each Regional Command sector there was either one designated Lead Nation (RC-North, RC-West and RC-East), or a number of nations sharing lead command on the basis of short-term rotations (RC-Capital, RC-South and from 2010 the newly-created RC-South West). 

The ISAF Operation: ISAF map showing the five ISAF Regional Commands (2004-2010) and the Lead Nations in command of these sectors, as well as subordinate supporting nations contributing forces to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[44]

Each of these nations performed the role of Lead Nation on behalf of the ISAF and held Command and Control (C²) over all ISAF military personnel and activities within their respective sectors.  This meant that the Lead Nation had overriding command and operational authority over all ISAF military units contributed by other supporting nations within its Regional Command AO, no-matter their size, function – and importantly for this caveat research – their own, often disparate, national Rules of Engagement (ROE).

By contrast, international civilians involved in the stabilisation Governance, R&D or Counter-Narcotics LOO activities were not controlled by the ISAF or its NATO Lead Nations, but instead answered to their own national government departments or to their respective national/international humanitarian aid organisations, for example UN personnel of the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA).[45]  In fact there were some difficulties between ISAF forces and a number of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) conducting R&D activities within Afghanistan during the course of the ISAF mission. This was because many of the NGOs insisted on being ‘neutral’ participants within the conflict between pro-Government ISAF forces and anti-Government, terror-using Taliban, other insurgents, and Al-Qaeda terrorists.  As such, NGO personnel often strongly objected to cooperating with or even working alongside ISAF military forces, to the point in fact of not allowing ISAF military personnel to assist in the same R&D projects – regardless of the ISAF force’s expanded non-military role in the context of COIN stability operations (the 80% effort).

Lead Nations were themselves commanded by, and answerable to, the COMISAF at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul by means of the COMISAF’s tactical Intermediate Joint Command (IJC) – one of three subordinate commands under the COMISAF (see the diagram below).[46]  These three commands included:

(1) Lead Nations command;

(2) Special Operations Forces (SOF) command; and

(3) NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) command.[47]

The COMISAF, meanwhile, was commanded by NATO’s operational Joint Force Command (JFC) Headquarters in Brunssum, the Netherlands, which in turn was directed and commanded by NATO’s highest Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. [48] 

 

ISAF Chain of Command: The military chain of command for ISAF security forces within the NATO-led ISAF Coalition of the Willing.

While IJC controlled all of the Regional Commands in Afghanistan from ISAF Headquarters in the Afghan Capital, Kabul, each Lead Nation in turn controlled its own military units from its own C² Regional Command headquarters within each sector.[49]  These headquarters were:

• RC-Capital headquarters in Kabul led by Lead Nations France, Turkey and Italy on the basis of rotation;
• RC-North headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif led by Lead Nation Germany;
• RC-West headquarters in Herat led by Lead Nation Italy;
• RC-South headquarters in Kandahar led by Lead Nations Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on the basis of rotation;
• RC-East headquarters in Bagram led by Lead Nation the United States;
• and from June 2010 onwards, RC-Southwest headquarters in Lashkar Gar led by Lead Nation the United States and subsequently Lead Nation the United Kingdom on the basis of rotation.

The military units controlled by the Lead Nation in each Regional Command included primarily:

• Major and Minor Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs), otherwise known as simply ‘combat units’ or ‘manoeuvre units’;
• Army Operational Training and Mentor Teams (OMLTs) working with the ANA;
• Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) working with the ANP; and
• PRT Security Units stationed at each of its PRTs in the sector.[50]

In addition to a Regional Command Headquarters, a Forward Support Base (FSB) established within each Regional Command provided logistical support for the sector, while Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) formed military base camps for most CMUs operating within the sector.

The ISAF mission objective in each of the Regional Command sectors via the designated NATO Lead Nations was, as overall within the Afghan theatre, to ‘provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.’[51] 

The Lead Nation sought to attain this mission objective and create such a secure environment by conducting activities along the four LOOs of: (1) Security; (2) Governance; (3) R&D; and (4) Counter-Narcotics. 

Although it was clearly the R&D and Governance LOOs that formed the greater part of COIN (the 80% effort), security was a vital precondition for their execution and had necessarily to be attained before the other LOOs could proceed.  Indeed, R&D and governance activities could not even commence in a localised vicinity, until a fundamental degree of security had been established by the Lead Nation’s security forces by way of various combat and security operations conducted along the Security LOO. 

This basic level of security had not only to be established, moreover, but it had also to be continuously maintained for the other three Governance, R&D and Counter-Narcotics LOOs to continue operating over prolonged periods of time. 

It is for this reason that the security LOO (the 20% effort) was always considered the most important of the four ISAF COIN LOOs, especially during the early and middle stages of a localised COIN campaign. 

