#33 The Problem of “National Caveats”

in NATO Operations around the World,

1996-2016

 

– Dr Regeena Kingsley

 

* This blog is a revised excerpt taken from Dr Regeena Kingsley’s original doctoral research in Defence & Strategic Studies (2014), entitled: “Fighting against Allies: An Examination of “National Caveats” within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign in Afghanistan & their Impact on ISAF Operational Effectiveness, 2002-2012.”

 

‘National caveats are a continual drain on the effectiveness of the Alliance.’[i]

– Julio Miranda Calha, General Rapporteur to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2006

 

National caveats, elsewhere known as national ‘restrictions’, ‘exemptions’ or ‘exceptions’ (all of which are regarded in this research as synonymous with ‘caveats’), are found within the classified Rules of Engagement (ROE) of national contingents deployed to Multinational Operations (MNOs).

As discussed in previous blogs, national caveat constraints have been imposed in multinational peace-enforcement, peace-keeping and peace-support operations commanded by the United Nations (UN) organisation over three decades since the early 1990s, where they have caused grave operational problems that have often resulted in security disasters – most famously in Angola, Rwanda and Bosnia, but more recently from at least 2016-2018 in South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see blogs ‘#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations’, ‘#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina’, ‘#19 Hindering Escape during an Emergency: National Caveats & the UNAVEM II Operation in Angola’, ‘#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”’, ‘#21 Srebrenica Aftermath: Serb Guilt & Dutch Liability for the Genocide in the UNPROFOR ‘Safe Area’ in Bosnia’, ‘#22 Recommended Viewing: The UN, National Caveats & Human Carnage in Rwanda’, and section 4 on ‘United Nations (UN) Operations & Personnel’ in blog ‘#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC’).  

The caveat impediment is so rife within UN operations, in fact, that national caveats continue to pose as much of a serious problem today in the UN’s first-ever peace-keeping operation – the Arab-Israeli UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) mission taking place in the Middle East in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria since 1948, as in its more recent UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) which has operated in West Africa from 2013 until today in 2020.  

To exemplify, in 2015 Major General (MAJ GEN) Michael Finn, Chief of Staff of the UNTSO, reported to the UN  Security Council (UNSC) that, much like other UN Force Commanders in the South Sudan and Mali, ‘observing the caveats imposed by troop-contributing countries’ was one of the many growing challenges within his mission in the Middle East.[ii]  Finn described national caveats as being a ‘significant restriction’ and ‘serious impediment’ to the command and performance of all UN multinational operations around the world today, asserting that the caveats ‘ultimately restrict a commander’s ability to exercise command and control in theatres of operation, potentially compromising the ability of ‘blue helmets’ to effectuate their tasks’. [iii]  As he stated:

‘I fully recognize the national interests that drive caveats, but I also see that caveats threaten to ‘drive a wedge’ between contributing nations, threatening as well peacekeeping and observer capabilities of the UN. Thus, it is a critical challenge to find ways to address the contentious issue of caveats and to maintain the integrity of peacekeeping missions into the future.’ [iv]

With regard to the UN’s mission in Mali, moreover, in 2016 a policy brief published by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) exposed ‘MINUSMA’s inability to deliver on its mandate’, asserting that the counter-productive conditions of mission under-resourcing in terms of both equipment and logistical support were being compounded by the fact that European TCNs to the mission had a number of strict caveats attached to their troop contributions, ‘in terms of where they can be deployed and under what conditions’.[v]  For example, most European MINUSMA TCNs only allowed their national forces to deploy on operations in Mali in their assigned sectors if they had helicopter support and access to Level 2 hospitals that could provide basic surgical expertise and life-support services to any casualties. Since multiple Level 2 hospitals simply do not exist and ‘are not present in all sectors’ of the Mali mission, however, this often meant that a number of European MINUSMA troops could not in fact deploy to conduct their government-permitted tasking within their own sectors.[vi] According to the DIIS brief, the tight conditions that the European TCNs had placed on their force deployments ‘shape how the mission is organized and the distribution of tasks and equipment, often to the detriment of African units.’[vii]

Three years later in April 2019, the UN’s mission in Mali was further described as being crippled by national caveat constraints. As Tull then stated:

‘The caveats of the various [MINUSMA] national contingents – including those of the German army – and a lack of mobility in the form of helicopters and armoured carriers make it impossible for the mission to expand its scope beyond the vicinity of its bases. By and large, Minusma is more a target than an anchor of stability.’[viii]

By the end of last year, in December 2019, a report by the current UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council on the Mali mission revealed that these caveats or ‘national controls’ included bans on escorting civilian convoys, participating in disposal of explosive ordinance tasking, and on allowing other MINUSMA contingents and emergency response teams into part of the UN camp a contingent was occupying. [ix]  National contingents who refused to follow orders from the MINUSMA Operational Command Headquarters on the basis of national caveats were being reported to the highest UN Secretariat body, and certain caveat-related incidents had resulted in the expulsion (‘repatriation’) of at least one National Commander for refusal to follow MINUSMA orders (refer to the ‘caveat mediator’ role of National Commanders in blog #13), since, as UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated, ‘all contingents deployed in a United Nations peacekeeping operation are an integral part of the Mission under the authority of the Head of Mission’ and ‘non-adherence must have consequences.’[x]

As within UN operations, this modern issue of restrictive and divisive national caveat limitations and bans, within the ROE of participating national military contingents, has likewise proven to be an on-going source of political and operational problems, contention, and crises for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and its NATO-led security missions. 

Indeed, national caveats have continuously plagued NATO operations over more than two decades – whether ground, sea or air operations – in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, around Somalia, over Libya – and in Afghanistan once again.  

As NATO’s own 2017 force generation guidance makes plain, due to the fact that national caveat constraints ‘influence NATO’s operational planning’, and in order ‘to provide the Operational Commander with the necessary capabilities at the right scale and readiness to accomplish the mission’, the Alliance today seeks national force contributions to all current NATO-led operations and missions ‘with as few caveats as possible’.[xi]

This blog will examine more closely NATO’s history of caveat imposition in NATO military operations. I will begin by referring to the legal grounds that permit NATO nations to impose national caveat restrains on their military forces deployed to NATO security missions, enshrined both in international law and the NATO Charter.  

I will also describe how vague UN mandates, NATO’s template command design, and its preference for clear-cut, conceptual divides between mission activities all actually encourage the imposition of these divisive and disunifying caveats by force contributing NATO nations.

Next I will outline the alarming and recurring habit of caveat imposition by NATO Member-States contributing military forces to take part in NATO military operations around the world over a 20-year period between 1996-2016, and the frequently negative effects of this NATO national caveat addiction, most notoriously in Afghanistan.

Subsequently, I will describe the crux of NATO’s “caveat problem”. 

I will then describe the three general effects that have continuously resulted from NATO members’ use of their freedom, to enact their legal rights and impose operationally counterproductive ROE constraints within NATO multinational security operations. Namely: (1) divided and inflexible NATO forces; (2) a disunified Multinational Force incapable of performing fundamental mission tasks; and (3) inequality and uneven burden-sharing within each NATO Multinational Force deployed to conduct NATO missions.

Lastly, I will offer some final thoughts on the issue of national caveats within NATO missions with reference to the purpose and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.

  

Why NATO Nations Impose “National Caveat” Restraints on their Forces

To begin, there are five principal reasons for the habitual imposition of national caveats by NATO Member-States within NATO operations.

1.  The Right of Sovereign Nations to Determine their Terms of Military Commitment

First of all, as outlined in a previous blog ‘#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations’, it is the right of all sovereign nations to set the limits of its national forces’ participation in any operation the government has committed military forces to.

Since the signing of the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ treaties of 1648, which laid the foundations of the current system of co-existing sovereign Nation-States, every State on the world stage is considered to hold sovereign power over their own territories and populations, including national instruments of power such as political institutions and military forces. In the context of international politics and security, this means that the government of every sovereign nation has the right to make its own decisions with regard to any military endeavour it might engage in.  In addition, it means that while other States or international organisations and entities may attempt to encourage, persuade, cajole or coerce a particular nation to act in a certain way with regard to its contributed military forces, they do not have the right to usurp that State’s power and impose their own will, interests, or recommendations on that sovereign nation.

