#32 BACKGROUND The ISAF COIN Strategy: 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs) & ‘Division of Labour’ among ISAF Nations & Forces – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” The last blog presented the dilemma that confronted the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), during
#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population
#31 BACKGROUND COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission led by the militarily capable – but politically constrained – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and prosecuted in Afghanistan from 2001-2014, has been one of
#30 BACKGROUND – NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014
#30 BACKGROUND NATO’s Operational Plan (OPLAN) for ISAF Mission Success in Afghanistan, 2003-2014 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” In the last blog, ‘#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success’, I provided an introduction to the International Security Assistance
#29 BACKGROUND – The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success
#29 BACKGROUND The NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan: Purpose, Mission, Characteristics, Genesis, Leadership & NATO Responsibility for Mission Success – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” In the last blog I provided a brief introduction to the ancient land and peoples of Afghanistan, and outlined the central roles that Pakistan, the Pashtun Taliban
#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012
#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012 – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” My research comprises an in-depth study of the problem of restrictive national caveats within the multinational NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, and
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research
#26 Time to Study National Caveats: The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research – Dr Regeena Kingsley * This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.” “There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.” « Il y a
#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators
#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators – Dr Regeena Kingsley In previous blogs it has been explained that Rules of Engagement (ROE) are instructions for the use of force by military forces, and that these instructions or rules relate to two specific issues – self-defence and mission accomplishment. With regard to self-defence, when individuals, groups of individuals, or an armed force are declared Enemy, it is permissible for force to be used as a matter of course and offensive action to take place. The Enemy force may be attacked, at the discretion and judgment of the military commander,
#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command & Control (C²)
#6 Managing Multinational Complexity – Command & Control (C²) – Dr Regeena Kingsley As stated previously, the conduct of multinational warfare is a very complex business. This complexity is inherent in every multinational security operation, being as it is, the activity of war (whether small- or full-scale), conducted by a temporarily-unified body, for a temporary purpose, that comprises a variety of different national actors via disparate military forces. Command and Control ‘Command and Control’ (C²) systems are crucial to successful management of this inherent complexity within MNOs. Indeed, according to Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Lou Marich from the
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations
#1 Introduction: The Problem of “National Caveats” within Multinational Operations – Dr Regeena Kingsley The difficulty of fighting wars in concert with allies is not a new idea. Indeed, Winston Churchill once commented that: ‘There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies –and that is to fight without them’.[1] In the modern era, however, the difficulty of allied multinational warfare has reached new and unprecedented proportions. This is especially the case given the maze of bureaucratic red-tape which is increasingly imposed by national governments on armed forces contributed to a military coalition, and which national