On the ground, this generally equated to establishing ‘security bubbles’ or ‘secure zones’ of development within each Regional Command, usually in districts around existing PRTs in a particular province.[52] 

Following the establishment of a secure zone, the Lead Nation sought to expand the size of the security bubble to encompass outlying areas through on-going security and stability operations.[53]

The end-goal of these continuous security operations at the perimeter of each ‘secure zone’ or ‘security bubble’ was to slowly and methodically expand the multiple security bubbles within each province, and to connect them together, in order to ultimately push the boundaries of the secure zone ‘bubble’ across the entirety of each province, and then across all the provinces to encompass the entire operational area of each Regional Command sector in Afghanistan.[54] 

 

Division of Labour Between ISAF Stability & Security Forces

In January 2007, two months after the decision to adopt a COIN strategy was taken at the NATO Riga Summit and when the ISAF’s COIN strategy first began to roll out in practical form across the country, the total number of international ISAF military forces within Afghanistan stood at 35,460 personnel.[55] This figure would rise exponentially over the following years to stand at 55,100 in January 2009, and ultimately at 130,386 personnel as of January 2012.[56] 

Although air forces, conducting reconnaissance, surveillance and close air support for combat operations (usually in the form of targeted airstrikes), comprised a significant portion of these total numbers and played an extremely important role in the fight against the Taliban and other anti-Government insurgents and terrorists operating in the country,  by far the largest proportion of these figures were comprised of infantry ground forces of diverse nationalities, capabilities, and ROE freedoms and restrictions.

This multinational force operating as part of the ISAF ‘coalition of the willing’, under the leadership direction, command and control of NATO, was divided into two main ‘camps’ or ‘teams’ of ISAF stability forces and ISAF security forces.

ISAF Stability Forces – Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

The ISAF’s stability forces chiefly comprised its many PRT civil-military teams. PRTs were established in key secured areas of every major Afghan province within the five ISAF Regional Commands and were comprised of a blend of around 120-150 military and civilian personnel, encompassing a broad range of knowledge and skills, who worked side-by-side in a variety of local projects and programmes.[57]

PRTs prosecuted localised COIN campaigns predominantly involving activities along the R&D and Governance ISAF LOOs, but also involving other counter-narcotics tasks along the Counter-Narcotics LOO (outside of kinetic interdiction operations conducted by the CMUs).

Along the R&D LOO, PRTs worked towards the objective of facilitating improvements in socio-economic development in coordination with the Afghan government and UNAMA.  This was achieved by the PRTs both actively contracting and supervising R&D projects themselves, and passively providing support for other humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by other national and international agencies.[58] 

In terms of the Governance LOO, moreover, the PRTs worked towards the objective of facilitating improvements in governance by promoting good governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights in the locality, and by overall fostering ‘the emergence of a strong and credible central government able to extend its influence nation-wide’.[59]  Specifically, PRT governance activities in pursuit of this objective involved working with local Afghan government authorities to ‘build capacity, support growth of governance structure, and promote an environment in which governance can improve’.[60] 

Lastly, since the 2008 Budapest Conference when counter-narcotic operations were added to ISAF activities in Afghanistan, to comprise a fourth LOO in the ISAF COIN mission, PRTs also actively and passively sought to support the ISAF Counter-Narcotics LOO.  They did this by:

(1) eliminating or burning drug crops;

(2) pro-actively encouraging healthy alternative crops such as grain crops (e.g. cereals and legumes), spice crops, and the creation of fruit orchards for food production;

(3) destroying drug processing facilities;

(4) taking legal criminal action against narcotics producers, in concert with Afghan authorities;

(5) sharing narcotics information with the local CMU combat units tasked with kinetic, narcotics interdiction operations and Afghan authorities;

(6) in extremis emergency support to these counter-narcotic CMU activities; and

(7) conducting efficient public information campaigns to give the local population informative and accurate information about both the individual penalties and the harmful consequences and dangers of illicit drug production and their sale to – 

(a) the farmers and their families (individual prison sentences, financial penalties such as fines, and the total elimination of their illegal drug crops resulting in loss of income and livelihood for the whole family),

(b) the health and well-being of their local Afghan communities (illegal employment with risks of danger and eventual imprisonment, heavy drug-addiction among members of the population, and the loss of crucial food supplies for the community as a result of farmers choosing to produce illegal-but-profitable drug crops rather than legal-and-vital food crops), and

(c) the country of Afghanistan as a whole as a result of drug sales and profits funding the bombings, suicide-attacks and recruitment of violent, anti-Government forces of instability and destruction in Afghanistan, most notably the Pashtun-fascist Taliban, Islamo-fascist Al Qaeda terrorists, and other hostile and bloodthirsty insurgent forces operating in the country.[61] 

In truth, PRTs formed the backbone of the entire ISAF COIN campaign in Afghanistan and were at the forefront of the ‘80%’ COIN effort within the campaign.  Indeed, it was primarily through these development ‘PRT bubbles’ – each fostering a measure of physical security and economic and political stability – that the ISAF sought to win the support of local Afghans in each vicinity, and thereby the support of the locals towards the Afghan central government.[62]  Figuratively speaking, the PRTs were intended to act as “secure and attractive life-rafts” in an insecure Afghan sea, extending a promise of “rescue” and “stability” to a storm-tossed and war-weary population.