The powerful concept of State sovereignty is further reinforced by international organisations such as NATO and the UN, since both of these international security organisations are formed on the basis that Member-States retain sovereignty. Consequently, as a founding premise underlying their existence, it is inevitable that these organisations must also deal with the ramifications of this State sovereignty whenever coordinating military forces for Peace Support Operations in support of international security.  As Auerswald & Saideman state: ‘For security organizations, the surrender of sovereignty by members is particularly difficult…countries almost never contribute forces to an alliance effort without a final say on how they are used.’[xii] 

In practice this means that within any multinational security operation, national caveat constraints can be imposed unilaterally by Member-States at any time, without reference to any other nation or even the international organisation in command of the MNO (e.g. the UN or NATO etc.).  Indeed, though some countries may voluntarily elect to do so, countries are under no obligation whatsoever to refer to, or consult with, either the overarching security organisation in charge of the MNO or the appointed Operational Commander in practical command of the MNO in question on the matter of the national caveat constraints binding or limiting their forces. 

Consequently, while the security organisation and its officials may employ their powers of persuasion with Member-States, in order to limit or reduce these unilaterally-imposed constraints on participating national forces, in reality neither the organisation nor any of its officials have any real control over the ROE imposed on the forces of any nation contributing to an international security operation.  With caveats, as with any other issue relating to international politics or security, State sovereignty reigns supreme.

With regard to NATO in particular, reference to the sovereign right of NATO nations to impose caveat restrictions on their military forces was specifically referred to in NATO’s first official resolution relating to national caveats within the Afghan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation.  This resolution, collectively passed in 2005 by the full NATO assembly, explicitly set forth that ISAF force contributing nations were sovereign and therefore had ‘the right to define the terms by which they participate in the mission.’[xiii] Three years later a 2008 British House of Commons report also underlined the key factor of State sovereignty with regard to national caveats within the NATO-led mission.  As the British Secretary of State for Defence then expressed:

‘We have to accept in operations, such as the operations in Afghanistan, where we are talking about the deployment of forces by sovereign nations, that the ultimate decision over how, when and where their forces will be deployed will lie with those sovereign nations.’[xiv] 

Sir Paul Lever, Chairman of the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think-tank at that time, also concurred with this assessment, arguing that while it would be ‘highly desirable’ if other NATO countries were ‘less restrictive’ in their use of caveats, one had to be realistic about this issue as a natural occurrence when governments deployed forces.[xv]  As Lever stated:

‘It would undoubtedly be highly desirable…if all allies gave what might be called carte blanche and said, ‘Here’s our contingent. Deploy it as you like’, but that is not how the real world is.’[xvi]

Other experts have reached the same conclusions, asserting that while caveats are ‘a real pain’ within NATO operations, due to the sovereign rights of all nations contributing to MNOs, national caveats are now like ‘death and taxation…an inevitable part of our military life’.[xvii]

2.  The Legal Right for NATO Nations to Impose Caveats in the NATO Charter

Subsequently, with regard to NATO specifically, caveat imposition is a legal right enshrined in the NATO Charter – the founding legal document of the NATO collective-security organisation – which  dates back to the organisation’s naissance on 4 April 1949.  Article V of the fourteen-point treaty states:

‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America [or military forces, vessels or aircraft in or over any NATO member territory or island territories globally that is located north of the Tropic of Cancer line – Article VI] shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area [emphasis added].’[xviii]

From this statement it is clear that, while NATO members are duty-bound to respond in concert to such an armed attack against one or all members, in, on or over the sovereign territory of NATO States in the NATO Area of Operations (AO) of North America or Europe or alternatively member territories globally located north of the Tropic of Cancer line, it in fact falls to each individual Member-State to decide exactly what form this contribution will take – ‘as it deems necessary’.  What this means, as Hunter deduces, is that while on the one hand ‘military caveats are clearly a “lemon”’, on the other hand, ‘Article 5, the NATO cornerstone, does not commit allies to take any particular or collective military action, but only for each to consider by its own constitutional processes what it is prepared to do.’[xix] 

In short, the ambiguity and freedom bestowed upon each Member-State of NATO back in 1949 has provided a convenient ‘opt out’ for members contributing to NATO campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world.  Each NATO member contributing to NATO operations may freely impose force and combat caveat restraints if it suits the nation’s interests, no-matter the consequences for the effectiveness or success of the NATO campaign as a whole.  Saideman argues in fact that any consensus among allies to send forces anywhere under the banner of the NATO Alliance would be impossible, unless members had this right to ‘opt out of some or all operations’.[xx]  

However, this right to impose national caveats on military forces within an alliance is not a new phenomenon, nor is it singular to NATO.  As Saideman further asserts, historically military alliances have ‘always placed limits on how one country’s commander can order the troops of another into battle.’[xxi]

3.  Vague UN Mandates Promote National Caveat Imposition

In addition to the legal rights of Sovereign States and NATO Member-States described above, another reason for NATO’s national caveat habit within its security missions lies in the way that the mission mandates promote caveat-imposition amongst NATO nations. 

There is constant ambiguity in the wording and meaning of the UN Security Council resolutions which form the mandates that authorise NATO security operations. 

These resolutions are deliberately made vague in order to gain the greatest political consensus possible between the “Permanent 5” and the rotating “Temporary 10” nations with seats on the UN Security Council at any one time. However this rhetorical political consensus frequently comes at the expense of political and military clarity, and at the tangible cost of operational disunity, ineffectiveness, confusion and even security crises within authorised MNOs. 

Indeed, the recurring reality of ambiguous UNSC resolutions over successive decades has led to NATO allies adopting different interpretations of the purpose and meaning of each operational mandate, and thereafter, taking ‘a wide variety of approaches’ as to how their respective NATO force contingents deploy, how they participate with operational programmes, and what limits they operate under while conducting their participation, in every NATO operation in which they have taken part.[xxii]  

Hence ‘mandate vagueness’ not only breeds confusion, but also a profusion of diverse national interpretations, responses, commitments, and national ROE – including caveat restrictions – between Member-State force contingents deployed to NATO operations.

4.  NATO’s Template Operational Design Encourages National Caveat Imposition

The regular imposition of national caveats by NATO nations within NATO operations is, furthermore, actually encouraged by the operational command design of NATO operations, especially the way in which the NATO Area of Responsibility (AOR) in each mission is commonly divided into regional, territory-specific commands – Regional Commands – with artificial boundaries that delineate and divide each sector off from the others within the total AO. 

This tendency has repeatedly led not only to a disunified command structure within NATO operations, but also to a disunified NATO force which acts in an unholistic manner.[xxiii] 

Firstly, national governments are inclined to allow their force contingents to be used only in a territorially-defined way, with caveats constraining forces from operating outside the NATO-defined Regional Command sector they have been deployed to, so that national forces are prohibited from operating in other parts of the NATO AOR in other NATO sectors – even when desired, requested, or urgently required during dire security emergencies within the conflict theatre.[xxiv]

Secondly, caveat imposition has been promoted by the NATO preference for “Lead Nation” roles within their operations, since one nation is usually vested with overall lead command responsibility for the security of each individual Regional Command sector, and sometimes also for accomplishing different security tasks too (e.g. training local security forces).  According to Cordesman, Burke & Kasten, this NATO preference for Lead Nations has:

‘Led to nations making strategic choices based upon national caveats and their manning capabilities, rather than a realistic assessment of the current and future threat environment and a coordinated approach to providing the resources required’.[xxv] 

Thirdly, when Lead Nations take leadership command over their designated sectors with their majority forces loaded down with ROE caveat constraints, including red-flagged caveat bans together with yellow-flagged and time-consuming limitation caveats (see blogs ‘#2 What are “National Caveats”?’ and ‘#3 National Caveats: Potential to Constrain the Full Spectrum of Military Personnel & Operations’), this encourages other Supporting Nations within NATO sectors to follow their lead and likewise impose a plethora of caveat restrictions on the movements, capabilities and permissions of their own smaller contingents stationed within the same sector.  This prevailing tendency of Lead Nations, subsequently emulated by Supporting Nations, leads to NATO sectors that are each individually manned and operated by heavily-fettered and operationally inflexible NATO force contingents. Such situations do not bode well for the effectiveness or success of the missions at hand, and are moreover an absolute headache and source of continuous frustration for all NATO Operational Commanders striving to achieve the NATO mission with operationally handicapped and sluggishly slow force contingents in every sector as his key instruments within the AO.

