#26 Time to Study National Caveats:
The “Caveat Gap” in Academic Research
– Dr Regeena Kingsley
* This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”
“There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves.”
« Il y a un temps pour faire la paix, il y a un temps pour faire la guerre. Il faut parfois tenter de faire les deux à la fois, mais pas à moitié. »
– Pierre Servent [1]
National Caveats
National caveats are limitation and prohibition rules, contained within the Rules of Engagement of national armed force contingents, which restrict how national forces may be used by the Operational Commander within a multinational mission.
Within the military, caveats may be imposed across the full spectrum of armed forces – on naval, air, infantry and elite Special Operations Forces (SOFs). Caveats may also be imposed to constrain the activities of civilian officials involved in reconstruction, development, governance and humanitarian assistance work. In this way, governments can enforce national caveats to constrict the activities and functions of both national security and stability forces deployed to a Multinational Operation (MNO).
A limitation caveat, also known as a ‘yellow-card’ rule, requires a deployed unit to apply for and obtain explicit approval and authorisation from the government in the home capital before that unit can participate in a task, operation or geographical movement required of it from Operational Command in theatre. In most cases, this government permission must be sought and obtained from the relevant Minister or Secretary of Defence, or in the case of civilian personnel the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Secretary of State, but the caveat may often also involve seeking and acquiring permission from the Head of Government as well, the Prime Minister or President of the nation.
By contrast a prohibition caveat, also known as a ‘red-card’ rule, is a complete ban. Participation of deployed national forces in certain tasks, operations, movements, communications and intelligence-sharing, and the use of certain tactics, weaponry and even lethal force within the MNO, are absolutely prohibited by the national government.
Caveats in Practice
Governments have imposed an extensive range of national caveats on national military contingents deployed to participate in multinational security campaigns over the past few decades.
Forces have frequently been limited or prohibited from being deployed by the Multinational Operational Commander to certain geographical locations within the mission, especially to high-risk or ‘hostile’ regions or districts of the Area of Responsibility (AOR), or in close proximity to international borders. They have further often been limited or prohibited by national caveats from deploying outside of specific geographical locations such as operational sectors, areas of operation, cities, city suburbs, airports, or military installations such as troop bases, camps and humanitarian reconstruction sites.
In terms of operations, national governments have limited or prohibited their force contingents from participating in certain operations or activities such as riot-control operations, counter-narcotics operations, counter-insurgent operations, counter-terrorist operations, offensive war-fighting operations, and even security patrols or participation in reconstruction work. Alarmingly, these national caveats have frequently appeared within international security operations in which dealing with public riots, drug smuggling, insurgents, terrorists and conducting regular and robust security patrols have been the express mission of the international force, and thereby work to contradict the international mandate and undermine the mission.
Caveats have also regularly been imposed on specific branches of the military, for instance to explicitly constrain infantry operations, aerial operations, naval operations, elite SOF operations, reconnaissance and intelligence operations involving UAV drones, and even emergency medical evacuation operations (constraining their use and curtailing medical assistance to, and transport of, allied and indigenous security forces).
Where participation of national forces in such operations has been permitted, additional limitation caveats have further constrained the manner in which these operations may be conducted. In terms of security patrols, for example, governments have prohibited infantry units from conducting foot patrols and restricted patrolling to armoured vehicles, or else the foot patrols have been authorised to be conducted only on main roads, within townships rather than its surrounding environs, or within prescribed short distances from military bases or medical facilities. Infantry, naval and aerial patrols have further been constrained by government-imposed caveats from patrolling at any time under cover of darkness, during bad weather, snowfall or in snowy conditions, in less than optimal numbers (e.g. infantry patrols must include no less than 15 soldiers and air patrols must be conducted with at least two aircraft per sortie), at certain times of year (such as national statutory holidays), and even the time of day (e.g. during the night or at dinner time).
Within several multinational security operations, government-imposed caveats have not only prohibited their national contingents from participating in or using kinetic lethal force in combat operations, involving the planning, execution, and active or passive support of offensive war-fighting operations to take the fight to the Enemy within an active theatre of conflict, but have also expressly forbidden the use of lethal force at all except in cases of unit or individual self-defence. This reality has created the modern oxymoron – both in word and in deed – of ‘non-combat-capable combat forces’.
In Afghanistan, one small nation went even further, the government banning their soldiers on the ground from ever firing their weapons – and subsequently, even more ludicrously – from ever carrying weapons in the course of their operations within the campaign. In a similarly puzzling paradox, many national governments have also forbidden their national armed forces from using certain kinds of necessary weaponry, for instance riot-control weapons and agents in riot-control operations, or automatic weapons or heavy artillery against insurgent Enemy fighters.
In addition, governments have imposed caveats to curtail or ban intelligence-sharing with allies as well as with rivals, to frustrate multinational intra-coalition agreements (the preference being government-level bilateral agreements nation by nation), to continually restrict contingent numbers to a ‘troop ceiling’ (even during troop rotations), and to constrain the communications, movement or transport of contingent National Commanders.
Caveats have furthermore been imposed to restrict military cooperation of national contingents with the forces of other international troop contingents within a mission, to restrict cooperation with indigenous local security forces (especially in regard to the training, mentoring or partnering tasks involved in capacity-building), and even to restrict cooperation with Operational Commanders of multinational security operations (thereby undermining ‘unity of command’ within the mission).