Nevertheless, the success of each PRT bubble was entirely contingent on the ability of ISAF forces to maintain security within the PRT reconstruction areas.  A decline in basic physical security in one reconstruction locality would inevitably result in the decline or even cessation of all other R&D and governance activities in that locality, as well as at other reconstruction sites within the PRT AOR.  Consequently, in addition to the usual blend of military and civilian personnel, PRTs typically also included a PRT security detail comprised of approximately 30 members of the national armed forces (usually land operations-trained army personnel) – the PRT security forces.[63] 

ISAF Security Forces – 4 Main Security Units

The ISAF’s security forces, by contrast, were comprised of four main security units that conducted combat and security operations along the Security LOO of the ISAF COIN strategy.  These were:

(1) Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs) to conduct kinetic, lethal, combat operations;

(2) OMLTs to train, mentor, and operate with the ANA;

(3) POMLTs to train, mentor, and operate with the ANP; and

(4) PRT Security Units to secure and protect the PRTs, their ISAF civil-military staff, and the local Afghan communities in each of the PRT areas throughout the country. 

Since my ISAF national caveat research is primarily concerned with these ISAF security forces operating along the Security LOO within the ISAF COIN campaign (the critical and prerequisite 20% effort of successful COIN), and the impact and effects of national caveat constraints on these security forces in the course of their activities, these four main units are of great importance to this ROE-focused research.

1              Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs)

The key agents conducting security operations along the Security LOO were, of course, the ISAF Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs), supported in varying degrees by local elements of the ANA and ANP, which were likewise supported by ISAF OMLT and POMLT teams. 

ISAF CMUs were commanded by the Regional Command Lead Nation from the ISAF Regional Command Headquarters within each Regional Command sector.  CMUs comprised a melange of international infantry, armour and cavalry units, usually organised into Task Force (TF) combat entities.[64] On occasion artillery units were also included in a combat unit, to act as provisional manoeuvre units.[65] 

There were both major and minor CMUs within the ISAF campaign, major units being those manoeuvre units comprising more than 700 troops, and minor units comprising less than 700 troops.[66]  In this sense, major combat units could well be thought of in terms of size as equivalent to a military ‘battalion’, with all CMUs within a Regional Command amounting to roughly one military division.[67] Quartered at specific military camps or FOBs around each Regional Command, these CMUs were usually responsible for conducting security operations within specific districts or provinces within the Regional Command. [68]

Map displaying the Major Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs) in Afghanistan during 2006, each comprised of more than 700 personnel, and tasked with conducting security operations along the Security Line of Operation (LOO) of the ISAF COIN strategy under the command and control (C²) of the NATO Lead Nations in each respective Regional Command sector.[69]

The primary objective and task of ISAF combat forces in Afghanistan, in coordination with ANSF forces, was to conduct security operations in order to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency. The ‘sharpest’ edge of this responsibility related to conducting overtly offensive, kinetic and lethal counter-insurgent operations against active insurgents in the vicinity – referred to generally as ‘Degrading Insurgent Capacity’.[70]   As a U.S. Pentagon stated on this vital area of activity:

‘A requirement for establishing security in Afghanistan is degrading and eventually destroying the capacity of insurgents and anti-government elements to attack and/or intimidate the general population, to attack international and GIRoA forces and assets, and to retain and recruit new members into their organizations.’[71]

In military terms, degrading insurgent capacity involved ISAF and ANSF forces conducting kinetic military operations to:

‘Directly diminish insurgent capacity by killing and capturing insurgents, destroying their equipment, supplies, and infrastructure, and denying insurgents access to and mobility within a given area, and physically separating them from the general population.’[72] 

These kinetic operations were intended, on the one hand, to demonstrate the insurgents’ inability to control territory, and on the other, to show to the general population the potential cost of joining the insurgent ranks, thereby weakening the ability of the insurgency to replenish their anti-Government forces and eroding their long-term capacity.[73]  However, as the Pentagon report also stated: ‘Kinetic operations have to be carefully executed to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage that weaken popular support for International forces and the GIRoA’.[74] 

These CMU kinetic operations were supported by stability operations along the other three LOOs, moreover, to further reduce insurgent capacity. These included ‘reconciliation’ programmes which provided incentives to insurgents to lay down their arms and integrate peacefully back into Afghan society, as well as on-going governance, R&D and humanitarian aid projects which demonstrated to the local populace ‘the inability of the Taliban or insurgents to provide meaningful public services, further discouraging popular support for the insurgents and diminishing the capacity to achieve their goals’.[75]  Indeed, in terms of reconciliation, the ISAF supported GIRoA-led efforts to reconcile insurgents who ceased fighting, accepted the Afghan Constitution, broke with the Al-Qaeda terrorist group, and received no power-sharing, government jobs, or protected territory in return.[76] This was because the offer of reconciliation caused an important internal division within the insurgency between the more reasonable moderates and the more fanatical hardliners, while also eroding insurgent morale and degrading insurgent capabilities by the fact of depriving the insurgency of both the manpower and leadership of those insurgents who had reconciled with the Afghan government.[77]

In addition, CMUs were also utilised to conduct kinetic counter-terrorism operations against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations active in the country, which were supporting both the Pashtun Fascist, terror-using Taliban and other insurgent groups with finances, training and personnel to destabilise Afghanistan. [78]  As the U.S. Department of Defense report set forth, ISAF military assets were used ‘to detect and eliminate terrorist networks in Afghanistan’.[79] 