In this way the “Lead Nation” operational design of NATO missions has oftentimes been ‘a recipe for failure’, which has encouraged limited warfighting and stabilisation capability within the NATO Multinational Force deployed to conduct multinational security operations. [xxvi]

[Indeed, given this repeatedly detrimental reality in NATO missions, it seems evident and highly advisable for the NATO organisation to ‘opt out’ of the ‘Lead Nation’ format altogether in future missions, by instead appointing their own NATO commanders and staff (streamlining more effectively “Unity of Command” towards greater “Unity of Purpose & Effort”), to lead NATO regional headquarters in regional sectors designed with more porous and flexible borders (allowing cross-border activities by sector forces if required or necessary), by commanding and coordinating the operations of all the contributed military forces of NATO nations in that regional AO on the basis of equality (not division into ‘Lead’ and ‘Supporting’ nations, thereby enhancing equality-based “Cooperation, Coordination & Consensus” towards greater “Unity of Purpose & Effort”), and armed with both: (1) a ‘fundamental ROE freedoms list’ that NATO governments must meet for their forces to be permitted to deploy and operate at all in the AO towards achieving the mission; and (2) pre-approved ‘in extremis’ emergency situation capabilities (ROE approvals, pre-deployment training, and appropriate equipment), when such a situation is determined to be in existence by the appointed NATO regional or total AOR mission commander (strengthening and reinforcing both “Unity of Purpose” and “Unity of Effort” simultaneously).]

5.  Artificial Conceptual Divides Encourage National Caveat Imposition

Lastly, it has been suggested that NATO’s tendency to make clear-cut divides between its various activities and operations within its missions also encourages further caveat imposition from its force contributing NATO members.

In the early years of the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan from 2003-2005, for example, a politically-motivated and rigid distinction was made between ‘stability’ personnel and operations and ‘security’ personnel and operations within the mission, which led to widespread and sustained government imposition of caveat constraints to prevent their respective national forces from engaging in, or switching between, the tasks of the ‘other’ category of activities.  For many nations the caveats imposed to maintain this conceptual divide remained in place for the duration of the mission, from December 2001 until its termination in December 2014, in spite of the mission’s changing needs and priorities over that time.

Within the specific category of security operations, moreover, further artificial, theoretical distinctions were made on paper between ‘counter-insurgent’ security operations vis-à-vis ‘counter-terrorist’, ‘counter-narcotic’, ‘combat’, ‘general crime’ operations, and other necessary security operations, which did not in fact mirror the interconnected realities of actual threats and operations on the ground in Afghanistan.[xxvii] These false distinctions again resulted in a glut of boundary-marking national caveats being imposed by ISAF force contributing governments in order to severely control or eliminate the possibility of their security forces engaging in some or all of the various kinds of security operations required to bring security to Afghanistan. 

Such an ‘operationally territorial’ approach from both NATO and Partner nations further fractured the ISAF Force, which was operating within an already severely divided ‘fighting/non-fighting’ multinational coalition and mission, and led to an outcry from ISAF commanders at all levels as the need for greater flexibility from ISAF forces became increasingly urgent in order to achieve the mission. The NATO General Rapporteur, Julio Miranda Calha (Portugal), placed emphasis on exactly this point in his ‘Lessons Learned from Current NATO Operations’ report to the NATO Parliament in 2006.  As he stated:

‘Troops under the ISAF mandate cannot be expected to maintain a clear line between stabilization operations and military operations designed to eliminate insurgent and terrorist forces as they move into southern Afghanistan.  Part of the mission is to assist in the creation of a safe environment, and a large part of that involves eliminating the remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida that continue to harass the efforts to stabilize the country. Creating an artificial divide between the missions will tempt contributing NATO nations to place national caveats on their forces to define what they will and will not do.  In a situation as fluid as southern Afghanistan, this is potentially dangerous.

 

…[In particular] the military commanders and NATO officials who have met with the Committee remain concerned about the caveats of some members, regarding the use of their forces in combat operations.  They emphasize that combat operations are a critical part of the mission and will become even more significant as NATO takes over the provinces with relatively high amounts of violence related to terrorist activity, insurgency, drug production or a combination of all three.’ [xxviii]

‘Commanders in Afghanistan have spoken to the Committee about the need for flexibility,’ he further stated.  ‘As Members of Parliament, we should not create barriers that make it more difficult for them to do their job. Many of those barriers come in the form of national caveats…NATO needs more troops in the country with fewer restrictions on their freedom of action.’ [xxix]

In sum, it is these five factors combined which have encouraged NATO nations to impose caveat limitations and bans on the ROE issued to their forces deployed to conduct NATO missions around the world.

 

 NATO’s Problematic Habit of Caveat Imposition on Security Operations

Despite the inherent ‘right’ of NATO nations to impose national caveats, however, and the reality that caveat imposition on NATO military forces has become a habitual practice wherever NATO operates in the world, the fact remains that the presence of national caveats within NATO operations is a significant problem for the effective prosecution of the campaigns for which national forces have been deployed. 

It is a problem, moreover, that has successively re-emerged in each of NATO’s largest, multinational, ground operations to date – in Bosnia (1996-2004), Kosovo (1999-present) and Afghanistan (2003-2014) – and which has continued to repeatedly reappear and wreak havoc within NATO security operations to the present day on the sea, in the air, and on land – in NATO’s naval anti-piracy mission around Somalia in 2008, in NATO’s air campaign over Libya in 2011, and in NATO’s successive “Resolute Support” ground mission in Afghanistan since 2015, to name a few.

Bosnia

To exemplify, between 1992-1995 NATO led two peace-enforcement operations in war-torn Bosnia following NATO’s successful air campaign against Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his military forces. These were the naval “Maritime Guard” and aerial “Deny Flight” operations (also providing close air support to the UNPROFOR mission simultaneously operating within Bosnia, Herzegovina and Croatia), which were subsequently followed by the 1995 “Deliberate Force” bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb belligerents that had been committing acts of ethnic cleansing, genocide and other major breaches of the Laws of War against civilians over several harrowing years (refer to blogs ‘#24 Laws of War Brief (Part 1): What is the Law of Armed Conflict & Customary International Law?’ and ‘#25 Laws of War Brief (Part 2): The Protections, Rights & Obligations of Civilian Non-Combatants & Military Combatants under the LOAC’).[xxx] 

After the July 1995, caveat-induced, Srebrenica massacre at the UN safe zone (see blog ‘#18 Caveats Endanger & Caveats Kill: National Caveats in UN Operations in Angola, Rwanda & Bosnia-Herzegovina’ or for more detail blog ‘#20 Betrayal & Barbarism in Bosnia: The UNPROFOR Operation, National Caveats & Genocide in the Srebrenica UN “Protected Area”’), the failed UNPROFOR ground peace-keeping operation was replaced in quick succession by two NATO-led ground operations – the short-lived NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) (1995-1996) and subsequently the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) (1996-2004) tasked with first implementing, then stabilising the peace following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.  These operations comprised 60,000 and 32,000 troops respectively, drawn from NATO and non-NATO countries.[xxxi] 

SFOR Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) & their placements within NATO regional sectors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1996-2004.[xxxii]

Within the SFOR operation, however, a large majority of the national force contingents deployed to ‘deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace’ were heavily constrained in their activities by national caveats which forbade them from ‘operating in specific ways’. [xxxiii] 

The effect of an array of constrictive government-imposed caveats on the operation was that many SFOR national force contingents were limited as to how, and indeed whether, national forces could be utilized by the SFOR Operational Commander at headquarters. 

The Canadian SFOR contingent, for example, operated under caveats that both prohibited them from ever deploying outside their originally-assigned sector and restricted them from deploying on any assigned operation without first ‘calling home’ and receiving specific permission from the Canadian government in their own national capital.[xxxiv] This was a process that was time-consuming and operationally costly to effectiveness – especially when permission was repeatedly refused.  Indeed, Canadian contingent requests during this time were reportedly ‘often met with a “no”’ in Ottawa.[xxxv]

 Kosovo

During NATO’s subsequent security operation in Kosovo (1999-present), an array of national force contingents participating in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) operation were again deployed severely bound by national caveats in their ROE.  Despite the fact that the mission’s primary objective was to ‘establish and maintain a secure environment and ensure public safety and order’, many participating nations deployed their contingents bound by caveat constraints that limited or prohibited any involvement with riot-control operations or any action to protect civilian property.[xxxvi] 

KFOR’s 4 regional sectors and scenes of destruction across the entire AO of Kosovo Province following the unchecked Kosovo Riots of March 2004.[xxxvii]

When a violent, Albanian, revenge-riot broke out against the minority Serb population there in March 2004, these national caveats prevented many NATO contingents deployed across Kosovo from deploying or intervening at all to protect the Serb population. The 51,000 Albanian rioters subsequently carried out a campaign of vengeful ‘reverse-ethnic cleansing’ against the Serb population of Kosovo over a period of three days.  The result was death, injury, the destruction of approximately 700 homes and multiple Serb villages across Kosovo, and the displacement of 41,000 of the targeted Serb civilians.[xxxviii]

Family homes in Serbian towns and villages set on fire or destroyed by the Albanian rioters during the Kosovo Riots of 17-19 March 2004.[xxxix]

Indeed during the course of the chaos – and to NATO’s great shame – many large, trained and armed KFOR national contingents, including a number of NATO Lead Nation and Supporting Nation contingents in command of entire regional sectors of the Kosovo AO (namely, Lead Nation France and Lead Nation Italy together with Supporting Nation Germany), were so bound by restrictive politico-security caveat bans and limitations in their ROE that they remained locked into their bases during the violent, successive days and never once deployed to quell the violence in their areas (for more in-depth information and analysis on NATO security forces’ failure to act and conduct actual security operations during a security emergency within a sanctioned security mission, see blog ‘#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots”’).