Finally, national forces have been limited or prohibited by their governments from directly or indirectly cooperating with or supporting personnel engaged in other UN, NATO or other national government operations occurring simultaneously within the same theatre of conflict, especially if those missions involve offensive war-fighting operations.
From these examples, it is clear that national caveats may relate to geographical mobility and manoeuvrability, participation in a wide spectrum of operations and activities including basic security patrols, participation in or support of kinetic, offensive war-fighting operations, tactics, weather, time, the use of lethal force, the use of certain weaponry, intelligence-sharing, force numbers, commanders, cooperation with Operational Commanders of missions, and cooperation with allies of all stripes – the forces of alliance or coalition partners within the mission, allied personnel participating in other simultaneous missions within the conflict theatre, and indigenous security forces of the host country.
In short, government-imposed national caveats restrict where national military forces may deploy, what operations and activities they may perform, in what manner these tasks may be conducted, and who they may cooperate with in the course of participating in a multinational security mission.
The negotiation of these national caveats constraints, by commanders and soldiers, sailors and pilots alike along the full chain of command, has rendered multinational military campaigns exceedingly complex and strenuous, to a much greater degree than would otherwise be necessary.
Within highly-complex multinational campaigns that are asymmetrical in nature and involve counter-insurgency warfare, such as those conducted by coalitions in Afghanistan or Iraq over the past decades, the added layers of difficulty caused by caveat-imposition not only create unnecessary hurdles for military personnel, but can also hold very costly and grave consequences for the outcome of the campaign itself.
Indeed, restrictive Rules of Engagement can become such an impediment to effective warfare that they can fracture the coalition or alliance conducting the military operation, dividing allies and even turning nations against one another in the midst of the campaign. In this way, national caveats can be the catalyst for transforming a purpose-driven operation against an Enemy in concert with allies on a military mission, into a less focused fight with and against those same allies instead of the Enemy in the midst of the campaign, with an accompanying loss of cohesion, unity, effectiveness and time.
In both political and military terms then, national caveats can be political and operational dynamite.
Academic Neglect of the Role & Effects of “National Caveats” in MNOs
During the past few decades it has become common practice for national governments to impose a wide range of restrictive national caveats on the armed forces they are contributing to multinational security operations. Nevertheless, despite this evolving – and alarming – international pattern in the conduct of multinational security endeavours, there has been a remarkable dearth of academic scholarship on the issue, either on the matter of national caveats themselves, or the impact such caveats have on the prosecution and effectiveness of the operations where they are present.
In fact, when preparations for this research began in mid-2008, not one single academic article could be found on the matter at all within the international academic sphere by means of academic database searches. In broader internet searches, moreover, the word ‘caveat’ seemed to belong solely to the domain of politics and law – in the sense of a ‘proviso’ or caution – with no apparent relationship or connection with military affairs or security discourse at all.
This academic neglect of national caveats and their role in multinational warfare within the domain of Defence & Security Studies is surprising for four main reasons.
Firstly, due to the frequency and number of multinational security campaigns that have taken place in the past three decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and which continue to be prosecuted today, most infamously in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. Indeed, despite the supremacy of the United States as the single so-called ‘hyper-power’ in the international system, a fact that has given rise to a unipolar balance of power ever since the end of the Cold War, multinational military operations – rather than unilateral or even bi-lateral arrangements – have become the preferred form of waging war in the modern globalised era. One only needs to think back over the conflicts that have taken place over the past three decades for evidence of this prevailing norm within the international system. From the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 to the multiple UN peacekeeping missions on the African continent throughout the 1990s, from the various UN and NATO military interventions in the Balkans to the 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) invasion of Afghanistan and beyond to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation, from the 2003 Iraq War waged by a multinational ‘coalition of the willing’ to the 2011 Libyan naval and air campaigns, and more recently the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq and Syria – multinational military campaigns have been the instrument of choice when conducting war campaigns or peace and stability operations.
Secondly, within these multinational security operations, there has been a simultaneous increase in restrictive national caveats within the Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the various national force contingents deployed to these missions – so much so that caveat-imposition has become a more and more common occurrence. Indeed, according to Auerswald & Saideman, ever since the multinational security operation in Bosnia in 1992, it has become ‘customary’ for nations contributing to a multinational security operation to deploy their forces bound by such limitations.[2] This prevailing habit has become so ‘normal’, in fact, that it has become standard procedure for a so-called ‘caveat spreadsheet’ to be created for Operational Commanders at the start of every multinational mission, in order to assist commanders in keeping track of all the limitation and prohibition ROE imposed by nations contributing to the Multinational Force (MNF).[3]
Thirdly, the regular imposition of a plethora of national restrictions within a Multinational Force deployed to prosecute a multinational security operation seem to have frequently created negative effects for the operation as a whole. Broadly-speaking, caveats have been known to create disunity and division among national contingents participating in MNOs, thereby impeding unity and cohesion within the international force. This division has often been sharpest wherever inequitable burden-sharing with regard to the execution of the most difficult security operations has become apparent between contingents within the force. This has meant that the fundamental military principles of unity of command and unity of effort have frequently become compromised by caveat-imposition.
Lastly, time and again the reality of clashing ROE and national agendas – symptomised by the caveats – have frustrated and hindered the ability of a Multinational Force to effectively prosecute the security campaign towards its security objectives. In fact, very disconcertingly, on several occasions widespread caveat imposition within multinational security operations has led to a deterioration of security within these security assistance missions – to the point of worsening, or even creating, security crises within the mission. The examples of caveat-induced security degenerations and human disasters provided in previous blogs – occurring in MNOs ranging from UN operations in Angola, Rwanda, Bosnia, South Sudan, the Congo and the Central African Republic to NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, among many other operational examples – are evidence of this unsettling and tragic reality.
