#6 Managing Multinational Complexity –
Command & Control (C²)
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
As stated previously, the conduct of multinational warfare is a very complex business. This complexity is inherent in every multinational security operation, being as it is, the activity of war (whether small- or full-scale), conducted by a temporarily-unified body, for a temporary purpose, that comprises a variety of different national actors via disparate military forces.
Command and Control
‘Command and Control’ (C²) systems are crucial to successful management of this inherent complexity within MNOs. Indeed, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Lou Marich from the U.S. Army War College:
‘Command and control (C²) is the critical primary tool needed for success in multinational operations’.[1]
It is important to recognise here, however, that though used together, the two terms within C² are not synonymous. They both encompass separate – though related – functions in the management of military forces.
Command
In general terms, command has been described as an art which, much like architecture, concerns the creation or building of a battle design for a military operation. Control, by contrast, has been described as more of a science: it is measurable and concerns adherence to an original design or plan.[2]
The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) defines command as:
The authority that a commander in a military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of their rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline of assigned personnel.[3]
Within established national military forces, command is regarded as legal authority, by virtue of rank, assignment or appointment, to direct, coordinate and control armed forces.[4] Without legal command authority, there can be no command. It is the role of appointed military commanders to assume this authority and responsibility for deploying and assigning forces to fulfil missions, and thereby to impose their will and intentions on subordinates to achieve designated objectives.[5]
This means that, as one NZDF publication neatly states: ‘Decision-making is a prime manifestation of command, for it is the making of major decisions that is a commander’s key duty’.[6] It falls to the commander to assign missions, deploy units, and reassign forces, though the commander may often, where appropriate, delegate the control of such action – whether operational or tactical control – to subordinates including members of his or her staff.[7] Commanders will often assume responsibility for administration and logistics as well.
To be sure, it is internationally recognised that the notion of command encompasses three key components – command authority, leadership and management – which each serve as both a duty and ideal of effective command.
Control
By contrast, control concerns the oversight, direction and coordination of forces towards the implementation of orders or directives issued from higher command.[8] Control has been described as: ‘The authority a commander exercises in the implementation of command and pertains to the monitoring of progress and results’.[9]
Once a command has been given, the following action must be ‘controlled’ and the command followed-through, in the sense that it is monitored, supervised and given oversight. Control thereby seeks to prevent activity pursuant to commands from spiralling out of control to the point that chaos ensues. One may see by this that control is even more important in times of war than in times of peace, when commanders are inherently operating within an operational environment which is already chaotic and fraught with friction – in the midst of the so-called ‘fog of war’.
Control is thus pivotal to the effective management of military forces. It is best defined as:
‘The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control of those units’.[10]
While commanders may sometimes perform this function themselves, it is often delegated downwards to become the responsibility of military personnel serving under him or her, in which case control is ‘the authority exercised…over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command’.[11] In assuming control functions, assigned personnel do not, however, wield command authority to allocate assets or order movement, which remains solely the domain of the commander.[12] They do not, as a matter of course, have to assume responsibility for administrative or logistic control either.[13]
Indeed, the main role of controllers is to provide oversight of activity stemming from command directives and to provide constant feedback to the commander, so that the commander is given accurate and up-to-date information and thereby ‘an opportunity to make timely and effective decisions’. [14]
Imposing Command & Control (C²): Alliances vs Coalitions
In terms of MNOs, imposing an effective C² system within an international operation is a difficult enterprise. It is generally considered that MNOs undertaken by a pre-existing alliance, with previous experience of military interoperability and established structures for C², are generally less problematic than those undertaken by an ad hoc coalition.
Alliances
An alliance is defined by the U.S. Department of Defence as:
‘The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members’.[15]
Current politico-military alliances include: land forces’ American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardisation Programme or “ABCA Armies” alliance; the strategic maritime Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States (AUSCANNZUKUS) alliance, which is also known as the Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) naval alliance; the corresponding five-nation Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC) alliance in the realm of aviation; the “Five Eyes” (FVEY) intelligence alliance, also comprised of the five nations cited above (AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US); the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) alliance; and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alliance.[16]
Working and operating together annually as they do to enhance intermilitary cooperation as well as doctrinal and organisational interoperability, such alliances form a good foundation for MNOs, having not only established standardisation agreements, but also having C² procedures already in place.[17]
Coalitions
By comparison, a coalition is a spontaneous, short-term, unformalised ad hoc arrangement, ‘formed in rapid response to unforeseen crises which usually occur outside the area of scope of an alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance to handle it’.[18] A coalition consequently involves actors with varying degrees of commitment, international engagement, and disparate experiences of MNOs and even warfare itself. These actors are also more likely to have dissimilar languages, terms of reference, doctrines, capabilities, organisation, and ‘tactics, techniques and procedures’ (TTPs) – all of which impede multinational interoperability.[19] Coalition warfare is thus rendered the more difficult of the two, and relies heavily on cooperation and coordination between its participant nations.