 Afghanistan

This alarming incident in Kosovo may be seen as a telling precursor to the extremely grave caveat situation that simultaneously emerged within the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan from 2003-2014 (refer to previous ISAF background blogs #28, #29, #30, #31 and #32).  Indeed, since the issue of problematic national caveats within multinational security operations was not at all properly addressed or resolved by NATO following the two large MNOs in Bosnia and Kosovo described above, it seems almost self-evident that the issue of heavy national caveat imposition would yet again resurface within NATO’s next, largest and most important multinational security operation with the highest stakes for NATO, Afghanistan and world security to date.

In the case of Afghanistan, a myriad of diverse and restrictive caveat restraints and bans were imposed by a near-constant majority of coalition NATO and Partner nations contributing military forces to the ISAF throughout the duration of the mission – a period of 13 years between December 2001 – December 2014.

Table 14.3 – Caveat-Imposing TCNs (2001-2012): A table showing the 50 ISAF Troop Contributing Nations as of December 2012, which have at some time imposed national caveat restrictions on their contingents between 2001-2012. Over this period only three nations – Georgia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom – have never imposed caveat constraints on the operations of their forces in Afghanistan.[xl]

Significantly, despite the fact that NATO had held command leadership over the entire mission and coalition of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) since August 2003, some of the most numerous and severe caveat fetters on ISAF combat and security forces were imposed by principal NATO member nations with strong and well-developed militaries.  

The ISAF Operation: ISAF map showing the five ISAF Regional Commands (2004-2010) and the Lead Nations in command of these sectors, as well as subordinate Supporting Nations contributing forces to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).[xli]

The caveats were imposed, moreover, in spite of the fact that many of these caveat-imposing NATO nations also held important Lead Nation security responsibilities for establishing and maintaining security within large swathes of the restive country at a critical period at the start of the Taliban resurgence (e.g. Germany in Regional Command North, Italy in Regional Command West, and France, Italy and Turkey in the strategically important Afghan Capital of Kabul City in Kabul Province, known as Regional Command Capital).

Graph 9.3 – Caveats & the ISAF Coalition (August 2003): Pie graph displaying the caveat-free and caveat-imposing ISAF force contributions nations as of August 2003, with nations named and arranged by NATO and Partner nation TCN groupings.

As my own research shows, over a period of ten years of warfare in Afghanistan from 2002-2012, approximately 215 national caveats were imposed on ISAF forces by TCN national governments at various times during the mission, with 102 ‘official’ caveats being imposed on ISAF forces at one single point of time in mid-2007 (and the total numbers of unofficial ‘de facto’ caveats remaining unknown). [For more information on this most secretive and insidious class of unofficial, unwritten, undeclared, ad hoc caveats, refer to blog ‘#15 Highly Classified: National Caveats & Government Secrecy (Official & Unofficial Caveats)’.]

These caveats affected the full spectrum of ISAF activities and operations, and constrained the activities of both security forces and stability forces – military and civilian personnel – across all the Lines of Operation (LOOs) and in every phase of the NATO Operational Plan (OPLAN) for over a decade. 

Graphs 10.3 & 10.4 – Comparing Percentages: Pie graphs comparing the percentage of total ISAF coalition TCNs imposing caveats on their national forces in Afghanistan, with the total percentage of the ISAF force that has been impacted and constrained by this caveat imposition, as of February 2009.

Indeed, approximately one quarter (between 22-30 percent) of the entire ISAF force were continuously restricted by national caveats in their ISAF activities over this vitally important ten-year decade in the Afghan war, regardless of the exponential growth in size of the ISAF coalition. This quarter of the ISAF military force equated to some 9,000-29,000 caveated forces in Afghanistan between 2007-2012 alone (for more detail see Chapters 8, 9 and 10 in my doctoral research thesis, and Appendices 4-10, freely available here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984). 

The caveats were wide-ranging in scope and related to 21 different categories of restraints (see Appendix 7(a) and 7(b) at the above link), namely: (1) mission caveats; (2) theatre of operations caveats; (3) geographic caveats; (4) regional caveats; (5) AO caveats; (6) force numbers caveats; (7) command caveats; (8) weaponry and lethal force caveats; (9) general operations caveats; (10) ground combat operations caveats; (11) ground security operations caveats; (12) air combat operations caveats; (13) MEDEVAC and other air operations caveats; (14) time-related caveats; (15) weather-related caveats; (16) counter-terrorism caveats; (17) counter-narcotics caveats; (18) ISAF cooperation caveats; (19) Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) cooperation caveats; (20) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) security operations caveats; and lastly (21) PRT stability operations caveats.

Among these, by far the worst and most damaging category of caveats for the effective execution and success of the ISAF security and stability mission concerned ‘combat caveats’, namely 50 kinds of combat restrictions that continuously prevented a large proportion of ISAF combat forces from ever taking part in combat or combat support operations (rendering them the oxymoronic phenomena of ‘non-combat-capable combat forces’).  

It is a shocking and appalling fact that between at least 2006 to mid-2009, these combat caveats prevented thousands of ISAF combat forces (including thousands of NATO Lead Nation combat forces) from ever engaging in offensive or defensive combat operations at all against the Taliban and other anti-government insurgents seeking to destabilise the country – especially in the North (Germany), the West (Italy) and the Capital province of Kabul (France, Italy and Turkey), but also including supporting NATO national contingents in every Regional Command sector (e.g. NATO nations Belgium, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia, Portugal and Spain). 

Figure 11.6 – Non-Combat-Capable ISAF Combat Forces (2006): The extent of combat caveat fetters on the ISAF mission’s security forces between January and September 2006.[xlii]

By contrast, caveat-free and therefore combat-capable NATO and Partner national contingents – especially those of NATO nations the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and then the Netherlands (from November 2006) – were forced by their reluctant, risk-averse, caveat-imposing NATO and Partner allies to bear a disproportionately large share of the fighting and the dying for the success of the NATO-led ISAF security mission in the most volatile South and East of the country.

 

Figure 11.7 – ISAF Combat forces operating with Combat Caveats (2006-2008): The extent of combat caveat fetters on the ISAF mission’s security forces over the two-year period between December 2006 and December 2008. [xliii]

The overall effects of this widespread imposition of combat caveats on the ISAF’s combat forces by contributing governments were that:

(1) firstly, the combat caveats severely diminished the ISAF mission’s overall combat capability;

(2) secondly, the combat caveats compounded ISAF under-resourcing, with shortages in manpower and equipment diminishing further the ISAF’s ability to prosecute effective combat operations – even with regard to the key priority of training ANSF forces; and

(3) thirdly, they directly aided and enabled the Taliban and other Enemy forces operating within the Afghan theatre, affording them a degree of freedom that – if not for the caveats – they would not have enjoyed (for more information on the caveat-diminished combat capability of the ISAF force between 2002-2012, see Chapters 11-12 in my doctoral research thesis, and Appendices 8-10, freely available here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984).    

Table 12.1 – Caveated Combat Units: The caveat-status of TCN combat units within the ISAF mission over the period of a decade between 2002-2012.

Overall, caveat restrictions presented real obstacles for the effective prosecution of combat operations along the critical ‘lynchpin’ security LOO within the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) campaign, leading directly to a loss of progress, a loss of time, and a loss of support from the majority Afghan population at a most critical juncture in Afghan and world history following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the emergence of the ‘global insurgency’ of Islamic extremism around the world. 

Indeed, this large national caveat ‘fly’ in the ISAF ‘ointment’ generated a number of negative operational effects within the mission, especially in the realm of security operations, that not only generated disunity of effort and consequently operational ineffectiveness within the mission, but also countered the intent and basic principles of COIN warfare in a vitally important COIN campaign (for more information refer to Chapters 14-15 in my doctoral research thesis, freely available here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984).