[For more information on these grave, caveat-generated disasters, see blogs ‘#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina’, ‘#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats & the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola’, ‘#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”’, ‘#22 Recommended Viewing: The UN, National Caveats & Human Carnage in Rwanda’, ‘#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots”’, ‘#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators’ for a situation that occurred in Afghanistan, and lastly, ‘#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC’ with regard to the UN’s abiding problem of national caveat imposition within UN operations in the South Sudan, Congo, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere around the globe.]
Why is Caveat Research Important?
Such a range of caveat-generated negative effects in the security sphere within operations designed to foster security, stability and peace is deeply concerning, especially given the fact that creating and maintaining security is the very raison d’être of most of these multinational security operations.
Indeed, it is these tangible realities, stemming from caveat imposition within these multinational security operations, which underscore the importance and necessity of conducting academic analysis of the reoccurring phenomenon within modern security ventures. However, while the effects of caveat imposition have from time to time resulted in security scandals and embarrassment at both the national and international level, rigorous academic study of the caveat catalyst behind these occurrences has not followed. Consequently, despite the growing evidence of the detrimental effects of national caveats within multinational security operations over the past two decades, there has in fact been scant research undertaken on this subject-area at all.
A thorough study into the effects of diverse and restrictive ROE amongst multinational allies participating in international security operations, with particular emphasis on national caveat limitation and prohibition rules, is therefore important, necessary and long overdue. If commanders are to manage this new norm properly, or take measures to mitigate these negative caveat effects, there must be a better understanding with regard to what caveats are, what form they take, and the various ways in which they impact on operational effectiveness and mission success.
The need for an academic study on the caveat issue is even more urgent, moreover, given the debilitating way in which caveats have been interfering with the prosecution of one of the world’s most important enterprises on the world stage today – the war in Afghanistan waged to secure the country, the region, and indeed the wider world from the threat of Islamic extremism in the form of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. In fact, in light of the threat of an Islamist ‘global insurgency’ in future decades, a prognosis asserted by insurgency expert David Kilcullen, it is likely that multinational counter-insurgency (COIN) missions will be necessary in future years within one or more of eight different theatres around the world, potentially to be prosecuted under very high stakes in the Global War against Terrorism (GWOT).[4]
In short, military interventions to prevent genocide may be a thing of the past, and COIN campaigns against insurgencies the wars of the future. Analysis of the effects of national caveats within COIN campaigns, such as that in Afghanistan, will consequently be important in the design and effective prosecution of future low-intensity security campaigns in the interests of world security.
The “Caveat Gap” in Existing Academic Literature
However, there is a “caveat gap” in existing academic literature with regard to national caveats, in addition to ROE more generally, and their effects within multinational security operations.
Most academic discourse with relation to MNOs pertains to:
(1) the advantages and disadvantages of multilateral warfare, as opposed to unilateral or bilateral warfare;
(2) the characteristics of MNOs in general;
(3) the varying nature of alliance-led versus coalition-led operations;
(4) the centrality of Command & Control (C²) for managing complexity within MNOs, whatever the operational environment of land, sea or air;
(5) the various command structures that exist within MNOs in order to implement this C²;
and lastly,
(6) the importance of unity of effort within MNOs, achieved usually through the combined process of unity of command and cooperation and consensus between parties to the MNO.[5]
Within this academic discourse, the subject of diverse ROE within national contingents participating in a MNO has appeared, more often than not, as a side note rather than a theme of robust analysis and discussion.
In truth, some of the fullest examinations and assessments of the role of ROE in multinational military campaigns are contained not in academic discourse, but within official reports written by national governments or security organisations, for example manuals written by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD, or ‘the Pentagon’) or papers resulting from NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) workshops in Geneva, Switzerland.[6]
Even within these reports, however, what does exist pertains to the few advantages and multiple disadvantages of ROE within military operations generally, with emphasis placed on the importance of developing one set of ‘standardised rules of engagement’ between the various parties to a MNO, at best prior to deployment. Very little of this material actually examines or analyses the issue of divergent or clashing ROE within Multinational Forces on operations, nor the tangibly negative consequences of this divergence on effective multinational security operations, including the creation and/or deterioration of security crises and disasters.
The subject of national caveats – the limitation and prohibitive classes of rules within national ROE – has featured even less than ROE, and has predominantly received no attention or mention in the MNO literature at all.
It is due to this fact that the examination of a great deal of information used to discuss the concepts of ROE and national caveats, as presented in preceding blogs, had to be drawn chiefly from non-academic sources, for instance NATO or government reports, combined with the researcher’s own research via official enquiries, and personal communications with defence academics, civilians and practitioners.
[See blogs ‘#2 What are “National Caveats”?’, ‘#3 National Caveats: Potential to Constrain the Full Spectrum of Military Personnel & Operations’, ‘#9 What are “Rules of Engagement”? Military Mandates & Instructions for the Use of Force’, ‘#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: “Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions’, ‘#11 How are Rules of Engagement Formed for Military Operations?’, ‘#12 The Binding Power of Rules of Engagement: Enforcement & Punishment’, ‘#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators’, ‘#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy (Official & Unofficial Caveats)’, ‘#16 The Practical Value of National Rules of Engagement: An Assessment’, and ‘#17 The Complexity of Diverse National ROE within Multinational Security Operations’.]