Coalition operations consequently also necessitate a greater level of effort from its Operational Commander, requiring more of the commander’s time, thought, energy and resources than would be the case for an alliance-based MNO. [20] As Marich summarises:
‘Coalition military operations are more complex and military coalition leaders face a much more daunting task in commanding and controlling multinational forces that, at best, may agree to a common purpose and like objectives, and at worst, can be a loose conglomerate of forces with divergent agendas’.[21]
Indeed, it is generally well-known that nations taking part in a coalition, as opposed to an alliance-based operation, work to retain more control over their own national forces than would otherwise be the case.[22]
Common Command Structures
As a consequence, coalition operations tend towards one of three command arrangements, each designed to impose a cohesive C² system on the assorted parties to a MNO. Coalitions may be organised under:
- (1) an integrated command structure, with all forces subordinate to one designated Lead Nation, thereby enhancing unity of command;
- (2) a parallel command structure, with all forces divided into two camps each headed by a Lead Nation, which, having no overarching commander, can be problematic and is heavily reliant on coordination centres; or
- (3) a hybrid, multi-parallel Lead Nation command structure, with all forces divided into smaller units, each commanded by a designated Lead Nation, and a main headquarters comprised of staff drawn from each of these Lead Nations in addition to staff appointed by coalition command.[23]
Of these, the latter multi-parallel command system is the most difficult to coordinate well within a MNO towards the achievement of the collective objective. According to the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense publication, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, this is because ‘nations are generally reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one lead nation’ and ‘are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the lead nation’s interest’.[24]
Nevertheless, it is important to note, that no one command system is a panacea that will fit all multinational military campaigns. Inevitably the precise command system to be employed within each MNO will be selected based on the nature and metrics of the military mission at hand, and the number, types and interests of the nations contributing forces to it. As the U.S. Defense MNO publication has also emphasized:
‘No single command structure best fits the needs of all alliances and coalitions. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that will best meet the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations’.[25]
C² & the Operational Environment
In selecting the appropriate command system, the operational environment for the MNO under consideration also has a bearing on the C² systems put in place. This is owing to the disparate nature and operational traditions of each of the military Services of sea, air or land. Indeed, different procedures and perspectives have developed within each of the three traditional military branches of national armed forces over long periods of time, which continue to influence C² systems within MNOs today.[26]
Naval Operations
In a maritime context, for instance, in which the MNF is comprised of individual semi-autonomous ships operating within a vast, open environment, C² procedures rely on high technology automation systems and modern communications, while also adhering to the historically entrenched maritime codes of conduct, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[27] Characterised by self-sustainability, flexibility, mobility and readiness as they are, naval MNOs are executed to influence, support, assist, deter or respond to an international security situation and are considered ‘the best equipped to facilitate complex multinational operations’.[28]
Air Operations
Similarly, in the sphere of aviation, air forces operate in an open international environment and follow entrenched international aerial rules. Like national navies, national fighting forces of the sky are comprised of semi-autonomous air weapons platforms that are usually operated by a single pilot, and have consequently developed C² systems that depend – for obvious reasons – almost exclusively on modern technology.[29] There are several advantages to conducting MNOs waged by national air forces: firstly, air forces tend to be flexible, versatile and capable of multi-tasking to perform simultaneous operations; secondly, air forces operate in an environment free from traditional obstacles and restraints; and thirdly, national air forces frequently operate in the international language of English. [30] Small wonder, then, that aerial MNOs are considered to be manageable and adaptable enterprises – far more so than their counterparts on land.[31]
Ground Operations
Indeed, MNOs conducted by ground forces on land are widely considered to be the most difficult and complex of all multinational military campaigns. This is, firstly, owing to the fact that unlike sea or air forces which primarily involve the manoeuvre of machine units, ground troops are a ‘highly personalised’ force with units being comprised of hundreds of individual human beings, each with their own will and perspective. This makes each national army land force a unique entity, and one far more difficult to control within a multinational context.