Meanwhile, tension, frustration, division, in-fighting, and outright anger, resentment and bitterness brewed between NATO nations (especially Lead Nations) in the NATO-led coalition, as a result of caveat-induced “unfair burden-sharing” and hugely disproportionate casualties between caveat-free and caveat-fettered NATO and Partner national contingents within the mission, as combat against the resurgent Taliban and other anti-Government insurgents continued and increased throughout the AO.  This heated and unresolved dispute ultimately resulted in the Netherlands and Canada – two NATO Lead Nations with caveat-free, hard-fighting and exhausted force contingents in Regional Command South – completely terminating their combat roles early within the mission and withdrawing all of their combat forces from Afghanistan (for more detail on all of these points see Chapters 13, 14 and 15 in my doctoral research thesis, together with Appendices 11-12, freely available here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984). 

Figure 13.1 – Unequal Burden-Sharing within the NATO-led ISAF Mission: Map demonstrating the unequal sharing of the combat burden within the ISAF mission, caused by the imposition of combat and geographical national caveats by Lead and Supporting Nations in the ‘North’ vs the ‘South’. [xliv]

As the NATO-led ISAF mission progressed over the years, and the in-fighting over non-fighting contingents continued unabated, the NATO organisation itself became fractured along ‘fighting/non-fighting’ lines into a three-tiered or even multi-tiered Alliance, its foundational principle of ‘all for one and one for all’ seriously undermined and challenged, and its future as a ‘transformed’ organisation capable of conducting effective out-of-area operations in response to modern security challenges thrown into jeopardy.

Despite multiple varied efforts from many official national and NATO quarters and officials, the ISAF’s dire problem of constrictive and inappropriate caveat restrictions within the mission was never resolved, nor the ISAF’s crippling dilemma of disproportionate and unfair burden-sharing the caveat situation had created.  In fact, the abiding “caveat problem” within NATO’s third and hugely important ISAF international mission only ceased with the termination of the ISAF mission in late 2014, and the withdrawal and redeployment of ISAF caveated force contingents elsewhere.

[*The grave caveat problem within the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan will be analysed and discussed in greater detail in a series of following blogs.]

Graph 9.9 – Caveats & the ISAF Coalition (December 2012): Pie graph displaying the caveat-free and caveat-imposing ISAF force contributions nations as of December 2012, with nations named and arranged by NATO and Partner nation TCN groupings.

 Somalia

But the ever-persistent problem of caveat-imposition and their negative effects in NATO security missions did not cease in Afghanistan, and has likewise never been resolved by the NATO organisation or its members. As the Wikileaks disclosures revealed, in 2008 inappropriate, disparate and clashing ROE, including caveat restraints and bans, were reported by the British government to be creating additional difficulties within NATO’s first, naval, anti-piracy mission around Somalia in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa – the first NATO-flagged naval force in the Gulf. [xlv] This mission was “Operation Allied Provider” (OAP) which took place from October 2008, and involved ships contributed from NATO nations the UK, Germany, Italy, Greece, Turkey and the United States (later succeeded by “Operation Allied Protector” from March-August 2009 and then “Operation Ocean Shield” from August 2009 to December 2016).

Libya

More recently still, national caveats featured prominently during the air campaign over Libya conducted initially by a Coalition of the Willing, and then subsequently by the NATO Alliance.  Following on from the democratic “Arab Awakening” in the Middle East (also known as the “Arab Spring”), a pro-democracy civilian protest arose against the al-Gaddafi dictatorship in Libya in February 2011.  In recognition of the atrocities carried out by Libyan government forces against the pro-democracy civilian uprising and Gaddafi’s further threat of ‘rubblizing’ the capital city of Benghazi, in March the UN Security Council authorised an arms embargo and the establishment of a No-Fly Zone over Libya, and also imposed a range of sanctions against the al-Gaddifi regime.

A controversial and very public fracas subsequently erupted between principal NATO Alliance members the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Turkey over the extent of NATO’s involvement in this air campaign and the possibility of NATO taking leadership command over the mission.  According to the Atlantic Council, adding to the heated intra-NATO debate over whether to take leadership command of the Libyan air operation was the important and controversial issue of national restrictions in ROE, since there was concern that ‘a NATO operation would limit the operational flexibility of commanders to execute the mission’.[xlvi]  In a word – caveats. 

Map displaying the NATO and Partner nations taking part in NATO’s air and naval campaign “Operation Unified Protector” in and around Libya from March-October 2011, including participating airbases and warships.[xlvii]

As anticipated, once NATO agreed to command the mission and “Operation Unified Protector” commenced (with NATO nations Germany, Poland, Portugal and initially Turkey ‘opting out’ of the mission entirely, and others refusing to take part in even the less-risky naval arms embargo operation), caveats were imposed by NATO participating nations which limited or banned national forces from participating in flights to enforce the No-Fly Zone, or alternatively limited or prohibited air force participation in air-to-ground bombing operations against government or rebel forces conducting attacks against civilians (e.g. the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy over a 6-week period between March-April when the risk to aircraft conducting airstrikes was high).[xlviii]

It is interesting to note by way of contrast that despite being small nations with small militaries, NATO nations Belgium, Norway and Denmark not only kept their air force elements caveat-free, but also took part in the most kinetic aspects of the mission at the ‘sharpest tip of the spear’, the high-risk, air-to-ground bombing missions, and were limited in their cooperation only by their military capabilities or low ammunition supplies.[xlix] [Or – in Norway’s case – by one, risk-averse, government-overriding, and caveat-imposing F-16 Contingent Commander, who felt personally that the Norwegian government had afforded his Norwegian pilots “too much freedom” to act and react while operating in the Libyan air campaign, and, reportedly out of fear that ‘simply following orders’ on bombing missions from NATO Operational Command Headquarters ‘could have exposed our politicians’ in Oslo to considerable political risk, therefore used his authority to impose his own Mission Accomplishment caveat restraints on Norway’s otherwise robust, caveat-free, flexible and effective bombing crews in order to reject certain NATO-issued targets and missions. It appears that in this instance, the commander was influenced by political considerations more than military ones, the political sphere more than the operational sphere in which he played a crucial and enabling role, seemingly believing that there might be political consequences for his government if, by obeying NATO’s commands to strike Libyan Command & Control facilities, the bombing strikes unintentionally killed existing leaders of the al-Gaddafi dictatorial regime at the sites thereby impacting on Libyan domestic politics, or accidentally caused collateral damage to civilians in the area. For more detail refer to blog ‘#35 Crucial Questions on Rules of Engagement (ROE): (Q2/3) Do Commanders Have Discretionary Authority to Change ROE?’.]

In sum, as Auerswald & Saideman state of the Libyan mission:

‘A significant factor in the decision as to who would do what depended on the political will of each individual country. Only a minority of the alliance’s members participated in a substantial way, along with a few partners (Sweden, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar).  Thus, less than half of NATO members participated even in the least controversial aspects of the mission, and less than a third were willing to drop bombs (emphasis added).’[l]

 Afghanistan – Again

Finally, in 2016 it become evident that national caveats had reappeared once again in Afghanistan, this time with regard to American forces within the new NATO-led mission.

In point of fact a portion of American forces had already operated under caveat constraints in Afghanistan during the earlier ISAF operation.  In January of 2010, as the ‘Obama surge’ of 30,000 Marines arrived in Afghanistan to reinforce their American and NATO allies in the Afghan South and East, the United States had imposed national caveats on 19,000 Marines (4,000 in theatre and 15,000 new arrivals) deployed to work alongside 9,000 British forces in Helmand province of Regional Command South (later Southwest), where they were conducting major, combined and joint, combat operations against anti-Government Taliban forces.[li]  

This act was the first time in America’s history of operations in Afghanistan that the combat forces of the United States had been constrained in its activities and movement by the notorious national caveat constraints that had frustrated and hindered the entire mission since its genesis, and the first time that the United States had become tarred as a caveat-imposing NATO and Lead Nation within the ISAF mission. As COL Douglas Mastriano from the U.S. Army War College then articulated on the matter: ‘The US is equally culpable of its own caveats. These range from independent combat operations, exclusive applications of force, segregated communication systems, and exclusive reporting’.[lii] 

Indeed, U.S. caveats reportedly led to great frustration among the American Marines and their commanders operating in Helmand Province at that time, to the point that by June 2010 negative reports on American ROE made international headlines over a period of several months.  ‘Rules of engagement for U.S. troops are “too prohibitive for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical successes”’, proclaimed one such article in The Washington Post.[liii]  ‘Obama’s rules of engagement in Afghanistan will ensure our failure’, declared another.[liv] However, the caveats remained in place for the remainder of the ISAF mission.

By contrast, NATO nation the United Kingdom never imposed national caveats on its own British combat forces, or any other British military forces that operated as part of the ISAF force in Afghanistan, meaning that for the duration of the ISAF mission from 2001-2014 British forces alone held the distinction of being the only permanently caveat-free, combat-capable, fast and flexible NATO Lead Nation forces ever to operate in Afghanistan and wage war against the Taliban and other anti-Government insurgent and terrorist forces.