Indeed, much of the information appearing in these blogs was gleaned from personal interviews with members of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), who have acquired knowledge of national caveats, and/or first-hand experience with their effects, while serving abroad on deployments to MNOs in Angola, Kosovo and Afghanistan.
This research necessity is a further illustration of the large gap in existing academic literature with regard to both ROE and national caveats, and their role within multinational security endeavours.
Secrecy & Sensitivity as Primary Obstacles to Caveat Research
There are, however, two key reasons for this academic research gap, which lies with national caveats themselves.
Caveat Secrecy
The first and primary obstacle to caveat research is the fact that, contained as they are within the official ROE of deployed military force contingents, national caveat restrictions are highly classified information.
There is of course a legitimate reason behind a national government’s desire to protect classified lists of ROE in force amongst deployed military forces participating in multinational security campaigns, which relates to national and operational security. Governments have an obligation to provide protection to deployed forces by keeping critical information secret with regard to the national contingent’s limitations, weaknesses, disadvantages or procedural seams, as well as those of the wider Multinational Force as a whole. In this sense, governments keep their ROE classified in order to deny the Enemy actionable information which, if known, could give the Enemy an advantage to exploit, by alerting them to potential ‘attack openings’ or ‘exploitable gaps’ within the national contingent, or between the national contingent and other participating allied forces.
However, ROE and national caveat restrictions are also often kept classified for an additional reason: in order to provide ‘political cover’ for national governments, especially in cases where the caveat restrictions imposed on deployed military forces are particularly severe or numerous. In these situations, governments have an additional incentive to keep their national caveats secret, quite apart from the main reason of force protection – that being to avoid their force limitations being exposed to the security organisation in charge of the multinational campaign or to other participating allies, and thereby to evade criticism, censure or ridicule from either party. Within the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, for instance, the political cover afforded by caveat secrecy seems to have been particularly sought by the most heavily caveated force contributing nations that were considered to be failing to carry their ‘fair share’ of the security burden, in relation to conducting the more difficult security tasks within the COIN operation.
It is for these dual reasons that ROE are kept classified and guarded jealously by both the military and political institutions of national governments. Within these ROE, national caveat constraints are especially fiercely guarded by nations deploying to MNOs, and kept secret from the forces of other participating nations and often even from the Operational Commander of the mission. Furthermore, all those with knowledge or access to ROE for a set deployment – current or historic – are often legally prohibited to speak of them in the interest of national security, even long after a military operation has terminated.[7]
The content and number of national caveats within any MNO is, consequently, extremely difficult information for any researcher to obtain.
Government Sensitivity
In addition to the inherent secrecy surrounding classified national caveats, a second and significant obstacle to caveat research within MNOs is the reality that national governments are hyper-sensitive about the issue of national caveats.
Indeed, most governments are extremely reluctant to disclose any information relating to their national caveats restrictions – even when serious and infamous security crises have arisen as a result of them, some of which have resulted in the deaths of civilians or military personnel in theatre (e.g. the Belgians following the massacre that took place at their UN compound during the UNAMIR operation in Rwanda in 1994, or the Dutch following the genocide in their UN Area of Responsibility in Srebrenica during the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia in 1995).
In fact, as a general rule, most national governments are hostile to any investigation on the effects of national caveat imposition within multinational missions, for fear of what such enquiries might disclose about their own contingent or commitments. For example, revelations about the lack of military training, equipment, preparedness, commitment or political will on the part of nations contributing forces to an international security operation – any of which would be the cause of much national embarrassment. According to Human Rights Watch, it was due to this overriding sensitivity among national governments that a comprehensive enquiry into the caveats that had led to the embarrassing failure of NATO forces during the Kosovo Riots in 2004 was never undertaken. [8]
In brief, academic research into the issue of caveat imposition has not been undertaken because caveat information has, until recently, been too classified to obtain, and even if obtained, too sensitive to analyse and publish with impunity. As a result, it has been extremely difficult for researchers to ascertain precisely and accurately the full picture and extent of the caveat issue within multinational Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
Accordingly, references to the existence or role of national caveats within multinational military campaigns have been few and far between within academic discourse. Only brief glimpses of the caveat iceberg lying beneath many MNOs have been afforded to the scholar in the occasional reference to problematic caveats made within news articles, or in interviews with military commanders returning from tours of duty in multinational missions overseas – especially where security crises and humanitarian tragedies have emerged as a result of the caveat restraints, such as in the Rwandan UNAMIR, Bosnian UNPROFOR, or Kosovo KFOR operations.
Afghanistan & the Caveat Sea-Change
However, a sea-change has occurred with regard to this secretive and sensitive subject of ‘national caveats’ by way of the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Due to the many serious operational difficulties occurring within the mission as a direct result of the caveat constraints imposed on ISAF forces by Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), this large and extremely important Afghan mission has thrown a large spotlight on the subject-area of national caveats in military operations for the first time in the history of modern warfare.
Beginning in 2006 and escalating throughout 2008-2009, national caveats and their negative influences on the ISAF mission to secure and stabilise Afghanistan began to make news headlines in written and audio-visual news media around the world. The shroud of secrecy surrounding classified caveats began to lift, as more and more details of the various ISAF caveats enforced by ISAF contributing nations on their armed forces were leaked to the media – especially by way of frustrated ISAF commanders (often on the basis of anonymity). The publicity heightened further, moreover, as governments began to blame national caveats for Afghan security disasters which – in some cases – had led to loss of life amongst national military personnel operating within the mission.