Furthermore, CMUs were also employed to conduct counter-narcotics interdiction operations in conjunction with ANSF forces along the Counter-Narcotics LOO, which involved the identification and arrest of drug-traffickers and the interdiction of drugs and money, in order to ‘dismantle the networks’ of the illegal Afghan narcotics industry. [80]

2&3        OMLTs & POMLTs

The aim of the ISAF OMLT and POMLT teams (pronounced by some as ‘omelettes and pomelettes’) was to develop ANSF forces through mentoring, training and equipping ANA and ANP units.[81] 

This secondary security task along the Security LOO was conducted with an eye towards Phase  IV – Transition of the NATO Operational Plan (OPLAN), with the final goal of the ISAF coalition being the transfer of security responsibility across the entire Afghan Area of Responsibility (AOR) to native Afghan security forces (see blog ‘#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014’).  As the Pentagon report stated:

‘To establish and maintain the security and independence of Afghanistan and to enforce the rule of law within the country, the Afghan government requires capable security forces. The long-term goal is to build a police force and military that is nationally respected; professional; ethnically balanced; democratically accountable; organized, trained, and equipped to meet the security needs of the country; and funded from the GIRoA budget…The U.S. long-term goal is for the ANSF to be capable of defending Afghanistan’s borders and providing internal security.’ [82]

Developing the ANSF consequently involved both the training and mentoring of ANA and ANP units, by means of these OMLT and POMLT teams, in addition to providing military equipment for ANA and ANP personnel with which they could ‘protect the people of Afghanistan and enforce the law’.  In this way the ANSF could act as a ‘force multiplier’ for the ISAF force, by likewise acting to reduce insurgent capacity within the country, while simultaneously showing ‘the strength of the GIRoA to the general public’.[83] [The ISAF also conducted ‘ministerial advisory’ stability operations in parallel to these ANSF capacity-building security operations, whereby ISAF forces ensured that ‘the responsible government ministries and offices at all levels’ had ‘the training, education, institutions, and supporting legislation to sustain and lead those forces.’[84]]

Responsibility for conducting and achieving these two essential ANSF security tasks along the ISAF security LOO rested with the Lead Nation of each ISAF sector – the nation that held overall lead command responsibility for security in the Regional Command sector, and whose own national forces generally formed the bulk of the available ISAF CMUs within the Regional Command. 

In some instances, these national combat forces were also supported in these security tasks and objectives by smaller, minor CMUs offered by other Supporting Nation TCNs based in the same sector. In these scenarios, since Lead Nations within the ISAF mission held lead security responsibility over the entire territory of their designated sector, the Lead Nation wielded overall leadership and command over all other supporting national security forces deployed to the sector – whether these were other national or multinational major/minor combat manoeuvre or combat support units, or security forces attached to a PRT. 

During this training and mentoring process by way of the OMLT and POMLTs, the lead responsibility for security within each Regional Command sector also remained solely with the NATO Lead Nation.  This lead responsibility continued right up until the point of time when ISAF Headquarters officially transferred lead security responsibility from the ISAF to its counterpart ANSF elements, comprised of trained, indigenous, Afghan security forces that had been recruited, trained, mentored and equipped by the ISAF OMLT and POMLT teams during the preceding years.

4              PRT Security Units

PRT Security Units, meanwhile, comprised military units – each attached to a specific PRT – that provided protection from insurgent attacks both to the local populace as well as the PRT military and civilian personnel conducting activities along the other Governance, R&D and Counter-Narcotics LOOs.  

While the majority of PRT staff undertook the numerous local reconstruction and development projects needed in the AOR to promote security and stability, the PRT Security Units acted like a local police or gendarmerie service to not only protect the various reconstruction sites within the PRT AO, but also to protect both the PRT personnel and the local people of the community within the PRT area. [85]  As LTCOL Gillard, a former Chief of Staff of the New Zealand-led PRT in Bamyan Province (CRIB 14, 2009), expressed with reference to PRT military-civilian personnel working in Bamyan Province:

‘You need door-kickers around those [PRT] engineers and those civilians, to ensure that there is enough security…this isn’t the Kapiti Coast [of New Zealand] here! If you go up into North-West Bamyan…Man, that is a scary place. It was the most on edge I’ve ever been in 20 years [in the military]. I mean, you’re travelling along dangerous, dusty roads as wide as this [narrow] room. It’s gravel, it’s rough as hell. You’ve got a raging river on one side, you’ve got sheer cliffs on the other. Every corner is an ambush site.  Every corner is an IED site.  Every town up there…it’s like it’s a dirty, dingy, nasty place to be [in terms of security]…I’m reading these articles back in New Zealand about how “we should be giving the money to NGOs and Afghans to build” – well that’s exactly what we do [at the PRT]! But you have to have a secure environment to allow those things to occur. Road gangs are a perfect target for the Taliban. Now they provide their own security, but without an ISAF “bubble” around them to provide overarching security, they can’t work.’ [86]

In addition to basic protection for the PRT team members themselves, the continual presence of these PRT Security Units – emphasized particularly through regular city patrols – helped to promote a general atmosphere of security and stability in the locality, which in turn inspired confidence among the local populace. 