On 31 December 2014 the NATO-led ISAF operation ceased and was succeeded on 1 January 2015 by the NATO-led “Operation Resolute Support” (ORS), otherwise known as “Resolute Support Mission” (RSM).  This new operation had the mission of training, advising and assisting national Afghan National Security Forces, which were henceforth vested with full security and combat responsibility throughout the Afghan AOR. Simultaneously “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) was also terminated and succeeded by “Operation Freedom Sentinel” (OFS) which – despite the change of name – continued to conduct counter-terrorist operations within Afghanistan and along the volatile Afghan-Pakistan border.[lv] 

Resolute Support Mission: NATO placemat map displaying the Lead Nations of each Regional Command sector of its successive Operational Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan, which commenced in January 2015 and continues to the present day in 2020.[lvi]

In December 2014, as the ISAF mission came to an end, the Obama Administration officially terminated America’s offensive “combat role” in Afghanistan. Along with the termination of this combat role, however, came the imposition of many new caveat restrictions on all American forces operating within the new Resolute Support mission throughout Afghanistan – especially combat caveats.  As a consequence, the national caveat problem that had haunted and frustrated the NATO-led mission during the ISAF operation began to inhibit the actions of tens of thousands of American forces participating in both of the post-ISAF, NATO-led and U.S.-led operations taking place in Afghanistan – even in dire emergency situations. 

In 2016, for instance, it became apparent that the Obama Administration had imposed a national caveat on its forces throughout 2015 that had prohibited American forces participating in Operation Resolute Support from ever engaging in kinetic, lethal, offensive operations against Islamic State (IS) fighters in Afghanistan alongside their ANSF counterparts, except in rare cases of unit or individual self-defence.[lvii]  This caveat was in place despite the fact that the primary function of U.S. forces in the RSM was to train, advise and assist indigenous Afghan forces in the conduct of all of their security and combat operations – which included waging war against anti-Government IS fighters. Not surprisingly, this caveat proved counterproductive to the intent and operations of RSM in Afghanistan and was therefore removed by the Administration that had imposed it a year later in January 2016.

At the same time the Obama Administration also modified a limitation national caveat that over the same time period had severely restrained parallel American OFS counter-terrorist forces from gaining approval to strike ISIS targets operating in Afghanistan, unless they could prove that the IS target had ‘significant ties to Al Qaeda’s remnants in the region’.[lviii]  These ISIS-related caveats had been imposed because the IS branch in the Afghan theatre of conflict had not yet been designated by the American government as a ‘foreign terrorist group’ and a ‘hostile force’ (as was also the situation in Libya from 2011-2016) and the Obama Administration reportedly only wished to carry out offensive attacks against ‘significant terrorists’ rather than ‘bomb groups “willy-nilly”.’ [lix] 

It is deeply troubling that these national caveats were imposed by the United States government when the express purpose of the two dual RSM and OFS missions in Afghanistan since 2015 was to prevent Afghanistan reverting to a sanctuary for radical Islamist terrorist groups (plural), that had led to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and many other global acts of violence committed against civilians in the years since, in order to terrorize, intimidate and ultimately control the populations of democratic, freedom-loving countries.  In the words of American Commander of the ISAF (COMISAF) General John F Campbell in his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2015: ‘Our primary focus continues to be on preventing Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven again for al Qaeda and other international extremist groups’ [emphasis added].[lx]

These national caveats consequently represented an alarming paradox and lack of political commitment to stated goals at the highest level of the American government.  As the late Republican Senator John McCain once expressed:

‘Like the President’s policy against ISIL, the President’s Afghanistan policy wreaks of strategic disconnect, providing a list of goals or preferences, but precluding the means necessary to achieve them’.[lxi]

As a principal and powerful NATO nation, and the Lead Nation of both of the concurrent security operations, also with the largest force presence in Afghanistan, American imposition of such operational caveat fetters on their military forces in the region was a disconcerting act that not only sent a negative and rather demoralising message of half-hearted American commitment to other NATO and Partner coalition governments and forces participating in the two parallel Afghan missions, but also signalled American prioritisation of (1) their own force protection over the attainment of important strategic goals within these critical security missions, and (2) their own national and domestic political interests over collective NATO and international security interests.

  

The “Caveat Problem” in NATO-led Military Operations

Overall, as one might see from this brief overview of national caveat imposition in NATO and NATO-led security operations, this national caveat trend in the prosecution of multinational operations seems to be indicative of an increasing reticence and aversion by NATO national governments to place national military forces in harm’s way or to expose them to a more substantial degree of risk – even in pursuit of important and collectively-shared security objectives. 

In short, whether in regard to NATO’s three largest ground operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan – all three being successively the first ground MNOs in the history of the NATO collective security organisation – or its naval and air campaigns, national caveat constrains have remained a characteristic and problematic feature of NATO operations since the 1990s.

The Crux of the Caveat Problem

Essentially the crux of this recurring “caveat problem” within NATO operations is encapsulated by the following statement: that the majority of NATO nations within NATO-led operations have been more willing to sacrifice the effectiveness, accomplishment and success of the mission for which their forces have been deployed, than to risk the life or limb of their professional forces-at-arms, all of whom have been specifically trained for war. 

As a result the protection of deployed national armed forces, the prevention of casualties of any kind through imposing caveat limitations and prohibitions, and thereby the avoidance of any domestic political fallout as a result of sustaining casualties during military operations, has again and again been given precedence by the governments of NATO nations over the actual effectiveness and success of the security mission itself or the attainment of the political and security objective(s) for which the mission was originally authorised, put into action, and multinational military forces deployed abroad. 

In sum, in NATO’s history of military operations from the early 1990s until today, political considerations have repeatedly outweighed security realities and necessities.

Indeed, 70 years after the founding of the NATO collective-security Alliance in 1949, it has sadly become clear that it is not collective commitment and unity of purpose and action that has become the overriding feature of NATO combined military operations in the modern era, but rather self-interested national difference and division.

[For more discussion on this debilitating, modern, military trend, occurring not only within NATO but also the UN and other regional collective-security bodies and their missions around the world, refer to blog ‘#14 An Alarming New Norm: National Caveat Constraints in Multinational Operations’.]

    

Caveat Effects of the “Caveat Problem” in NATO-led Military Operations

In general, this strategic prioritisation of ‘force protection’ measures over the achievement of mission objectives, on the part of many – if not most – contributing governments to these NATO operations, has produced a number of caveat-specific effects.

1.  Divided & Inflexible NATO Forces

Firstly, in each case, caveat restraints have caused the NATO Multinational Force (MNF) to become divided and inflexible. 

With a large number of NATO nations imposing a diverse range of limitations and bans on the activities of their respective contingents in these NATO operations, difference, division and disunity has consistently become the overriding feature of the MNF.

Furthermore, this web of caveat constraints within the MNF, especially geographical and operational caveats, has also meant that NATO forces have not been flexible enough to be redeployed by the Operational Commander to assist allied forces in need, to conduct a wider range of tasks, or to render help or assistance in times of emergency within the mission AOR.

In this way, the NATO force has repeatedly become not only fractured along caveat lines, but also inflexible and rather cumbersome and unwieldy for the mission at hand, much like a clumsy or blunted instrument (especially due to the laborious and slow permission processes caused by the imposition of ‘limitation’ caveats – see blog ‘#10 Rules of Engagement & National Caveats: “Self-Defence” & “Mission Accomplishment” Instructions’ for a description of limitation caveats and ‘#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators’ for a tangible example of such a caveat-generated slow permission process in Afghanistan.)

2.  A Disunified MNF Incapable of Performing Fundamental Tasks

Secondly, with such a divided, constrained and disunified MNF as NATO’s primary security instrument in these operations in conflict theatres, it logically follows that there has been a knock-on effect for tactical security operations within the MNOs. 

Because of the caveat constraints (and perhaps, even more importantly, the political motivations driving and enforcing them on national military forces), a large proportion – usually the majority – of each NATO MNF has neither been prepared nor authorised to properly and effectively conduct the tasks they have been specifically assigned – especially with regard to Lead Nation force contingents and combat operations. 

In short, caveated NATO force contingents have been regularly and repeatedly ill-equipped physically and operationally for the mission they have been specifically deployed to prosecute, with many contingents incapable of performing even the most fundamental security tasks required and expected of them to accomplish the security mission. 