As Major (MAJ) Josh Wineera of the New Zealand Army asserts, unlike in the navy or air force where during machine-based manoeuvres ‘both the cowards and the brave go right’, in the army it is up to each individual within the unit to obey command orders and to get him or herself into position. [32] Moreover, on a naval vessel or air craft, the threat is shared equally by the personnel aboard giving a higher incentive for personnel to obey.[33] Within the army, however, the human factor weighs far more heavily on the actions taken where the threat is far more heightened for the brave and daring who obey their commands, but significantly less so for those who shy away from their orders.[34]
In addition to the human element, C² systems within a multinational ground force are complicated by an array of countervailing factors. This is because while land forces in themselves are mobile and manoeuvrable, versatile, sustainable, and capable of interoperability, C² within a multinational ground force is frustrated among allied contingents by divergent languages of communication, force structures, operational procedures, equipment, information technology, and professional capabilities – all in addition to the traditional land warfare problems of manoeuvring large units within a ‘closed geography’, in which communication is impeded by a ‘ground clutter environment’, and in which commanders are afforded poor visibility.[35] The result of all these interacting variables is that, as Marich states, ‘ground operations continue to be the most complex and difficult to execute’ in a multilateral context with C² being ‘as much art as it is science’.[36]
C² and the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan
In light of this discussion, it is interesting and worthwhile to note here that the ISAF operation currently operating in Afghanistan presents many challenges to NATO in terms of C². This is for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it is a hybrid-creature that operates according to the most difficult multi-parallel Lead Nation command system design for MNOs.
Secondly, it is also fundamentally an ad hoc coalition of the willing, with leadership over this coalition subsequently assumed by an alliance (NATO), meaning that it is comprised of both coalition and alliance member-nations, with the latter having a more influential voice in the leadership of the mission.
Thirdly, the ISAF mission predominantly involves large numbers of infantry ground forces, who are involved in a prolonged COIN-oriented land campaign (to be discussed further in a later blog).
As a result of all these factors, the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is one of the most difficult MNOs currently being conducted anywhere in the world.
*This blog is an excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014) entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012”.
Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices can be viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
Endnotes
[1] L. L. Marich (LTCOL), ‘Enhancing Command and Control in Multinational Operations’, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2002, p. iii, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA404313 (accessed May 14, 2010)
[2] MAJ Josh Wineera, Personal communication (II) with Regeena Kingsley, 17 June 2010, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
[3] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), ‘Chapter One: Introducing Command in the New Zealand Defence Force’, Command and Control in the New Zealand Defence Force – NZDDP – 00.1, New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, Wellington, 2008, pp. 1-3.
[4] Ibid., pp. 1-4.
[5] Ibid. pp. 1-2.
[6] Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[7] New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force (HQNZDF), ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, Foundations of New Zealand Military Doctrine – NZDDP-D 2004, New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication, Wellington, 2004, G-9.
[8] HQNZDF, ‘Chapter One: Introducing Command in the New Zealand Defence Force’, op. cit., pp. 1-4.
[9] Ibid.
[10] HQNZDF, ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, op. cit., p. G-9.
[11] HQNZDF, ‘Chapter One: Introducing Command in the New Zealand Defence Force’, op. cit. pp. 1-3.
[12] Ibid., pp.1-4.
[13] HQNZDF, ‘Glossary and Acronyms’, op. cit., p. G-9.
[14] HQNZDF, ‘Chapter One: Introducing Command in the New Zealand Defence Force’. op. cit. pp.1-4.
[15] U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), The Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, New York, Skyhorse Publishing, 2009, p. 31.
[16] MAJ Josh Wineera, Personal communication (II) with Regeena Kingsley, op. cit.
The term “Five Eyes” is an abbreviation of the “SECRET— AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY” classification marked on intelligence documents shared between these intelligence allies within the alliance – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States (or ‘AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US’). In conversation, allied officials began to refer to the alliance as “Five Eyes” because it was much shorter and easier to say (J. Cox, ‘Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community’, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2012, p.4, http://cdfai.org.previewmysite.com/PDF/Canada%20and%20the%20Five%20Eyes%20Intelligence%20Community.pdf (accessed November 28, 2016)).
[17] Marich, op. cit. p. 7
[18] U.S. Department of Defence (U.S. DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013, p. II-10., http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf, (accessed 6 June 2009).
[19] Marich, op. cit. p. 14.
[20] Ibid., p. 7.
[21] Ibid.
[22] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, op. cit., p. II-10.
[23] Marich, op. cit. p. 10; U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, ibid., p. II-10.
[24] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, ibid., p. II-11.
[25] Ibid., p. II-7.
[26] Marich, op. cit. p. 2.
[27] Marich, ibid., pp. 2-3.
[28] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, op. cit., p. IV-5; Marich, ibid., p. 3.
[29] Marich, ibid., p. 3.
[30] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, op. cit., p. IV-7; Marich, ibid., p. 3.
[31] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, ibid., pp. IV-7 – IV-8; Marich, ibid., p. 3.
[32] MAJ Josh Wineera, Personal communication (I) with Regeena Kingsley, 27 May 2010, Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] U.S. DoD, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, op. cit., p. IV-2; Marich, op. cit. pp. 1, 3.
[36] Marich, ibid., p. 3.