It was for this reason that in the NZ-led PRT in Bamyan Province one military patrol – consisting of a Liaison Officer, a Patrol Commander and 10 infantry ‘door-kickers’ – was generally stationed at each patrol base within the PRT Province during each deployment, each acting as a ‘self-contained unit’ to both provide security via patrols and to train and mentor the ANP in local villages in the district, among other more minor functions.[87]  Indeed, in many instances the New Zealand PRT security detail would also perform other non-security related tasks in support of the civilian PRT effort, such as undertaking engineering work in support of specific reconstruction projects, supplying trusted drivers for transport, aiding communications, providing emergency medical aid, and conducting project quality control tasks.[88] 

Importantly, only the military elements of the PRTs – military personnel including engineers, medics and aid staff in addition to the ‘security detail’ at each PRT – was subject to ISAF authority via the ISAF chain of command, especially that of the Regional Command Lead Nation, with the civilian elements of the PRT answering directly to their own national governments or national/international agencies.[89]

Any serious security problems or threats within the PRT or outside the PRT, however, such as those posed by insurgents, were reported by this policing unit to the Regional Command Lead Nation combat units vested with security responsibility, usually via the combined Regional Command/Lead Nation Headquarters.[90]  This was because the task of combating local insurgents through conducting combat operations was not the responsibility of the PRT security detail, but rather that of the CMUs within the Regional Command sector, which, as the principal forces conducting security operations along the security LOO, were tasked with conducting all offensive operations against Enemy forces (refer to map below).

Map displaying 2 of the 4 major security units among ISAF security force in Afghanistan – Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs) deployed to conduct combat operations against anti-Government insurgents and terrorists in each Regional Command sector, and PRT Security Forces stationed at each PRT to provide fundamental security to PRT personnel and local Afghan communities in and around the PRTs.[91]

In addition to combating insurgents and providing security for PRTs, these combat units also held overall responsibility for securing the wider area in and around the PRT – an area known as Regional Development Zones (RDZs) (a concept created in 2004 and piloted first in Kandahar).[92]  Through maintaining a sustained presence in the RDZs, combat forces were believed to ‘complement the work of the PRTs’ by enabling ‘government and coalition forces to integrate security and development assets in those areas “and thus gain a synergistic local effect”’.[93]  The ISAF intent through this structure of PRTs, combined with a sustained combat force presence in surrounding RDZs within each Regional Command, was to ‘present terrorist organisations with an impossible situation, one where it was hoped they could not demonstrate any viable alternative of value to the Afghan people’.[94] 

In short, then, CMUs performed the role of the Regional Command’s military force in contrast with the PRT security detail, which predominantly performed a policing ‘Bobby-on-the-beat’ role.[95] 

The ISAF mission’s 5 Regional Commands from 2006-2010 along with their Lead Nations, Supporting TCN nations & PRT nations. CMUs, provided by the Lead Nation(s) and supporting nations, are represented by large national flags, while PRTs – including PRT Security Units – are represented by small national flags.[96]

Nevertheless it must also be said, in accordance with COIN doctrine, that these security units within the PRTs had to be continuously capable of reverting to their combat military training and acting as combat forces themselves in rare emergency circumstances.  This ‘combat role’ for PRT Security Units could occur in situations in which Lead Nation or Supporting Nation CMUs were either insufficient or unavailable to address an emerging and threatening security situation.[97] 

While such scenarios are usually rare, it is in fact an underlying assumption in all COIN campaigns that all military security and stability forces participating in a COIN operation must be combat-capable and flexible – that is, they must all be ready and able to transition from a ‘development’ or ‘policing’ role to a ‘fighting combat role’ at any moment in response to developing security emergencies.  As Gillard has neatly stated: ‘Cooks and bottle-washers can shoot as well’.[98] 

A study by the University of Edinburgh has likewise reached this conclusion, with regard to all multinational forces deployed on the full range of multinational security operations in the interest of world security:

‘In the end, a military’s basic function is to have the ability to use force to impose its will on an adversary. As such, MNF [Multinational Force] forces working within the ranges of MOOTW/SSC [Military Operations Other Than War/Small Scale Contingencies, or in other words COIN campaigns] must be able to rapidly shift to the “use of force or threat of force” to ensure mission accomplishment…The MNF “must be ready to fight” (or transit to fight) at all times (emphasis added).’[99]

This abiding fact and requirement is a very important principle in all population-centric, COIN warfare focused on ‘winning’ and ‘protecting’ the native civilian population.

Map displaying the Major Combat Manoeuvre Units (CMUs) in Afghanistan in February 2011, each comprised of more than 700 personnel, and tasked with conducting kinetic, lethal, combat operations against anti-Government insurgents and terrorists along the Security Line of Operation (LOO) of the ISAF COIN strategy, while operating under the overall command and control (C²) of the NATO Lead Nations in each of the 6 respective Regional Command sectors (including in the new RC-Southwest sector from June 2010).[100]

 

ISAF COIN: The 4 Sequential Phases of  ‘SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD’

As outlined in the previous blog (‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’), the four headings of ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ were the four planned phases of the ISAF COIN strategy by which ISAF Headquarters sought to first secure, then stabilise, each district – and then each province – of Afghanistan.

To summarise, during the ‘SHAPE’ phase, reconnaissance was carried out to identify the key security, economic and social metrics of the given area, and planning undertaken to first select and then deploy the appropriate ISAF forces to the area. 