Unfortunately, this reality has been equally true with regard to the large national contingents of NATO Lead Nations – usually deployed by principal NATO nations with well-funded and strong militaries with wide-ranging military capabilities – as with the smaller, less well-funded and more narrowly-trained national contingents of NATO Supporting Nations within each Regional Command sector of NATO operations.

As the caveat impediment has been endemic within the NATO force, the resultant tactical problems have also been widespread on the ground, in the air, and on the sea – and generally “across the board” wherever and whenever NATO forces have operated within the NATO military operation.

This caveat-generated plight has become particularly evident whenever security emergencies or crises have taken place within the mission, at which points of time the extent of the constraints within the NATO force is highlighted in awkward and ugly displays, e.g. NATO’s woefully inadequate response to the 2004 Kosovo Riots (discussed in blog ‘#23 Caveat Chaos in Kosovo: Divided Allies & Fettered Forces in NATO’s KFOR Operation during the 2004 “Kosovo Riots”’) and to multiple security emergencies that occurred within the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (e.g. those occurring in Garmsir of RC-South and Maimana in RC-North described previously in blogs ‘#13 National Commanders: Caveat Mediators’  and ‘#31 BACKGROUND – COIN Warfare & the ISAF’s COIN Strategy: Battle for the Majority Population’ respectively).

Indeed, the sum total of ineffective security operations at the tactical level in each Regional Command is that, over time, the entire security mission as a whole in the entire AO also becomes compromised.

3.  Inequality and Uneven Burden-Sharing within the NATO Force

Thirdly, caveat-imposition within NATO operations has created skewed realities and inequalities within the MNF, whereby some national contingents are authorised to conduct a wider range of operations than others.  Unequal freedoms and abilities (operational inflexibility) inevitably leads to unequal sharing of the security burden (operational disunity and inequity) within the mission overall between inflexible caveat-fettered and flexible caveat-free NATO national contingents. 

In sum, non-caveated national force contingents have, by virtue of their caveat-free, flexible and therefore ‘effective’ force status, been compelled to conduct an unfair and disproportionate share of the hardest security tasks within these NATO missions – to carry more than their fair share of the operational burden especially with regard to security and/or combat operations. 

In this way, the most committed NATO nations – those who have physically and practically honoured their commitment to NATO missions by deploying military forces that are flexible, capable and effective in the prosecution of their assigned tasking within each NATO mission – have ultimately been penalized by their less-committed, less-willing, less-capable and more risk-adverse allies. 

This uneven division of labour between NATO force contingents – especially where real war-fighting capability is required within the missions – has resulted in operations being led by a disunified and acrimonious alliance of nations, adopting a disjointed approach to the mission, with disunity of effort and action prevailing on the ground, in the air and on the sea amongst the various NATO force contingents taking part in the operations, and ultimately to clumsy, ineffective and prolonged NATO missions. 

 

NATO, National Caveats & the Future

The harmful combination of these three, negative, caveat-generated effects within NATO missions has not only frequently had detrimental consequences for the prosecution and eventual success of NATO operations however.  It has, furthermore, had a negative impact on the NATO collective-security Alliance itself, as the Peace Support Operation (PSO) organisation in command of these MNOs. 

The unfair burden-sharing generated by caveated force contingents in NATO’s global operations, in particular, has become a constant and heated point of dissension and division in relations between NATO Member-States during the 2000s and 2010s. 

This is a vital and pressing subject of concern that is sure to continue to haunt and fragment the Alliance into future security operations if the issue of national caveat imposition in NATO missions is not confronted and resolved in some way by the NATO organisation, to the agreement and satisfaction of all its 30 members, and to the benefit and greatly enhanced flexibility, effectiveness and success of NATO’s important security missions that continue to take place around the world in the interests of collective security against dangerous threats in the modern era. 

NATO’s 70^th anniversary summit in London, 3-4 December 2019.[lxii]

With regard especially to NATO nations that contribute military forces to conduct NATO security missions, but also equally to those nations contributing military contingents to take part in UN operations, although without question it is indeed the sovereign right of nations contributing national contingents to impose caveat constraints on their national forces, the truth is that this is a right nations really ought and need to forego in most cases in the interests of achieving the best possible results in their collective actions – namely, united and effective collective action in their multinational security operations in conflict theatres around the world.

It is of worth for NATO national governments that contribute military forces to NATO’s global security missions to always remember that NATO, just like the UN, has a distinct role and purpose to fulfil in global security affairs, specific security objectives that must be achieved in order to render their security missions effective and successful in the world, and a reputation to uphold and maintain in the course of all of their military operations.

These are highly-important aims that can only be achieved by determined self-denial, self-discipline and self-sacrifice on the part of national governments, to the best of their ability, to enable a strong and robust performance of their national military contingents towards collective mission objectives, for the greater good of all – both combatant military personnel and non-combatant civilians alike – against menacing global threats in world security affairs today.  

In short, by ensuring the effectiveness and ultimate success of their security missions, NATO nations will also secure the effectiveness and future of the NATO Alliance in global security affairs.

 

* For more information on the impact of national caveats within the NATO-led ISAF Operation in Afghanistan, see Dr Kingsley’s full Thesis and its accompanying volume of Appendices (including ISAF national caveat lists), which can be freely viewed and downloaded from Massey University’s official website here: http://mro.massey.ac.nz/xmlui/handle/10179/6984.

 

 Endnotes

[i] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), J. Miranda-Calha (Portugal), General Rapporteur, ‘Draft General Report: Lessons Learned from NATO’s Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E’, NATO Parliamentary Assembly 17 March 2006, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=997. 2-3., (accessed 14 December 2011).

[ii] United Nations (UN), ‘At Security Council, UN force commanders recount challenges of modern peacekeeping’, UN News, 17 June 2015, https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/06/501922-security-council-un-force-commanders-recount-challenges-modern-peacekeeping, (accessed 24 April 2020).

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] Ibid.

[v] P. Albrecht, S.M. Cold-Ravnkilde & R. Haugegaard, ‘African Soldiers are in the Firing Line in Mali: Inequality in MINUSMA #1’, DIIS Policy Brief, December 2016, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13099?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents, (accessed 4 May 2020).

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Ibid.

[viii] D.M. Tull, ‘UN Peacekeeping in Mali – Time to Adjust Minusma’s Mandate’, SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/German Institute for International and Security Affairs, April 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C23/, (accessed 24 April 2020).

[ix] United Nations Security Council (UNSC), A. Guterrres (UN Secretary-General), ‘Letter dated 27 December 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Counil’, 30 December 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2019_1004.pdf , (accessed 4 May 2020).

[x] Ibid.

[xi] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘Troop Contributions’, 6 June 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50316.htm?selectedLocale=en, (accessed 16 July 2018).

[xii] D.P. Auerswald & S. M. Saideman, ‘Caveats Emptor: Multilateralism at War in Afghanistan’, a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, United States, (15-18^th February) 2009, p. 5, http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Caveats%20and%20Afghanistan,%20isa%202009.pdf, (accessed November 18, 2009).

[xiii] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘Resolution 336 on Reducing National Caveats, presented by the Defence and Security Committee’, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 15 November 2005, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=828, (accessed 14 January 2011).

[xiv] United Kingdom House of Commons (U.K. HoC), Defence Committee, The Future of NATO and European Defence, Ninth Report of Session 2007-2008, 20 March 2008, p. 39, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/111/111.pdf, (accessed 31 January 2013).

[xv]  Ibid., p. 38.

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii] C. Grant (Center for European Reform) and General Sir J. Deverell (Ret’d), (former Commander-in-Chief of  NATO Alled Forces North (AFNORTH)), cited in U.K. HoC, The Future of NATO and European Defence, Ninth Report of Session 2007-2008, ibid., p. 38.

[xviii]  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘The North Atlantic Treaty –Washington D.C., 4 April 1949’, NATO e-Library: Official Texts, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, (accessed 28 July 2011).

[xix] H.E. Robert, ‘NATO Caveats Can Be Made To Work Better for the Alliance’, European Affairs, vol. 9, no. 1-2, (Winter/Spring) 2008,  http://www.europeaninstitute.org, (accessed 17 May 2011).

[xx] S.M. Saideman, ‘CIPS Policy Brief #6: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations’, October 2009, University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy Studies, p. 2, http://cips.uottawa.ca/publications/caveats-values-and-the-future-of-nato-peace-operations/, (accessed 5 June 2013).

[xxi] Ibid., p. 2.

[xxii] S. Sloan, ‘NATO in Afghanistan’, UNISCI Discussion Papers, Redalyc,Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Espana/University of Madrid, no.22, (Enero-sin mes/January-March) 2010, pp. 34-55.

[xxiii] J. Hale, ‘Continuing Restrictions Likely on Some NATO Forces in Afghanistan’, DefenseNews, 21 September 2009, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4286208, (accessed 23 September 2009).