A political uproar quickly followed the public revelations, with NATO and several ISAF participating nations loudly and vociferously condemning those nations that were keeping their military forces constrained within the mission by the political caveat fetters. This stream of caveat-related information has continued to flow into the public arena until the present day, by means of unofficial ‘leaks’ by ISAF personnel to news journalists, and even via official channels too by way of NATO, ISAF and national government reports. As a result, general public awareness of the caveat issue within the ISAF multinational mission has grown with the passage of time. Indeed, today the existence of national caveat constraints within the ISAF is a well-known and discussed issue in relation to the war in Afghanistan.
The flow of information with regard to ISAF caveats has meant that the contours of the caveat problem within the Afghan mission have become increasingly clear, and the issue much more visible for academic examination. For example, whereas in early 2008 any search of the key words ‘national caveats Afghanistan’ generated only a handful of articles on the matter, any general internet search of the same words today in 2014 on the worldwide web will generate approximately 160,000 articles in which national caveats are mentioned.
Consequently, there is a very large amount of available information on the issue of the ISAF mission’s caveats and their consequences within the mission. This information has stripped away the layers of secrecy that have traditionally surrounded the issue of national caveats, allowing in-depth analysis to occur for the first time on the role national caveats play within a multinational security operation.
Caveat Research on the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan
Nevertheless, in spite of the new availability of this formerly classified information, the political and public outrage over the ISAF caveat issue has been slow to gain attention in the domain of academic research.
ISAF Caveat Research in the Domain of Political Science
In 2007 the only rigorous academic examination of the issue was a collaborative pilot study conducted by three political scientists – David P. Auerswald from the National War College in Washington D.C. (U.S.A.), Stephen M. Saideman from McGill University in Montreal (Canada) and Michael J. Tierney from the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia (U.S.A). In September 2007 Auerswald, Saideman and Tierney presented a paper at the ‘Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association’ in Chicago, which focused exclusively on ISAF caveats as an impediment to coordination within multinational military interventions.
The paper was entitled ‘Caveat Emptor! National Oversight and Military Operations in Afghanistan’ and specifically assessed the degree to which Canadian civilian oversight, by means of civilian-military institutions, had impacted on the discretion of Canadian commanders on the ground within the Afghan theatre of war.[9] The paper was a self-declared ‘first cut’ at exploring the issues stemming from caveat imposition within the ISAF mission, and was chiefly based on information gained through interviews with senior Canadian officers who had served within either the ISAF or OEF operations and/or had liaised with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on the issue in some capacity. [10]
Two years later in February and September 2009 – while my own ISAF doctoral research was already underway – Auerswald and Saideman presented two more conference papers on the caveat issue at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association in New York and Toronto. Using the same primary sources of interviews with Canadian commanders, these political scientists had collaborated on two further studies to identify the sources of the caveats imposed on the Canadian, French and German contingents in Afghanistan. The first conference paper that year was oriented towards ‘understanding the variations in caveats among and between contributing countries’, by examining the political process through which the caveats have been formulated and enforced, and in particular, the role of civil-military institutions and political and military individuals in this process.[11] The second paper, examined the process by which change was brought about in the levying and lifting of caveats within the ISAF, by focusing solely on the Canadian contingent to assess ‘how individual expertise, attitudes toward risk, and organizational culture affects the likelihood of decision-makers to impose caveats’.[12]
Together these three presentations were pioneer studies on the role of national caveats in MNOs, through which Auerswald and Saideman sought to address the ‘large gap in the literature on alliances’ with regard to caveat-imposition and the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.[13] Indeed, according to Auerswald and Saideman, despite the ‘very high profile of caveats’ within the international arena and the fears regarding them in relation to the NATO organisation, ‘caveats, their sources, and efforts to mitigate them are poorly understood’. [14] As they explained further:
‘Scholars have focused on other challenges raised by coalition warfare…Perhaps as a result, the variation in national caveats both over time and across contingents presents something of a mystery…Understanding these restrictions is important if we want to comprehend the limits and effects of international cooperation at the pointy end of the spear, to use the military’s phrase. In sum, we seek to understand how multilateralism works in wartime…Very little scholarship has actually examined how alliances function or dys-function during wartime.’ [15]
Saideman subsequently followed up these presentations with a policy brief for the Centre for International Policy Studies (CIPS) at the University of Ottawa in October 2009, entitled ‘Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations’.[16] In this brief, Saideman described the extent of the caveat problem within the ISAF mission and argued that caveats had split NATO into three factions based on nations’ attitudes towards the use of force in the modern era. As he argued:
‘National caveats that restrict the activities of different NATO contingents in Afghanistan are more than just operationally problematic; they represent profound differences among NATO countries on the use of force.’[17]
Saideman concluded the brief arguing not only that the ISAF mission’s caveat problem would deter any future NATO MNOs, but also that the ISAF caveats were diminishing the commitment of principal nations to the NATO organisation itself. As Saideman stated:
‘The ISAF mission has made it obvious to all that the political risks, which are always high when putting troops in harm’s way, are quite steep when NATO cannot get its act together (caveats) and those that we are supporting seem unworthy of our effort (the values gap).’[18]
In 2012 Auerswald and Saideman undertook additional pioneering analysis within the domain of Political Science, by undertaking an investigation of the political sources of the various national caveats imposed on Canadian, French and German national contingents within the ISAF operation. In their article published by the journal International Studies Quarterly, and entitled ‘Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan’, they proposed that political institutions within the three countries under examination (i.e. coalition, presidential and majoritarian parliamentary governments) offered a better explanation for these nations’ observed behaviour of caveat-imposition within the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, than other earlier explanations focusing on public opinion, threat perception or military strategic culture.[19]
However, none of these studies have thoroughly analysed the extent or scope of the caveat problem within the ISAF mission, or identified the ways in which widespread caveat imposition amongst ISAF national contingents have impacted on either operational effectiveness or prospects of mission success.