During the ‘CLEAR’ phase, military security operations commenced, in partnership with local ANSF forces, to ‘eliminate, detain, or expel insurgents and anti-government entities’ from the area and create a space between the Enemy insurgents and the local Afghan population.[101] 

During the ‘HOLD’ phase, while military security operations continued to widen the security ‘bubble’ within the given locality, the ISAF began development and governance projects to connect the local populace with its central government in Kabul. 

Finally, in the ‘BUILD’ phase, ISAF forces sought to capitalise on the security and stability established in the preceding phases to establish the basic political, social, economic and security infrastructure and institutions which would allow the area to become fully secured and stabilised, and serve to safeguard the area’s future.[102]

The Ultimate Goal of ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ in Afghanistan

According to New Zealand Army LTCOL Roger McElwaine, who led the New Zealand PRT in Bamyan Province during 2008 (CRIB 10, 2007), the ultimate goal of these four S-C-H-B phases was the full transition of security responsibility to native Afghan security forces.[103] 

In other words, the purpose of the ISAF COIN phases was to eventually give full responsibility for the secured and stabilised Afghan districts and provinces back to the legitimate, elected and representative of the Afghan people, over the passage of time as each became ready for transition, so that the country might be governed and secured by its own people, for its own people (the key characteristics of a true democracy – ‘Government of the people, by the people, for the people’).  

In this way the new nation of Afghanistan – with international assistance and support from a host of national allies, friends and well-wishers from around the world – would be enabled to function as a true, secure and stable democracy in the heart of the troubled Central Asian region.

The Changing Emphasis of ‘S-C-H-B’ Over Time for ISAF Security & Stability Forces

Each of these S-C-H-B phases correlated to a changing emphasis on security vis-à-vis development within each Afghan district over the passage of time.[104] 

To clarify, following the conduct of reconnaissance and planning and the initial deployment of armed forces to a given area of operation (SHAPE), full emphasis was first placed on security (CLEAR), then subsequently on security with a degree of development (HOLD), and finally on development with a degree of security (BUILD).[105] 

The focus then shifted to concentrate pre-eminently on development, at which point the given area had been secured and stabilised to the extent that it had become ready for transition to Afghan command and control (see exemplifying image below).[106]

Changing Emphasis in the Conduct of COIN: The changing emphasis and relationship between security and development for ISAF security and stability forces, during the four ‘SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD’ phases of the ISAF COIN strategy from 2006-2014.

 

The Vital Importance of ISAF Security Forces for the Effective Conduct of COIN

One may see by this that establishing and maintaining security remained the key focus for security forces during all three ‘CLEAR’, ‘HOLD’ and ‘BUILD’ phases of the ISAF COIN strategy.   

The abiding need for security forces and security operations was also reflected in the three stated primary objectives of the COIN strategy:

(1) to remove insurgent and anti-Government elements from a given area or region, thereby creating space between the insurgents and the population;

(2) to maintain security, denying the insurgents access and freedom of movement within the given space; and

(3) to exploit the security space to deliver humanitarian relief and implement reconstruction and development initiatives that will connect the Afghan population to its government and build and sustain the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals. [107]

Security LOO ‘Priority Areas’ for ISAF Security Forces

As previously outlined earlier above, the priorities of ISAF security forces in the conduct of these military security operations included the following: 

(1) to degrade insurgent capacity;

(2) to develop the ANSF (both ANA and ANP forces); 

(3) to manage the territorial border delineating the sovereign territory of Afghanistan from that of neighbouring countries, especially the ‘Durand Line’ border with Pakistan;

(4) to conduct counter-terrorism operations when and as required (including potentially cooperation with force elements of the neighbouring OEF operation along the Afghan-Pakistan border);

and finally, from 2008 onwards,

(5) to take part in counter-narcotics interdiction operations when requested (a task officially grouped under the Counter-Narcotics LOO). 

These priority areas for ISAF security forces, in comparison with the priority areas of the stability forces conducting activities along the other COIN LOOs, may be seen in the diagram below.

Priority Areas for ISAF Security Forces (2008-2014): A chart showing the priority areas for ISAF forces along the 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) within the ISAF COIN strategy. Priority areas for the ISAF’s security forces are marked in red.[108]

Primary Security Tasks within the 5 Priority Areas

Each of these five priority security areas also involved specific security tasks, conducted by particular ISAF force units. 