[xxiv] Ibid.

[xxv] A. H Cordesman, A.A. Burke & D. Kasten, ‘Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces’, CSIS, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Working Draft, Burke Chair in Strategy, 6 January 2008, p. 21-22,  http://www.csis.org/burke/reports, (accessed 1 February 2013).

[xxvi] Ibid.

[xxvii] NATO, Miranda-Calha, ‘Lessons Learned from NATO’s Current Operations 061 DSC 06 E’, op. cit.

[xxviii] Ibid.

[xxix] Ibid..

[xxx] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘NATO Operations and Missions: Terminated missions and operations’, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 18 October 2013, from http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm, (accessed 17 May 2014).

[xxxi]  Ibid.; North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘SFOR Stabilization Force: History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm, (accessed 26 January 2015).

[xxxii] Modified image taken from ‘This Day in History: Dec 20, 1995: NATO assumes peacekeeping duties in Bosnia’, Dinge & Goete (Things & Stuff), 20 December 2013, http://dingeengoete.blogspot.co.nz/2013/12/this-day-in-history-dec-20-1995-nato.html, (accessed 18 September 2017).

[xxxiii] NATO, ‘SFOR Stabilization Force: History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, op. cit.; Saideman, ‘CIPS Policy Brief #6: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations’, op. cit., p. 2.

[xxxiv] Related by MAJGEN Tim Grant, Commander of the Canadian national contingent in Bosnia. Footnote 40 in D.P. Auerswald & S.M. Saideman, ‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan’, a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, (2-5^th September) 2009, p. 17,  www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20%at%20War.pdf (accessed 18 March 2013); Saideman, ‘CIPS Policy Brief #6: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations’, ibid., p. 2.

[xxxv] Saideman, ‘CIPS Policy Brief #6: Caveats, Values and the Future of NATO Peace Operations’, ibid., p. 2.

[xxxvi] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ‘NATO’s Role in Kosovo’, 30 November 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (accessed 26 January 2015).

[xxxvii] Modification (2004 KFOR Command Structure) of a KFOR sector map originally provided by U.S. Department of Defense (U.S. DoD), Defense Visual Information Center, ‘{{PD-USGov}}Category:Kosovo’ [online map], http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/map30b.jpg, (accessed 9 March 2010); together with a modification of a ‘Scenes of Destruction’ Illustration taken from News from Kosovo: March Pogrom, Website of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, http://www.kosovo.net/news_pogrom.html, (accessed 13 March 2010).

[xxxviii]‘Kosovo: Failure of NATO, U.N. to Protect Minorities’, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 26 July 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/07/26/kosovo-failure-nato-un-protect-minorities, (accessed 13 March 2010); International Crisis Group, ‘Collapse in Kosovo – Europe Report No. 155’, 22 April 2004, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2627&1=1, (accessed 1 December 2009); N. Wood, ‘Kosovo Smolders After Mob Violence’, The New York Times, 24 March 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/24/world/kosovo-smolders-after-mob-violence.html,(accessed 13 March 2010); ‘Riots in Mitrovica, March 17-18’, News from Kosovo: March Pogrom, Website of the Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, http://www.kosovo.net/news_pogrom.html, (accessed 13 March 2010).

[xxxix] Modified images taken from ‘Kosovo – As it really is 1999-2003’, Post-War Suffering – Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, 2019, http://www.kosovo.net/report.html, (accessed 17 January 2019); ‘March Pogrom – Kosovo 17-19 March 2004’, News from Kosovo – Serbian Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, http://www.kosovo.net/news_pogrom.html, (17 January 2019); R. Colville, ‘Kosovo minorities still  need international protection, says UNHCR’, UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency UK, 24 August 2004, https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2004/8/412b5f904/kosovo-minorities-still-need-international-protection-says-unhcr.html, (accessed 17 January 2019); and ‘Burning of the Serbian village Svinjare, March 17’, Kosovo.net, 2019, http://www.kosovo.net/pogrom_march/svinjare1/page_01.htm, (accessed 17 January 2019).

[xl] Modification of a ISAF TCN table provided in ‘International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ‘ISAF Placemat’, About ISAF – Troop Numbers and Contributions, 3 December 2012, http://www.isaf.nato.int/, (accessed 20 February 2013).

[xli] Modification of a map provided in ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’ [online map], 1 December 2008, ibid.

[xlii] Modification of a map provided in ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’ [online map], June 2009, ibid.

[xliii] Modification of a map provided in ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’ [online map], June 2009, ibid.

[xliv] Modification of a map, presented in ISAF, ‘ISAF Placemat’ [online map], 1 October 2009, ibid.

[xlv] U.S. Embassy London (released by Wikileaks), Cable 08LONDON3218, Somali Piracy: Industry Uncomfortable With On-Board Security Teams, 29 December 2008, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08LONDON3218.html, (accessed 11 July 2011); North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), SHAPE Headquarters, ‘Operation Allied Provider’, https://shape.nato.int/page13984631.aspx, (accessed 12 May 2020).

[xlvi] J. Joyner, ‘NATO Libya Roundtable: Command and Control’, Atlantic Council in the United States (ACUS), 28 March 2011,  http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-libya-roundtable-command-and-control, (accessed 30 March 2011).

[xlvii] Modification of a map taken from ‘2011 Military Intervention in Libya’, Wikipedia [image], 21 March 2011, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_military_intervention_in_Libya, (accessed 7 May 2020).

[xlviii] S. Saideman, ‘Coalitions Are Not So Convenient’, Political Violence @ a Glance, 27 August 2013, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2013/08/27/coalitions-are-not-so-convenient/, (accessed 17 February 2016); S. Saideman, ‘Who is Doing What in Counter-ISIS Campaign?’, Political Violence @ a Glance, 8 December 2014, http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/12/08/who-is-doing-what-in-counter-isis-campaign/, (accessed 17 February 2016); D. Auerswald & S. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone, Princeton: Princeton University Press, USA, 2014, pp. 199, 201.

[xlix] Auerswald & Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone, ibid., pp. 201, 208-209, 211.

[l] Ibid., p. 200.

[li] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (U.K. MoD), Defence Update, June 2010 version, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/00A60838-DE4C-4BD6-8EA7-14B8993F46CF/0/TLMjune2010.pdf, (accessed 30 March 2011).

 ‘UK Army Chief: More Troops Needed in Afghanistan’, CBS News,15 July 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/15/ap/europe/main5160698.shtml, (accessed 22 July 2009); United States Library of Congress, Morelli & Belkin, op. cit.

[lii] D.V. Mastriano (COL), ‘Strategy Research Project: Faust and the Padshah Sphinx: Reshaping the NATO Alliance to Win in Afghanistan’, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2010, p. 17, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518150, (accessed 15 August 2013).

[liii] G.F. Will, ‘An NCO recognizes a flawed Afghanistan strategy’, Washington Post, 20 June 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR2010061803760.html, (accessed 2 April 2013).

[liv] Ibid.

[lv] ‘Statement of General John F. Campbell, USA, Commander, Resolute Support Mission, Commander, United States Forces-Afghanistan’ in ‘Stenographic Transcript before the Committee of Armed Services United States Senate to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan, Thursday, February 12, 2015’, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2015, p. 12-15, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-13%20-%202-12-15.pdf, (accessed 18 April 2016).

[lvi] Slide taken from J. Collins, IO/NGO Advisor at NATO SHAPE Headquarters,‘Comprehending the Comprehensiveness of Resolute Support’ , 2017,  https://slideplayer.com/slide/10943683/, (accessed 7 May 2020).

[lvii] C. Savage, ‘Obama Relaxes Rules for Striking ISIS in Afghanistan’, The New York Times, 20 January 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/world/asia/obama-relaxes-rules-for-striking-isis-in-afghanistan.html?ref=topics&_r=1, (accessed 30 January 2016).

[lviii] Ibid.

[lix] Ibid.

[lx] ‘Statement of General John F Campbell, USA, Commander U.S. Forces-Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan, 12 February 2015’, Senate Armed Services Committee, 2015, p. 1, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Campbell_02-12-15.pdf (accessed 17 February 2016).

[lxi] ‘Opening Statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona’ in ‘Stenographic Transcript before the Committee of Armed Services United States Senate to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan, Thursday, February 12, 2015’, op. cit., p. 3.

[lxii] Modified image taken from J.S. Tobin, ‘If NATO is going to fight terrorism, it needs Israel’, JNS, 5 December 2019, https://www.jns.org/opinion/if-nato-is-going-to-fight-terrorism-it-needs-israel/, (accessed 7 May 2019).