Furthermore, the studies were conducted from the perspective of the Political Science school of academic thought, which focuses chiefly on domestic political processes. Consequently, they did not address the issue of ISAF caveats in a defence-oriented manner.
ISAF Caveat Research in Defence & Security Studies
A short study conducted in 2007 by John Brophy and Miloslav Fisera was the first defence-oriented academic study in this respect, which used news articles and political speeches on the ISAF caveat dilemma as their primary sources. In their article, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’ [sic], Brophy & Fisera sought to define the prevalent device of caveats within MNOs and to explain the source of the caveats imposed on the Czech ISAF contingent operating in Afghanistan.[20] The article also sought to identify the impact of caveats on military C² in MNOs, by briefly outlining the problems caveats had posed to command within three recent multinational security operations – in the Balkans, Kosovo and Afghanistan. While this article was oriented chiefly towards the Czech army and its commanders, the study concluded by recommending that a more detailed analysis of national caveats be undertaken in order to better prepare military commanders for future NATO missions.[21]
The only other academic treatment of caveats from a military perspective has been a French-language article written by naval commander, Captain (CAPT) Romuald Bomont, at the French École de Guerre (the government-operated Command & Staff College – or ‘School of War’ – for French military officers in Paris), which was published on the official French Ministry of Defence website in June 2010.[22] Given renewed emphasis on the engagement of French armed forces in multinational security operations, Bomont argued that caveats had become the ‘common lot’ to varying degrees of all military operations conducted by NATO, the European Union (EU) and the UN, in addition to coalitions of the willing.[23] ‘Caveats no longer represent only an embarrassment at the tactical or operational level,’ he argued, ‘but are well and truly a problem at the politico-strategic level. They have therefore not failed to generate numerous debates, questions and controversies’.[24]
Bomont argued further that these caveats were not only ‘sources of weakness’ within multinational coalitions, dating as far back as the European Union Force (EUFOR) Congo mission, but that they were also ‘veritable brakes on operational effectiveness’ within international security missions.[25] This was also the official conclusion reached by the French military, he claimed, citing an internal military publication which stated:
‘The diversity in behaviours, objectives and means put into effect by contingents can constitute just as many sources of weakness. It is necessary to take these differences into account, which can represent a vulnerability for the entire force.’ [26]
Bomont concluded the article by arguing that caveats within multinational military operations represented a cruel dilemma, with no apparent answer, which centred on the way in which the caveats caused an unequal distribution of ‘the war effort’.[27] As the well-known French military strategist, writer and commentator, Pierre Servent, once stated:
‘There is a time to make peace, there is a time to make war. It is even necessary, sometimes, to do both at the same time, but never by halves’.[28]
In fact the most comprehensive treatment of the problems posed by caveats to the Afghan ISAF mission, in the realm of defence, has appeared in official organisational or government reports.
For example, one of the earliest reports to discuss the problems posed by caveats to the ISAF mission appeared in a report by the Danish Institute for International Affairs (DIIA), written by Peter Dahl Thruelsen.[29] The report, entitled ‘NATO in Afghanistan – What Lessons Are We Learning, and Are We Willing to Adjust?’, devoted three-and-a-half pages to the ISAF’s caveat problem under the heading of ‘operational-level: unity of command’.[30]
One or two page sections on caveats have also appeared in government reports, such as those released quarterly or annually by the British House of Commons and the American DoD, where the problems relating to their imposition are frequently raised. In the case of the U.S. Pentagon reports, detailed information relating to caveats has from time to time been provided, for instance regarding the numbers of officially declared caveat restrictions existing within the ISAF mission, and increases or decreases in the overall number of caveated contingents within the mission.
On the whole, however, the issue of national caveats has remained a highly sensitive and classified area. Moreover, due to the collective, consensus-based nature of the NATO organisation, official NATO and ISAF reports have remained heavily censored and consequently provide only vague indications of the scale of the caveat problem within its mission in Afghanistan.
In sum, a large and significant gap continues to exist within academic discourse concerning national caveats in multinational security operations. Academic examination of the ISAF mission in the realm of Defence Studies has focused on four main areas:
(1) civil-military cooperation (or lack of) within the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) conducting stability and reconstruction operations throughout Afghanistan;
(2) the various Afghan insurgency movements and their ties to external supporters Pakistan and Iran, in addition to the Al-Qaeda organisation;
(3) the prosecution of Counter-Insurgency (COIN) within the Afghan mission;
and more recently,
(4) the lack of unity of command and unity of effort within the ISAF mission.[31]
Thorough academic examination of the numbers and types of national caveat constraints that have existed within the mission, the particular nations that have imposed them (and removed them), and the overall effects of all of these caveats on operational effectiveness – especially as regards the security line of operation within the COIN campaign – have never been properly addressed in an academic capacity.