Degrade Insurgency Capacity

The first priority area, ‘Degrade Insurgent Capacity’, involved kinetic, lethal and offensive operations to eliminate insurgents, capture insurgents, destroy insurgent equipment and supplies, destroy insurgent infrastructure, and deny insurgents mobility and access to population centres.[109]  It also, however, simultaneously involved less-kinetic but also lethal defensive operations, such as those conducted by the PRT security units to secure the PRTs and their surrounding environs.  In addition, it was incumbent upon these units to relay any gathered insurgent intelligence to the appropriate kinetic units – usually the nearest CMUs in the locality tasked with conducting combat operations against anti-Government insurgent and terrorist forces.[110] 

Develop Indigenous Afghan National Security Forces

The second priority area, ‘Develop ANSF’, chiefly involved the tasks of training and mentoring strategically-placed, indigenous, Afghan army and police units within each Regional Command sector, which included mentoring and supervising these units to plan and execute their own offensive combat operations.[111] 

Manage the Border

The third priority area, ‘Border Management’, involved the task of training, mentoring and supervising Afghan Border Police units, by way of OMLTs, in addition to assistance in denying cross-border mobility of anti-Government insurgents and illegal narcotics goods across Afghanistan’s borders, especially through the mountainous – and subsequently porous – Durand Line border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. [112]

Counter-Terrorism Operations

The fourth priority area, ‘Counter-Terrorism’, again involved kinetic, lethal, offensive operations to first detect, then eliminate, terrorist elements within Afghanistan – whether through the use of ground infantry forces or air forces, or indeed the combination of both in effective combined operations. 

Counter-Narcotics Interdiction

Finally, the last priority area, ‘Counter-Narcotics Interdiction’, involved ISAF security forces undertaking the tasks of:

(1) identifying, then arresting or eliminating drug-traffickers within Afghanistan; and

(2) interdicting drugs or drug money, in order to dismantle narcotics networks functioning within the country.

A summary of all of these primary tasks within the five priority areas of the COIN Security LOO, conducted by the four main CMU, OMLT, POMLT and PRT security units of the ISAF’s security forces within Afghanistan, can be seen in the diagram provided below. 

 

Key Security Tasks for COIN Security Forces: The key tasks within the 5 priority security areas allocated to the ISAF’s security forces conducting security operations along the Security and Counter-Narcotics LOOs of the ISAF COIN strategy, 2008-2014.[113]

Conclusion to ISAF Background Blogs

In conclusion, this blog has examined the ISAF operation in greater detail in order to provide a broad overview of the way in which the mission was intended to operate on the ground in the Afghan theatre of war. From this overview it is clear that the prosecution of the COIN-oriented campaign in Afghanistan was a very complicated affair, involving efforts across the full spectrum of security and stability operations. 

It is also evident that security operations, in particular, although comprising only 20% of the overall effort expended within the COIN strategy, represented a very important – even crucial – aspect of the ISAF mission.  Security operations along the Security LOO were required to establish security, maintain security, protect the population, and eliminate or capture anti-Government insurgent and terrorist fighters. 

In short, ISAF security operations were the necessary prerequisite that made the prosecution of ISAF stability operations along the other three LOOs possible.  Effective security operations were therefore absolutely vital for enabling NATO and the ISAF coalition of nations to achieve the ISAF’s mission objective of establishing and maintaining a safe and secure environment in support of the Afghan government.

This understanding of the crucial role of security forces in enabling the ISAF to conduct its mission, and to achieve its goals – the very reason for which the ISAF was created and deployed to Afghanistan by the international community – is fundamental for understanding the caveat analysis which is soon to follow in subsequent blogs. 

In the series of ‘background’ blogs I have so far presented on Afghanistan (#26-32), I have sought to provide both the methodological framework and the contextual historical, political and military setting of this national caveat research on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

[See ‘#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research’, ‘#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012’, ‘#28 BACKGROUND – Afghanistan: The Land, its Diverse Ethnic Peoples & the Pashtun Taliban’, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, ‘#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014’, and ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’.]

In the following blogs, I will now address the core subject of this research: (1) the grave problem of national caveat constraints within the ISAF mission, (2) the extent and scale of this fundamental operational problem within the ISAF coalition, and (3) the tangible impact of these national caveats on the ISAF’s timely prosecution of the COIN campaign and the overall operational effectiveness of the mission, over the period of a decade of warfare in Afghanistan from 2002-2012. 

 

* For more information on the impact of national caveats within the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here:

http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984

 

Endnotes

[1] D. Kilcullen, ‘Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007’, a presentation given at the Small Wars Center of Excellence Counterinsurgency Seminar 07, Quantico, VA, 26 September 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/COINSeminarSummaryReport.doc, (accessed 5 January 2011).

[2] Ibid.

[3] United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Dictionary of Military Terms, (Joint Pub 1-02), New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2009, p. 515.

[4] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, NATO in Afghanistan: NATO Bucharest Summit Guide (2-4 April 2008), http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2008/0804-bucharest/presskit.pdf, (accessed  6 February 2013).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid; New Zealand Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Nick Gillard, former Chief of Staff at the New Zealand-led PRT in Bamyan Province of RC-East (CRIB 14, 2009) under American Lead Nation command and New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Military Advisor at the New Zealand High Commission in London (2010), Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 1 September 2010, New Zealand High Commission, London, United Kingdom.

[10] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[11] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.; C. Scott, ‘Assessing ISAF: A Baseline Study of NATO’s Role in Afghanistan’, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), March 2007, p. 3, http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan.pdf, ( 12 April 2009).

[21] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] UN Resolutions: R 1563 (2004), 1623 (2005), 1707 (2006), 1776 (2007), 1833 (2008).

[28] NATO, ‘NATO’s Role in Afghanistan – Leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’, op. cit.

[29] Ibid.

[30] United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Pentagon, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan – Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defence Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181)’, January 2009, p. 17,  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf, (accessed 14 January 2013).

[31] Modified image taken from U.S. DoD, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, ibid.

[32] U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, ibid., pp. 17-19.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Created compilation of the ISAF’s 4 LOOs drawing from 4 diagrams appearing separately in U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, ibid., pp. 17, 19, 22, 24.

[37] International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 29 January 2007, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 February, 2013).

[38] ‘ISAF Mission Statements January 2007 – January 2011’, in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007-3 February 2011, ibid.

[39] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 13 February 2009, 16 June 2009, 1 October 2009, 1 February 2010, ibid.

[40] Ibid.; NATO’s role in Afghanistan, op. cit.

[41] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 5 March  2010, 6 July 2010, 15 November 2010, 3 February 2011, ibid.

[42] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 3 February 2011, 6 January 2012, 3 December 2012, 19 February 2013, ibid.

The ISAF mission statement did not change in substance until the tenure of COMISAF General Petraeus in February 2011. Under his command, the mission statement then altered to the following:

‘Mission: NATO-ISAF aims to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorists, to help provide security, and to contribute to a better future for the Afghan people.  NATO-ISAF, as part of the overall International Community effort and as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, is working to create the conditions whereby the Government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country. To carry out its mission, ISAF conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations in partnership with the ANSF and provides support to the Government and International Community in Security Sector Reform, including mentoring, training and operational support to the ANA and the ANP. NATO-ISAF key priorities in Afghanistan are: Protect the Afghan people; Build the capacity of the Afghan Security Forces so they can take lead responsibility for security in their own country; Counter the insurgency; and Enable the delivery of stronger governance and development’ (emphasis added) (ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 3 February 2011- 19 February 2013, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 February, 2013).

[43] United States Army Lieutenant General (LTGEN) David W. Barno (Ret’d), former Operational Commander of Operation Enduring Freedom’s Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (2003-2005) and Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington D.C., Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, 26 August 2010, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), Washington D.C., United States.

[44] Modified image of a map provided by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 1 December 2008, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 February 2013).

[45] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[46] ‘Afghan War Order of Battle’. eNotes, http://www.enotes.com/topic/Afghan_War_order_of_battle#Regional_Command_North, (accessed 18 July 2012).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] ISAF, About ISAF – Mission, 2009, http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html, (accessed 1 December 2009).

[52] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 29 January 2007, op. cit.

[56] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 12 January 2009, 6 January 2012, ibid.

[57] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[58] ISAF, About ISAF – Mission, op. cit.

[59] ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)’, GlobalSecurity.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-prt.htm, (accessed 18 July 2012)

[60] ISAF, About ISAF – Mission, op. cit.

[61] Ibid.

[62] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[63] Ibid.

[64] W. Morgan. ‘Afghanistan Order of Battle: Coalition Combat Forces in Afghanistan’, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), June 2012,  http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AfghanistanOrbat_July2012.pdf., (accessed 18 July 2012).

[65] Ibid.

[66] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 1 February 2010 – 3 February 2011, op. cit.

[67] ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 3 February 2011, ibid.; ‘Afghan War order of battle’, eNotes, op. cit.

[68] Morgan, ‘Afghanistan Order of Battle’, op. cit.,

[69] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 16 June 2009, op. cit.

[70] ISAF, About ISAF – Mission, op. cit.

[71] U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, op. cit., p. 18.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Ibid., p. 19.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., p. 26.

[81] ISAF, About ISAF – Mission, op. cit.

[82] U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, op. cit., p. 18.

[83] Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[84] Ibid.

[85] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.; ISAF, About ISAF – Mission, op. cit.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)’, GlobalSecurity.Org, op. cit.; LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, ibid.

[89] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 1 October 2009, op. cit.

[92] ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)’, GlobalSecurity.Org, op. cit.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

[95] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[96] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 16 April 2010, op. cit.

[97] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[98] Ibid.

[99] ‘Chapter A-1: ‘Introduction – Asia-Pacific Shared Interests, MNF SOP Objectives, Applicability, and MNF Considerations’, in  Multinational Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), 6^th working draft, Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute (AIAI) of the University of Edinburgh, 10 April 2002, p. A1-B-1, www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/coax/demo/2002/mpat/SOP/A1.DOC (accessed 20 January 2009).

[100] Modified image taken from ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’, 3 February 2011, op. cit.

[101] U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, op. cit., p. 16.

[102] Ibid.

[103] New Zealand Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Roger McElwaine, former Commander of the New Zealand-led PRT in Bamyan Province (CRIB 10, 2007) in RC-East under American Lead Nation command and Commander of Waiouru Military Camp (2009) of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Personal communication with Regeena Kingsley, 26 February 2009, Wharerata, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, op. cit., p. 15, 

[108] Created using information taken from U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, ibid., pp. 17, 20, 22, 24.

[109] Ibid., p. 18.

[110] LTCOL Nick Gillard, Interviewed by Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.

[111] ‘Episode 3’ and  ‘Episode 4’, ‘Ross Kemp – Back on the Frontline’, dir. Southan Morris, U.K., Television Channel Sky 1, British Sky Broadcasting (216 mins), 2011 [DVD].

[112] U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, op. cit., p. 19.

[113] Created using information taken from U.S. DoD, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, January 2009, ibid., pp. 17-19, 24-26.