My Research: The Extent & Impact of National Caveats within the ISAF
The following research, the content of my doctoral thesis in Defence & Strategic Studies, undertaken between 2008-2014 at the Centre for Defence & Security Studies (CDSS) at Massey University, New Zealand, is consequently intended as a contribution towards filling this large and important gap in defence academic literature.
The research is the first, in-depth, academic examination of the issue of national caveats and their effects within multinational security operations, and is focused on the multinational NATO-led ISAF campaign in Afghanistan.
Drawing from new caveat information, including the revelations contained within the cache of diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks in 2010-2011, the research analyses the issue of national caveats within the ISAF operation in order to determine both the extent of the caveat constraints within the ISAF mission, and the impact these caveats have had on overall operational effectiveness within the Afghan COIN campaign, over the period of a decade of warfare between 2002-2012.
[For more information see blog ‘#27 My Research: National Caveats in the ISAF Operation in Afghanistan & their Impact on Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012’.]
This research will be presented in a series of subsequent blogs.
* For more information on the extent and impact of national caveats on the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984
[1] Pierre Servent, a well-known French military commander, military strategist, author and journalist.
[2] D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, United States, (15-18th February) 2009, p. 6, http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf, (accessed November 18, 2009).
[3] Ibid.
[4] See David J. Kilcullen’s ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, (August) 2005, pp. 597-617 and ‘Counter-insurgency Redux.’ Survival, vol. 48, no. 4, (Winter) 2006, pp. 111-112.
[5] For example: M. A. Canna (LTCOL), ‘Key Characteristics Effecting Command and Control for Multinational Operations Involving United States Military Forces’, A Research Report Submitted to Air Force Fellows, CADRE/AR, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, March 2004, pp. 1-72; P. de B. Taillon (COL), ‘Some of the Challenges of Multinational Force Command’, New Zealand Journal of Defence Studies, vol. 1, March 2007, pp. 1-9; R. Lane (MAJGEN), ‘The Command, Leadership and Management Challenges of Contemporary Multinational Command’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, vol.151, 2006, pp. 30-34; L.L. Marich (LTCOL), ‘Enhancing Command and Control in Multinational Operations’, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2002, pp. i-vi, 1-31, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA404313 (accessed May 14, 2010); Multinational Standing Operating Procedures (MNF SOP), 6th working draft, Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute (AIAI) of the University of Edinburgh, 10 April 2002, www.aiai.ed.ac.uk/project/coax/demo/2002/mpat/SOP/A1.DOC (accessed 20 January 2009); T.J. Pudas, ‘Preparing Future Coalition Commanders’, Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), (Winter) 1993-1994, pp. 40-45, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA528835, (accessed 25 June 2013); J. Rice, ‘Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare’, Parameters, (Spring) 1997, pp. 1-13, strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/…/rice.htm, (accessed 20 January 2009); R.W. Riscassi, ‘Principles for Coalition Warfare’, Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 1, (Summer) 1993, pp. 58-71, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA528818 (accessed 6 June 2009); and S. M. Womack (LTCOL), ‘Rules of Engagement in Multinational Operations’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 80, no. 2, February 1996, pp. 22-23.
[6] U.S. Department of Defence (U.S. DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, 11 August 2011, pp. i-xxii, I-1-GL-18, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf, (accessed 6 June 2009); U.S. Department of Defence (U.S. DoD), Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, Joint Publication 3-16: Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 16 July 2013, p. GL-4, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_16.pdf, (accessed 6 June 2009); Strekalov, A., (LTCOL), ‘Drafting ROE for Multinational Operations: EAPC/PfP Workshop: Towards Legal Interoperability Between Multinational Forces’, (Lucerne, Switzerland, 23-25 September 2002), NATO Partnership for Peace Forum, http: pforum.isn.ethz.ch/docs/Strekalov.doc, (accessed 8 October 2009).
[7] AIRCDRE Greg Elliott, Official communication to Regeena Kingsley via the New Zealand Embassy in Washington D.C., [Email], 26 August 2010, Washington D.C., United States; LTCOL Justin S. Emerson, Personal correspondence with Regeena Kingsley, [Letter], 3 September 2009, Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington.
[8] ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, Human Rights Watch (HRW), July 2004, Volume 16, no. 6 (D), p. 3.
[9] D.P. Auerswald, S.M. Saideman & M.J. Tierney, ‘Caveat Emptor! National Oversight and Military Operations in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at a conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, United States, (September) 2007, pp. 1-25.
[10] Ibid., p. 2.
[11] D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, (2-5th September) 2009, pp. 1-39, www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20%at%20War.pdf, (accessed 18 March 2013).
[12] D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, United States (15-18th February) 2009, pp. 1-41, http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf, (accessed November 18, 2009).
[13] Auerswald & Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, op. cit., p. 33.
[14] Ibid., p. 2 .
[15] Ibid., pp. 3, 33.
[16] S. M. Saideman, ‘CIPS Policy Brief #6: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations’, October 2009, University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy Studies, p. 1, http://cips.uottawa.ca/publications/caveats-values-and-the-future-of-nato-peace-operations/, (accessed 5 June 2013).
[17] Ibid., p. 1.
[18] Ibid., p. 3.
[19] D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, 2012, pp. 67-84.
[20] J. Brophy & M. Fisera, ‘“National Caveats” and it’s impact on the Army of the Czech Republic’ [sic], Univerzita Obrany, 29 July 2007, http://www.vabo.cz/stranky/fisera/files/National_Caveats_Short_Version_version_V_29%20JULY.pdf. (accessed November 18, 2009).
[21] Ibid., p. 1.
[22] R. Bomont, ‘Les « caveats »: Un concept d’engagement à géométrie variable au sein des coalitions est-il viable?’, École de Guerre, June 2010, pp. 1-8, http://www.ecoledeguerre.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/CF-Bomont_Caveats.pdf, (accessed 7 February 2013).
[23] Ibid., p. 2.
[24] Ibid.
[25] « Sources de faiblesse de la coalition » and «Véritables freins à l’efficacité opérationnelle » (Bomont, ibid.).
[26] « La diversité des comportements, des objectifs ou des moyens mis en oeuvre par les contingents peuvent constituer autant de sources de faiblesse. Il est nécessaire de prendre en compte ces différences qui peuvent représenter une vulnérabilité pour l’ensemble de la force » (Bomont, ibid.).
[27] Bomont, ibid., p. 8.
[28] « Il y a un temps pour faire la paix, il y a un temps pour faire la guerre. Il faut parfois tenter de faire les deux à la fois, mais pas à moitié » (Pierre Servent, cited in Bomont, ibid.).
[29] P. D. Thruelsen, ‘NATO in Afghanistan – What Lessons Are We Learning, and Are We Willing to Adjust?’, Danish Institute for International Affairs (DIIA), 2007 (14), pp. 1-52, http://subweb.diis.dk/sw45914.asp, (accessed 20 June 2009).
[30] Ibid., pp. 19-22.
[31] To exemplify, see the following examples below, grouped respectively by subject-area:
(1) J.J. Collins, ‘Afghanistan: Winning A Three Block War’, Journal of Conflict Studies, vol. 24, no. 2, (Winter) 2004, http://journals.hil.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/204/361, (accessed 25 June 2013); A.S. Natsios, ‘The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development’, Parameters, (Autumn) 2005, pp. 4-20; S. Haysom & A. Jackson, ‘‘You don’t need to love us’: Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan, 2012-13’ , Stability Journal, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1-16, www.stabilityjournal.org/article/download/sta.by/112, (accessed 11 July 2013); T. Morris, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan’, Forced Migration Review, University of Oxford, FMR13, pp. 14-15, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR13/fmr13.5.pdf, (accessed 11 July 2013); M. Paul, ‘CIMIC in the ISAF Mission: Conception, Implementation and Development of CIMIC Cooperation in the Bundeswehr Abroad’, Stifting Wissenschaft and Politik (SWP) Research Paper [German Institute for International and Security Affairs], 2009/RP 05, (April) 2009, pp. 1-30, http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/cimic_in_the_isaf_mission.html, (accessed 11 July 2013); and B.R. Rubin, ‘Brief 28: Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Afghanistan’, Bonn International Center for Conversion (B.I.C.C), pp. 1-74, www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/brief28.pdf, (11 June 2009).
(2&3) T. Bowman, ‘Taliban Resurgence Strains Alliance in Afghanistan’, National Policy Review (NPR), 9 October 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18125911, (accessed 21 October 2008); D.W. Barno (LTGEN, Ret’d), ‘Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005’, Military Review, 2007, September-October, pp. 32-44; S. Gregory, ‘The ISI and the War on Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 30, no. 12, 2007, pp. 1013-1031; S.G. Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, Survival, vol. 48, no. 1, (March) 2006, pp. 111-128; S.G. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s Dangerous Game’, Survival, vol. 49, no. 1, (Spring) 2007, pp. 15-32; S. Kay & S. Khan, ‘NATO and Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 28, no. 1, (April) 2007, pp. 163-181; D.J. Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, August 2005, pp. 597-617; H. Nuzum, ‘Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of “unity of effort” in American Counterinsurgency’, Strategic Studies Institute (23 April 2010), pp. i-xii, 1-132, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=981, (accessed 25 June 2013); V. Liebl, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 3, (September) 2007, pp. 492-510; S.M. Maloney, ‘A Violent Impediment: The Evolution of Insurgent Operations in Kandahar Province, 2003-2007’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 19, no. 2, (June) 2008, pp. 201-220; S.M. Maloney, ‘Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front, 2001-2006’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 1, (March) 2007, pp. 27-44; P. Melshen, ‘Mapping Out a Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan: Critical considerations in Counterinsurgency Campaigning’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 4, (December) 2007, pp. 665-698; and B. Riedel, ‘The Return of the Knights: al-Qaeda and the Fruits of Middle East Disorder’, Survival, vol. 49, no. 3, (Autumn) 2007, pp. 107-119.
(4) I. Hope, (COL), ‘Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken Principle of War’, Strategic Studies Institute, (November) 2008, pp. 1-21, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub889.pdf, (accessed 25 June 2013); CJ. Lamb & M. Cinnamond, ‘Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan’, Strategic Forume, Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, no. 248, (October) 2009, pp. 1-12, http://www.nud.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF248_Lamb.pdf, (accessed 11 November 2011); and T. Noetzel & S. Scheipers, ‘Coalition Warfare in Afghanistan: Burden-sharing or Disunity?’, Chatham House, Asia and International Security Programmes ASP/ISP BP 07/01, October 2007, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108663, (accessed 17 February 2013).